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1 Introduction 
Despite strong encouragement of many international financing and development 
agencies to stimulate private sector involvement in the water supply and sanitation 
sector1 (Haque 1996; Nickson 1997), the overwhelming majority of water supply and 
sanitation services are still provided by public sector organizations in most middle- and 
low-income countries. Current estimates place the share of the world’s population that 
is being serviced by private service providers at no more than 3%-10%, of which the 
majority resides in high-income countries (OECD 2003). The general consensus is that 
provision of water services will remain in the public sector for many years to come, 
especially in low- and middle-income countries.  
1.1 The Poor Performance of Public Water Utilities 
 
In many countries, however, the public service providers have failed to provide 
consumers with adequate water supply and sanitation services (Panayotou 1997; 
Nickson 2002; Mwanza 2004; Mwanza 2005). Despite making progress, in the sense 
that between 1980 and 2000 an additional 2.4 billion people have gained access to 
water supply and 600 million more people have access to sanitation services, some 1.1 
billion people still do not have access to safe water and 2.4 billion lack access to 
sanitation services (WHO UNICEF 2001). The existing frustration of inadequate 
service provision is exacerbated by the fact that population growth and the mounting 
pressures of increasing urbanization have offset much of the gains in service coverage 
(Gentry and Fernandez 1997).  
Apart from problems of service coverage, other problems also plague public 
service providers. Many public utilities experience high unaccounted-for-water (UfW) 
rates, which often average between 40%-60%2. UfW rates of 40%-60% mean that half 
of the potable water produced by a service provider is lost somewhere in the provision 
process.  Public water utilities are also frequently overstaffed. According to Haarmeyer 
and Mody (1997) these utilities have five to seven times more employees than what is 
considered ‘efficient’. Moreover, the service providers are often confronted with 
financial problems due to a combination of low tariffs, poor consumer records and 
inefficient billing and collection practices (World Bank 1994; Idelovitch and Ringskog 
1995; Foster 1996; Mwanza 2004).  
As a result, the quality of water services that is actually delivered to the consumer, 
if he/she is lucky enough to be connected at all, is low.  
 
 
 
 
1 In this thesis the term ‘water supply and sanitation’ sector and ‘water services’ sector are used 
interchangeably. 
2 UfW rates between 10% and 20% are usually used as an indicator for well performing utilities. 
In some high-income countries UfW rates of 5% are reported (VEWIN 2003).  
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1.1.1 Problem Statement 
 
The problem statement that underlies this thesis is that many public water utilities in 
low- and middle-income countries, which are likely to remain responsible for service 
provision for many years to come, provide inadequate services to their customers. 
1.2 The Economic and Health Consequences of Poor Service Provision 
 
In cases where water utilities provide inadequate services, the people not served or 
being poorly served often belong to the low-income segment of the population 
(Jouralev 2004). Briscoe (1992:16) provides a gripping description of how the poor are 
impacted by inadequate service provision. Although the description originates from the 
early 1990s, it still provides an accurate account of the consequences of poor service 
provision. Briscoe’s description is of a family in Lima, Peru. 
 
“A poor family, living in an illegal squatter settlement, waits for the 
water truck to arrive. When it does, the family members fill a few 
buckets with water of dubious quality, paying $3 per cubic meter3, 
which often amounts to 10 percent of household income. Because the 
price is so high, they use little water, cutting down, particularly, on 
‘discretionary uses,’ such as washing and bathing. They defecate in a 
fly- and insect-infested open toilet. The economic, health and human 
consequences of these miserable sanitary conditions are tremendous. As 
a result of diarrhea and other hygiene-related diseases, for example, 
almost one in ten children dies before its first birthday”.  
 
As Briscoe’s description clarifies, the burden of inadequate service provision is visible 
both in financial terms as well as in health terms. The financial impact of inadequate 
service provision is most convincingly illustrated by the prices charged by private 
vendors in comparison to the piped water supplied by the ‘formal’ utilities. As everyone 
requires water to live, those people who are not served by the ‘formal’ utilities must 
arrange for their water in an alternative manner. Often this alternative source for water 
supply takes the form of buying water from private vendors. However, the water 
supplied by these private vendors is much more expensive than water supplied by the 
formal utilities. On average, the people depending on private vendors for their water 
pay 12 times more per liter of water than citizens who have a house-connection.  
 
 
 
3 The price of US$ 3 per cubic meter is more than 10 times as much as the average water tariff in 
Lima in 1992. The average water tariff stood at approximately US$ 0.29 per cubic meter. It also 
represents a price which is approximately 30 times higher The ‘social tariff’ which was 
approximately US$ 0.10 per cubic meter (Alcázar et al. 2000).   
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Figure 1.1: Price of vended water and piped water 
 
The health impacts of access to potable water are most clearly illustrated by the 
relationship between child mortality and access to water supply and sanitation. Figure 
1.2 displays a graph showing the link between access to water supply and sanitation 
services and child mortality rates. If access to water supply would increase from a level 
of 70% for a given location to 90%, the child mortality rate would decline from 60 
deaths per 1,000 to 43 deaths per 1,000. If household sewerage connections were to be 
increased from 70% to 90%, the child mortality rate would decline from 70 per 1,000 to 
60 per 1,000. 
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Figure 1.2: Predicted child mortality by percent of access to potable water and household 
connections to sewerage system in 1993 (Number of children dead before reaching the age of five 
per 1,000 live births) 
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1.3 Explanations for the Poor Performance 
 
The problems facing the water supply and sanitation sectors in many low- and middle-
income countries have not gone unnoticed. Countless interest groups and authors have 
analyzed the functioning of public utilities and have proposed explanations for their 
poor performance4. Although the details of the explanations presented by these groups 
and authors may vary, what is apparent is that the poor performance can often be linked 
to the nature of the sector and the political institutions in a given location. Spiller and 
Savedoff (1999:2), who analyzed the provision of water supply and sanitation services 
in Latin America, explain the poor performance of many public water utilities as 
follows:  
 
“[T]he nature of the sector, coupled with a nation’s political institutions, 
[…] together create incentives for government-owners of public utilities 
to behave opportunistically, for the service providers to operate 
inefficiently, and for the consumers to withhold support from the sector. 
As such, the water services sector under these circumstances has a 
tendency toward a low-level equilibrium from which it is difficult to 
escape”. 
1.4 Reforms in the Water Sector 
 
Until the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (1981-1990) the 
main approach to improving the performance of water utilities was to focus on 
providing poorly performing utilities with the proper ‘hardware’ to provide services. 
The thought was that if a utility would be technically equipped to provide services, the 
utility would do so. Unfortunately, the results of the Drinking Water Decade proved 
disappointing with almost as many people still lacking either clean water or sewerage at 
the end of the Decade as when the Decade began (Economist 1994). The main lesson 
learnt was that concentrating on the technical aspects of service provision is, in itself, 
unlikely to improve the provision of water services. Or as Spiller and Savedoff (1999:2) 
noted, “the problem [of providing adequate services] is not related to project finance or 
lack of technical or manpower capabilities”. As a result, at the end of the Drinking 
Water Decade, attention shifted from technical solutions to solutions of a ‘managerial’ 
and institutional nature in the early 1990’s. The ‘managerial’ approach to improving 
service provision basically followed two paths. Firstly, management of the water 
utilities was delegated to the private sector through concession contracts or other 
contractual arrangements. The second reform strategy kept management of the utility 
within the public realm, but concentrated on introducing management practices 
associated with the private sector in the public water utility. 
 
 
 
 
4 See for example World Bank 1994, Foster 1996, Nickson 2002 
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1.4.1 Private Sector Involvement 
 
The first reform path involves large-scale involvement of the private sector (World 
Bank 1997b) and is exemplified by much publicized contracts such as the Buenos 
Aires, Jakarta and Manila concessions5. Many international and bilateral donors and 
lending agencies perceived private sector involvement as a means of removing politics 
from the sector and as a source of investment capital (Brown 2002)6. Following the 
disappointment of the Water Supply and Sanitation Decade in the 1980s, initial 
optimism for the beneficial impact of increased private sector involvement was 
enormous, even if the actual implementation remained controversial. Illustrative of this 
optimism is the following passage written by Michael Dumol about the preparatory 
stages of the awarding of two concession contracts for water services provided by the 
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) in Manila.  
 
“Also about this time, through one of the MWSS board members we got 
hold of a copy of a pamphlet written by Emmanuel Idelovitch and Klas 
Ringskog (both from the World Bank) about the Buenos Aires 
privatization. The copy we got was probably a fifth-degree copy, 
terribly faded, but we treated it as a sacred document” (Dumol 2000:14; 
emphasis added). 
 
In recent years, however, the gospel of private sector involvement in the water supply 
and sanitation sector has faded. High-profile concession contracts which once were 
presented as representing the future of the water services sector collapsed or are facing 
increasing operational difficulties. Best-known among the collapsed concession 
contracts is the concession contract in Cochabamba in Bolivia, which was terminated in 
2000 following a period of civil protest often referred to as the ‘Water War’7. Other 
well-known concession contracts that were terminated include the El Alto-La Paz 
concession (2005) in Bolivia and the Buenos Aires concession (2005) in Argentina. In 
recent years, it has become apparent that private sector involvement, as it was 
envisioned and implemented in the 1990s, was not the ‘golden solution’ that many had 
believed it to be a decade earlier.  
Increased private sector involvement was also an important strategy for improving 
performance in the Mexican water supply and sanitation sector. In the early 1990s the 
private sector was seen as an essential component to ‘the solution’ to Mexico’s water 
problems (Casasús 1994). For this purpose build-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts, 
concession contracts and service contracts were strongly promoted. An evaluation in 
1999, however, concluded that: 
 
5 In the period between 1990-2001, more than 40 countries engaged in over 200 projects with 
private sector participation in the water and sewerage sector (World Bank 2003a).  
6 The 1994 World Development Report argues that numerous examples of past failures in public 
provision, combined with growing evidence of more efficient and user-responsive private 
provision, argue for a significant increase in private involvement in financing, operation, and – in 
many cases – ownership (World Bank 1994). 
7 For a discussion about the collapse of the Cochabamba concession see Nickson and Vargas 
(2002) and Assies (2003) 
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 “The first wave of PSP initiatives in the water sector fell short of 
expectations, and left most of the water system's needs unmet.  In 
response to newly imposed, and very stringent water effluent standards, 
between 1990 and 1993, 50 municipalities awarded BOT contracts for 
wastewater treatment plants.  Today, however, only 11 of these plants 
are operating.  The remainder were canceled outright, or have yet to be 
constructed due to lack of financing” (Capital Advisors 1999:8). 
 
The same evaluation finds that: 
 
“[t]he use private sector participation to increase efficiency and 
investment has been much less effective than anticipated and therefore 
have contributed little to ameliorating performance problems of urban 
water and sanitation systems. Over the past seven years, the primary 
strategy to improve the sector has been private sector participation.  
Few projects were a success, many failed or were filled with conflicts, 
and most of the successes needed government support, or require little 
private sector risk.  Consequently, the impact has been negligible” 
(Capital Advisors 1999:3). 
 
By 2003 it became apparent that the overwhelming majority of urban water services 
provision remain (and would continue to be so) in the hands of public sector 
organizations. At the same time, the World Bank, who had been one of the strongest 
promoters of private sector involvement, found itself confronted with disappointing 
levels of lending to the water supply and sanitation sector. As figure 1.3 illustrates, 
lending decreased by more than two-thirds between 1996 and 2002. 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank 2005:1 
 
Figure 1.3: World Bank lending in the water supply and sanitation sector 1996-2002    (US$ 
millions) 
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The strong decline in World Bank lending to the water supply and sanitation sector 
(through loans and guarantees by the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and the International Development Agency) led to a policy shift in the 
World Bank. Roughly speaking from 2003 onwards, the World Bank set to ‘engage’ 
itself again with public sector water utilities. In ‘re-engaging’ itself with public services 
providers the World Bank implicitly acknowledged that the promise of large-scale 
private sector involvement as it was envisioned in the early 1990s did not live up to 
expectations. 
 
1.4.2 Reforms within the Public Organizations 
 
The second reform strategy promoted in the 1990s is that of introducing reforms 
within the public realm, in which institutional arrangements and management practices 
generally associated with the ‘private sector’ are introduced in the institutional context 
in which these utilities operate and in the public water utilities themselves.  
Bately (1999), in examining reforms in four developing countries, including one 
country in which the study focused on the water supply and sanitation sector, found that 
the thrust of reforms was towards changes in arrangements within the public sector by 
increasing the autonomy of state-owned utilities and requiring them to manage on a 
more commercial basis. The origins of this second form of reform, often referred to as 
the New Public Management, lie in New Zealand and the United Kingdom where it 
originated in the early 1980s. The New Public Management ‘model’ is often presented 
as a more market-oriented and output-based approach alternative to the traditional 
‘bureaucratic model’ of public administration (Kettl 2000; Peters 2001; Barzelay 2002). 
It is this second reform path in the water supply and sanitation sector, the New Public 
Management, which is the main focus of this research. 
Although this reform strategy was implemented parallel to that of large-scale 
private sector involvement, it has become more prominent in recent years as the 
difficulties of implementing forms of private sector involvement have emerged 
(Schwartz 2003; Braadbaart 2005). Nickson and Franceys (2003:182) even go so far as 
to conclude that “the sector lends itself to the introduction of NPM reforms” and that “it 
is proving to have a significant impact on improving service provision the world over”. 
Nickson and Franceys’ conclusion appears to be widely shared within the global water 
supply and sanitation sector (Schwartz 2003; Baietti et al. 2006).  
1.5 Research Objectives and Main Research Questions 
 
As mentioned previously, public water utilities are not providing adequate water supply 
and sanitation services to its consumers, if they serve them at all. The consequences of 
poor service provision in terms of health and financial costs to especially the low-
income households are enormous. At the same time, the disappointing experiences with 
private sector involvement in the water supply and sanitation sector have lead to the 
acknowledgement that the overwhelming majority of people will continue to be 
serviced by public water utilities for many years to come.  
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The objective of this research is to examine the potential of reforms associated with 
the New Public Management and to contrast these reforms with reforms associated with 
the bureaucratic model of public administration, the so-called Weberian reforms. The 
main research questions that underlie this thesis are: 
 
• Do urban public water utilities in low- and middle-income countries perform better 
because they adhere to the New Public Management?  
• Do poorly performing urban public water utilities adhere to the traditional 
‘bureaucratic’ model of public management?   
 
Achieving the research objective and answering the research questions will be done 
primarily by way of an in-depth analysis of five case studies in the State of Guanajuato 
in Mexico. 
1.6 Research Significance 
 
As explained above, the New Public Management has increasingly been promoted in 
the water supply and sanitation sector. Nickson and Franceys (2003:182) arrive at the 
conclusion that the water supply and sanitation sector “lends itself to the introduction of 
NPM reforms” and find that the New Public Management is proving to have a 
significant impact on improving service provision the world over. 
At the same time empirical evidence for the impact of the New Public 
Management, both in the water supply and sanitation sector as well as in other sectors 
remains rather thin. Often the evidence of the NPM’s impact is considered to be at best 
‘inconclusive’ (Lynn 1997; Kettl 20008; Skelley 2002; Pollitt 2003).  
Answering the main research questions by researching selected case studies thus 
contributes to the current discussions concerning the New Public Management by 
adding to the available empirical evidence. At the same time, addressing these 
questions can lead to more concrete and applied benefits for the water supply and 
sanitation sector. The most important of these benefits is that it provides considerable 
insight in effective reform strategies for poorly functioning water utilities. A finding 
that the overwhelming majority of well functioning public water utilities adhere to a 
certain management model or elements of that model would warrant reforms associated 
with that management model to be investigated as potential reform options for poorly 
performing water utilities.  
1.7 Outline of the Thesis 
 
In the first chapter we have sketched a particular serious problem in the water services 
sector (the poor performance of many public water utilities) and the economic and 
health consequences of that problem for especially low-income households. The origins 
of that problem, the nature of the water services sector in conjunction with prevailing 
 
8 Kettl (2000:51) does, however, mention that “anecdotal evidence, coupled with cross-national 
comparisons, indeed suggests that many nations succeeded in improving government’s ability to 
produce more and better government services at lower cost”. 
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political institutions, were briefly touched upon. The two dimensions, the nature of the 
water services sector and the political institutions are the main focus of chapter two and 
three. 
Chapter two revolves around the nature of water services sector. The nature of the 
water services sector can, however, be approached from a number of different angles. 
The chapter starts with a definition of ‘water services’ and explains the main 
differences in the way the water services sector can be organized. The second part of 
chapter two examines the considerations, which underlie the organization of the water 
services sector. This section argues that a particular setup of the water services sector 
can be traced back to physical characteristics of providing water services, economic 
considerations, political and ideological considerations as well as historical 
developments. The third part of this chapter addresses the prevalence of public water 
utilities. It is argued that urban water services can be viewed as a private good, as well 
as a merit good, and subject to market failure. This combination of characteristics 
causes the provision of water services to feature prominently on the political agenda in 
many countries, essentially making it a ‘political good’. The prevalence of public water 
utilities can, for a large part, be linked to water being a ‘political good’. The chapter 
ends with a discussion about how the performance of a water utility can be assessed. 
The research questions speak of well performing and poorly performing utilities. But 
how can good performance and poor performance be distinguished? 
The third chapter introduces two models of management for managing public 
organizations. This introduction then leads to the presentation of the hypotheses and 
propositions in the final section of this chapter. The two models discussed are the 
‘traditional bureaucratic model’ and the New Public Management. The ‘traditional 
bureaucratic model’ is based on Weber’s ‘ideal type’. After discussing Weber’s 
bureaucracy the criticism levied against this model will be examined. Although 
Weber’s ‘ideal type’ has received criticism from a variety of sources9, the focus will 
particularly be on criticism originating from the Public Choice School. The reason for 
this is that a number of authoritative authors have identified the Public Choice School 
as being one of the foundations upon which the New Public Management is based 
(Aucoin 1990; Harrow 2002). Following the discussion on the Public Choice School’s 
criticism on Weber’s bureaucracy and the reforms that emanate from this criticism, the 
‘managerialist school of thought’ (or managerialism) will be discussed. The importance 
of managerialism is that, like the Public Choice School, elements of the New Public 
Management can be traced back to it. In the third part of chapter three the New Public 
Management is discussed and defined. As part of this discussion I also examine 
concerns, which have been raised against the NPM in literature. The chapter 
culminates, as mentioned, with the presentation of the hypotheses and propositions 
around which this thesis revolves.  
Chapter four highlights the research methodology used in this research. This 
research is based on a case study research methodology involving a two-stage 
approach. The first stage consists of primary data collected in five water supply and 
sanitation utilities in the State of Guanajuato, Mexico. These cases represent one well 
performing utility, one whose performance has improved considerably between 2000-
 
9 See Lane (1987) for a discussion of various criticisms to the bureaucratic model. 
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2003, and three poorly performing utilities. From these cases preliminary conclusions 
will be drawn. The second stage consists of checking the validity of the findings from 
the first set of case studies. This is done by using secondary data from four cases.  
Chapter five encompasses a discussion of the research results for a series of five 
case studies undertaken in the State of Guanajuato in Mexico. The chapter starts by 
presenting a brief introduction of the five case studies. These are the utilities operating 
the municipalities of Dolores Hidalgo, Moroleón, Valle de Santiago, San Francisco del 
Rincon, and Guanajuato. The second part of the chapter goes into detail regarding the 
level of performance of each of the public water utilities operating in these 
municipalities. The third part discusses the findings from the cases relating to the 
hypotheses and the propositions. The final part of this chapter draws the preliminary 
conclusions regarding the hypotheses and the propositions stated in chapter three. 
For reasons explained in the research methodology, secondary data is available for 
a number of public water utilities, which have been identified by international financing 
agencies as well as sector specialists as examples of well performing public utilities. 
This data provides the basis for undertaking a crosscheck regarding the preliminary 
conclusions presented in chapter five. In chapter six the results of these four cases are 
presented. First, the four cases are introduced. The four well performing cases are the 
water utility in Hai Phong, Vietnam, the State utility in Nuevo Leon, Mexico, the 
national utility operating in Uganda and the municipal water utility in Campinas, Brazil. 
The chapter follows a similar setup as chapter five in order to allow for a comparison 
between the findings. 
In Chapter seven, the results from the previous two chapters are combined to 
discuss the results stemming from the two sets of case studies. These results focus 
mainly on the bureaucratic model, the New Public Management model and utility 
reform. Moreover, the chapter discusses salient findings from the research. 
Chapter eight forms the final chapter of this study. This chapter is devoted to the 
conclusions of this thesis.  
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2 Water Services  
This chapter begins by providing a definition of the term water services and elaborates 
about variations in the way in which the provision of these services can be organized. 
The second part of this chapter discusses considerations, which underlie a particular 
choice for organizing the water services sector. The third section discusses the question 
why the provision of water services is often kept in the hands of public sector 
organizations. The chapter ends with a discussion on the way in which performance of 
a water utility can be measured. 
2.1 Defining Water Services 
 
Article 2 of the Water Framework Directive of the European Union provides a series of 
definitions related to the water sector. This Directive defines water services as10: 
 
"all services, which provide, for households, public institutions or any economic 
activity: 
(a) abstraction, impoundment, storage, treatment and distribution of surface water or 
groundwater,  
(b) waste-water collection and treatment facilities, which subsequently discharge into, 
surface water. 
 
  
Source: Schouten and Schwartz 2005:4 
 
Figure 2.1: Schematic overview of the provision of water services 
 
10 Water Framework Directive 2000: article 2, point 38. 
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In the EU definition, water services relate to the whole series of activities from the 
abstraction of raw water at the source to the delivery of (treated) water to the consumer 
and from the consumer back to a water source. The definition of water services as 
stipulated by the Water Framework Directive also encompasses a broad range of 
consumers. Provision of industrial water, irrigation water for agriculture and potable 
water for domestic purposes all fall under the definition of water services. Although the 
definition of the Water Framework appears thorough, it does obscure the fact that in 
reality water services are not as homogenous as the definition suggests. What all water 
services share is that water is abstracted, it is delivered to the consumer and then is 
likely to be discharged again. However, what happens in between those phases of the 
provision process may differ. For some consumers, treatment of water may not be 
required or only rudimentary treatment is necessary11. For consumers of potable water, 
however, extensive treatment may be required. Moreover, the fact that something is 
desirable does not mean it actually takes place. In Mexico, only between 10%-16% of 
wastewater is actually treated (Saade 1997; Morales-Reyes et al. 1998). This basically 
means that the wastewater-treatment step in the provision of water services is absent in 
approximately 87% of the water services provided to the population of Mexico. In this 
research, the focus is exclusively on urban water services, which means that the 
provision of water for agricultural use is not part of the research. 
2.2 The Organization of Water Services 
 
Not only the actual characteristics of water services provided can differ. Also, the way 
in which this service provision process is organized can show considerable variance 
from one location to the next. The organization of the service provision process 
revolves around three dimensions. These three dimensions concern: 
 
1) The degree to which activities in the service provision process are 
concentrated; 
2) The type of organization that is responsible for a certain step or steps in the 
provision process; and  
3) The outcontracting of steps or aspects of a certain step to third parties. 
 
2.2.1 The Concentration or Fragmentation of the Service Provision Process  
 
Firstly, the question which organization is responsible for which step (or which steps) 
in the service provision process has to be answered. In the provision of (urban) water 
services the following steps can broadly be identified (VEWIN 2001:16):  
 
• Production process: The production process consists of all activities concerned 
with groundwater abstraction, surface water collection, storage, pre-purification, 
transport and infiltration in the production company and the purification and 
 
11 Water used for agriculture, for example, often receives no treatment. Also water for some types 
of industry requires only rudimentary treatment. 
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processing of this water into drinking water (including operation and maintenance 
of these facilities). 
• Distribution process: This process consists of all activities concerning the 
distribution of drinking water to end-users including maintenance of pipes, 
connections, and replacement and maintenance of water meters. 
• Sales process (water supply): Consists of all service activities in which the 
relationship with end-users (customers) is central. It includes obtaining and 
processing meter-readings, invoicing, management of debtors and payments 
received, management of customer contacts and provision of water-related services 
such as advice, information and inspection.  
• Collection process: The collection process consists of all activities concerned with 
the removal of wastewater from the user and the transport of that wastewater to a 
treatment facility (or to the water source to which it is discharged). 
• Treatment process: The treatment process consists of all activities related to the 
treatment of collected wastewater and the subsequent discharge of the treated 
wastewater to a water source.  
• Sales process (wastewater): The sales process for wastewater is similar to that of 
water supply and essentially concerns all service activities in which the relationship 
with users from whom wastewater is collected is central. It includes invoicing, 
management of debtors and payments received, management of customer contacts 
and provision of wastewater-related services such as advice, information and 
inspection. 
 
The question which organization is responsible for which step is basically an indication 
to what extent responsibilities for providing the different steps (or processes as they are 
called above) in the provision of water services are either concentrated in one 
organization or fragmented over multiple organizations. Often these responsibilities are 
attributed by way of laws and regulations. In the Netherlands, for example, the water 
services sector is highly fragmented (Schwartz 1999). Production and distribution of 
potable water is the responsibility of the regional water supply companies, collection of 
wastewater is the responsibility of municipalities and the treatment and discharge of 
wastewater is the responsibility of waterboards. In Mexico, article 115 of the Mexican 
constitution attributes the responsibility for providing public services such as water 
supply, drainage, sewerage, treatment and disposal of wastewater to the municipal 
governments. In the State of Guanajuato, the State Water Law reiterates the 
Constitution and stipulates that municipalities are to create organizations for the 
provision of these services. As a result, the various steps in the provision of water 
services have been concentrated in single municipal organizations.  
 
2.2.2 The Type of Organization 
 
The second dimension in which the organization of the service provision process may 
vary from one location to the next relates to the type of organization that is responsible 
for providing (part of) water services. This dimension relates to the characteristics of 
the service provider (public, semi-public or private organization, legal status of the 
organization) and the administrative level (local, regional, national) at which the 
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organization operates. In the Netherlands, for example, the regional water supply 
companies that supply potable water are almost all12 government-owned public limited 
companies covering a large number of municipalities. In the case of Guanajuato, article 
146 of the State Law of Municipal Organizations calls the so-called ‘autonomous 
agency’13 the preferred option for organizing the provision of water services at the 
municipal level. The five case studies discussed in chapter five of this study are indeed 
all ‘autonomous agencies’. 
 
2.2.3 The Outcontracting of Activities 
 
Thirdly, the responsible organization(s) can contract third parties to undertake parts or 
all of the steps for which they bear responsibility. In the provision of water services a 
distinction needs to be made between the organization that has the responsibility for 
providing services and the organization that may be contracted to provide all or parts of 
these services. In almost every service provider part of the tasks of providing services 
are contracted to third parties. This does not diminish the responsibility of the 
organization responsible for providing water services. It does, however, mean that not 
all of the activities of the service provision process for which the organization is 
responsible are done ‘in house’. The question is then what steps or what aspects of a 
certain step in the service provision process have been outcontracted to a third party or 
third parties? In the case of the municipal organizations in Guanajuato, relatively few 
tasks or parts thereof have been outcontracted as will be discussed at greater detail in 
chapter five. 
2.3 Factors Underlying the Organization of Water Services 
 
The way in which service provision is organized in a given locality essentially depends 
on a number of interdependent factors. Although these factors may be interdependent 
they may also be contradictory. Striving for the most economically efficient service 
provision process, for example, will lead to an arrangement, which, from a purely 
economic point of view, is the most efficient. In many cases, this may lead to a 
preference for large-scale, centralized systems. At the same time socio-political and 
ideological considerations, such as stimulating greater accountability of the service 
provider and more public participation in the service provision process, may, lead to 
favoring decentralized, small-scale systems. As such, the outcome of exactly how the 
service provision process is arranged is very much dependent on the priorities given to 
the various factors and considerations mentioned below. The considerations and factors 
affecting the organization of water services provision are as follows: 
 
• The Physical Characteristics of the Service Provision Process - As the definition in 
the Water Framework Directive states, the physical activities undertaken in the 
 
12 The two exceptions in 2005 are the Municipal Water Department of Amsterdam and a private 
water supply company operating in the rural municipality of Doorn. 
13 Organismo decentralizado. The Law on Municipal Organizations also contains a description of 
the rights and obligations of the ‘autonomous agency’ and of its owner, the municipality. 
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provision of water services are the abstraction, impoundment, storage, treatment 
and distribution of surface water or groundwater and the collection, treatment and 
discharge of wastewater. Although these steps may be generally applicable, the 
actual nature of these steps differs from one location to the next. For example, 
when the users reside at great distance from the water source the service provision 
is different then when the users are located nearby as the element of distribution of 
potable water and collection of wastewater figures less prominently in the latter 
situation. Also, when groundwater of relatively good quality is the source for raw 
water the service provision process is different than when the service provider has 
to use surface water from a polluted river as its source of raw water as the demands 
on the treatment process will be very different. In summary, the physical 
characteristics of the service provision process determine the (technical) 
complexity of the provision process. The (technical) complexity of the service 
provision process and the affiliated requirements in capacity are likely to influence 
the scale of the organization and the type of organization considered most suitable 
for handling the complex task. The more technically complex the service provision 
process is the more capacity is required to provide the service. 
• Economic Considerations – The degree to which the provision of services is 
subject to economies of scale and scope and the degree to which ‘the market’ can 
efficiently provide the service influence the organizational set-up of the water 
service sector. Economies of scale imply that an organization lowers the average 
cost per unit through increased production since fixed costs are shared over an 
increased number of goods. Economies of scale tend to exist where production 
requires high fixed costs relative to variable costs, so that average costs for service 
provision decline continuously over the relevant range of output. Economies of 
scope are determined by the degree to which “unit costs of producing different 
services in combination are lower than of producing them separately” (Kessides 
1993:5). An example of utilizing economies of scope is the ‘multi-utility’, which 
provides distinct infrastructure services, such as water services and electricity. The 
‘marketability’ or ‘contestability’ of a good or service depends on the degree to 
which the production of that service or good requires ‘sunk costs’14. When 
“production of a good [or service] requires no ‘sunk costs’ it is said to be perfectly 
contestable” (Kessides 1993:7). The contestability of a good can influence the 
extent to which private sector production of that good or service is feasible. 
• Political and Ideological Considerations – Water is a basic necessity for human 
life, as well as a valuable economic input in many industrial, agricultural and 
commercial production processes. Of great impact on the way services are 
organized are the political and ideological views concerning the way such a good 
should be managed (and the role of different stakeholders in the management of 
that good). Moreover, the water sector like other sectors is subject to political and 
ideological shifts that influence society as a whole. These ‘macro’ political and 
ideological characteristics impact the way in which the service provision process is 
organized.  
 
14 Capital costs are ‘sunk’ to the extent that they cannot be recovered for other uses (Kessides 
1993).  
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• Historical Developments – Apart from technical, economical, political and 
ideological considerations the organizational set-up of the water services sector in a 
given locality is also dependent on historical developments in the water sector. The 
allocation of responsibilities in the water services sector in the Netherlands, for 
example, is partly “the peculiar product of historical events, some of which date 
back to the Middle Ages” 15 (Schwartz 1999:21). 
 
As mentioned, the final outcome of the way water services provision is organized is 
largely dependent on the emphasis given to the various considerations and factors 
mentioned above. In the case of Mexico, and specifically the water supply and 
sanitation sector in the State of Guanajuato, the political considerations are of particular 
importance to highlight. Article 115 of the Mexican constitution, which devolved 
responsibilities for water services provision to the municipal level, is a product of the 
decentralization policies of the 1980’s. The main reasons for introducing these 
decentralization policies appear to have been to ease “mounting political pressures” and 
to “alleviate some of the administrative problems that have contributed to the erosion of 
the government’s legitimacy and control” (Rodríguez 1997:1). This observation is of 
considerable importance as it highlights two important characteristics of the 
decentralization of water services in Mexico.  
First of all, it means that the attribution of responsibilities for providing water 
services to the municipal level is not likely to have been based on a consideration of the 
(physical and economic) characteristics of the provision of water services. Indicative 
that this may be the case is the fact that water supply and sanitation services were 
decentralized as part of the larger package of ‘public services’, without distinction 
between these public services. Illustrative is that the Mexican constitution decentralizes 
‘public services’ as diverse as street lighting and water services in the same article, 
without any distinction between these two services. 
Secondly, with the decentralization of public services to the municipal level, little 
attention seems to have been paid to the institutional and administrative capacity of the 
level of government to which responsibilities were attributed. In the Mexican context 
this is quite important as the disparities in capacities are more pronounced among 
municipalities than among states, with urban and larger municipalities typically having 
more capacity than rural and smaller municipalities (Courchene et al. 2000). 
2.4 The Prevalence of Public Utilities  
 
Based on the considerations and factors mentioned above, each locality has organized 
the water services sector in their own way, resulting in a wide landscape of 
organizational modes. Although the specific characteristics of service provision for 
each locality differ, in the vast majority of cases the responsibility for providing water 
services has been attributed to the public sector organizations. Although exact figures 
on the degree of private sector participation in the water supply and sanitation sector do 
not exist, it is generally assumed that the number of people served by private utilities is 
 
15 The historical events in this quote relate to the establishment of the first waterboards during the 
Middle Ages. 
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limited to about 200 million (OECD 2003)16. This leaves about 5.8 billion people who 
receive water services from either public water utilities or independent systems. Also in 
Mexico the overwhelming majority of service provision remains in public hands. 
Two main reasons explain the prevalence of public sector organizations in the 
provision of water services. These two reasons, which cannot be seen in isolation but 
rather must be seen as reinforcing each other, are the nature of providing water services 
(basically, the nature of the good) and the political importance of providing water 
services. Interestingly, these two reasons for the prevalence of public utilities are 
strikingly similar to Spiller and Savedoff’s (1999) reasons for poor performance of 
water utilities (the nature of the sector coupled with a nation’s political institutions). 
 
2.4.1 The Nature of Water Services 
 
In this section, the nature of water services is discussed. Essentially, the section will 
explain why water services is a private good, a merit good as well as a good that is 
subject to market failure. The combination of these three characteristics forms part of 
the explanation why public service providers are so prevalent in the water supply and 
sanitation sector. 
 
2.4.1.1 Water Services as a Private Good  
 
Water is often characterized as being a ‘public good’. Especially in the often-heated 
debates regarding the (possible) role of the private sector in providing water services, 
the argument is frequently forwarded that the private sector should not be permitted to 
provide a ‘public good’. However, characterizing water as a ‘public good’ is not only 
done in the context of the ‘public-private debate’ that has raged through the water 
supply and sanitation sector during the past decade and a half. Savenije (2001:342) in 
explaining why water is unlike other good, states that “[w]ater is public good. This is a 
consequence of water being essential, scarce and non-substitutable”. Often in these 
discussions it is not entirely clear if the author in question refers to water resources or 
providing water services. 
From a purely economic perspective, however, the majority of water supply and 
sanitation services, strictly speaking, fall in the category of being a ‘private good’. The 
economic distinction between different types of goods is based on17: 
 
1) The degree to which a good is subtractable in use.  
2) The degree to which consumers can be excluded from consumption 
 
If a good is non-subtractable in use (meaning they are goods which can be used by one 
person without diminishing the opportunity for use by others) and it is very costly to 
 
16The same publication estimates that in low- and middle-income countries approximately 3% of 
the population is supplied by private operators. 
17 Interestingly enough, if one uses these two criteria to establish if a particular good is public or 
not, one would have to conclude that also water resources are not a public good, as they are 
subtractable in use. 
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exclude (potential) consumers from accessing the good then we can speak of a public 
good18.  
In the case of urban water supply and sanitation services, the degree to which 
service provision is either a public good or a private good depends on the way in which 
services are provided. For potable water services by way of in-house connections, water 
supply services are both subtractable in use and it is possible to exclude consumers by 
cutting off service provision. As such, in-house connections of water supply services 
are private goods (Nickson 1997)19.  
 
2.4.1.2 Water Services as a Merit Good 
 
In the previous section it was mentioned that water services are often referred to as 
being a ‘public good’. Even if, from an economic perspective, this may be an incorrect 
view, the message that often underlies the description of water as a ‘public good’ is that 
access to adequate water services is a human right and that nobody should be excluded 
from having access to safe water supply and sanitation. This argument refers not to 
water (services) being a public good, however, but rather to water services being a 
‘merit good’. Merit goods are goods or services that are deemed to have positive 
externalities or considered to be so important that society believes that everyone should 
have access to these goods or services. In the Introduction the consequences of poor 
service provision were highlighted. It was explained that poor service provision has 
both an economic as well as a health impact on those who are unserved. Especially the 
impact on health, as illustrated by child mortality, is such that a general consensus 
exists that everybody should have access to water services. As such, water services can 
also be viewed as a merit good (Clarke and Wallsten 2002; Kessides 2003) in addition 
to being a private good.  
 
2.4.1.3 Water Services as Being Subject to Market-failure 
 
Although the provision of water services is a private good, the provision of water 
services is subject to potential market-failures. Market-failures mean that markets will 
fail to provide services either efficiently or in line with the public interest. Therefore, 
correction of market-failures is one of the four reasons often presented for the existence 
of public enterprises (Hughes 2003)20. A number of possible reasons for market failure 
exist (Musgrave and Musgrave 1989), but in the case of water supply services the most 
 
18 It is relatively difficult to find public goods in their pure form. In fact, it has been suggested 
that “there is no such thing as a public good in an objective sense, and that it is a purely cultural 
construct” (Malkin and Wildavsky 1991, as cited in Walsh 1995:7). 
19 It should be taken into account that other forms of service provision may have different degrees 
of excludability and subtractability in use. In the case of traditional sewerage services it is much 
more difficult to exclude consumers from using these services as it is very difficult to cut off 
users. In many countries, however, this difficulty is overcome by combining water supply and 
sewerage services in the same company. 
20 The other three reasons are to alter the structure of pay-offs in an economy, to facilitate long-
term centralized economic planning and to change the nature of the economy from capitalist to 
socialist. 
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important cause of market-failure is the monopoly-like characteristics of service 
provision through a piped-network and the externalities of service provision.  
With the fixed costs of potable water generally making up two-thirds to 80 percent of 
the costs of supplying services (Noll et al. 2000; Kessides 2003), the urban water sector 
is characterized by a high degree of sunkness of costs. In addition, the sector is subject 
to large economies of density, meaning that for a given distribution network, increasing 
the number of households connected or their consumption reduces the network’s 
average costs (Spiller and Savedoff 1999). This means that the provision of urban water 
services would be subject to declining marginal cost for service provision. These two 
factors cause distribution of water supply to be “a natural monopoly bottleneck to an 
urban water system” (Nol et al. 2000:5). With distribution making up such a large part 
of the costs of service provision, the provision of water services, viewed holistically, 
obtains monopoly-like characteristics. As a result, the main scope for competition 
between different service providers is competition for the market rather than in the 
market21. The crucial importance of this aspect for water services lies in the fact that 
the consumers (or customers of the water supply and sanitation utility) are ‘captive’, in 
the sense that short of moving they had few alternatives to the service provision of that 
particular utility. This ‘captivity’ was aptly illustrated during a visit to a water supply 
company operating in one of the northern provinces of the Netherlands. The financial 
manager of that company was asked about the customer-orientation of the utility. The 
manager raised his shoulders and replied “I don’t go to the customers, the customers 
come to me”22. 
 
2.4.1.4 A Private Good, a Merit Good and Subject to Market-failure 
 
The combination of being a private good, a merit good and subject to market-failure has 
some important consequences for the provision of water services. Being a private good 
it could be suggested that provision should be left to the private sector, as the 
combination of subtractability of use and excludability would appear to make water 
services an appealing service to provide by the private sector.  
However, water services are also a merit good meaning that everyone should have 
access to them. Being a merit good means that the criterion of excludability de facto no 
longer applies, essentially causing the good to no longer be a ‘private good’. A similar 
argument is forwarded by Wolfson (1988), who describes what he calls ‘quasi-public 
goods’23. ‘Quasi-public goods’ are goods, which in principle are characterized by 
excludability but which, for normative reasons24, are not treated as such. In other 
words, for normative considerations these goods are withdrawn from the workings of 
the market and treated more in line with public goods.  
With the excludability criterion no longer applicable and water services as such 
being quasi-public goods, there would be a very strong incentive for consumers of that 
service to generate ‘free-rider’ behavior, as there is no possibility of them being cut off 
 
21 Although ideas of common carriage competition have been raised, they have so far not been 
applied extensively in the water sector. 
22 Visit in February 2005. 
23 Wolfson (1988) uses the Dutch term ‘quasi-collectieve goederen’.  
24 As opposed to purely descriptive reasons. 
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from service provision. In addition, a private company is essentially driven by profit. 
As such, there is little incentive for a private service provider to expand service 
connections, if the costs of expanding these connections are high in relation to what the 
(new) consumers can afford. In other words, the private service provider would have a 
strong incentive to concentrate on the profitable areas of its service network and neglect 
the less-profitable areas (so-called ‘cherry picking’). In the context of water services 
being a merit good, this would be unacceptable to society. 
Moreover, water services are subject to market-failure. This in essence means that 
there is a strong incentive for the private operator to provide water services 
inefficiently. Efficiency in essence relates to the amount of resources used to produce 
an output. Without any competition, the private service provider is likely to have an 
incentive to charge higher prices for the services it provides in order to increase its 
profitability25.    
The result of this combination of characteristics (a private, as well as a merit good 
that is subject to market failure) is that the provision of water services features 
prominently on the political agenda in many countries, essentially making it a ‘political 
good’. With water services being a ‘political good’ it is not surprising that the 
overwhelming majority of water supply and sanitation services are still provided by 
public sector organizations in most middle- and low-income countries. 
 
2.4.2 Public Control and Government Opportunism  
 
In addition to the reason provided above, which stresses the regulatory task that the 
government has filled in by ownership of the service provider, direct government 
control over the provision of water services may be a means for a government to 
achieve objectives, which are not directly related to the provision of water services. An 
example is the water supply company PWN in the province of North-Holland, the 
Netherlands. This water supply company not only has the task of providing water 
supply to the residents of that province, but also has a ‘nature conservation’ task. 
Another example is that of the municipal water utility in the city of Naucalpan in 
Mexico. Apart from providing water services this utility is, at times, also requested to 
perform activities “that are not the utility’s responsibility or within its budget” such as 
constructing fountains (Rangel 2005:47). It should be noted, however, that although 
these utilities are performing tasks, which are not directly core activities, arguments can 
be made why having these organizations perform these tasks is desirable. In both cases 
mentioned above, for example, certain economies of scope may exist which make the 
combination of tasks more desirable (from an economic efficiency point of view) than 
appointing a separate organization to perform these tasks.  
Not only can water utilities be asked to undertake tasks, which lie outside their core 
activities. Also, income generated by water utilities can be used for cross-subsidizing 
other government activities, which are not necessarily related to the field of water 
services. In this case the income of the utility is not used for purposes of providing 
water services, but rather other activities, which the government may find more 
 
25 The existence of market failure per se does not mean that a public enterprise should actually 
deliver services. It does, however, mean that some form of regulation should take place. 
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pressing26. In other words, the utility is used as a fund-raising center to finance other 
activities. If the service provider would not be government-owned, the government 
would not have access to the income generated by the service provider. Thus 
government officials have a strong incentive to stay in control of the service provider. 
Linked to this (financial) incentive the government also has political incentives reasons 
for staying in control of the service provider. The government may try to use the water 
utility in order to achieve short-term political objectives. The most notorious example 
from the water supply and sanitation sector is a government seeking to appease ‘the 
governed’ by reducing water tariffs. In locations where the government official is 
subject to periodic elections, such politically based decisions often come shortly before 
elections. In these situations, in which the government uses water utilities to achieve 
‘short-term’ objectives, existing assets are often run down in order to achieve these 
objectives.  
It is important to realize that one of the difficulties of managing water services is 
the friction between short-term objectives and long-term service provision objectives. 
In case of public management, these short-term objectives are likely to be political in 
nature. A government has an incentive to see short-term results for its reform and 
investment efforts, as the government is held accountable (by its constituents) in the 
short-term (for example, by way of a 3-yearly or 4-yearly electoral cycle). At the same 
time, reform efforts, which incorporate substantial investment efforts and require a 
change in ‘corporate culture’, are likely to require long-term commitments. This 
friction between short-term and long-term objectives not only exists for ‘public’ water 
utilities. Also privately owned utilities face trade-offs between realizing short-term 
objectives and long-term objectives. The short term-objectives for privately owned 
utilities are often the (short-term) profitability of the company. In order to increase 
profits private owners may have to run down existing assets (and/or limit investment in 
future assets). Maximizing profitability in the short-term, by limiting investment and 
running down existing assets may come at a cost to service provision objectives in the 
long term.  
2.5 Measuring the Performance of a Water Utility 
 
Establishing what constitutes ‘good performance’ in the water services sector is 
actually more difficult than it may appear. To determine to what extent a utility is well 
performing or poorly performing (or anything in between) almost automatically implies 
comparing the performance of one utility with that of another. This comparison is rather 
difficult, however, as the circumstances under which different utilities function show 
considerable variation. A variety of external factors can influence the performance of a 
utility. These include: 
 
 
26 A World Bank study of the infrastructure sector in Indonesia found that “[d]espite the 
legislative intent to ‘create ‘autonomous’ organizations, in practice, local governments interfere 
in management [of the water utility], notably by insisting on receiving dividends even when the 
utility is incurring losses” (World Bank 2004a:197). The dividends that the local government 
receives are subsequently used for other purposes, not related to providing water services.  
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• Availability of raw water resources. The availability of raw water resources 
concerns the nature of the source (groundwater or surface water), the quantity of 
the water resources available and the quality of the water source (basically the 
degree of pollution). A utility, which is dependent on a limited surface water 
source of poor quality, will have much higher treatment costs than a utility, which 
has access to an abundance of unpolluted groundwater sources. 
• Topography. About 66%-80% of the total costs in providing water services lie in 
the distribution of water through the network. As such, the distribution of potable 
water forms by far the largest cost component of providing services. The 
topography of a service area can greatly influence these costs. The costs of 
providing services in an area in which large differences in altitude exist are likely 
to be substantially higher than in areas in which there is very little difference in 
altitude. 
• Socio-demographic processes. Over the period 1980-2020 the world’s population 
is expected to grow from 4.5 billion to approximately 7.7 billion people (WRI 
1997). Most of this population increase, approximately 90%, will take place in 
cities in middle and low-income countries (Gleick 1993). This presents water 
utilities in these cities with a plethora of problems. First of all, a rapidly increasing 
population means that the network also needs to be rapidly expanded in order to 
keep up with the pace of growth of the population. Secondly, the high 
concentration of people in urban areas is likely to result in increased pollution 
levels and stress on water sources, leading to increasing water scarcity (OECD 
2000). As such, varying urbanization rates will also likely lead to varying levels of 
performance. 
• Legal and administrative frameworks and culture (Larbi 1999). As mentioned 
earlier, a utility does not function in a vacuum but operates within a specific 
institutional setting. This setting greatly influences the performance of the utility. 
Aspects which are important in this context include the nature of enabling 
legislation, clarity of rules and regulations, enforcement mechanisms and means of 
redress, predictable and stable legal environments, administrative culture, ethics 
and attitude towards accountability and openness.  
• Civil-public interactions (Larbi 1999). As argued earlier, the provision of water 
services is, in many countries, a politically sensitive issue. This means that the 
nature of civil-public interactions will influence the performance of a utility. 
Aspects of civil-public interactions which are of importance include change in 
societal values, reactions and responses to change, level of literacy and awareness 
of rights, opportunities to express ‘voice’ and ‘choice’, private-public sector 
interactions and existence and clarity of property rights. 
 
With this in mind, it is clear that the performance of a utility should be seen in the 
context of the external factors, which impact it. A utility operating in a relatively flat, 
industrialized country such as the Netherlands, with access to an abundance of water 
resources, with an average per capita income of above $26,000 has fewer challenges to 
address than a utility operating in water-scarce and mountainous areas of Mexico, with 
a per capita income of some $6,000.  
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Having noted the difficulty of establishing if a utility is well performing or poorly 
performing, there are some generally accepted indicators, which collectively provide a 
picture about a utility’s performance. Tynan and Kingdom (2002:1) identify “five broad 
characteristics of a well run utility”. These are:  
 
1) Efficient and effective capital investment;  
2) Efficient operations and maintenance;  
3) Financial sustainability;  
4) Responsiveness to customers; and  
5) Accountability to stakeholders.  
 
Tynan and Kingdom then translate these characteristics into seven categories of 
performance. These categories are subsequently ‘operationalized’ by way of one or two 
indicators per category. For each indicator, a target is set, which indicates the 
performance target that a utility should strive for. Tynan and Kingdom (2002) 
developed the targets by taking a sample of 246 water supply and sanitation utilities in 
51 developed and developing countries. They measured the level achieved by the top 
25% of these utilities. That level they take as the target for other utilities. 
 
Table 2.1: Tynan and Kingdom’s categories and indicators for measuring performance 
 Category Indicator Target 
Staff per 1,000 connections <5 staff per 1,000 
connections 
Operational efficiency 
Staff per 1,000 population served <0.94 staff per 1,000 
served 
Financial sustainability Working ratio <0.68 
Commercial performance Collection period*  < 3 month 
equivalents 
Coverage and access Water coverage 100% 
Asset maintenance Unaccounted for water <20% 
Service quality Continuity of service 24 hrs per day 
Price and affordability Affordability of 20 L per day <0.12% of GDP 
* Accounts receivable/annual revenues expressed in months equivalent sales 
Source: Tynan and Kingdom (2002:1-5) 
 
The framework presented by Tynan and Kingdom is useful in the sense that it analyzes 
different categories of utility performance. At the same time some qualifications need 
to be added when using this framework as a framework for assessing if a utility is well 
performing or not27. The first of these qualifications is that improving service provision 
takes considerable time and this dynamic perspective on utility performance is not 
really captured in this framework. Even if a utility has shown remarkable performance 
improvements over the past decade, they may still not meet the performance targets as 
set by Tynan and Kingdom.  
A second qualification concerns the question how realistic the proposed targets 
are? The targets appear to be somewhat unrealistic in the sense that few utilities will be 
 
27 It should be noted that the framework was originally developed for benchmarking purposes and 
not for the question of assessing the performance of a water utility. 
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found that actually meet the set targets28. This is especially a question in low- and 
middle-income countries and specifically in Mexico. Perhaps most illustrative of this 
point is the proposed target for water coverage. Tynan and Kingdom recommend that a 
well performing utility should have coverage rates of 100%. Although the reasoning 
behind this target (and the desirability thereof) is clear, few utilities in middle and low-
income countries are able to claim such a rate. In fact, with the pressures resulting from 
urbanization and the rapid development of unplanned settlements on the city’s fringes, 
it is unlikely that any city in middle and low-income countries has a service coverage 
rate of 100%29. Moreover, it is likely that there are very few utilities in middle and low-
income countries that will have 100% coverage and also meet the other targets.  
A third qualification concerns the selection of the indicators. Specifically, the 
‘operationalization’ of the performance category ‘operational efficiency’ can be 
questioned. Tynan and Kingdom (2002:1) define this category as the “lowest cost use 
of labor, energy, water and materials in the day-to-day operation of a utility, with the 
most efficient combination partly dependent on local input prices and prior capital 
investment decisions” (emphasis added). Their selection of indicators, however, only 
focuses on labor productivity (staff per 1,000 connections or staff per population 
served). This means that operational efficiency is equated with labor productivity 
without regard for the ‘local input prices’ of the various resources. In industrialized 
countries, such as the Netherlands, where labor costs are relatively high, the water 
utility has a strong incentive to reduce the number of staff. Not surprisingly, almost all 
utilities in the Netherlands have a very high labor productivity (of less than 1 staff 
member per 1,000 connections). In many low- and middle-income countries water 
utilities rarely reach a value below 5 staff per 1,000 connections. However, labor costs 
in many low- and middle-income countries may be relatively cheap in comparison with 
other input prices. As such, it is not surprising that water utilities in low- and middle-
income countries have more employees per 1,000 connections.  
In chapter four the methodology for this research will be discussed. Part of that 
chapter also highlights the framework used to determine if a utility is well performing 
or not. The framework presented in chapter four is based on that of Tynan and 
Kingdom but some alterations have been made in order to address the qualifications 
mentioned above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 This second qualification can be traced to the method for setting targets that Tynan and 
Kingdom used. As mentioned earlier, they took the top 25% for each category. They did not take 
the top 25% of the utilities in general (i.e. incorporating all performance categories). 
29 The issue of service provision to informal settlements is a rather complex issue. Often water 
companies are not allowed to establish service provision to these areas even if they were able to 
do so. This is because development of such infrastructure services could be viewed as a 
legalization of the informal settlement, which the local government wants to avoid. This means 
that water companies are often under pressure from government to ignore these areas, which are 
subsequently serviced by alternative service providers such as private vendors.  
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3 Two Models of Public Management 
This chapter revolves around two models of public management. The first of these 
models is the bureaucratic model, which is largely based on Weber’s ‘ideal type’ 
bureaucracy. This model will be examined in the first part of this chapter. The second 
model is that of the New Public Management, and this model will be the subject of the 
final part of this chapter. These two models will be linked by elaborating on the Public 
Choice School and on the ‘Managerialist School’ in the middle part of this chapter. The 
Public Choice School provides a suitable link between these two models because this 
School has been a source of considerable criticism levied against Weber’s ‘ideal type’, 
whilst at the same it is seen by a number of authors30 to be one of the two pillars on 
which the New Public Management has been built. Apart from providing a suitable link 
between the two models of public management, the Public Choice School is also useful 
to illustrate an important conceptual difference between these two models. This 
difference, the importance of self-interest for the individual employee, can be traced 
back to the contrast of methodological individualism which underlies the ‘economic 
approach’ to public management as highlighted by the Public Choice School with the 
‘collectivist method’ of sociology which guides Weber’s ‘ideal type’ of bureaucracy. In 
addition to the Public Choice School, this chapter also discusses ‘managerialism’, 
which is the second pillar on which the New Public Management is based. As 
mentioned, elements of the New Public Management can be traced back to both the 
Public Choice School and managerialism. The interesting thing about this parentage, 
however, is that this hybrid parentage leads to some internal contradictions in the New 
Public Management. This contradiction will also be examined in this chapter. 
The first section of this chapter focuses on the bureaucratic model of public 
management. The background of the model is discussed and the main features of the 
model are presented. The second section of this chapter concerns the criticism levied 
against this model by the Public Choice School. Although the bureaucratic model has 
been criticized by other schools, for aforementioned reasons this study concentrates on 
criticism originating from the Public Choice School. The main criticism discussed 
revolves around the work of Downs (1967), Niskanen (1994) and Tullock (2005). Once 
this criticism has been elaborated upon, the chapter turns to the second pillar on which 
the New Public Management is founded. This second pillar concerns ‘managerialism’. 
Having elaborated on the Public Choice School and managerialism, and the 
contradictions brought forth by this parentage, the New Public Management is 
discussed. The third section of this chapter starts by placing the origin of the New 
Public Management and its increasing popularity in the context of political, economic 
and societal developments of the 1980s and early 1990s. Subsequently, the main 
principles of the New Public Management are discussed. The fourth section of this 
chapter focuses on the bureaucratic model-New Public Management dichotomy, which 
is frequently presented in literature31. Although this study does not necessarily 
 
30 These authors include Harrow (2002), Hill (1997), Aucoin (1990), Christensen and Laegreid 
(2002). 
31 See for example Lane (2000), who refers to these models as ‘mirror images’. 
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subscribe to the perspective of viewing the bureaucratic model and the New Public 
management as opposites, this section of this chapter does present the two models as 
being ‘contrasting’. The final section of this chapter presents the two main hypotheses, 
which will be addressed in this research. 
3.1 The Bureaucratic Model  
 
Although the bureaucratic model was not developed solely by one person Weber’s 
writings on the rational-legal authority and the bureaucracy are considered to be highly 
influential in this approach (Lane 2000). Considering the prominence of Weber’s work 
for the ‘theory of bureaucracy’ it is useful to elaborate on the background of his work 
and how the ‘bureaucratic model’ fits in his work. 
The starting point of the bureaucratic model must be seen in the three ‘pure’ types 
of ‘legitimate’ authority that Weber distinguishes. These are claims to legitimacy based 
on (Weber 1978:215): 
 
• Rational grounds – which rest on “a belief in the ‘legality’ of patterns and 
normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to 
issue commands”. Under this so-called rational-legal authority, obedience is owed 
to the legally established impersonal order.  
• Traditional grounds – in this case authority rests on “an established belief in the 
sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those 
exercising authority under them”. In this case obedience is owed to a ruler on the 
basis of tradition, in which tradition has often provided the ruler with an area in 
which he can exercise his free discretion (Diamant 1962). 
• Charismatic grounds – in which case authority rests on “the devotion to the specific 
and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, 
and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him”. 
 
The nature of an organization and especially the staff serving in that organization is 
strongly influenced by the prevailing authority in that organization. As such, the nature 
of administrative staff can be linked to ‘pure types’ of authority as described above 
(Diamant 1962). Or as Weber phrases it “according to the type of legitimacy which is 
claimed, the type of obedience, the kind of administrative staff developed to guarantee 
it, and the mode of exercising authority, will all differ fundamentally” (Weber 
1978:213). At this time it is useful to also elaborate on the Weber’s usage of ‘pure 
types’ or ‘ideal types’. The organizing principles proposed by Weber should be read as 
‘ideal types’, meaning that they are formulations which exaggerate and simplify the 
empirical evidence in the interest of conceptual clarity (Weber 1978). As such, it is 
clear that ‘truly’ bureaucratic organizations do not exist. The argument made by Weber, 
however, is that organizations, which approximate this ideal type, are likely to be more 
efficient than those organizations, which do not resemble this ideal type (Kiggundu 
2002).  
For the ‘bureaucratic model’ the legal-rational authority is of particular importance. 
According to Weber (1978:217) “the effectiveness of the [rational]-legal authority rests 
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on the acceptance of the validity of the following mutually inter-dependent ideas”. 
These ideas are fivefold (Weber 1978:217-218): 
 
• “That any given legal norm may be established by agreement or imposition, on 
grounds of expediency or rational values or both, with a claim to obedience at least 
on part of the members of the corporate group. […]. 
• That every body of law consists essentially in a consistent system of abstract rules 
which may have normally been established. Furthermore, administration of law is 
held to consist in the application of these rules to particular cases. […]. 
• That thus the typical person in authority occupies an ‘office’. In the action 
associated with his status, including the commands he issues to others, he is 
subject to an impersonal order to which his actions are oriented. […]. 
• That the person who obeys authority does so only in his capacity as a member of 
the corporate group and what he obeys is only ‘the law’. […]. 
• In conformity with point three, it is held that the members of the corporate group, 
in so far as they obey a person in authority, do not owe this obedience to him as an 
individual but to the impersonal order. […].” 
 
Based on these ideas the main principles that underlie the bureaucratic model can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
• There is a principle of fixed and official jurisdictional areas, which are generally 
ordered by rules, that is, by laws or administrative regulations. Officials should 
apply these rules and procedures in a uniform manner. 
• The principle of office hierarchy and levels of graded authority mean a firmly 
ordered system of super- and subordination in which there is a supervision of the 
lower offices by higher ones 
• Tasks are organized on a rule-governed basis. Experts in substantive matters – such 
as engineers – should be assigned to line agencies whilst experts in budgeting, 
accounting, purchasing, and personnel should be assigned to centralized staff 
functions.  
• Office management presupposes thorough and expert training. 
• Public employees orientate towards the tasks within the public sector in terms of 
vocation or sense of duty. The employee also strives and usually enjoys a distinct 
social esteem as compared to ‘the governed’. 
• Loyalty of the employee is devoted to impersonal and functional purposes and does 
not establish a relationship to a person. 
• An employee is appointed by a superior authority and normally the appointment of 
the employee is for life. As such, the employee is set for a career within the 
hierarchical order of the organization. 
• Each position of an employee is to be remunerated according to a fixed monthly 
salary. The salary is not measured like wage in terms of work done, but according 
to ‘status’. The ‘status’ depends on the responsibilities that the employee has. 
 
The principles deriving from Weber’s ideal type have been somewhat adapted by other 
authors to describe the main features of the bureaucratic model. Peters (2001:4), who 
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recognizes that the bureaucratic model is not singularly implemented, nonetheless finds 
it possible to attribute certain core characteristics to a bureaucracy, which he refers to as 
the “old chestnuts”. The core characteristics that Peters (2001:4-12) identifies are: 
 
• An apolitical civil service – This core idea is strongly associated to the policy-
administration dichotomy. The idea is that public sector employees should not 
have “political allegiances of their own”, but that they should be able to serve 
“any master”.  
• Hierarchy and rules – This core idea relates to the hierarchical and rule-bound 
management that is to predominate in the bureaucratic model. 
• Permanence and stability – Permanence and stability relates both to the 
permanence and stability of organizations as well as to the secure terms of 
employment of public sector employees.  
• An institutionalized civil service – the fourth core idea is that “there should be 
an institutionalized civil service that is governed as a corporate body”. 
• Internal regulation – The fifth ‘chestnut’ finds that “the civil service should be 
acquiescent and respond almost without question to policy directives issued by 
its nominal political masters”. 
• Equity - The last of the ‘chestnuts’ is the conception that clients with the same 
objective characteristics should receive exactly the same benefits with the aim 
of producing equitable outcomes. 
 
As such, the bureaucratic model public sector leads to organizations that are permanent 
and stable organizations within government that implement hierarchical and rule-based 
management. The characteristics of the bureaucratic model “evolved over periods of 
time and generally represent responses to a number of problems that existed in public 
administration at earlier times” (Peters 2001:4). As Pollitt (2003:33) explains, the 
bureaucratic model “appeared to offer considerable advantages over what went before. 
Bureaucracy was designed to be reliable, equitable, and free from corruption. Civil 
servants in bureaucracies owed their jobs to merit, not patronage. They worked to 
predictable rules, based directly or indirectly on public laws. They treated individual 
cases impartially, according to these rules”. Praise for the bureaucracy is also provided 
by Jaques (1990:234), who finds that “managerial hierarchy is the most efficient, the 
hardiest, and in fact the most natural structure ever devised for large organizations”. 
In this research, the bureaucratic model revolves around six principles. These 
principles are mainly based on Weber’s ideal type and Peters’ ‘chestnuts’. However, the 
exact content of these principles has at times been altered to reflect the realities of the 
water supply and sanitation sector. In the context of the water services sector, for 
example, a principle such as permanence and stability is limited to permanence and 
stability of staff within the organization and not so much about the organization itself. 
The reason being that, water services being a merit good, a water utility has a 
continuous task of providing water services. This means that ideas such as ‘flexible’ 
organizational arrangements or ‘virtual organizations’ to take the place of water utilities 
may not be very applicable (or at least have not been applied to my knowledge).  These 
six principles are: 
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• An apolitical civil service – Which is understood as meaning a separation of 
the political realm and the management of the service provider. Policy is 
formulated by the political realm, which is then subsequently implemented by 
the management and staff of the service provider. 
• Hierarchy and Levels - The organization operates according to the principle of 
hierarchy and levels in which there is supervision of the lower office by higher 
ones. 
• Permanence and Stability - The organization is characterized by permanence 
and stability, meaning little staff turnover and stable management. 
• Internal Regulations - The organization operates according to explicit internal 
regulations, which guide the employees in the work they do. Management and 
staff are accountable for following these regulations.  
• Fixed salary - Employees are remunerated according to fixed salary levels 
• Vocation - Employees opt for working in water supply and sanitation 
companies in terms of vocation or sense of duty. 
3.2 Criticism of the Bureaucratic Model: The Public Choice School 
 
The many negative connotations of the word ‘bureaucracy’ illustrate that the 
bureaucratic model has been subject to considerable criticism. This criticism is not a 
recent phenomenon. The bureaucratic model has received criticism since the 1930s 
(Hood and Jackson 1991; Barzelay 1992; Hill 1997; Pollitt 2003). Criticism has 
originated from a variety of schools and has been levied at various principles identified 
by Weber. This thesis, however, focuses mainly on the criticism originating from the 
Public Choice School. The reason is that apart from being one of the most influential 
sources of criticism, Public Choice Theory is often seen as having greatly influenced 
the New Public Management.  
The tone of the criticism deriving from the Public Choice School is perhaps best 
illustrated by Rowley who opens the ‘Foreword’ to Niskanen’s collected works by 
stating that the early theories of bureaucracy “emanated not from economics but from 
naive sociological scribblings by Max Weber” (Niskanen 1994:vii). Apart from 
highlighting the disdain to Weber’s work, which can be frequently observed in many of 
the writings by Public Choice Theorists, Rowley’s statement also encompasses the 
basis for criticism coming from the Public Choice School. This basis is the application 
of the methodology of economics to public administration.    
In this section, the underlying principles of the Public Choice School, those of 
methodological individualism and of utility-maximizing bureaucrats are elaborated 
upon. Subsequently, the criticism of the bureaucratic model originating from the work 
of Downs, Niskanen and Tullock is presented. 
 
3.2.1 Two Underlying Principles: Methodological Individualism and Utility 
Maximization 
 
As mentioned, the Public Choice School applies the methodology of economics to 
study public administration and public institutions. Because the Public Choice School 
uses this methodology it has been viewed as an ‘economic approach’ to public 
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administration. The importance of the ‘economic approach’ to public administration 
lies in the use of methodological individualism as its underlying postulate. 
Methodological individualism takes the individual agent as the fundamental building 
block for analysis32. In essence, methodological individualism assumes that social 
aggregates such as groups or formal organizations can be viewed as collections of 
individuals. As such, “the properties of these social aggregates are reducible to the 
properties of individuals” (Lane 2000:210). Whereas Weber’s view of organizations 
emphasized the formal structure and implicitly viewed these ‘social aggregates’ as 
“single organisms whose individual parts were all directed to a common purpose” 
(Fukuyama 2005:63), methodological individualism reduces the organization to “the 
purposive behavior by individuals, not to explain the behavior of the individual […], 
but to generate hypotheses concerning the aggregative consequences of the interaction 
among individuals” (Niskanen 1994:5-6).   
In addition to taking the individual as the starting point, a second principle 
underlies the Public Choice School. This principle emphasizes the interests and 
preferences of individual agents or in the case of bureaucracies of individual 
bureaucrats. Downs (1967:2) states this as follows: “the fundamental premise of the 
theory is that bureaucratic officials, like all other agents in society, are significantly – 
though not solely – motivated by their own self-interests”. The specific focus on the 
individual and the emphasis on the self-interests of that individual contrast sharply with 
Weber’s ‘ideal type’, which focuses on “the formal organization which reflected the 
official goals, needs, etc. of the organization” and “made no provision for informal 
structures which might develop by which bureaucrats would try to satisfy their own 
needs” (Diamant 1962:83).  
 
3.2.2 Rigidness: Downs 
 
Within Public Choice one of the sources of criticism of Weber’s bureaucracy derives 
from Downs’ Inside Bureaucracy, which was published in 1967. Downs’ publication 
deals with the life cycle of bureaus. Of particular importance, in terms of criticism 
regarding Weber’s bureaucracy is the aging of bureaus and the effect of age on the way 
the bureau functions. Downs (1967) argues that bureaus, like people, follow similar 
patterns of aging when they grow older. A selection of the effects of the aging of 
bureaus is as follows (Downs 1967): 
 
• Bureaus learn to perform given tasks better with experience. Although this at first 
glance seems like a positive development, Downs argues that efficiency gains that 
are accrued from this better performance are translated into input-cuts for the 
bureau. Rather, the bureau increases output of the same service, absorbs efficiency 
gains as organizational slack or devotes the gains to seeking new functions or 
‘capture’ existing functions from other bureaus. 
• As bureaus grow older, they tend to develop more formalized rule systems. As the 
organization ages it experiences a wide variety of circumstances and the 
 
32 Niskanen contrasts the methodological individualism with the ‘collectivist method’ of 
sociology which “develops hypotheses about social behavior from models or role behavior by 
aggregative ideal types” (Niskanen 1994:5)  
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organization learns how to deal with this variety. Over time more formalized rules 
appear to deal with the variety of circumstances that the organization has been 
exposed to. The increasing rules have three main effects on the organization. First 
of all, it improves the performance of the organization regarding situations 
previously encountered and provides a degree of stability and predictability to the 
organization. Secondly, they tend to divert attention of employees in the 
organization from the official objectives of the organization to the conformation to 
the formalized rules. This can also be referred to as ‘goal displacement’, in the 
sense that rather than pursuing the goal of achieving the organization’s objective, 
the goal becomes the conformation of the rules of the organization, which do not 
necessarily lead to the fulfillment of the organization’s objectives. Thirdly, these 
formalized rules increase the organization’s structural complexity. This in turn 
strengthens the organization’s inertia as sunk costs in the organizations procedures 
increase. The result is that older organizations are more stable and less flexible (i.e. 
more resistant to change) than younger organizations. 
• As bureaucratic organizations grow older the objectives of the organization’s 
employees and managers shift from the official ‘social functions’ to ensuring the 
organization’s survival and growth as an autonomous institution. In order to ensure 
the survival of the organization, the employees and managers also become more 
willing to modify the official objectives of the organization. This willingness is 
largely explained by the personal interests of the officials in the organization. As 
they stay with the organization for a longer period of time, the less incentive they 
have to find a new job (which may result in losing rank and seniority). As result, 
rather than abolishing an organization (and their own position in it) the official 
prefers to alter the objectives of the organization ensuring that it (and the official’s 
own position) survive.  
• As an organization grows older, the number and proportion of administrative 
officials tends to rise. This shift illustrates the increasing emphasis that is placed on 
routines and administration as the organization becomes older. 
 
The result of these effects lead to what Downs describes as being the ‘Law of 
Increasing Conservatism’. This Law reads as follows: All organizations tend to become 
more conservative as they get older; unless they experience periods of rapid growth or 
internal turnover.  The result of the ‘Law of Increasing Conservatism’ is that as bureaus 
become older they become more and more rigid. The organization will have abandoned 
its original goal for objectives, which will ensure its survival. Moreover, the average 
age of officials working in the organization increases as the officials working in the 
organization focus on securing their position and the accompanying benefits that this 
position brings forth.  
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3.2.3 Budget Maximization: Niskanen 
 
One the most influential criticisms stemming from the Public Choice School was 
formulated by Niskanen33. His book, Bureaucracy and Representative Government, 
was one of the first systematic efforts to study the bureaucracies within the public 
choice framework34. The main argument he makes in this book relates to budget 
maximization tendencies in bureaucracies.  A bureau does not supply a number of units 
of outputs, but rather supplies levels of activities from which output levels must be 
inferred (for example, a level of security is measured by the number of police walking 
in the streets). The budget for the bureau is defined not by the outputs (the level of 
security), but rather by the activities that the bureau undertakes (the number of police 
walking in the streets), even if ultimately the citizens are only interested in the final 
outputs (Mueller 1989). The reason being that the outputs produced by bureaus are at 
times difficult to measure (such as the level of security). As it is easier to monitor the 
activities (number of policemen, etc.), these activities are taken as proxies for the output 
and as such as the defining indicator for the budget. This monitoring problem, however, 
is exacerbated by an informational advantage of the bureau and weak incentives for the 
bureaucrats to improve efficiency.  
So with weak monitoring of the bureaucrat’s activities and little incentive to 
improve efficiency, what are the goals that a bureaucrat will strive for? Niskanen’s 
argument is that a bureaucrat will pursue goals such as salary, prerequisites of the 
office, public reputation, power, patronage, output of the bureau, ease of making 
changes, and ease in managing the bureau (Niskanen 1994). He continues to explain 
that, apart from the last two goals, each goal is positively related to an increased budget. 
As such, the bureau will strive to maximize its budget and as such, also increase the 
activities it undertakes.  
Budget maximizing in itself does not represent bureau inefficiency in the sense that 
the activities produced may be produced efficiently. What it does mean is that it leads 
to so-called social inefficiency. This refers to an inefficient allocation of resources of 
society as certain activities or goods are overproduced (in other words, there would be 
too many police men walking the streets).  
Although the issue of budget maximization has been a cornerstone in the criticism 
of Weber’s bureaucratic model, the question is if public water utilities can be 
considered bureaus in Niskanen’s model. Contrary to Weber who does not distinguish 
between public and private bureaus, Niskanen (1994:15) defines bureaus as “nonprofit 
organizations, which are financed, at least in part, by a periodic appropriation of grant”. 
This means that utilities, which are operating on the basis of full cost recovery, would 
be excluded, as they are entirely self-financing. As the case studies in chapters four and 
five show, however, few water utilities in low- and middle-income countries operate at 
 
33 Aucoin (1990:116), in explaining the “ascendancy” of Public Choice Theory in political 
circles, refers to Niskanen’s work as ‘best representing the spirit of the set of Public Choice 
ideas’.   
34 In discussing Niskanen’s criticism of the bureaucracy, the main source used is a collected 
works publication published in 1994. This publication included his book Bureaucracy and 
Representative Government from 1971. As such, although reference is made to the 1994 
publication it should be noted that this publication is the same as the 1971 book.  
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full cost-recovery levels. This means these utilities are indeed dependent on a periodic 
appropriation of grants and as such they would qualify as being a ‘mixed-bureau’, 
which is dependent on income from sales as well as grants.  
 
3.2.4 The Uncontrollability of the Bureaucracy: Tullock 
 
Another authoritative criticism of the bureaucratic model originates from one of the 
founding fathers of the Public Choice School, Gordon Tullock. Tullock’s book, The 
Politics of Bureaucracy, was published in 1965. The fundamental criticism levied by 
Tullock revolves around bureaucracies being too big. So big, in fact, that these 
organizations suffer an information problem as well suffering a compliance problem. 
The information problem that Tullock identifies finds its origins in the difficulty of 
passing information through the various levels of an organization without distortion. 
Tullock compares this difficulty with the ‘Whispering Down the Lane’ game35 often 
played by children. According to Tullock (2005:149) the “standard version of 
bureaucracy” works as follows: “The lower levels of the structure receive information 
from various sources. This information is then passed along upward through the 
pyramid. At the various levels, the information is analyzed, collated, and coordinated 
with other information that originates in separate parts of the pyramid. Eventually, the 
information reaches the top level where the basic policy decisions are made concerning 
the appropriate actions to be taken. These decisions on policy are then passed down 
through the pyramid with each lower level making the administrative decisions that are 
required to implement the policies sent from on high”. Tullock, however, argues that 
this system inevitably will lead to distortions in the information passed up and down the 
organization. “The degree of distortion that would arise under such a bureaucratic 
system would probably be so great that neither the original report nor the issued order 
would be recognizable in any sizeable organization. This would be true due to the 
complexity of the information, and of the orders, transmitted and also because of the 
particular problems in transmission” (Tullock 2005:149-150). The information problem 
ultimately leads to the officials at the top of the pyramid being unable to control the 
lower levels. “In a large organization […], each link in the ‘chain of command’ will 
introduce some modifications and changes on the order received from above, and as a 
result of the series of these changes, which compound each other, central control will be 
eliminated” (Tullock 2005:178-179).  
The second criticism that Tullock levies against the bureaucratic model is based on 
situations in which bureaucracies have greatly exceeded the limits of control and are 
related to the aforementioned problem of information. Tullock (2005:178) argues that 
“the larger the organization, the smaller the percentage of its actions that represent 
directly the ultimate sovereigns of the organization, its higher officials”. Because of the 
difficulty for the higher officials to control what is happening in the lower levels (partly 
due to the information problem described above) “the bureaucracy will be ‘free’ from 
whatever authority it is allegedly supposed subordinate to. ‘It’, the bureaucracy, will do 
things, will take actions, not because such actions are desired by the ultimate authority, 
the center of power, in the organization, but because such things, such actions, develop 
 
35 In fact, Tullock (2005) titled the chapter dealing with this criticism ‘Whispering Down the 
Lane”. 
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as an outgrowth of the bureaucracy’s own processes” (Tullock 2005:179). The result is 
what Tullock refers to as ‘bureaucratic free enterprise’ and is characterized by the 
inability of higher officials to control the bureaucracy. This inability to control the 
bureaucracy leads to inefficiency, irresponsibility and waste (Lane 2000). 
 
3.2.5 Summary of Public Choice Criticism: Principal-Agent Problems 
 
The criticism of the Public Choice School described above can be summarized by 
referring to principal-agent problems that form the core of agency theory. The central 
dilemma of principal-agent problems is how to get the agent to act in the best interests 
of the principal when the agent has an informational advantage over the principal and 
has different interests from the principal. In the context of this research the principal is 
formed by the politician, who represents the electorate36 and whose policy decisions are 
to be implemented by the people working in the public organization (the agent). The 
question is how to get the public organization, or ‘the bureaucracy’, to implement the 
policies of the principal when the bureaucrats have an informational advantage and 
have interests, which are different from implementing the policy formulated by the 
politician.  
The authors mentioned above, Downs, Niskanen and Tullock, all argue that the 
agent in a bureaucracy will always have an advantage over the principal. Or as Aucoin 
(1990:126) explains “the perception under which public choice theory operates is one in 
which the problem is bureaucratic power”. The bureaucrats will then use this power to 
maximize their own utility by increasing their own power, prestige, security and income 
by “using the hierarchical structure for their own ends instead of advancing the goals of 
the organization” (Hughes 2003:40). This inevitably leads to rigid organizations in the 
case of Downs, to budget-maximization in the case of Niskanen and to an 
uncontrollable bureaucracy or ‘bureaucratic free enterprise’ in the case of Tullock.  
In summary, the principal-agent problems inherent in bureaucracies leads to 
inefficiency of service provision because of rigidity and inflexibility of the 
organization, an uncontrollable organization which pursues its own survival rather than 
organizational goals, and an internal orientation of staff who focus more on maximizing 
budgets and chasing their self-interests rather than serving the public (Metcalfe and 
Richards 1990; Burki and Perry 1998; Minogue 1997; Kettl 2000; Lane 2000). 
 
3.2.6 Public Choice Reforms 
 
It has been mentioned that the Public Choice School is often viewed as one of the 
strands of parentage to which the New Public Management can be traced. Having 
presented the criticism levied by the Public Choice School above, it is useful to discuss 
the reforms proposed by the Public Choice School as elements of these reforms 
reappear in the New Public Management.  
 
1) One of the reforms advocated by the Public Choice School is ‘simply’ a wider 
use of local government. This, as Tullock (2005:236) argues, “obviously puts 
 
36 The relationship between the electorate (the voters) and the politician can also been seen as a 
principal-agent relationship. In this case the politician is the agent and the voters the principal. 
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less strain on the voter’s ability to supervise his government”. By pushing 
“governmental functions to the lowest possible organizational level” the voter 
is better able to control the government and as such ensure that services 
provided are in accordance with the wishes of the voter. Niskanen (1994) also 
promotes the ‘decentralization’, by arguing in favor of the financing of public 
services at the lowest level of government that includes most of the 
beneficiaries of that service. 
2) Secondly, the bureaucracy is seen as being “well above the optimum size” 
(Tullock 2005:237) and this, as Tullock has argued leads to uncontrollability 
of the bureaucracy (or bureaucratic free enterprise). The proposed solution is 
relatively simple, namely limit the size of the bureaucracy by essentially 
privatizing a variety of services that are not necessarily the ‘core business of 
government. Tullock argues that by “trying to do too much the (local) 
government is losing its power to carry out even its minimum responsibilities”. 
Niskanen (1994:228) argues that the ‘optimal’ level of public services could be 
achieved by “[a] competitive supply of public services”. This competition 
would include the following ‘general’ changes: 
 
• Increase competition among the bureaus for the supply of the same or 
similar public services; 
• Change in the incentives of the bureaucracy to induce more efficient 
behavior by the senior bureaucrats; 
• Increase competition to the bureaucracy by greater use of private sources 
of supply of public services. 
 
Increasing competition, Niskanen argues, should reduce both the problem of 
oversupply (resulting from budget maximization) and the problem of 
inefficiency of some public organizations. 
3) Thirdly, in discussing the information problem in bureaucracies, Tullock 
(2005) argues that decision-making should not be centralized. Rather decisions 
should be made at lower levels. These decisions should fit in the grand design 
of the organization. In other words, the information problem could be 
overcome by decentralizing decision-making authority to lower levels, as long 
as decision makers at that level take the overall objective of the organization 
into account.  
4) Fourthly, the mechanism of organized hierarchy is considered unable to 
achieve the required degree of coordination necessary for producing certain 
specified tasks or aspects of tasks. Although acknowledging that there are 
governmental functions that are not suitable for market organizations, Tullock 
(2005:172) argues that “no comparable mechanism even approaches the 
market in terms of functional efficiency”37. In other words, if possible, the 
 
37 Tullocks (2005) argument conflicts with Donahue’s (1989) conclusions based on a comparison 
of public and private management of water utilities. Donahue (1989:75) concludes “that there is 
no tendency for private water utilities to be any more productive” or efficient. 
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provision of services should be left to the market rather than providing that 
service through organized hierarchy.  
 
Reforms emanating from the Public Choice School highlight “the need to reestablish 
the primacy of representative government over bureaucracy” (Aucoin 1990:115). In 
other words, the primacy of the principal should reestablished by restricting the power 
of the agent. As the abovementioned list of reform measures illustrates, the preference 
within public choice theory is that this power should be reduced by “devolving 
authority” to levels closer to the electorate (Aucoin 1990:119). Although public choice 
theory prefers reassertion of representative democracy over the ‘professional 
bureaucrats’ by way of reducing the latter’s power, in many cases the executive 
authority has preferred to reassert its position by strengthening its power against 
bureaucracy. In other words, rather than reestablishing primacy by restricting the power 
of the agent, primacy is reestablished by increasing the power of the (central) principal. 
This requires effective centralization, coordination and control by the executive 
authority over the bureaucracy and as such appears to run against the notion of 
devolving authority to levels closer to the electorate, which is often advocated by Public 
Choice Scholars.   
3.3 Managerialism 
 
Whereas the Public Choice School was borne out of the application of the methodology 
of economics to public institutions, the second line of heritage to which the New Public 
Management can be traced is the rise of managerialism in the public sector. 
Managerialism itself seems to have been around for quite some time. Walsh (1995), for 
example, argues that managerialism should be seen as a continuation and enhancement 
of a managerialist process that had long existed. Pollitt (1993; 2003) places the origins 
of ‘managerial thought’ at the end of the 19th century. Since its origin it has moved 
through at least six broad phases.  
The first phase is characterized by theorists who have to deal with the process of 
industrialization. The dominant doctrine in this phase is that of Social Darwinism with 
the employer focusing on maintaining the “healthiest, strongest workers and not paying 
too much attention to the rest” (Pollitt 1993:13).  
The second phase is that characterized by the ‘New Thought Movement’, which 
emphasized “not biology, but the power of positive thinking”. The idea being that with 
sufficient willpower and mental energy success could be achieved.  
The third phase is strongly associated with Taylor and his principles of 
management. Taylor introduced management as a “true science, resting upon clearly 
defined laws, rules and principles, as a foundation” (Taylor as cited in Pollitt 1993:14). 
Taylorism was centrally concerned with the “processes of determining and fixing effort 
levels and can be seen as the bureaucratization of the structure of control but not the 
employment relationship” (Littler as cited in Pollitt 1993:16).  
The fourth phase is characterized by the ‘human relations school’, which developed 
from the 1930s onwards. What distinguishes the human relations school is that more 
attention is paid to the individual worker, who is viewed as responding not only to 
incentives and punishments from the management, but “to a much wider variety of 
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environmental factors, including behavioral norms created and sustained by informal 
groups of fellow workers38. The significance of the human relationist school in 
contemporary management lies in the importance and the attention paid to the informal 
relations within an organization and the feelings and attitude of the employees.  
The fifth phase distinguished by Pollitt (1993) is that of the ‘decisions and systems’ 
phase and can be situated in the period following the second World War until the 
1970s. Essentially it consists of two approaches, the decision-making approach and the 
systems approach. The decision-making approach is closely associated with Herbert 
Simon and focuses on the detailed cognitive and emotional processes of individual and 
group decision-making in organizational contexts. The systems approach concentrates 
on the level of the organization as a whole, and aims to understand the “macro-features 
of organizational performance by characterizing them as open, socio-technical systems” 
(Pollitt 1993:18). Rather than develop absolute principles, as those forwarded by 
Taylor, these two approaches have a more relativistic stance in which the design of an 
organization is dependent on the type of objectives that the organization seeks to 
achieve and the environment in which it operates.  
The sixth phase of management thought, that of ‘culture management’ as Pollitt 
(1993:23) calls it emerged in the 1970s and became popular in the 1980s. Similar to 
human relationist school’s reaction to Taylor’s principles of scientific management, 
‘culture management’ can be seen as reacting to the decision-making and systems 
approaches, which were seen as neglecting symbolism and ritual in organizations. 
Successful organizations, in this perspective, were seen as being ‘value driven’ guided 
by carefully maintained ‘cultures of excellence’. In these organizations managers work 
to create “the right ‘climate’, to encourage identification with corporate goals, high 
motivation, and internalization of ‘constructive attitudes’” (Pollitt 1993:24). 
Although it is not disputed that (elements of) managerialism have been around for a 
long time, it is also undeniable that in the 1980s and 1990s it has been the subject of a 
considerable revival in the public sector. Hughes (2003:48) places the beginning of this 
revival between the 1950s and the 1980s when governments became “unconvinced that 
the traditional system of administration provided an effective form of management of 
their public services”.  
The main elements of managerialism as defined by Pollitt (1993:2) are as follows: 
 
• The main route to social progress lies through the achievement of continuing 
increases in economically defined productivity. 
• Such productivity increases come mainly from the application of ever-more-
sophisticated technologies. These include information and organizational 
technologies as well as the technological ‘hardware’ for producing material goods. 
• The application of these technologies can only be achieved with a labor force that 
is ‘disciplined in accordance with the productivity ideal’. 
 
38 The human relations school is also a source of strong criticism of Weber’s bureaucracy. As 
mentioned, Weber focused strongly on the formal organization and said little about the individual 
employees in a bureaucracy. 
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• Management is a separate and distinct organizational function and one that plays a 
crucial role in planning, implementing and measuring the necessary improvements 
in productivity.  
• To perform this crucial role managers must be granted reasonable ‘room to 
manoeuvre’ (i.e. the ‘right to manage’). 
3.4 The Public Choice-Managerialist Contradiction 
 
In the aforementioned sections, the Public Choice School and managerialism have been 
presented as the parentage to which the New Public Management can traced. This 
mixed parentage of the New Public management can give rise to tensions, however. 
Public Choice theory places a strong emphasis on reestablishing primacy of the 
principal, by weakening the power of the agent. Managerialism, on the other hand, 
focuses much more on a manager’s ‘right’ to manage. The main contribution of this 
school of thought is that it seeks to “enhance the capacities of managers to take action, 
to clarify missions and objectives, and to be responsive to their clients/customers on the 
one hand and to their personnel on the other” (Aucoin 1990:122). In this perspective a 
deconcentration of power is regarded as beneficial to good management and as such 
extensive decentralization, deregulation and delegation are promulgated.  
It is notable that coupling the idea of reestablishing primacy of the principal, as it is 
frequently implemented in practice, with that of managerialism thus can give rise to 
tensions, if not outright contradictions (Aucoin 1990, see also Hill 1997). Christensen 
and Laegreid (2002) concur with Aucoin as they also highlight the, at times, conflicting 
elements of the New Public Management. They attribute these tensions to the 
centralizing tendencies inherent in the public choice perspective and the devolutionary 
tendencies of managerialism. The hybrid character of the New Public Management, 
Christensen and Laegreid (2001:78) argue, make the NPM into “a double-edged sword 
that prescribes both centralization and devolution”. It should be emphasized, however, 
that the ‘centralization-side’ of ‘double-edged’ sword finds its origin in the actual 
implementation of the New Public Management rather than the theoretical reform 
agenda proposed by the Public Choice School. In practice, politicians have opted for 
‘reestablishing the primacy of the politician over the bureaucracy’ by opting for 
centralization, i.e. increasing the power of the politician rather than decreasing the 
power of the bureaucracy (Aucoin 1990). This has the added benefit for these 
politicians that it increases their own power.  
3.5 The Shift towards New Public Management 
 
Having elaborated on the (at times conflicting) foundations on which the New Public 
Management rests it is useful to examine the context in which the NPM gained in 
popularity. The increasing popularity was largely a result of a series of interdependent 
developments in the 1980s. These developments, which are described below, paved the 
way for what some authors consider a shift from the bureaucratic model to that of the 
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NPM. The underlying pressures for the shift away from the bureaucratic paradigm are 
three fold39.  
 
3.5.1 Rising Government Expenditure and the Effectiveness of Large 
Bureaucracies 
 
First of all rising government expenditure in combination with poorer than anticipated 
economic performance inspired a fundamental questioning of the effectiveness of large 
public bureaucracies (Hood 1991; Barzelay 2001; Minogue 1997; Aberbach and 
Christensen 2001; Hughes 2003; Jones and Kettl 2003). During the 1980s, many 
western governments faced economic slowdowns and large public sectors that 
generated high levels of public expenditure40. Thompson (1997) finds ‘some truth’ in 
viewing the ascendancy of the New Public management in the context of economic 
crises that many countries were facing. Many countries that initially adopted these 
reforms (New Zealand, Australia, Great Britain, Sweden, and Canada) were under 
considerable economic and fiscal pressure. Schick (1996:11) argues that:  
 
“Economic conditions were not sustainable in New Zealand when 
reform was initiated in 1984. The economy was in disrepair and 
conventional remedies – more fiscal stimulus and more government 
intervention – had not worked […]. Doing nothing – or as little as 
politicians could get away with – was not a viable option”.  
 
Kaul (1997:14), after finding that changes in the role and responsibilities of government 
have largely been driven by economic pressures, even goes so far as to state that it has 
led to a “reassessment of the fundamental responsibilities of government in economic 
management and delivery of public service”. This reassessment, as Kaul argues, has led 
to the rise of the New Public Management. 
In the water supply and sanitation sectors of middle and low-income countries, the 
majority of expenditure on infrastructure is financed through tax revenues. Increasingly, 
however, governments found their tax revenues “insufficient to meet all the competing 
needs” (OECD 2000). NPM style-reforms could then mitigate both the burden of the 
rising expenditure as well as the large bureaucracies. For example, by introducing 
reforms such as agencification, which refers to “the conversion of government-
departments which previously operated in a hierarchical chain […] into semi-
autonomous [agencies]” (van Donge 2002: 315), large bureaucracies could be reduced 
in size as these agencies, operating at arm’s length of the government, would be 
 
39 Pollitt stresses that the transition to the doctrines of the New Public Management was not such 
a totally clean-cut break with the past. Moreover, he argues that the NPM was not so much 
‘caused’ by external events, but rather ‘chosen’ by practitioners (2003:36-37). 
40 Hughes (2003:49) mentions the first oil shock as severely constraining government resources. 
As “practical politics” dictated that the actual services delivered by the public sector could not be 
cut, a strong pressure existed to attempt to manage the same services with less money and fewer 
staff. 
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expected to reap the efficiency gains associated with private sector organizations41. 
Other reforms that mitigate this ‘burden’ include privatization and outsourcing 
strategies. 
Thompson (1997) argues that part of the shift can be explained by other forms of 
organization (in casu, the market) becoming more efficient than the traditional 
bureaucracies. Changes in ‘information or transaction costs’ could cause a shift in 
viewing which institutional arrangement has a comparative advantage over other 
arrangements. With a significant reduction in information costs over the past decades, 
the efficacy of the market has increased relative to government provision and control.  
 
3.5.2 Consumers as Customers 
 
Secondly, consumers of services provided by public organizations have come to 
demand services of better quality and no longer accept to be treated as passive objects 
of public policies (van Mierlo 2003). “People today expect to be valued as customers, 
even by government [service providers]” (Osborne and Gaebler 1992:167). The 
improved levels of education of the consumers explain part of this shift. “Increasingly 
well-educated and demanding citizens […] were less and less prepared to accept poor 
service from public officials” (Pollitt 2003:33). Some even argue that increased 
customer-orientation lies at the heart of the New Public Management and presents the 
most important conceptual challenge to the bureaucratic model (Barzelay 1992; Jackson 
200142). Kaul (1997:15) echoes that observation when he finds that “citizens have 
indicated a clear limit to their willingness to purchase unattractive and inefficiently 
produced public services through their tax contributions”.  
 
3.5.3 The Ideological Attack on the Bureaucratic Model 
 
A third pressure driving the shift towards New Public Management is more ideological 
in nature and finds its roots in the “ideological attack on the public sector in the 1970s 
and 1980s […] in the United Kingdom and the United States” (Hughes 2003:256) and 
is, as such, associated with right leaning governments like that of Mrs. Thatcher in the 
U.K. and Reagan in the U.S. (Jones and Kettl 2003). In this context the NPM is 
considered to be “an accepted administrated philosophy concerning organization design 
in government” (Barzelay 2002:19; also Exworthy and Halford 1999). However, not 
everyone agrees with viewing the NPM as a result of ‘new right’ ideological pressure. 
Pollitt (2003) argues that social democratic or Labor governments introduced some of 
the most sweeping NPM-style reforms, for example in Australia and New Zealand. In 
Australia, the initial steps, which lead to the introduction of NPM-style reforms, were 
 
41 The question whether empirical support exists for the view that private sector organizations are 
more efficient than public organizations is beyond the scope of this research. This view, based on 
property rights theory, is, however, forwarded often (Braadbaart 2002).  
42 Jackson (2001) places this development in a broader crisis of confidence in the public sector. 
He  finds that by “the mid-1970s the general public’s attitudes towards the public sector had 
reached a low. There was loss of confidence in the public sector’s abilities to deliver public 
services of the quality expected, to manage the economy, to solve social problems or to be 
prudent with the public finances” (Jackson 2001:9). 
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taken by the conservative Malcolm Fraser. Much of the actual implementation of these 
reforms was done under the Labor government of Prime Minister Hawke. As such, the 
political parties at both sides of the political spectrum appeared to share views on the 
way public services were to be managed (Hughes 2003). In New Zealand, the Labor 
Government of Prime Minister Lange would be one of the most reform-minded 
administrations in the country’s history. Similarly, improved management in the United 
States appears to have been initiated in the Carter Administration as illustrated by the 
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, which aimed to give managers greater responsibility 
for results. As such, although the NPM may have received a considerable boost by the 
administrations of Thatcher and Reagan, it would appear that the support for the New 
Public Management couldn’t only be attributed to ‘right-wing’ governments. 
Rather, the ideas of the New Public Management were so influential “precisely 
because they were combined with and succeeded in articulating other intellectual 
currents” (Kirkpatrick and Martínez 1996:4). The actual implementation of the New 
Public Management was then much more a choice made by practitioners (of various 
political signatures) rather than ideologists. Perhaps more important than the ideology 
of the government was the fact that government changed. Britain (1979), the United 
States (1980), Australia (1983), and New Zealand (1984) all experienced changes in 
government in a relatively short time span. These changes presented opportunities for 
practitioners to implement new reforms. The fact that two of the cases (Britain and the 
United States) shifted to right-leaning governments, whilst two cases (Australia and 
New Zealand) shifted to left-leaning governments indicate that the ideological leanings 
of the government in power seem to be of secondary importance.  
3.6 The New Public Management 
 
Although there appears to be a general consensus that ‘New Public Management’ 
(NPM) originated in New Zealand and the United Kingdom in the early 1980s, a review 
of literature would, at first, lead the reader to conclude that little agreement exists on 
what exactly NPM encompasses43. Hood (1991) has described the NPM as ‘a loose 
term’, which covers a ‘set of broadly similar administrative doctrines’. Lane 
(2000:131), who can be viewed as standing favorably towards the New Public 
Management, mentions that “it is certainly not a coherent set of principles that replace 
public administration”. Manning (2002) has suggested that the absence of a standard 
definition of New Public Management is related to the mixed parentage of the New 
Public Management, which as highlighted earlier has some inherent contradictions. He 
characterizes NPM as being a ‘slippery term’, which describes a menu of choices rather 
than a single option. Pollitt (2003:27) finds that many commentators allow the NPM to 
have a number of “facets and ingredients, and that from one country and time to another 
the emphasis may vary between these”.  
 
43 One possible explanation for the lack of agreement regarding the specific meaning of the term 
‘New Public Management’ is that this term was first used by Hood (1991) to describe reforms 
which had taken place in the 1980s and early 1990s. As such, the term ‘New Public 
Management’ was coined well after the administrative reforms it described were implemented 
(Christensen and Laegreid 2002). The term was thus used to describe a wide array of 
administrative reforms. 
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3.6.1 Defining the New Public Management 
 
Combining the pillars of Public Choice theory and managerialism leads to a public 
management model that presents a more market-oriented and output-based approach to 
the traditional bureaucratic model with an increased emphasis on user-orientation by 
adopting ‘business’ style measures (Kaboolian 1998; Kettl 2000; Peters 2001; Harrow 
2002; Budding and de Groot 2003). As such, NPM seems to advocate that public sector 
organizations adopt practices that have long been associated with the ‘private sector’ 
(Metcalfe and Richards 1990). However, even if these broad classifications shed some 
light on what the NPM is, it still does not enlighten us on what elements the NPM 
exactly encompasses.  
With the aim of identifying what elements can be placed under the New Public 
Management umbrella different descriptions of the NPM by a selection of authoritative 
authors were analyzed. Table 3.1 (page 49) provides an overview of these different 
definitions. At first glance the definitions appear to be quite different. In fact, some 
statements, such as ‘meet the needs of the customers, not the bureaucracy’ (Osborne 
and Gaebler 1992:166), almost appear to be political slogans. 
However, if one analyzes the descriptions, it also appears that the differences in 
description relate not so much to different views on what the NPM encompasses, but 
are a result of different perspectives and at different levels of the public sector. Lane’s 
(1994) description, for example, largely contains itself to a description of elements 
within an organization and almost reads like a checklist for a manager of that 
organization. Pollitt’s (2003:28) description appears to take a broader view, and looks 
at the NPM from outside the organization as is illustrated by an element such as the 
“blurring of the frontiers between the public sector, the market sector and the voluntary 
sector”. Similarly, Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992:25) plea for a “steering rather than 
rowing government” also takes a very broad perspective. In fact, in the discussions 
relating to the NPM it is surprising to see how little attention is paid to the levels at 
which the analyses of the authors takes place.  
Moreover, some elements mentioned by the authors are strongly related. So strong 
in fact, that it can be questioned if these elements should be seen as separate 
‘ingredients’ of the NPM. If emphasis is placed on achieving accountability for 
specified outputs than it should not be surprising to see that a shift occurs “towards 
more measurement and quantification especially in the form of systems of performance 
indicators” (Pollitt 2003:27). How else could one measure if the outputs, which are so 
heavily emphasized, have been achieved?  
This begs the question if the NPM is such a ‘slippery’ and ‘loose’ term after all? 
The fact that almost all authors first introduce the NPM as a ‘loose’ term, only to 
proceed to discuss this ‘loose’ term at great length seems to indicate that the NPM may 
not be as ‘slippery’ and ‘loose’ as many suggest it is. An indication that there is a 
relatively concrete understanding of what the NPM entails is that the absence of this 
understanding would severely frustrate any discussion about the topic. Few authors find 
it necessary to start their articles and papers by explicitly stating what they mean by the 
NPM. The most likely reason for this being that they assume that the reader already 
knows.  
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It would, in fact, perhaps be even more surprising if there were something of a 
uniform New Public Management. If administrative reform is (at least partly) a 
response to specific problems and local challenges the reform measures have to be 
implemented with the aim of addressing these specific problems and challenges, within 
the prevailing administrative and political structures and in the context of historical 
developments in that locality. It would seem logical that, given the variance of 
problems, structures and historical developments, the actual reform measures 
introduced also show variation. As such, we would expect to see ‘facets and 
ingredients’ of the NPM vary from one country to the next.  
Furthermore, this would also apply to the ‘facets and ingredients’ of the 
bureaucratic model, which as Peters (2001) explained is also ‘not singular’. In contrast 
to the NPM, however, the bureaucratic model is not considered ‘slippery’ or ‘loose’ by 
many authors. As such, it is my opinion that a pattern of recurring themes does exist 
although it is acknowledged that not every author adheres to this pattern (partly because 
of the different perspectives taken). Based on each of the definitions presented in table 
3.1, four main elements of the NPM can be identified. These main elements are: 
 
1) Autonomy - A focus exists on the decentralization of authority. The 
decentralization of authority has an external component and an internal component.  
a) The external component refers to decentralizing authority to autonomous 
organizations, which become responsible for providing services.  
b) The internal component relates to decentralizing authority within the 
organization. This essentially means creating ‘lean’ and ‘flat’ 
organizations.   
2) Accountability for results - All definitions mention an increased emphasis on 
outputs produced by the organization. Although here too the terminology differs 
the authors refer to the same idea, namely that the organization has to meet certain 
specified results (be they called outputs or objectives) and is held accountable for 
meeting these results. Similar to the element of autonomy accountability for results 
has an external and an internal component. 
a) The external component concerns accountability for results produced by 
the organization as a whole. 
b) The internal component relates to accountability for results achieved by 
individual managers and employees within the organization. 
3) Customer-orientation - Almost all definitions refer to the consumer, be it that a 
variety of terms are used such as client, customer or citizen. Although I realize that 
these terms strictly speaking have different meanings, in this context they more or 
less appear interchangeable. Part of the usage of different terms may also be 
because the authors have different public services in mind. In other words, the 
terminology of the end-user of a service may differ, for example the beneficiary of 
street cleaning would not often be referred to as a customer, whilst this can be the 
case for water services.  
4) Market-orientation - Most of the authors refer to ‘the market’ and ‘market-type’ 
mechanisms. These markets are both external to the organization as well as 
internal. The external market appears to refer to both outsourcing activities to 
(private) organizations, which can undertake that activity cheaper or better. The 
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internal market (or market-style mechanisms) appears to be aimed at introducing a 
degree of competition with the organization. 
3.7 The New Public Management: Criticism from Literature 
 
Over the past decade(s) the NPM-style reform strategies have been implemented widely 
and promoted by a broad coalition of sector professionals, donors and lending agencies 
(Bately 1999). In fact, a wealth of literature has grown, promoting the New Public 
Management reforms over the traditional bureaucratic model. However, as the 
discussions below will show, the NPM is not without criticism. In light of the question 
if public water utilities perform better because they adhere to the New Public 
Management it is useful to review and discuss the criticism levied against the NPM.  
 
3.7.1 The Impact of the NPM 
 
As mentioned, much of the literature regarding the NPM is written with the perspective 
of celebrating the NPM’s triumph over the bureaucratic model or defending the 
bureaucratic model from these celebrations. Unfortunately, little empirical evidence 
supports the claims by many of the NPM advocates.  
Part of the inconclusiveness of the evidence can be traced to the question what 
exactly constitutes ‘beneficent change’. As Hood (1998) notes different notions of 
‘beneficent change’ exist. In the water supply and sanitation sector, for example, 
beneficent change may be a lowering of the price of water per cubic meter, it may be a 
more reliable service for the customer, or it may be an expansion of the service 
network. But what happens if the network is expanded at the cost of service reliability 
and a higher price per cubic meter of water? Would that constitute ‘beneficent change’? 
Or if reliability to customers is improved and the price stays the same, but the network 
is not expanded?  
Secondly, reforms tend to consist of several simultaneous changes (Pollitt 2003), 
making it difficult to conclude what the impact of the NPM reforms have been. This 
opinion has been echoed by others such a Foster (1996:6) who suggests that the 
existence of a “strong institutional culture, encompassing both a high degree of 
professionalism among staff and a sense of pride and ‘ownership’ within the local 
community” may be at the root of the success of well-functioning public utilities. 
Others have noted the importance of leadership of top management on the performance 
of utilities (Cullivan et al., 1988). Dimensions associated with the NPM, such as 
customer-orientation and market-orientation, may then be outward manifestations of 
these factors rather than underlying causes of the success of well-functioning 
enterprises (Foster 1996).  
The fact that reforms are introduced simultaneously with reform elements that are 
not part of the NPM model, make it difficult to establish if water utilities perform better 
because they perform to the NPM. Perhaps other elements, such as leadership or 
corporate culture, are of greater importance than elements of the NPM model, or the 
bureaucratic model for that matter? 
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Table 3.1: Elements of the New Public Management  
Hood (1991)  Osborne and 
Gaebler  (1992) 
Pollitt (2003) Kernaghan  
(2000) 
Borins (1997) OECD (1995) Burki and 
Perry (1998) 
Lane (1994) 
Hands-on 
professional 
management 
Steering rather than 
rowing government 
A shift in the focus of 
management systems and 
efforts from inputs and 
processes towards outputs and 
outcomes 
Citizen-
centered 
Providing high quality 
services that citizens 
value 
Greater flexibility 
on results and 
increased value for 
money 
Devolution 
of decision-
making 
Focus on the achievement of 
objectives 
Explicit 
standards and 
measures of 
performance 
Empower 
communities, 
rather than simply 
serving them 
A shift towards more 
measurement and 
quantification especially in the 
form of systems of 
performance indicators 
Leadership Increasing managerial 
autonomy, particularly 
by reducing central 
agency controls 
Devolution of 
authority and 
enhanced 
flexibility 
Performance 
orientation 
Efficiency is more important than 
rule obedience 
Greater 
emphasis on 
output controls 
Injecting 
competition into 
service delivery 
A preference for more 
specialized, ‘lean’, ‘flat’ and 
autonomous organizational 
forms rather than large, multi-
purpose, hierarchical 
ministries or departments 
Change-
oriented 
Demanding, measuring, 
and rewarding both 
organizational and 
individual performance  
Strengthened 
accountability and 
control 
Client focus Flexibility and adaptation are 
more important than predictability 
and responsibility and require 
unconventional decision-making, 
surprise and secrecy in order to 
enhance innovation 
Shift to 
disaggregating 
of units in the 
public sector 
Transforming rule 
driven 
organizations to 
mission-driven 
organizations 
A widespread substitution of 
contracts for what were 
previously formal, 
hierarchical relationships 
Results-
oriented 
Providing the human and 
technological resources 
that managers need to 
meet their performance 
Client- and 
service-orientation 
 
Effectiveness is expected of the 
management 
Shift to greater 
competition in 
the public 
sector 
Fund outcomes, 
rather than inputs 
A much wider-than-hitherto 
deployment of markets of 
market-type mechanisms 
Decentralized Strengthened 
y for 
g 
strategy and policy 
capacit
developin
Managers work on the basis of a 
contract that appeals to the self-
interests of managers 
Stress on 
private sector 
styles of 
management 
practice 
Meet the needs of 
the customers not 
of the bureaucracy 
A emphasis on service quality 
and consumer orientation 
Revenue 
driven 
Introducing 
competition and 
other market 
elements 
Focus on earning 
resources, rather 
than just spending 
A broadening and blurring of 
the frontiers between the 
public sector, the market 
sector and the voluntary sector 
Collaboration 
Prevent rather cure 
problems 
Non-
departmental 
form 
Decentralize 
authority 
Competitive 
Stress on 
greater 
discipline and 
parsimony in 
resource use 
Leveraging change 
through the market  
A shift in value priorities 
away from universalism, 
equity, security and resilience, 
and towards efficiency and 
individualism 
People-
centered 
Maintaining 
receptiveness to 
competition and open-
mindedness about which 
public purposes should 
be performed by public 
servants as opposed to 
the private sector. 
Changed 
relationships with 
other levels of 
government 
Market 
orientation 
 
Profitability is a highly relevant 
objective 
 
3.7.2 The Costs and Benefits of Contracting 
 
Contracts are one of the main instruments of the NPM. In discussing the NPM Lane 
(2000:147) even refers to it as “the medium of communication in the public sector”. 
These contracts can vary in nature such as performance contracts, employee contracts 
or contracts for outsourcing tasks and activities to the private sector. Entering into and 
monitoring these contracts is not without cost, however, and the question is if the cost 
of implementation is not higher than any efficiency gains that may have been realized. 
For example, although proponents of outcontracting often claim savings of around 20% 
to 30%, establishing if the increased use of service contracts does indeed lead to cost 
savings is difficult. This difficulty is due to problems in measuring “the costs of  
transactions, the ongoing costs associated with managing contracts (or governance 
costs), and the overall costs to the organization of organizing market competition and 
undertaking the transition to new arrangements” (Hodge 2000:237; also Hill 1997). 
Much appears to depend on the nature of the service or activity that is outsourced. 
Some activities, such as vehicle maintenance, may lend themselves for realizing 
significant savings whilst “contracting for some services may not enhance, and may 
even reduce, the efficiency of public sector services because the additional transaction 
costs are likely to outweigh any gains in technical efficiency”(Hodge 2000:238)44.  In 
other words, when transaction costs are high, “the incorporation of suppliers, 
distributors, etc. into hierarchies may become a desirable strategy” (Hill 1997:168). In 
addition to transaction costs, the use of contracts may involve so-called switch costs, 
which refer to costs, which have to be incurred when a reneging contractor has to be 
replaced by a new contractor (Lane 1996) as well as ‘information costs’ which are costs 
that a utility must bear in order to increase the probability of selecting the best 
contractor (Ferris and Graddy 1997). Moreover, the responsible government agency 
requires “an effective capacity to monitor among other things achievement of 
performance indicators set out in the agreement and the resources devoted for this 
purpose” (Awortwi 2003:108).  
With making, monitoring and revising contracts being a costly business, it would 
make sense for both the party awarding the contract and the party fulfilling the contract 
to seek long-run stability (Hill 1997). But not only is the tendency for long-run stability 
a question of costs. Often the party awarding the contract is too eager to bind a good 
contractor beyond the duration of the contract agreed upon, when a credible contractor 
with specific performance qualities is identified (Lane 1996). This tendency to seek 
long-run stability may run against the original aims for which the use of contracts was 
intended. One of the main arguments for the use of outcontracting is that the application 
of competitive tendering can provide substantial efficiency gains (Awortwi 2004). 
However, the tendency of both parties towards establishing long-run stability (or 
partnering) is likely to be at the cost of the level of competition for the contracts. With 
 
44 The theory of transaction costs includes characteristics such as uncertainty, frequency, asset 
specificity, measurability of attributes, bounded rationality and opportunism to arrive at a 
transaction cost (Hodge 2000:39). These characteristics of a service would then also indicate the 
suitability for outcontracting a service or task. Lane (1996) has stated that there is an inverse 
relationship between production costs and transaction costs. 
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the contracts being tendered with less competition, the gains from competitive 
tendering will be reduced. 
 
3.7.3 The pre-requisites for implementing the NPM 
 
The implementation of NPM-style reforms may require a set of preconditions, which 
are required for these reforms to be successful. Schick (1998) argues that a formal 
public sector, incorporating budgets that controlled spending and corresponded to 
actual transactions and a civil service system that governed how public employees are 
hired and paid are essential preconditions for NPM-style reforms to succeed. Or put 
differently a utility should first “be able to control inputs before they are called to 
control outputs; they must be able to account for cash before they are asked to account 
for cost; they must abide by uniform rules before they are authorized to make their own 
rules; they must operate in integrated, centralized departments before being authorized 
to go it alone in autonomous agencies” (Schick 1998:130). In many developing 
countries, which are characterized by an informal economy and public sector, these 
preconditions are not met. This view is shared by Wallis and Dollery (2001:260) who 
find that in areas where “these basics have been mastered, there may be scope to shift 
from systems of external control to internal control”. However, if these basics have not 
been mastered, NPM-style reforms are unlikely to hold great promise. This view is also 
shared by the former World Bank president Wolfensohn, who states that “New-
Zealand-style management-by-contract systems, or indeed, any system of public sector 
contracting out, cannot work in a society without a well-developed system of contract 
law. Output-based management controls fail if the government does not have a strong 
budgeting system to set goals and accounting system to track results. The government 
reforms movement puts especially heavy pressure on government managers, who not 
only must do more with less. They must also build new capacity to find imaginative 
ways to do things they have never done before” (Wolfensohn, as cited in Kettl 
2000:60). Even one of the ‘re-inventing government’ gurus has noted that “you have to 
invent government before you can re-invent it” (Gaebler as cited in Schneider and 
Heredia 2003:8). In short, “the greater the shortcomings in a country’s established 
management practices, the less suitable the reforms” (Schick, 1998:124).  
 
3.7.4 Accountability for Results 
 
Questions can also be raised regarding the applicability of some of elements of the 
NPM model in the (public) water sector. Accountability for results, for example, 
assumes that performance can be fully and properly measured by objective measures. 
The question is if many of the real benefits of the provision of water services lend 
themselves to quantative measurement (Mintzberg 1996). “The high degree of 
uncertainty and complexity under which [public utilities] have to function do not lend 
themselves to a neatly divided set of obligations set down in a document” (Islam 
1993:144). Even Tullock (2005), in examining the potential of ‘judgement by results’45 
 
45 Tullock (2005:207) identifies three separate requirements that must be fulfilled before 
‘judgement by results’ can be implemented. These are 1) the results can, without great trouble be 
measured, 2) it must be possible to attribute the results to particular persons who are responsible 
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as a means of improving control of the bureaucracy finds many activities undertaken in 
an organization are ruled out from ‘judgement by results’ as these activities do not meet 
the requirements to allow for this ‘device of supervising subordinates’. Apart from 
tasks and activities being potentially unsuitable for accountability for results, such 
mechanisms may also lead to an over-concentration on what is precisely quantifiable 
and an under-concentration on other aspects of service delivery, which are not so easily 
measured, but which may be just as important (Pollitt 2003).  
Another potential problem with accountability for results relates to the weak 
redress that governments have when its own organizations fail to perform. If the 
government, being the owner of the water utility, were to undertake legal action against 
that water utility, it would essentially be undertaking legal action against itself (Lane 
2001). As such, “[i]t may be subject to as much capture in negotiating and enforcing as 
it was under pre-reform management” (Schick 1998:126; see also Bately 1999).  
 
3.7.5 The Weakening of Public Sector Values 
 
The trend that recent public sector reforms seem to be inspired by private sector 
experience has also meant that traditional ‘public sector values’ may have been 
weakened (Kernaghan 2000; Schick 1998). In particular, questions can be raised about 
the strong emphasis on efficiency and effectiveness that this reform strategy adheres to. 
As Lane (2000:14) explains the “NPM is basically about focusing on efficiency”. 
However, the criteria the public sector, and public water utilities, are supposed to pay 
attention to extend beyond efficiency and effectiveness. With water services being a 
merit good, public water utilities also have social objectives as part of their 
responsibilities and the question is if these social objectives are not neglected due to an 
overemphasis on the increase in efficiency (Islam 1993; Lane 1994; Hill 1997; Hodge 
2000; Hague 2001)? Pollitt (2003:28) mentions as a key element of the NPM a “shift in 
value priorities away from universalism, equity, security and resilience, and towards 
efficiency and individualism”. This position appears to be supported by Walsh 
(1995:xvi), who argues that “the impacts of the more critical consumer of public 
services are quite strong as it alters the nature of the concept of citizenship from one 
relating to participation in the public realm to one referring to consumption in the 
private realm”.  
Some authors argue that the introduction of the NPM may also weaken the ‘public 
sector work ethic’. “As the security of their employment has diminished, and the 
pressure on them to produce results has increased, public officials are said to have 
become more instrumental and calculating in their attitudes. They won’t ‘go the extra 
mile’ unless their contract specifies it, or some extra bonus or privilege is provided as 
reward” (Pollitt 2003:48). Interestingly enough, this criticism seems strikingly similar 
to criticism levied against the bureaucratic model.  
 
 
for it and 3) the results from the activities of one subordinate must be comparable to those 
obtained from others. 
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3.8 Contrasting the Bureaucracy and the New Public Management  
 
According to Lane (2000) the bureaucratic model and the NPM model can be viewed as 
‘mirror images’. Lane’s metaphor is illustrative of current discussions in much of the 
literature regarding the bureaucratic model and the NPM. In this section, however, the 
perspective is taken that although visualizing the two models as ‘mirror images’ is 
perhaps a useful metaphor in the discussion concerning the (possible) existence of a 
paradigm shift from one model, it also obscures the realities of public administration 
and management in many countries.  
In this section we discuss the supposed dichotomy between the bureaucratic model 
and the NPM. The argument forwarded is that much of this supposed dichotomy can be 
traced to the ideological nature of discussions regarding both the bureaucratic model 
and the New Public Management. The alleged dichotomy is explained by the fact that 
the conduct of a polemic focuses attention on the differences between two points of 
view to the neglect of their continuity and convergences (Gouldner 1954). Rather than 
viewing the two models as opposites, they are presented as contrasting. 
 
3.8.1 The Bureaucratic Model - New Public Management Dichotomy 
 
In many writings about public management, the bureaucratic model is often presented 
as a distant predecessor of the New Public Management. Hughes (2003:256) for 
example, argues that the bureaucratic model is “obsolete and has effectively been 
replaced by a new model of public management. This change represents a paradigm 
shift from bureaucracy to markets […]” (see also Barzelay 1992; Borins 1997; Aucoin 
1990; Lane 2000; du Gay 200046). This position is not shared by everyone, however. 
Pollitt (2003:32-33) has argued against the idea that ‘traditional bureaucracy’ ruled the 
earth, “like some ponderous dinosaur”, prior to the advent of the New Public 
Management. He explains that “the public sectors or West European and North 
American states contained a rich variety of organizational types and forms”. Pollitt’s 
view is largely reflected by Lynn (2000), who expresses doubt about the existence of 
the ‘bureaucratic paradigm’, which supposedly dominated the public sector prior to the 
onset of the New Public Management. Although the views of Lynn and Pollitt are most 
likely correct and unlikely to be contested by many, it has not withheld an array of 
authors from actually portraying recent developments in public management in the 
same bureaucratic model-New Public Management dichotomy that Hughes (2003) 
heads towards. Whereas Pollitt and Lynn question the idea of a paradigm shift by 
emphasizing that both models co-existed for many years, other authors stress that “it is 
both misguided and remarkably premature to announce the death of the ethos of the 
bureaucratic office” (du Gay 2000:146; also Hood 1995; Gow and Dufour 2000; 
Manning 2002; Goodsell 2004).  
Interestingly enough, much of the literature relating to the New Public 
Management has the focus of wanting to declare final victory or discussing if victory 
can be declared. Countless articles address the question if the New Public Management 
 
46 Du Gay (2000:6) argues that the proponents of the New Public Management represent 
bureaucratic government as the “paradigm that failed”. 
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can be seen as a ‘paradigm’ and if a paradigm shift has taken place. All the while, 
empirical evidence for supporting these claims (whichever way they go) remains rather 
thin. It would appear that much of the literature concerning the bureaucratic model and 
the NPM is written from an ideological perspective.  
 
3.8.2 Contrasting the Two Models 
 
The aim of this research is not to contribute to the ‘celebration’ of the NPM, or to 
the ‘celebration’ of the bureaucratic model for that matter. This research will, however, 
be based on using the bureaucratic model and the New Public Management as 
contrasting theories of public management. Contrasting, as it is used here is seen as 
markedly different from opposite.  
Although there are perhaps elements of both models that appear opposite, the two 
models also share elements. The bureaucratic model, for example, presupposes an 
apolitical civil service (essentially a stringent separation between the political and 
administrative realms). The NPM model incorporates autonomous agencies operating at 
arm’s length of the government. Both models, as such, do not view politics to be part of 
the day-to-day functioning of public sector organizations. Similarly, if the bureaucratic 
model finds that ‘loyalty is devoted to impersonal purposes’ then it does not mean that 
the NPM model views loyalty as being solely devoted to ‘personal purposes’ (although 
the NPM does place a strong emphasis on creating incentives for employees and 
highlights self-interests). And if the NPM model views the extensive use of markets as 
a key element of a well-functioning public organization, it does not mean that the 
bureaucratic model is vehemently opposed to using markets in the delivery of services. 
All bureaucratic organizations use ‘the market’. What is different, however, is the 
emphasis placed on using the market as a means of improving service provision. 
Different emphases, however, do not constitute mirror images.    
The reason for elaborating on this issue is that in this section the bureaucratic 
model and the NPM model will be presented as two contrasting theories. Important to 
realize, however, is that although the two theories are contrasted, they are not 
necessarily opposites in all aspects. Essentially, the contrasting theories are based on 
the earlier discussions of the models. In the case of the NPM model the elements of 
decentralization of authority and of accountability for results have been separated into 
an external component and an internal component.  
 
Table 3.2: The bureaucratic model  
The Bureaucratic Model 
1. An apolitical public service (a separation of the political and administrative realms) 
2. The organization operates according to the principle of hierarchy and levels in 
which there is supervision of the lower office by higher ones 
3. The organization is characterized by permanence and stability, meaning little staff 
turnover and stable management 
4. The organization operates according to explicit internal regulations. 
5. Employees are remunerated according to fixed salary levels  
6. Employees opt for working in water supply and sanitation companies in terms of 
vocation or sense of duty. 
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Table 3.3: The New Public Management model 
The NPM Model 
1. The organization enjoys a large degree of autonomy.  
2. The organization is strongly accountable for results to external organizations and 
the owner 
3. The organization has a strong market-orientation. 
4. The organization has a strong customer-orientation 
5. Within the organization decision-making has been decentralized  
6. Within the organization employees have a strong accountability for results  
3.9 Main Hypotheses and Propositions 
 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter the objective of this research is to identify 
whether implementing reforms associated with the New Public Management can 
improve the performance of the poorly performing public water utilities. Do public 
water utilities perform better because they adhere to the New Public Management? 
And, do poorly performing public water utilities adhere to the ‘traditional’ bureaucratic 
model of public management? In order to address these questions, two main hypotheses 
have been identified. The hypotheses that will be tested in this research read as follows: 
  
Hypothesis 1: Well performing public utilities adhere to the NPM model. 
Hypothesis 2: Poorly performing public utilities adhere to the bureaucratic model. 
 
In order to test these hypotheses a series of propositions relating to the NPM model and 
the bureaucratic model have been developed. These propositions are based on the 
discussion of the two models in this chapter. The propositions all relate to the public 
utility and as such, the utility shall be the main unit of observation in this research.  
 
The propositions that derive from the first hypothesis, which concerns well performing 
utilities and the NPM model, are as follows:  
 
1. Well performing public utilities have a large degree of external autonomy.  
2. Well performing public utilities are strongly accountable for results to external 
organizations. 
3. Well performing public utilities have a strong market-orientation.  
4. Well performing public utilities have a stronger customer-orientation.  
5. Well performing public utilities have decentralized decision-making within the 
organization.   
6. Well performing public utilities have a strong accountability for results within the 
organization.  
 
The propositions that derive from the second hypothesis, which relate to poorly 
performing utilities and the bureaucratic model are as follows: 
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7. Poorly performing utilities are apolitical. 
8. Poorly performing utilities are characterized by hierarchal levels in which lower 
offices are supervised by higher ones.  
9. Poorly performing utilities are characterized by permanence and stability. 
10. Poorly performing utilities operate following internal regulations. 
11. Employees in poorly performing utilities are remunerated according to fixed salary 
levels. 
12. Employees opt for working in water supply and sanitation companies in terms of 
vocation or sense of duty. 
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4 Research Methodology 
As mentioned in the previous chapter the hypotheses and propositions that are to be 
tested relate to the performance of public water utilities and the extent to which they 
adhere to either the bureaucratic model or to the NPM model. In this chapter the 
research methodology is presented. The first part of the chapter addresses two terms, 
which require explicit definitions. These two terms are the ‘public utility’ and ‘good 
performance’. These two terms are explicitly defined in sections 4.1 and 4.2 of this 
chapter.  
The second part of this chapter revolves around the actual research methodology. 
The main research methodology used is that of the case study approach. The aim is to 
identify a pattern for well performing public water utilities by analyzing two clusters of 
case studies. The identified pattern will then be compared with the bureaucratic model 
and the New Public Management model presented in the previous chapter. As the 
selection of case studies is of fundamental importance in case study research, the basis 
for selecting the cases is also elaborated upon. The chapter ends by discussing the two 
clusters of case studies that were selected (and why they were selected) and the 
collection of data concerning these cases. 
4.1 Defining a ‘Public’ Utility 
 
The water supply and sanitation sector is characterized by a wide landscape of 
organizational models. This landscape of models seems to have become increasingly 
diversified with the increase of private sector involvement over the past decades and the 
resulting landscape of options is a sliding scale from ‘pure public’ to ‘pure private’, 
which are also the two forms of utilities that are quite rare. Almost all utilities concern a 
mix of public sector and private sector involvement. In this sense I concur with the 
view of Bozeman (1987) who finds that that no organization (or utility) is wholly public 
or private. Only the nature of this mix seems to differ from utility to utility. This 
“blurring of the distinction between public and private” is not limited to the water 
supply and sanitation sector but appears to be describing a range of public sector 
activities (Hogget 1996:11). 
Although the issue of what exactly is ‘public’ and what exactly is ‘private’ may 
seem trivial, in an era where discussions on ‘privatization’ in the water sector still lead 
to highly emotional responses, such a distinction is in fact crucial. Illustrative is a study 
financed by the Bank-Netherlands Water Partnership (BNWP) from 2003-200547. The 
World Bank, following the realization that it would have to reengage itself with public 
water utilities decided to undertake a study in which it would analyze well performing 
public water utilities. The idea was that these well performing examples could provide 
insight into how to reform poorly performing public water utilities with World Bank 
 
47 This example is based on own experience as the consultant hired for this study was the 
UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education. I was part of the project team that was involved in 
this project. 
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assistance. The World Bank hired a consultant to undertake this study. After an initial 
selection of cases and development of the framework for analyzing the cases, the 
research-phase of the project, incorporating the actual case studies was started. Before 
any of the results were even published, however, the Public Services International 
Research Unit criticized the research. Hall (et al. 2003:7) argued that only a minority of 
the cases studies by this project “relate effectively to publicly-owned and managed 
water supply and sanitation operations”. In their view a utility which has engaged in 
private sector participation by a “management contract or other forms of PSP” cannot 
‘effectively’ be considered to be “publicly-owned and managed”.  
As such, when discussing public water utilities, it is first necessary to specify what 
we mean by a ‘public utility’ and what different kinds of public utilities we distinguish. 
In this research, a utility is considered to be public as long as the government owns 
more than 50% of the organization48. This definition, which adheres to using the 
“conventional distinction” of ownership to distinguish between public and private 
(Boyne 2002:98), largely follows the ‘standard check-list’ proposed by Praxy and 
Sicherl (as cited in Tuner and Hulme 1997). As the example, above shows, however, 
this definition of a ‘public utility’ is not likely to be generally accepted.  
 
Table 4.1: The basic characteristics of three types of organizations in government49
 Ministry or Department Statutory Body 
(or parastatal) 
A Company 
Legal 
Foundation 
Normally an executive 
order  
A Statute A Memorandum and 
articles of association 
(registered under a 
Companies Act or the 
like) 
Status as 
Legal Entity 
Normally unincorporated 
(thus does not have a 
legal personality separate 
from that of the 
government)  
Either 
incorporated of 
unincorporated 
Incorporated (thus has 
own legal personality) 
Basis of 
Ownership 
Notionally, owned by the 
government as creator 
Notionally, 
owned by the 
government as 
creator 
Owned by the 
government as creator 
and shareholder 
Legal 
Framework 
Operating under public 
law 
Operating under 
public law 
Operating under private 
(company) law 
Source: Based on Thynne 1994 
 
It also should be noted that although the only criteria is the ownership of more than 
50% of the organization, the actual type of public organization that is providing 
services can differ. In the case of the Mexican water supply and sanitation sector, for 
 
48 This means that the joint-stock company or ‘empresa mixta’, in which the government owns 
more than 50% of the shares, is considered to be a public utility.  
49 Thynne (1994) also distinguishes the government ‘trust’ as a possible type or organization. This type 
of organization, however, is not very common in the water supply and sanitation sector.  
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example, the ‘autonomous agencies’ providing water services are organized as statutory 
bodies, fully owned by the government. In the case of SANASA in Brazil, which will 
be subject to discussion in chapter five, the water utility is organized as a company, or 
to be more precise a joint-stock company, in which the municipality owns 99.9% of the 
shares.  
In general, four types of government organizations can be distinguished (Thynne 
1994). Three of these types of organizations can also be found in large numbers in the 
urban water supply and sanitation sector. Table 4.1 provides an overview of these three 
common types and their general characteristics. 
4.2 Defining ’Good Performance’ 
In chapter two the measurement of performance of a water utility was discussed using 
Tynan and Kingdom’s benchmarking framework. That discussion ended with some 
qualifications concerning the use of that framework for determining if a utility is well 
performing or not. In this study two types of good performance are distinguished. First 
of all, a utility which has managed to improve performance on four categories of 
performance (labor productivity, financial sustainability, asset management and 
coverage/access) over a number of years will be considered well performing. Secondly, 
a utility which meets specified performance targets for these same performance 
categories will also be considered well performing. As such, the specific definition used 
for considering a utility well performing or not are as follows: 
 
1) The utility shows continued good performance (according to the categories 
and indicators provided in table 4.2). These indicators are based on Tynan and 
Kingdom (2002), but the values of the targets have been altered to address 
some the qualifications discussed at the end of chapter two; 
2) The utility has shown a remarkable improvement (or ‘turn-around’) in recent 
years on the categories and indicators in table 4.2. This turn-around would 
have to be visible by looking at the following indicators: working ratio, labor 
productivity, financial sustainability and unaccounted-for-water.  
 
Table 4.2: Defining a well performing utility 
Category Indicator Target 
Labor productivity Staff per 1,000 connections <8 
Financial sustainability Working ratio <1 
Asset Management Unaccounted for water <25% 
Coverage and access Water coverage >90% 
Source: Based on Tynan and Kingdom (2002) 
4.3 Research Methodology: A Two-Staged Approach 
 
When the original ideas for undertaking this research were developed in the beginning 
of 2003, the idea was to concentrate on a series of five case studies that were to be 
located in a similar region and within the same administrative boundary in order to 
ensure that the utilities would be operating in similar topographic, climatological and 
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institutional settings. The idea was to focus only on one cluster of case studies. 
However, the opportunity arose to expand the research allowing an extra check on the 
results obtained in the ‘main’ cases. As such, by chance, the research developed into a 
two-staged approach in which a first cluster of cases led to preliminary conclusions, 
which could then be checked by a second cluster of cases. 
Figure 4.1 provides a graphic overview of the research methodology. The details of 
the methodology are discussed below. 
 
 
 
Source: Based on Yin (1994) 
 
Figure 4.1: Research methodology 
 
4.3.1 The First Cluster: Five Cases in the State of Guanajuato, Mexico 
 
As the main hypotheses both revolve around the issue of performance, the five case 
studies that were selected in the State of Guanajuato had to show varying performance. 
The idea being that this variation in performance could then be explained by a different 
pattern of adherence to one of the public management models, as the propositions 
would suggest. With this in mind a cluster of five case studies was selected in the State 
of Guanajuato in Mexico. The case studies were selected after consultation with Dr. 
Ricardo Sandoval, the Director of the State Water Commission of Guanajuato (CEAG) 
in May 2003. In addition to the variation in performance the cases were selected on the 
basis of two other criteria. These were: 
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1) The cases are all municipal utilities located in the State of Guanajuato in Mexico 
and as such are subject to a similar institutional environment. This means that the 
differences in terms of the institutional environment are likely to be limited. 
Moreover, all organizations are the same type of organization50. 
2) All but one of the utilities are of a similar scale, with all but one serving more than 
100,000 inhabitants and having between 15,000 and 22,500 connections. The one 
exception is the utility in the city of Moroleón, which serves a relatively small 
amount of people. However, the number of connection (12,495) is more in line 
with that of the other utilities. 
 
Table 4.3: Characteristics of five cases in Guanajuato in 2000 
Name of the utility Service 
Coverage 
(%) 
Service 
area 
(pop.) 
Water 
Connections 
Average 
Consumption 
(lt/hab/day) 
Sistema Municipal de Agua 
Potable y Alcantarillado de 
Guanajuato, (SIMAPAG) 
94.4 141,196 22,395 97 
Sistema de Agua Potable y 
Alcantarillado del Municipio de 
San Francisco del Rincon 
(SAPAF) 
93.7 100,239 15,540 100 
Sistema de Agua Potable y 
Alcantarillado Municipal de 
Valle de Santiago (SAPAM). 
94.5 130,821 15,569 99 
Comité Municipal de Agua 
Potable y Alcantarillado de 
Dolores Hidalgo (CMAPADH). 
95.6 128,994 15,094 84 
Sistema Municipal de Agua 
Potable y Alcantarillado de 
Moroleón (SMAPAM). 
96.5 47,132 12,495 103 
Source: Comisión Estatal del Agua de Guanajuato (2002) 
 
4.3.1.1 Replication Logic and Pattern Matching 
 
Testing of the propositions was done by focusing on the ‘replication logic’ as described 
by Yin (1994). For this cluster of five cases, I focused specifically on theoretical 
replication. Theoretical replication predicts that the researcher will find contrasting 
results but for predictable reasons. For the cluster of 5 cases in the state of Guanajuato, 
the differences that are ‘predicted’ relate to the adherence to the two management 
models.  
As mentioned above, the five cases that were selected showed varying 
performance. If the propositions are not false, the expectation is to find contrasting 
patterns of adherence to the two management models among these five cases, as the 
propositions link the performance of the utility to a specific management model. On the 
basis of the propositions stipulated at the end of chapter three, the prediction is that 
 
50 The ‘type of organization’ is used as it is described in chapter two 
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poorly performing utilities will show a pattern that indicates a strong adherence to the 
bureaucratic model. At the same time the prediction is that the well performing utility 
will show a contrasting pattern, one that indicates a stronger adherence to the New 
Public Management model. As such, the expectation is that contrasting patterns will be 
visible, but for predictable reasons. 
Testing for theoretical replication of the propositions was be done by using a 
‘pattern-matching logic’ (Yin 1994). The main idea behind pattern-matching is that by 
comparing an empirically based pattern with a predicted one (in essence the 
propositions as stipulated above), the validity of the propositions can be tested. This 
means that instead of statistical generalization this study shall adhere to the method of 
‘analytical generalization’ (Yin 1994). The predicted patterns for which we will analyze 
the case studies are based on the propositions stated earlier. This means that the pattern 
that is expected to characterize poorly performing utilities is as follows: 
 
• A stringent separation of the political and administrative realms 
• Hierarchy and levels in which higher levels supervise lower levels 
• Permanence and stability 
• Explicit internal regulations 
• Remuneration of employees by fixed salary levels 
• Employees who work in the utility out of vocation. 
   
The pattern that is predicted for the well performing utilities contrasts with the above 
mentioned pattern, which is based on the bureaucratic model. The predicted pattern for 
well performing utilities is as follows: 
 
• The utility enjoys a large degree of autonomy 
• The utility is strongly accountable to external agencies and the owner 
• The utility has a strong market-orientation 
• The utility has a strong customer-orientation 
• The utility has decentralized decision-making responsibilities 
• The utility holds individual employees accountable for results that these employees 
produce. 
 
In order to test the empirical pattern a semi-structured questionnaire was developed 
which was used as the guideline for data collection for all five cases. This semi-
structured questionnaire is presented in Annex three. The questionnaire was tested 
thoroughly in the context of the BNWP Public Modes of Engagement Program. On 
August 25th and August 26th, 2003, a workshop was held in Delft, the Netherlands, 
during which the semi-structured questionnaire was tested and discussed51.  
 
51 At the workshop the following people were present: David Tagg (consultant), Edna Aguiñaga 
(consultant), Do Nhat Hoang (MSc. Participant), Cesar Yñiguez (consultant), Meike van 
Ginneken (World Bank), Jan Janssens (World Bank), Bill Kingdom (World Bank), Jude Mwoga 
(consultant and NWSC), Phillip Pybus (consultant), Meine Pieter van Dijk (Professor UNESCO-
IHE), Irma Philips (M.A. student), Marian Kwietniewski, Fadhel Ghariani (consultant), Fernando 
Ruiz Mier (consultant), Pedro Rojas (MSc. Participant), Klaas Schwartz (UNESCO-IHE). 
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4.3.1.2 Data Collection 
 
Having selected the case studies and established a pattern for which to look for in the 
selected case studies, the next step was data collection. Apart from studying available 
documentation, reports and literature, data collection was undertaken in a number of 
ways. For each of the cases, the main method for collecting primary data was as 
follows: 
 
• In July of 2003, a first round of interviews, over a period of four weeks, was held 
by a local consultant52 using semi-structured questionnaire presented in Annex 
three as a guideline.  
• In October 2003, a second round of interviews, over a period of five weeks, was 
held at all utilities. This time both the local consultant and I undertook the 
interviews. As a guideline for the second round of interviews the semi-structured 
questionnaire was used again. This time, however, the answers provided in July 
were included. During this second round I attempted to collect any missing 
information and clarify any uncertainties from the first round of interviews. The list 
of people interviewed is presented in Annex four. 
• In September/October 2005, I undertook a final round of fieldwork lasting six 
weeks . The purpose of this last visit was to collect any missing data from the case 
studies that were still outstanding. 
 
4.3.2 The Second Cluster: Four ‘Well Performing’ Utilities 
 
In the course of 2003, the opportunity arose to undertake more case studies using the 
same guideline that was used for the five cases in Guanajuato. These cases were either 
undertaken as part of the BNWP project Public Modes of Engagement (BNWP 033) 
project or as Master of Science (MSc.) theses by MSc. students at the UNESCO-IHE 
Institute for Water Education or a combination of both. In contrast to the cases from 
Guanajuato, these cases are scattered around the globe, with two cases from Latin 
America, one from Africa and one from Asia. What makes these cases interesting is 
that all these cases are viewed and promoted as examples of well performing public 
water utilities. In this context these cases have received considerable publicity at 
various international fora and in numerous publications over the past years53. The main 
purpose of including these cases in this research is to check if the findings from the five 
cases in Guanajuato are corroborated by evidence from these four cases. The selection 
of these cases is based on: 
 
• Exemplary function. These cases have been presented in international fora and in 
publications as being examples of well performing utilities. The fact that three of 
these utilities were selected in the BNWP Public Modes of Engagement project, 
 
52 The local consultant who undertook the first round of interviews was Ms. Edna Aguiñaga, who 
was financed under the BNWP 033 project. 
53 In section 6.1 of chapter six, the recognition received by these utilities is elaborated upon. 
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which sought to analyze 10+5 cases of well performing public water utilities, 
supports this54. 
• The performance of the utility. All utilities are considered to be well performing or 
have shown remarkable improvements in performance over the past decade, and as 
such meet the criteria for well performing utilities stipulated earlier. 
• The scale of the utility. The utilities differ in scale. One of the utilities has a 
national mandate, two operate at state or provincial level and one is a municipal 
utility. As we are assuming that well performing utilities adhere to the NPM model, 
the issue of scale should not matter, so the same patterns should be observed 
regardless the scale of the utility. 
• Geographical spread. The utilities are geographically distributed over the 
continents. The geographical spread of the cases is important as it can contribute to 
the generalizability of the conclusions of this research as the utilities operate in a 
different institutional context. 
 
The second cluster of cases consists of the following four cases: 
 
• Hai Phong Water Supply Company (HPWSC), Vietnam 
• National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC), Uganda 
• SANASA, Campinas, Brazil 
• SADM, Monterrey, Mexico 
 
Three of these four cases (HPWSC, NWSC and SANASA) were identified as part of a 
larger sample of 10 cases, which was the focus of the BNWP Public Modes of 
Engagement project. Selection of these cases was based on a long-list of cases, which 
counted 27 utilities. These utilities were identified by sector professionals through 
interviews55. Selection of the final 10 cases from the list of 27 was based on a 
discussion between the different project members and task managers as to which cases 
would be most suitable for the BNWP 033 project. 
The case of SADM was added at a later stage. The reason for this is that this utility 
has the reputation of having a long tradition of good performance. SADM was, in fact, 
already mentioned in 1990 as being one of the best performing utilities in Latin 
America (Yepes 1990).  
Of these cases SANASA and SADM represent cases, which have performance 
indicators in-line with the definition of a well-functioning utility as provided in the 
previous chapter56. HPWSC and NWSC present a performance, which does not meet 
the criteria for a well performing utility as defined earlier. HPWSC has service 
coverage below 90% and unaccounted-for-water levels above 25%. The NWSC has 
unaccounted-for-water levels, which are well above 25% and staff per 1,000 employees 
 
54 The project sought to analyze 10 single case studies and five case studies which were subject to 
a smiliar institutional environment. These five cases were the five municipal water utilities in 
Guanajuato, Mexico.   
55 The majority of these interviews took place at the World Bank in January 2003. 
56 On the indicator of unaccounted for water SANASA scores 1% above the target of 25%. 
However, it was decided to include SANASA in light of the fact that the level of unaccounted for 
water improved significantly over the past decade, decreasing from 37% in 1995 to 26% in 2003. 
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above 7. The reason for including these cases, however, is that these indicators have 
improved noticeably over the past years. In the case of NWSC, unaccounted-for-water 
decreased from 42% in 1999 to 39% in 2003. In that same period, staff per 1,000 
connections decreased from 21 to 11 staff per 1,000 connections (Mwoga 2004). In the 
case Hai Phong, unaccounted for water decreased from 72% in 1992 to 32% in 2002. In 
that same time frame service coverage increased from 68% to 85% (Hoang 2004).
 
Table 4.4: Characteristics of 4 cases in 2002 
 Pop served 
(millions) 
Service 
coverage 
–water 
supply 
Level of 
decentralization 
UfW Working 
Ratio 
Staff per 
1000 
population 
served 
Hai Phong Water 
Company, Vietnam 
(HPWSC) 
0.54 85% Municipal 32% 0.62 1.27 
National Water and 
Sewerage Corporation, 
Uganda (NWSC) 
1.3 63% National 39% 0.79 0.72 
SANASA Campinas, 
Brasil  
0.98 98.9% Municipal 26% 0.79 1.68 
SADM, México57 3.44 99.18 Regional 24.94% 0.73 0.94 
Sources: Hoang 2004, Mwoga 2004, Aguiñaga 2004, Ramos 2005, Rangel 2005 
 
4.3.2.1 Literal Replication and Pattern-Matching 
 
This cluster of cases aims at ‘literal replication’. Literal replication predicts similar 
results in similar cases meaning that because all of these utilities are considered to be 
well performing utilities, they should also show similar adherence to the New Public 
Management model if the propositions are not false. Similar to theoretical replication 
for the five cases in Guanajuato, these cases were analyzed using ‘pattern-matching 
logic’. In fact, the patterns used for these four cases were the same as the patterns used 
for the cases in the State of Guanajuato. This means that the following pattern is 
predicted for these four cases: 
  
• The utility enjoys a large degree of autonomy 
• The utility is strongly accountable to external agencies and the owner 
• The utility has a strong market-orientation 
• The utility has a strong customer-orientation 
• The utility has decentralized decision-making responsibilities 
• The utility holds individual employees accountable for results that these employees 
produce. 
 
 
 
 
57 Figures from 2003 
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4.3.2.2 Data Collection for the Second Cluster of Four Well Performing 
Cases 
 
As mentioned earlier, the collection of data for the cluster of four well performing 
utilities is based on two main sources. These sources are the BNWP 033 Public Modes 
of Engagement Project and the research work undertaken by a number of MSc. students 
at the UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education. For the Master of Science theses at 
UNESCO-IHE, I was involved as supervisor in all cases. 
 
• For the case of Hai Phong, Vietnam, Mr. Do Nhat Hoang, applied the analytical 
framework in the period October 2003 – January 200458. In November 2003, I also 
visited the utility in Hai Phong with Mr. Hoang and together with him held 
interviews with managers at the utility and with the former managing director of 
the utility. The case description in the annex draws heavily on Mr. Hoang’s case 
description and my notes during the interviews in November 2003. 
• For the case of NWSC, Uganda, this study depended on two persons. As part of the 
BNWP 033 project, Mr. Mwoga undertook as case study of the NWSC in the fall 
of 2003. In addition, Mr. Mwoga defended his MSc. Thesis in 2003, which 
addressed the use of performance contracts by the NWSC. In addition, Ms. Irma 
Philips researched the NWSC for her Master of Arts Thesis in 2004 at the 
University of Twente, which was arranged in conjunction with the UNESCO-IHE 
and in which I was involved as the supervisor from UNESCO-IHE. Ms. Philips 
focused her thesis on the influence of the political environment of the functioning 
of NWSC. These three reports form the main source for the case description in the 
annex. 
• For the case of SANASA, Brazil, this research uses a consultant’s report by Ms. 
Edna Aguiñaga and a Master of Science study by Ms. Mara Ramos as the main 
sources. Ms. Aguiñaga’s consultancy report concerned a case study of SANASA in 
the context of the BNWP 033 project in January 2004. As part of her Master of 
Science thesis, Ms. Ramos visited SANASA in January 2005.  
• For the case of SADM, Mexico, this research depends strongly on the research of 
Mr. Rangel in the context of his Master of Science thesis at the UNESCO-IHE 
Institute for Water Education. For his MSc. Thesis Mr. Rangel undertook case 
studies of three utilities, which have different performance records, in the country 
of Mexico. The utility from Mr. Rangel’s selection of case studies with the best 
performance was SADM, which he visited for his fieldwork in the beginning of 
2005.  
 
 
58 For his MSc. Thesis, mr. Hoang compared three cities in Vietnam (Hai Phong, Hanoi and Ho 
Chi Minh City) applying the analytical framework described in Chapter three for all three cases 
(Hoang, 2004). The Hai Phong case doubled as a case for the BNWP 033 project. 
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 5 Five Public Water Utilities in the State of 
Guanajuato, Mexico 
In this chapter, the five case studies in the state of Guanajuato will be presented. This 
presentation begins by providing a very brief description of the five municipalities in 
which the water utilities operate. Once this description has been provided the level of 
performance of the five utilities is elaborated upon. This overview will show that one of 
the utilities can be classified as well performing, one as having improved performance 
substantially over a period of three years and three utilities are relatively poorly 
performing. After discussing the performance of the utilities, the chapter focuses on the 
legal framework and institutional set-up of the water supply and sanitation sector in the 
State of Guanajuato. All five cases operate within the same institutional setting and as 
such, the characteristics discussed apply to all five cases. Having identified the 
institutional setting, the most salient findings from the five case studies will be 
discussed in the third part of this chapter. The final part of this chapter consists of a 
cross-case comparison, in which the patterns found in the five case studies are 
compared in terms of their adherence to one of the public management models. This 
will lead to preliminary conclusions, which can be drawn about the propositions 
presented at the end of chapter three. In the following chapter these preliminary 
conclusions will then be compared with findings from the second cluster, which 
consists of four well performing utilities. 
5.1 Description of the Five Cases 
 
In this section a brief description of the five case studies in Guanajuato will be 
provided. Apart from the physical location of the municipality some salient features of 
the municipality will be elaborated upon. The public water utilities operate in the 
municipalities of Dolores Hidalgo, Moroleón, Valle de Santiago, San Francisco del 
Rincon, and Guanajuato. 
 
5.1.1 Dolores Hidalgo 
 
The Municipality of Dolores Hidalgo counts 129,000 inhabitants and is located in the 
center of the State of Guanajuato. The city is famous for being ‘the Cradle of National 
Independence’ as it was in this city that Don Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, pronounced his 
famous ‘Cry for Independence’ (El Grito) in the early morning hours of September 16th, 
1810. Apart from being the cradle of Independence, the municipality is known for its 
traditional ceramics industry. In terms of employment per economic activity, the 
manufacturing industry is Dolores’ largest employer, followed by agriculture and cattle 
farming, and commerce.  The per capita GDP in Dolores is approximately US$ 2,300 
below the state average of US$ 5,376 (Instituto Nacional para el Federalismo y el 
Desarrollo Municipal 2003). 
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 Figure 5.1: Location of the five utilities in Guanajuato 
 
5.1.2 Moroleón 
 
The municipality of Moroleón with its 47,000 inhabitants is located in the southern part 
of the State of Guanajuato bordering on the State of Michoacan. Although more than 
80% of its territory is used for agriculture, the main economic activity in terms of 
income generation in the municipality is the textile industry, which accounts for 91% of 
the municipality’s income. The industrial development of Moroleón is also evident in 
the per capita GDP, which lies about US$ 1,000 higher than the state average. The 
importance of the textile industry is also evident in the employment figures of 
Moroleón. Almost two-thirds of the population works either in the manufacturing 
industry (which is mainly focused on textile manufacturing) or in commerce (which has 
a strong focus on selling the products produced in the textile industry). 
 
5.1.3 Valle de Santiago 
 
The municipality of Valle de Santiago is located in the southern part of the State of 
Guanajuato. The per capita GDP of the more than 130,000 inhabitants living in the 
municipality of Valle de Santiago is considerably less than the State average. In fact, 
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the per capita GDP is almost US$ 2,000 below the state average. About 70% of the 
territory of Valle is used for agriculture and cattle farming. The main crops harvested 
include corn, beans, sorghum and alfalfa. 
 
5.1.4 San Francisco del Rincon 
 
The municipality of San Francisco del Rincon was created by the governor of the State 
of Guanajuato in 1867. The municipality is located in the western part of the State of 
Guanajuato. The per capita GDP in the municipality lays approximately US$4,000 
above the State average, which is largely explained by the prominence of the industrial 
and manufacturing sector in San Francisco del Rincon. The main manufacturing 
activities, for which this municipality is renowned, concern the production of footwear 
and hats. The prominence of the manufacturing and industrial sector is also visible in an 
overview of industrial activities in terms of the employment of the municipality’s 
residents. Whereas a municipality like Valle de Santiago had only 10% of its residents 
working in the industrial and manufacturing sector, more than half the employed 
population works in this sector in San Francisco.  
 
Table 5.1: General characteristics of the five cases in the State of Guanajuato (2000) 
Indicator Dolores 
Hidalgo 
Moroleón Valle de 
Santiago 
San Francisco 
del Rincon 
Guanajuato 
Total population 128,994 47,132 130,821 100,239 141,196 
Population growth 
1995-2000 (%) 1.63 0 -0.09 0.6 1.95 
Population density 
(persons per km2) 81 262 156.54 194 140 
Dwellings 24,015 10,838 26,307 18,975 28,871 
Literacy rate (%) 82.8 90.2 86.2 89.5 92.6 
Population earning less 
that minimum wage (%) 10.4 9.12 14.82 5.62 8.23 
Population earning 
between 1 and 2 times 
minimum wage (%) 
37.2 28.41 34.73 28.97 26.04 
Population earning 
between 2 and 5 times 
minimum wage (%) 
26.72 38.69 23.50 45.43 38.53 
GDP per capita  (US$) 3,004 6,365 3,716 10,410 6,979 
Infant mortality rate (per 
1,000 live births) 29.10 21.6 26.2 23.3 24.10 
Life expectancy index59 0.80 0.86 0.82 0.84 0.84 
Source: Instituto Nacional para el Federalismo y el Desarrollo Municipal 2003 
 
 
59 The life expectancy index is calculated by applying the following general formula: LFI = 
(Actual value – minimum value)/ (maximum value – minimum value). In this formula the 
maximum value is considered to be 85 years and the minimum value 25 years. The result of this 
formula is an indicator between 0 and 1. The United States, for example, have a life expectancy 
index of 0.87. Kenya has a life expectancy index of 0.34 (United Nations Development 
Programme 2004) 
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5.1.5 Guanajuato 
 
The municipality of Guanajuato is the capital of the State of Guanajuato. It not only 
houses the State Government offices, but also the main buildings of the University of 
Guanajuato, which is attended by some 15,000 students. The municipality is located in 
the center of the State and is renowned for its colonial architecture, which was 
constructed following the discovery of silver in the vicinity in the late 1500’s. The city 
has since received the status of UNESCO World Heritage site. The presence of the 
University and the State Government is visible in the employment structure in 
Guanajuato. Close to 1 out of 10 people works in the education sector and 1 in 20 for 
government. With the colonial city being a World Heritage site, the tourist industry is 
very important. The manufacturing and industry sector provides employment to about 
11% of the working population. 
5.2 Comparison of Performance for Five Utilities in the State of 
Guanajuato 
 
As mentioned in the methodology, the selection of the five case studies is based on the 
possibility of making a distinction in the performance of these utilities. Below the 
performance of the five utilities is compared for the period between 1995 and 2002. 
Over this period the performance of these utilities shows substantial variation. Not only 
does performance vary considerably between service providers, but also within one 
service provider performance at times shows a large variation from one year to the next. 
Over these seven years, unaccounted for water levels have shown significant fluctuation 
for many of the utilities. In one case (SAPAF), unaccounted for water supposedly 
jumped from below 20% to well over 50% in the span of 1 year. In the case of SAPAM, 
the official data suggests that the UfW went from over 60% to 15% and back up to 35% 
in the span of four years. A number of factors can explain such tremendous variations. 
Part of the large fluctuations could possibly be explained by poor measurement of 
unaccounted for water over the paste decade leading these utilities to simply estimate 
UfW. Another possible, and perhaps more likely, explanation is that it may have been 
politically desirable for the utility to report estimates which are much more optimistic 
than realistically possible. As such, the extreme downward peaks in this graph (the 
sharp downward drops followed by sharp increases) should be taken with some caution. 
Nonetheless, the most consistent of the utilities is SIMAPAG, which has reduced its 
unaccounted-for-water from close to 40% to 18% over the past 7 years at a steady pace. 
SIMAPAG is the only utility, which has managed to have unaccounted for water rates, 
which lie below or slightly above the 25% mark between 1999 and 2002. 
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Figure 5.2: Unaccounted for water 1995-2002 
 
Whereas the unaccounted-for-water presents an indication of the state of physical 
infrastructure, the ratio of income generated versus income required presents an 
indication of the financial viability of the utility. In figure 5.3, this ratio is presented for 
the utilities over the 1995-2002 period. From the graph it is clear that the only utility 
that is managing to generate enough income is the utility of SIMAPAG. The other 
utilities seem to cover only 60%-80% of their required needs. Impressive is also the 
significant increase displayed by the utility from Valle de Santiago, which in 1998 only 
met approximately 40% of its requirements, whilst in 2002 managed to achieve well 
over 90% of its requirements. 
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Figure 5.3: Actual versus required income 1995-2002 
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The main explanation of why SIMAPAG was able to meet its requirements and why the 
utility from Valle de Santiago has shown impressive improvements is that in 2002 these 
utilities had the highest tariff levels of the five utilities. SIMPAG, which has been able 
to meet its requirements (more or less) for the 5-year period between 1997 and 2002, 
has by far the highest tariffs. The tariff level in Valle has more or less tripled over the 
same time period. 
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Figure 5.4: Tariff levels 1995-2002 
 
Whereas SIMAPAG is the best-performing utility in terms of unaccounted-for-water 
and in terms of generating income to meet the requirements, the utility performs 
relatively poorly in terms of the number of employees per 1,000 connections. All other 
utilities have between 2.5 and 4.5 staff per 1,000 connections, whilst SIMAPAG has 
almost 8 staff per 1,000 connections. Also of interest is that the figure for SAPAM has 
increased considerably between 2001 and 2002. 
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Figure 5.5: Staff per 1,000 connections 1995-2002 
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Although the value of 8 staff per 1,000 connections places SIMAPAG at the limit of 
being a ‘well performing utility’, as defined by this research in chapter two, not too 
much emphasis will be placed on this issue. First of all, as Tynan and Kingdom 
(2002:1) mention in their presentation of performance of a utility operational efficiency 
is defined as the “lowest cost use of labor, energy, water and materials in the day-to-day 
operation of a utility, with the most efficient combination partly dependent on local 
input prices and prior capital investment decisions” (emphasis added). If local input 
prices for labor are relatively low, then staff per 1,000 connections may be relatively 
higher than in locations in which labor costs are relatively high, without losing 
operational efficiency. The second argument is that the importance of operational 
efficiency lies in the fact that it influences the level of cost recovery of the utility. 
Increasing efficiency, in other words, is a means of improving the financial 
performance of the utility. Efficiency gains could then be used for a variety of purposes 
such as decreasing tariffs if the utility operates at cost recovering levels, increasing 
investment, or other goals that the utility may want to achieve. However, as we have 
seen from the level of actual income versus required income, SIMAPAG is the only 
utility which has income levels close to the required levels. Moreover, if we compare 
the salary costs in relation to total expenses, SIMAPAG turns out to be placed in 
between the other utilities. The ratio of salary costs to total expenditure for 2001 was as 
follows: SAPAM (30%), SMAPAM (32%), SIMAPAG (35%), CMAPADH (42%) and 
SAPAF (50%) (CEAG 2001; CEAG 2002). 
On the basis of the comparison in performance, two distinct groups can be 
distinguished. One group consists of SIMAPAG, which displays the best performance 
of these utilities. The other group consists of the remaining four utilities. Of these four 
utilities, however, the case of SAPAM deserves some extra attention. The reason being 
that within the water supply and sanitation community in Guanajuato, the water utility 
was recognized as having dramatically improved its performance over the 2000-2003 
period and for this reason received an award from the State Water Commission in 
Guanajuato in 2003. Elements of the improvement can be seen in terms of the financial 
viability of the water utility, which increased sharply in this period.  
5.3 The Water Sector in the State of Guanajuato 
 
As mentioned in chapter two, when looking at the water supply and sanitation sector it 
is important to observe which entity is responsible for what step in the service provision 
process, what the characteristics are of that organization and if the responsible 
organization(s) contract third parties to undertake parts or all of the steps for which they 
bear responsibility. In this section the legal framework and the institutional set-up of the 
water services sector in the state of Guanajuato will be discussed in greater detail. This 
framework is the same for each of the five utilities, which will be the focus in the 
remainder of this chapter. 
 
5.3.1 Legal Framework for the Provision of Water Services in Mexico  
 
In identifying how the responsibilities for providing water services have been attributed 
to the different organizations, it is necessary to understand that Mexico is a federation 
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in which a hierarchical relationship exists between the different levels of Government 
and the legislation that is produced at the different levels. In the case of Mexico, the 
responsibilities for providing water services are first addressed in the Mexican 
Constitution. The most important articles in the Constitution with respect to the water 
supply and sanitation sector are article 27 and article 115. Article 27 arranges that the 
Federal Government has ownership of the country’s water resources and they have the 
authority to provide water rights and concessions to third parties. Article 115 arranges 
the responsibilities of the municipalities. Article 115 was modified in the early 1980’s 
to attribute increasing powers to the municipalities, including the responsibility for 
providing public services such as water supply, drainage, sewerage, treatment of 
wastewater, and disposal of wastewater. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Legal framework for the provision of water services in Mexico 
 
5.3.1.1 The National Water Law 
 
The National Water Law, which comes forth from Article 27 of the Constitution, 
provides for the general institutional framework in which the water sector is managed 
in Mexico. The National Water Law was enacted in 1992, revised in 1998 and was 
under revision again in 2003. The National Water Law states that it is the role of the 
Federal Government to manage the national water resources (dams, rivers, etc.) and to 
sell these resources to four categories of users. These four categories are irrigation 
districts, hydropower systems, industrial users and municipalities. Article 45 of the 
National Water Law further stipulates that it is the responsibility (competencia) of the 
municipal authorities to arrange the exploitation and use of water resources that are 
attributed to them60. The National Water Law furthermore attributes specific 
responsibilities to the National Water Commission (Comisión Nacional del Agua - 
CNA).  
 
60 It should be noted that only a fraction (6%) of the total water resources are used for urban 
water supply (Capital Advisors 1999) 
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5.3.1.2 Guanajuato State Water Law 
 
The State Water Law was developed by the State Water Commission (Comisión Estatal 
del Agua de Guanajuato - CEAG) of Guanajuato together with CNA and was published 
in the Official Newspaper of the State of Guanajuato in 2000. The State Water Law 
reiterates article 115 of the Constitution and explains that the municipalities are to 
create an autonomous public agency or another form of organization stipulated in the 
Law of Municipal Organizations. The law furthermore stipulates that service providers 
should charge tariffs, which are sufficient for covering the costs of service provision 
and provides guidelines for the municipalities, which are to determine the actual tariffs. 
In addition to providing these guidelines the State Water Law spells out the obligations 
(and the resources) of the State Water Commission.  
 
5.3.1.3 Guanajuato State Law on Municipal Organizations 
 
The Guanajuato State Law on Municipal Organization has the objective of regulating 
the government, structure and functioning of the Municipalities. Article 141 of this Law 
attributes the responsibilities of “drinking water, drainage, sewage collection, treatment 
and discharge”. This Law also makes the creation of ‘autonomous agencies’ 
(organismos decentralizados) possible that become responsible for undertaking part of 
the responsibilities attributed to the municipalities. In fact article 146 of this Law finds 
the autonomous agency to be the preferred option for organizing the provision of water 
services at the municipal level. The creation of these autonomous agencies, which 
remain subject to the coordination and supervision of the municipal government, is 
subject to a set of specific requirements, which are stipulated in Article 127. Amongst 
others, these requirements include: 
 
• The goals of the organization; 
• Relationship with the municipal government; 
• Establishment and characteristics of a monitoring entity; 
• Anything else that needs to be arranged to perform its functions. 
 
Another important aspect is that the Law states that in case an autonomous agency is 
responsible for the provision for a ‘public service’, the Municipal Government will, 
based on a proposal of the relevant agency, set the tariffs and publish them in the 
official State Journal. This means that for the municipal water utilities of Guanajuato 
the municipal government, which in Mexico is strongly dominated by the municipal 
president, has the authority to set tariffs. Furthermore, this law arranges the reporting 
requirements of the agency. The agency is to report to the Municipal Government every 
three months and the Municipal Government can request information at any time it 
feels it is necessary.   
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5.3.2 Institutional Set-up of the Water Sector 
 
The legislation described above provides the legal backbone for the service provision 
process in the State of Guanajuato. The water services sector in the State of Guanajuato 
is characterized by a wide array of organizations, which play a role in the water sector 
of Guanajuato. What complicates matters is that these actors and organizations operate 
at federal, state and municipal level. What results is a complex overview of 
organizations as depicted in figure 5.7. The role of the organizations mentioned in this 
figure will be elaborated upon below. 
 
5.3.2.1 Federal Level 
 
At the federal level 6 main actors or organizations play a role in the water sector. As 
figure 5.7 shows, some of these federal organizations are also deconcentrated to state 
and even municipal level. Below the main responsibilities of the actors and 
organizations at the federal level is briefly described. 
 
5.3.2.1.1 The President 
According to article 27 of the Constitution, the Mexican President has the authority to 
regulate the abstraction and use of the nation’s water. The President also has the 
possibility to propose new laws relating to the water sector. Moreover, the President has 
considerable influence on the national water policy as he is authorized to appoint the 
Minister of the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources (Secretaría de 
Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales - SEMARNAT) and the National Water 
Commission.   
 
5.3.2.1.2 The National Congress 
The National Congress has the responsibility of approving the annual federal budget as 
well as approving national legislation related to the water sector. As such, they have 
influence on the national water policy as it passes through the two chambers of the 
National Congress. 
 
5.3.2.1.3 Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT) 
The main objective of SEMARNAT is to constitute a national policy for environmental 
protection in order to establish a foundation for sustainable development of the country. 
The National Water Commission, whose tasks are elaborated upon below, officially 
falls under the umbrella of SEMARNAT. 
 
5.3.2.1.4 National Water Commission (CNA) 
The National Water Commission is supervised by a Technical Council, in which a 
number of Federal Ministries are represented. The CNA is organized as a 
deconcentrated organization with offices at the central level (1), regional levels (13) 
and state levels. The national CNA office develops the national water policy and 
supports the operation of the regional and state offices. The regional offices are 
organized on a hydrological basis, having a strong focus on the management of water 
resources. The state offices apply the policies, strategies and programs developed by 
 80
 81
•
•
•
•  
B
CNA in their respective states. The main responsibilities attributed to the Commission 
in relation to the water supply and sanitation sector include: 
 
• To propose the national water policy to the President; 
• To set norms relating to the quantity and quality of water use;   
• To support the development of water supply and sanitation systems; 
• To issue concessions for the abstraction of water resources and the discharge of 
effluents; 
• To issue and monitor water rights;  
• o monitor the application of the National Water Law. T
 
N
 
orms set by the CNA are applicable to all water utilities and include: 
• NOM-003-CNA-1996: regarding requirements for the construction of groundwater 
wells; 
• NOM-004-CNA-1996: regarding protection of aquifers during maintenance, 
rehabilitation and cancellation of wells; 
• NOM-001-ECOL-1996: regarding standards for wastewater discharge to water 
sources 
• NOM-002-ECOL-1996: regarding standards for wastewater discharge to sewer 
systems 
 
5.3.2.1.5 Ministry of Health (SS) 
The Ministry of Health sets the standards for drinking water quality. Like most federal 
organizations the Ministry of Health operates at various levels, having offices at both 
the state and municipal level. The national Ministry sets the national norms for drinking 
water quality, whilst the state and municipal offices of the Ministry of Health undertake 
inspection of adherence to these norms. These norms, which are applicable to all water 
tilities include: u
 
 NOM 012-SSA1-1993: regarding standards that must be met by drinking water 
supply systems; 
 NOM 013-SSA1-1993: regarding standards that must be met by transport and 
distribution of drinking water by truck; 
• NOM 014-SSA1-1993: regarding procedures for taking samples of drinking water; 
 NOM 127-SAA1-1994: regarding quality and treatment standards for drinking 
water; 
 PROY-NOM-179-1998: Regarding monitoring, evaluation and control of drinking
water quality distributed by the water supply systems 
 
5.3.2.1.6 Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicios Públicos (BANOBRAS) 
In light of the importance of public infrastructure for the economic development of the 
country, a development bank for public infrastructure projects was created in 1933. 
This bank was later transformed into BANOBRAS and operates under the Ministry of 
Finance (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público). Similar to other national agencies, 
ANOBRAS also has agencies operating at the state level.  
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Figure 5.7: Overview of the organizations in the water sector of Guanajuato 
5.3.2.2 The State Level 
 
Every state government is structured according to its own constitution and 
administrative laws. The most important state law in Guanajuato concerning the water 
supply and sanitation sector is the Water Law for the State of Guanajuato, which was 
promulgated in the year 2000. This law organizes the planning, management, 
conservation and preservation of water in the State. Moreover, it establishes the general 
basis for the municipalities to provide the services of water supply and sanitation. As 
such, this law arranges the roles and responsibilities of the different actors in the water 
sector of the State of Guanajuato.  
 
5.3.2.2.1 State Government 
Apart from monitoring the performance and functioning of the State Water 
Commission, the Role of the State Government is officially relatively limited. The main 
role played by the State Government is that they are able to control the access that 
water utilities have to financial resources. This control is done in a number of ways. 
First of all, the State Government is able to provide guarantees for loans from the 
development Bank, BANOBRAS and other possible financiers. Secondly, the utility is 
also able to influence the budget available for the State Water Commission, which in 
turn can allocate funds to municipal utilities. Finally, the municipalities let their tariff 
proposals pass through the State Legislature for approval, although this is generally 
nothing more than a formality. 
 
5.3.2.2.2 State Water Commission (CEAG) 
As stipulated by the Water Law for the State of Guanajuato the State Water 
Commission is an organization with a separate legal status, which is headed by a 
Commission of Directors, chaired by the State Governor or a representative of the 
Governor. In addition to the chairman the Commission consists of representatives from 
a number of state ministries, six representatives from municipal councils, one 
representative for each use of the water (i.e., domestic, commercial, industrial, etc.) and 
the executive secretary of the State Water Commission 
The State Water Commission has among others the following responsibilities61: 
 
• To implement policies, strategies, objectives, programs and norms that lead to the 
optimal use of water in the state; 
• To take concrete actions to preserve and conserve water in the State; 
• To promote a ‘culture of water’, which considers water a vital and scarce resource 
that must be used rationally and efficiently; 
• To advise, following a request from the municipal councils, in the development of 
municipal programs for water services, such as providing support and technical 
advice to water utilities; 
• Anything else that is stipulated in the State Water Law and its regulations. 
 
 
61 Ley de Aguas para el Estado de Guanajuato: article 6 
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The funds that CEAG has at its disposal form the main instrument by way of which it 
can influence the development of the state’s water supply and sanitation sector. Rather 
than influence the functioning of utilities by way of sanctions and penalties, CEAG 
applies an incentive system based on the access to the grants that are part of the 
programs that it manages. However, because many of the funds received by CEAG are 
earmarked as well as the fact that CEAG’s budget must receive prior approval from the 
State Congress, CEAG has limited flexibility in the way it wishes to allocate the funds 
that it possesses. 
 
5.3.2.3 Municipal Level 
 
Apart from the deconcentrated federal agencies, the municipal level has two main 
organizations that play a crucial role in the provision of water services. These 
organizations are the Municipal Government and the Municipal water utilities. 
 
5.3.2.3.1 Municipal Government 
In the state of Guanajuato the municipalities are the owners of the water supply and 
sanitation utilities. Each municipality adopts and publishes statutes, which stipulate the 
institutional set up of the utility (including the role of the Board of Directors, the 
Managing Director, the Municipal Representative in the Board, etc.). According to the 
State Water Law of Guanajuato the municipal councils have the following 
responsibilities: 
 
• Develop, implement and evaluate policies aimed at the promotion of sustainable 
water development in the municipality; 
• Approve the tariffs for the provision of water services; 
• Implement actions in order to prevent the pollution of water and improve its quality 
in accordance with relevant regulations; 
• Approve, publish and to follow up on municipal water services programs; 
• Negotiate with other municipalities about the creation of intermunicipal service 
providers; 
• Anything else that is mentioned by law or regulations. 
  
5.3.2.3.2 Water utilities 
Actual service provision is done by the municipal water utilities. In the cases studied 
these were all ‘autonomous agencies’ as described in the State Law on Municipal 
Organization. Each utility has its own set of statutes that specify how the utility is set-
up, administrated and functions. The regulations also specify in greater detail how the 
tariffs are to be set and any other matter the municipal government decided to arrange 
n the regulations. i
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5.4 Cross-case Comparison for the Five Utilities in the State of 
Guanajuato 
 
In this section the findings of the five case studies are presented. The findings relate to 
the different dimensions of the bureaucratic model and the New Public Management 
ighlighted in chapter three. For each dimension thh
p
e main observations will be 
r d s will be discussed in greater 
e s in the form of a large table, 
degree to which the organization follows internal regulations. 
ccoun e discussed following the discussion about autonomy, 
lates  the management of the utility is held accountable for the 
es. Instead of discussing all findings extensively, the 
cus
er
• 
 implement 
• 
esente first in bullet form. Then the main observation
tail. Each section ends with a short summary of the cased
which illustrates important features for that dimension.  
 
5.4.1 Autonomy and accountability of the utilities 
 
The autonomy of the utility essentially relates to the degree to which the management 
of the utility is able to make decisions regarding the provision of water services. The 
discussion below, however, also provides information regarding the degree to which the 
utilities can be seen as being apolitical or not, the permanence and stability of the 
rganization, and the o
A tability, which will b
to the degree to whichre
decisions they make.  
 
5.4.1.1 Autonomy 
 
Prior to discussing the findings, this section starts with an overview of observations 
ade from the case studim
dis sions focus on what I consider to be the most important issues. A detailed 
discussion for each individual case study can be found in Annex 3. The main 
vations are as follows: obs
 
For all utilities, the Ministry of Health and the CNA set the norms for water 
supply quality and wastewater discharge; 
• SIMAPAG appears to be better able to attract qualified staff, though this better 
ability is limited. The main advantage that SIMAPAG has is that as a bigger 
organization it can provide (limited) opportunities for growth that the smaller 
utilities cannot. 
The municipality • controls pay scales. The only utility that was able to
its own pay scales was SAPAM in the 2000-2003 period. 
• SIMAPAG is the only utility able to generate sufficient income to meet the 
required income. 
In all cases the municipality controls the tariff level and structure. 
With the exception of SIMAPAG increase in tariffs do not appear to • be in line 
with the level of inflation. Moreover, apart from the tariff indexation in 
SIMAPAG, the tariff increases are not systematic (meaning that proposed 
increases continuously require approval from the municipal president). 
 85
• All utilities remain dependent on external funds from CEAG, CNA and, in some 
cases, the municipality. 
Almost all utilities face difficulties with respect to water resources. SMAPAM 
appears to be the onl
• 
y exception. 
 SAPAF and SIMAPAG appear to have been the most ‘stable’ organizations in 
s Council. However, in the case of 
eriod. This means that in 1999, the utility was 
only
elec
•
term  of changes in management and the 
SIMAPAG this has changed since 2003 and SAPAF experienced some 
turbulence in 2001. 
 
5.4.1.1.1 Financial Autonomy and Tariff Levels 
First of all, the major observation is that what distinguishes SIMAPAG from the other 
utilities is its level of financial autonomy. This finding largely supports existing 
research, which finds the level of financial autonomy to be of crucial importance for the 
performance of public utilities (Cullivan et al. 1988; Islam 1993; Hoffer 1994; Bately 
1999). Although it is clear that none of the utilities come close to full cost recovery, and 
the assistance of CEAG and CNA are of critical importance for all utilities, SIMAPAG 
is the only utility which has tariff levels which are sufficiently high to meet its required 
expenditure. What is also relevant in this context is the way in which tariffs are 
increased. In SIMAPAG a system of automatic monthly tariff increases exists. In the 
period 1997-2003, the tariffs would automatically increase by 1.1%. In this time period, 
tariff increases were automatic unless the municipality would intervene actively. In the 
case of the other utilities, tariff increases, in so far as they took place, all took the form 
of requests sent to the municipality, which then had to approve the requested tariff 
increase. As no elected official likes to raise tariffs, the consequence is that in all 
utilities, apart from SIMAPAG, the tariffs lagged behind the level of inflation, meaning 
that the real tariffs were dropping. Perhaps the most striking example of this hesitation 
of increasing tariffs is provided by SAPAM. The doubling of the tariffs in 2000 was the 
first increase in tariffs in a nine-year p
 able to charge the same tariffs it had been charging in 1990. It would appear that 
the lack of tariff increases in this nine year period conflicts with the State Water Law, 
which stipulates that service providers should charge tariffs, which are sufficient for 
covering the costs of service provision. 
What this discussion about tariffs also indicates is the enormous dependency that 
the utility has on the municipal president. Assuming that the municipal president does 
not decide to replace the entire management (or a large part thereof), and decides to 
work with the existing management, for that management everything depends on the 
degree to which the municipal president understands and is willing to support realistic 
tariff levels and, as such, the functioning of the utility (regardless the stipulations of the 
State Water Law). If the management is lucky, they will receive this support and at 
least have a period of three years, until the next election and the next municipal 
president to try to improve performance. If they are not, then they just have to make do 
with what they have. Even if the utility has had a period of support, such as in the case 
of SIMAPAG between 1995 and 2003, nothing guarantees that this will not change 
once the next elections come around. In fact in 2003, just prior to the municipal 
tions, the municipality of Guanajuato decided to reduce the level of inflation from 
1.1% per month to a level of 0.01% per month. This level of 0.01% is well below the 
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level of inflation meaning that since October 2003, the real tariff levels have been 
dropping. In time, if this situation persists, it will erode SIMAPAG’s financial viability. 
Not only is municipal support relevant for tariff levels. The cases show that almost 
all issues relating to potential costs that could be incurred by the utility (pay scales, 
loans, etc.) all require the approval and support of the municipal president. In a way, 
this is understandable. Because it is basically inconceivable that a water utility would 
be allowed to go bankrupt and that service provision to the citizens of that municipality 
would cease, the municipality, as the owner, has to provide the guarantee that the utility 
ill be able to meet its expenses. If necessary, this may require transfers from the 
 result, the municipality would want to ensure 
ement of the organization. This 
ability depends greatly on the municipal president. Upon the election of a new 
 replaces the management (or a large 
f) o r supply and sanitation utilities. Table 5.2 below shows the 
gene
 
2: Chang
w
municipal government to the utility. As a
that the management of the water utility does not enter in any expensive obligations, 
without prior approval of the municipal president.   
 
5.4.1.1.2 Stability of the organization 
A second observation that can be made from analyzing the cases is that few of the cases 
have achieved a high degree of stability in the manag
st
municipal president, the incoming president often
part thereo f the wate
changes in ral managers for the five case studies. 
es in general managers of the utilitiesTable 5.
Utility 
 
Changes  
SIMAPAG One general manager from 1995-2000. Replaced by someone who lasted less 
than a year. From 2001-2003 another general manager, who was replaced in 
2003 by another general manager.   
SAPAF Very stable until 2000 when the general manager for more than 20 years was 
replaced by a ‘friend’ of the mayor. After a year, the new general manager 
resigned and the ‘old’ general manager took up his old position again. 
SAPAM Following the municipal elections in 2000, the entire management team was 
replaced. In 2003, the entire management team was again replaced following 
municipal elections. 
CMAPADH Up to 2000, the managing director was replaced frequently with almost no 
managing director lasting more than a year. Between 2000 and 2003 the same 
ral manager held office. gene
SMAPAM ality forced 
changes in the Council (making the vice-president the president of the 
Relatively stable between 199562 and 2002, when the municip
Council63) and appointed a new general manager. The changes in the Council 
and the appointment of a new general manager were subject to challenge. 
Source: Interviews with the Managing Directors, October 2003. 
   
Important in the case of SIMAPAG is that despite changes in the general manager in 
the 2000-2003 period, the management team itself remained relatively stable. 
 
62 In 1995, a new managing director was appointed but he was replaced six months later by the 
managing director who would keep that position until 2002.  
63 The position of President of the Council in SAPAF is the only position in the Council for 
which financial compensation is available. 
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Illustrative is that the general manager between 2001-2003 was also on the management 
team under the general manager who served from 1995-2000. However, the change in 
general manager in 2003, who resigned under pressure from the Council, is different as 
it was preceded by three members of the management team ‘resigning’64. What is even 
more striking, however, is that the chairman of the Council, overseeing the functioning 
of SIMAPAG, subsequently took over the position of general manager. This shifting of 
positions, in which a Council member first presses the general manager to resign and 
then
trast between 
SIM
In the Mexican public sector, it is possible to broadly distinguish two levels of 
empl 5) 
prov
 
 
 fills the vacant position does seem to present some conflict of interests. The 
conflict of interests becomes even more pronounced when one realizes that the ‘new’ 
general manager is also the cousin of the municipal president who was elected in 2003. 
The main performance improvement achieved by SIMAPAG over the 1995-2003 
period, is accredited to the general manager who managed the utility between 1995-
2000, Raul Silva, and whose work was subsequently continued by the general manager 
from 2001-2003. Despite the changes of the managing director over this period, the 
management itself remained relatively stable. From the interviews held during the 
fieldwork, this stability is considered to be a pre-requisite for improving performance in 
the long-term. In that sense a comparison with SAPAM is useful. In 2000, following a 
period of exceptionally poor performance, the incoming municipal president in the 
municipality of Valle de Santiago decided to remove the Council and the general 
manager of the water utility. The new general manager brought in an entirely new 
management team from the municipality of Salamanca. The new management of the 
water utility managed, with support from the municipality65, to start improving 
performance, to the degree that the State Water Commission of Guanajuato officially 
recognized the improvement in performance in 2003. However, the management team 
did not survive the municipal elections held in 2003. In the immediate aftermath of the 
elections, the municipal president, who up to the point of his election had run a butcher-
shop in Valle de Santiago, decided to replace all members of the management team. 
What is even more striking is that they were replaced by people with very little 
experience in the water supply and sanitation sector. The main con
APAG and SAPAM in this sense is that whereas SIMAPAG had the time, and 
relatively stable environment, to improve performance, no such stability existed for 
SAPAM, despite their recognized performance in the 2000-2003 period. 
oyees66. The description below, taken from Arellano and Guerrero (2003:16
ides a useful elaboration on the nature of the Mexican bureaucracy.  
“First, there are low-level employees (empleados de base), who are unionized 
and cannot be fired, including drivers, maintenance staff, secretaries, archivists, 
and lower technical staff who generally lack a university education. Second, 
there are the medium- and high-level public officials, called funcionarios de 
confianza (literally, “confidence officials”, similar to political appointees in the 
United States) who are responsible for all the substantive areas of public 
64 In very few cases someone is actually fired. Rather the manager in question is strongly 
persuaded to ‘resign for personal reasons’. 
65 Again, support was evident in the tariff increase that was allowed by the municipal president. 
66 In this distinction the levels of medium and high public officials have been combined.  
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administration. These appointees traditionally have been accountable for their 
performance only to the official who appointed them and can also fire them 
without difficulty when they cease to be useful or when they no longer have the 
trust of their boss. The low-level employees have little chance of being 
promoted or making a career […], while political appointees are in charge of 
making decisions and controlling budget and resource allocation. For the first 
group, the benefits are job security and stability. For members of the second 
 employment (as 
lso mentioned by Arellano and Guerrero). Especially in municipalities such as 
e struggling with global competition 
indus  the of em
 
 condi  staff of  utilities 
Com ive 
Sal
Devel t and 
promotion possibilities in 
the utility 
Job ity 
group, benefits are better salaries and resources, as well as political protection 
and access as long as they are useful to their superiors […].” 
 
Although, management (the ‘confidence officials’) of the water utilities is subject to 
frequent changes, the opposite seems to apply to the non-management employees of the 
organization. Most of the utilities tend to have very stable workforces with very little 
staff turnover. In fact, apart from SIMAPAG, which had turnover levels of 4.3%, the 
other utilities had levels well below 1%. The main reason for these low turnover rates 
seem to be the relatively favorable working hours and the security of
a
Moroleón and San Francisco del Rincon, which ar
for their trial products,  security ployment is appealing.  
Table 5.3: Labor
Utilities 
tions for
parat
 the five
Work 
ary level schedule 
opmen  secur
SIMAPAG High 8:00-16:00 High High 
CMAPADH Low 8:00-16:00 Low High 
SAPAF High 8:00-16:00 Low High 
SMAPAM Low 8:00-16:00 Low High 
SAPAM Low 8:00-16:00 Low High 
 
Having said this, two important qualifications need to be made. The first qualification is 
that although stability appears important, it should also be emphasized that what 
initiated performance improvements in SIMAPAG and SAPAM was a change in 
management. Part (perhaps even a large part) of the reason why these two utilities were 
able to improve performance was that a new manager/management entered the utility 
with
relatively stable, but whereas SIMAPAG appears to have the capacity (both financial 
ization operates. For very small utilities, such as SAPAF, labor 
 new ideas, and who was able to implement these ideas with support of the 
municipal president. In other words, keeping poor management stable basically does 
little more than prolong poor management.  
Secondly, although stability is a pre-requisite for improving performance over 
time, it is in itself not a sufficient factor. This can be illustrated by comparing the most 
stable of the utilities, namely SAPAF with SIMAPAG. Both organizations have been 
and in terms of human resources) to improve performance SAPAF seems to lack this 
capacity67. Even though SAPAF has the required authority, is headed by what appears 
 
67 To some extent, this would mean that the level of labor productivity should be seen within the 
context in which the organ
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to be a capable general manager and is not subject to frequent political intervention, it 
simply does not have the capacity to really improve service provision. In other words, 
without capacity, in terms of financial capacity (generating sufficient income) as well 
as in terms of human resources (having sufficient man-power to improve performance), 
stability of management appears to have little impact. 
In summary, it can be observed that the researched water utilities in Guanajuato 
seem to be characterized by the friction between the management’s long-term goals of 
performance improvement (assuming that the management follows the aims and 
objectives of providing water services) and the short-term (political) goals of the 
municipal presidents. The frequent changes in many of the utilities studied, both in 
management positions and in the Council, mean that it is virtually impossible to 
develop and implement a medium- to long-term plan for the improvement of water 
services provision. The incoming municipal president has a time frame of three years 
before he/she leaves office and as such does not have strong incentives to support a 
plan or program that will produce benefits years after he or she will have left office. 
 
5.4.1.1.3 The Consejos (Councils) 
 
In light of the powerful position of the municipal president the role of Consejos is quite 
important in the functioning of the utility. In all five cases were the utilities supervised 
by Consejos (or Councils). The tasks of these Consejos are stipulated in the internal 
regulations (Reglamento) of the utilities and as such show small differences from one 
Consejo to the next. However, broadly they have the same responsibilities. These are: 
 
• Monitor the functioning of the utility; 
• Discuss and approve the annual budget; 
• Supervise the use of resources; 
• Formulate and approve the tariffs; 
• Address relevant user complaints; 
• Formulate infrastructure projects, which are required to guarantee service 
provision; 
• Inform the municipality every three months about the results produced by the 
utility; 
• Any other activities required by rules or regulations. 
 
Although the role of the Consejo would appear to be similar to that of a Board of 
Directors, in that they are overseeing the functioning of the utility, the Consejos do 
have a stronger role in the day-to-day management of the utility. Illustrative is that in 
some of the cases researched at least one of the Consejo-members literally has to sign 
off on every cheque that is paid by the utility. This means that in contrast to Boards of 
Directors in countries such as the Netherlands, which have a very strong focus on the 
 
productivity levels are well below 5, which is more or less the generally accepted guideline. 
However, this may also represent an obstacle to further performance improvement. The utility 
may simply not have the staff to undertake extra activities with are aimed at improving the 
performance of this utility.  
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that Consejo-members were selected from groups representing civic society 
and 
ejo can then approve or not. However, 
in 2
intment of the Consejo it is 
ques onable if the Consejo will act as buffer between the management of the utility and 
ip intment of the Consejo as it takes place 
ium- and long-term functioning of the utility, the Consejos concentrate on a shorter 
time horizon. It also means that some of the Consejo members have to be present at the 
utility much of the time, which is also fundamentally different than Boards and 
Councils in countries such as the Netherlands. 
The role played by the Consejo is of importance because it operates between the 
general manager of the utility and the municipal president. As such, it fulfills the role of 
a vital linchpin in the governance of the organization, looking outwards to the 
government-owner and other stakeholders and inwards to its management and staff 
(Schwartz and Blokland 2002). In this sense the Consejo can act as a buffer between the 
municipal president and the utility, shielding the utility from too much political 
interference in the day-to-day management of the utility. In fact, one of the reasons why 
SIMAPAG was able to make considerable progress from 1995 to 2000 was that the 
Consejo and the management of the utility collectively worked to limit the influence of 
the municipal president. The extent to which the Consejo can f
ever, depends on the membership of the Consejo and, as such, on the way in which 
the members are appointed to the Consejo. Table 5.4 provides an overview of the ways 
in which the selection of Consejo members is arranged in the regulations of the utility 
and contrasts this to the way in which it has occurred in reality. 
The table presented shows that only in two of the five cases the Consejos were 
constituted in the way they were supposed to according to the statutes of the company 
(meaning 
without management of the utility doubling as Consejo-members). And in one of 
these two cases, the actual selection was subsequently subject to legal action. In the 
other three cases, the municipal president has more or less directly appointed the 
Consejo. 
Moreover, for the utility to manage to limit political interference, the Consejo and 
the general manager need to work together. Often, however, the general manager and 
the Consejo may have conflicting objectives. At such times, also the Consejo does not 
hesitate to deviate from the regulations. Illustrative are events relating to the 
‘resignation’ of the Head of the Commerce Department in SIMAPAG just prior to the 
second research visit in October 2003. According to article 49 of the Reglamento the 
managing director is responsible for submitting appointments or dismissals of 
managerial staff to the Consejo, which the Cons
003 the Head of the Commerce Department ‘resigned’ following pressure from the 
Consejo, without the managing director being involved. What made the matter more 
curious was the ‘public secret’ that the Head of the Commerce Department and the 
managing director were romantically involved.  
In summary, it appears that the appointment of the Consejo is very much a 
politicized process. Moreover, the members of the Consejo subsequently have their 
own interests and objectives they follow, which do not always stroke with the 
objectives of the water utility. Moreover, with direct appo
ti
the munic al president. Furthermore, the appo
in reality also shows the limitations of formal rules and regulations as a means of 
impacting the functioning of water utilities in Guanajuato.  
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 then also supervises and monitors these contracts. In 
is way, these organizations are able to ‘steer’ the utilities towards investments that 
they consider worthwhile. As such, these organizations have a strong strategic role in 
the ater supply and sanitation sector. In table 5.5, different aspects of the autonomy of 
the fi e utilities are displayed.  
 
 
 
 
5.4.1.1.4 The Role of the CNA and CEAG 
Finally, what is interesting is the role played by the CNA and CEAG. All utilities 
depend on CNA and CEAG for covering investment costs. It seems, however, that the 
CNA and CEAG use the leverage created by the possibility of awarding funds, in order 
to steer developments in the water supply and sanitation sector. This steering is done by 
offering funds only for specific investments, which these organizations consider 
priorities within the sector. Both CEAG and the CNA tend to offer funds only when 
their contribution is matched by a contribution from the receiving water utility. 
Moreover, most of these funds have specific allocations (the CNA funds, for example, 
must be used for the development of wastewater treatment facilities). In the case of 
CEAG, the funds and their spending are largely managed by CEAG themselves. This 
means that many of the contractors and consultants undertaking an activity will actually 
be contracted by CEAG. CEAG
th
w
v
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Table 5.4: Consejo characteristics in 2003 
 Consejos according to the regulations Consejos in practice 
CMAPADH The secretary of the Consejo is named and removed by the 
Municipality. Other members are to be elected from a 
variety of organizations representing civic society68. 
The municipality appointed the members directly. Moreover, three out of five 
members are employees of CMAPADH 
SMAPAM Consejo members (including the President and the 
Treasurer) are to be elected by an Assembly of Users 
The municipality has directly appointed the Consejo since 1998. In the 1998-
2000 term, the municipality decided to extend the term for the previous 
Consejo. In 2000, the municipality tried to assign political supports to the 
Consejo. The existing Consejo members opposed this. In response, the 
municipality decided to remove the president of the Consejo and appoint 
someone who would agree with their selection of Consejo members. From 
2000-2002 the functioning of Consejo members was relatively stable until 
2002 when the municipality decided to remove the president of the Consejo 
and replace him with the vice-president of the Consejo. 
SAPAM The selection of Consejo members is done by the 
municipality on the basis of recommendations of 
associations, chambers and other professional organizations. 
The municipality analyzes the recommendations of these 
organizations and then selects the most suitable six 
candidates 
Instead of selecting Consejo members on the basis of proposals from 
professional organizations, the municipality decided to appoint the general 
manager as the chairman of the Consejo and the heads of the different 
departments of the utility as the other Consejo members. In October 2003, 
following a municipal election and a change in municipal president, the entire 
management team of SAPAM that had been installed in 2000 was removed 
(and as such also the entire Consejo). 
SAPAF The municipality assigns the chairman, the secretary and the 
treasurer of the Consejo. The municipality also elects the 
four external members or vocales on the basis of proposals 
submitted by a variety of organizations 
The procedures as stated are followed  
SIMAPAG Consejo members are to represent organizations from civil 
society. The Commission of Public Works will consider the 
profiles of the proposed Consejo members and present the 
results of their analysis to the municipal president. He will 
then select the Consejo members 
Procedure more or less followed. Selection of the Consejo was subject to legal 
challenge, however. 
Sources: Regulations of the water utilities; Interviews with utility managers in 2003
 
68 These organizations include: chamber of commerce, neighborhood associations, banks, professional organizations, unions, user groups. 
Table 5.5: An Overview of autonomy  
Pattern for external 
autonomy 
CMAPADH SMAPAM SAPAM SAPAF SIMAPAG 
Utility is able to attract and 
maintain qualified staff on its 
own account 
Limited Limited Limited Limited Yes 
Utility and the Council can set 
the pay scales for the utility 
No No Between 
2000-
2003 
No No 
Level of actual income is equal 
to required income 
No No No No Yes 
Utility is able to set its own 
tariffs 
No No No No No 
Utility has access to sufficient 
raw water resources 
Limited Yes Limited Limited Limited 
Income generated by the utility 
can only be used for provision 
of water services by the utility. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tariffs have increased in line 
with inflation 
No No, no 
tariff 
increases 
between 
1995 and 
2002 
No, tariff 
increase 
in 2000 
was first 
in 9 
years 
Since 
2001 
Up to 2003 
Tariffs have been sufficient to 
meet O&M costs 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tariffs have been sufficient to 
meet O&M and investment 
costs 
No No No No No 
Few changes in management of 
the utility have occurred over 
the past years 
No, since 
2000 
Yes No Yes Between 
1995-2000 
Few changes in the Council 
have occurred over the past 
years 
No No No Yes Yes 
The utility is able to cut off 
service provision to consumers 
who have not paid their bills 
No, service 
is reduced 
No, service 
is reduced 
Yes Yes Yes 
Is the utility able to take out 
loans without prior approval 
from the owners? 
No No No No No 
 
5.4.1.2 External Accountability  
 
Based on the case studies we can note the following observations concerning the five 
water utilities in Guanajuato: 
 
• The degree of accountability for results to external organizations shows very little 
difference between the cases 
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• Apart from the standards and norms promulgated by the Ministry of Health and the 
CNA none of the utilities really have performance targets for which they are 
accountable to external organizations. 
• The accountability that does exist to external organizations is largely to official 
government agencies 
 
It is noteworthy that apart from the standards and norms for water supply and 
wastewater discharge none of the utilities are subject to meeting performance standards 
set by either the owner, other government agencies or through other mechanisms such 
as a customer charter. The absence of performance targets would seem to limit the 
degree to which the utility can be held accountable. After all, if the results that the 
utility is to achieve are not specified, the account given by the utility appears to be 
based on relatively unclear and undefined notions of what the utility should have been 
doing. 
Having said this, it is clearly recognized that every utility remains strongly 
accountable to the municipal president. In a way this is to be expected as ultimately the 
municipal president can control the functioning of the utility. In addition to the strong 
accountability to the municipal presidents, the utilities have a strong accountability to 
organizations such as the CNA or CEAG from which they received grants or loans.  
In none of the cases did organizations exist which had the specific purpose of 
representing the interests of the customers. In essence, what this means is that the 
account given by utilities tends to be ‘upward-looking’ (to the municipal president, to 
the CEAG, CNA, and the Ministry of Health) and not very focused to the customers of 
the utility. In fact, apart from individual complaints the customers can only work 
‘through’ the municipality or the federal government by approaching the Controlaría 
Municipal or the Procuradoria Federal del Consumidor, which are ombudsman-type 
organizations. Basically what this means is that accountability between the utility and 
the consumer is limited whilst ‘legal and political forms of accountability’69 
predominate. What was rather interesting to observe, however, is the accountability 
relationship to individual customers. In examining the accountability of the various 
utilities to their customers, a sharp difference was observed between SIMAPAG and the 
other utilities. Interestingly enough, this difference appeared to be strongly related to 
the relatively high tariff levels that SIMAPAG was charging. As mentioned SIMAPAG 
introduced a monthly tariff increases in the late 1990s. Every month the tariffs were 
increased by 1.1%. The customers were willing to pay these high tariffs, as they 
remembered the water crisis in Guanajuato in the 1980s that left the city without 
potable water for almost two weeks and which even resulted in the University of 
Guanajuato having to close its doors. Between 1996 and 2001 the income received from 
users increased by 280% from approximately $141,000 to over $400,000 (Aguiñaga 
2003). 
Although the customers were willing to pay this relatively high tariff, they also 
started forcing the water utility to become accountable to them for the service they were 
providing. This link was also echoed by Ruben Nieto, the chairman of the Council of 
SIMAPAG in 2003, during a presentation at the World Bank Water forum in 2003. In 
 
69 The term “legal and political forms of accountability” is taken from Minogue (2002:7). 
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this presentation he explained that although SIMAPAG’s customers were willing to pay 
relatively high tariffs they are also becoming more demanding, insisting upon higher 
service standards that SIMAPAG must meet70. In this light it is interesting to re-
introduce one of the concerns raised against the New Public Management in chapter 
three. In that section it was mentioned that a key element of the NPM is a “shift in 
value priorities away from universalism, equity, security and resilience, and towards 
efficiency and individualism” (Pollitt 2003:28). The impact of such a shift is quite 
strong as “it alters the nature of the concept of citizenship from one relating to 
participation in the public realm to one referring to consumption in the private realm” 
(Walsh 1995:xvi; also Law 1999). The increased pressure on SIMAPAG to give 
account to its customers (on an individual basis) would indicate that such as shift has 
occurred. However, this ‘shift’, if it can be called that, has not been accompanied by a 
shift away from ‘legal and political’ accountability. In fact, if anything it can be 
observed that the stronger accountability to the customer can be viewed as involving an 
additional accountability on top of the strong accountability to the municipal president 
and the other government agencies. It seems that the SIMAPAG’s accountability to the 
‘public realm’ stays strong and in addition accountability to the individual customer (in 
the private realm) exists. This observation does not support that “hierarchical control [is 
replaced] with the market as the means of coordinating activity” (Deakin and Walsh 
1996:36). Rather, it supports Hogget’s finding that instead of “witnessing the 
replacement of hierarchy by market, what we observe is the development of a ‘plural 
mode of governance’ in which elements of the market are combined with elements of 
hierarchy” (Hogget 1996:16). The table below provides an overview of the level of 
accountability for each of the studied utilities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
70 The link between customer orientation and the income of the utility is also reflected in 
Awortwi’s (2003) research into service delivery in Ghana. Awortwi (2003:278) illustrates that 
link by quoting a contractor, who finds that “[p]eople’s attitude towards the service is not my 
problem at all because they do not pay me. It’s [local government] which pays, so if people show 
apathy, that is their problem.”     
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Table 5.6: An overview of external accountability 
Pattern for external 
accountability 
CMAPADH SMAPA
M 
SAPAM SAPAF SIMAPA
G 
Regulator sets specified 
performance targets,  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Failure to meet these 
targets can result in 
penalties being applied. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Have these penalties ever 
been applied 
No No No No No 
The utility reports 
frequently to these 
regulators  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Owner sets performance 
targets 
No No No No No 
Failure to meet these 
targets will result in 
penalties being applied. 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
No 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Utility reports to owner 
periodically 
On paper 
every three 
months but 
in practice 
this is less 
Yes Yes Once per 
year 
Yes 
A representative of the 
owner is present at 
council meetings 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financial institutions, 
which have donated/lent 
money to the utility, 
require specified 
performance targets to be 
achieved.  
No No No No No 
The utility is actively 
accountable to customer 
organizations  
No No No No No 
The customer’s rights and 
obligations are clearly 
stated in a customer 
charter 
None exists None 
exists 
None 
exists 
None 
exists 
None 
exists 
The customer’s rights and 
obligations are stated in 
the customer contract 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The charter or contract 
contains performance 
targets which the utility 
must meet 
No No No No No 
The utility is actively 
accountable to non-
governmental 
organizations 
No No No No No 
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5.4.2 Hierarchy and Levels, The Market and Customers 
 
The previous section on autonomy and accountability discussed the utilities in terms of 
the relationship between the utility and the outside environment. In this section, the 
focus is more on the internal organization. Although it is realized that dimensions such 
as ‘markets’ and ‘customers’ are also external to the organization, this section focuses 
specifically on how the utility views the market and the customers. In other words, this 
section focuses on the utility policy (implicit or explicit) with respect to the market and 
customers. As such, this section addresses issues such as the market-orientation of the 
utilities, the customer-orientation, decentralization of decision-making authority within 
the utility, internal accountability for results, the issue of internal regulations, and the 
remuneration of staff.   
 
5.4.2.1 Hierarchy and Levels 
 
The theme of hierarchy and levels essentially has two components, which show 
similarity to the discussion of autonomy and accountability. The aspect is to identify 
which level decides what. The second aspect is to identify how the employees (at 
different levels) are accountable for the decisions they then make. On the basis of the 
five case studies in the state of Guanajuato, the following observations were made 
regarding hierarchy and levels within the organization: 
 
• There does not appear to be much difference between the level of decentralization 
in SIMAPAG and that of the other utilities. If a difference does exist, it would 
appear to be more one related to the size of the organization than to the actual 
decentralization of authority. 
• All decisions which have a strong financial dimension or are likely to have a 
financial impact, such as decisions about tariffs, procurement of goods and 
services, remain highly centralized and require at minimum the approval of the 
general manager. Often, however, not even the general manager has sufficient 
authority to make these decisions. 
• Decisions relating to human resources also remain highly centralized. Approval of 
the general manager is always required and in many cases that of the Council as 
well. 
• The only area in which decision-making is relatively decentralized is in customer 
management. In the case of customer management a set of policies are in place to 
deal with complaints, which the employees follow without having to consult the 
management.   
 
As mentioned, all of the utilities are strongly centralized. SIMAPAG appears to be 
somewhat more decentralized in the sense that it has a separate legal section and a 
separate section for institutional development, which have limited decision-making 
powers. However, this appears to be more a function of the size of the utility (in terms 
of number of employees) than a deliberate company policy. With 200 employees, the 
functions within the utility are likely to be more differentiated than in a utility with 32 
employees. Increased differentiation of tasks can then lead to increased decentralization 
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of decision-making responsibilities. For the rest, any decision that is either not 
addressed in company policy/protocol or has any financial consequences, requires at the 
very least approval of the general manager. However, as mentioned above, in most 
cases, even the general manager’s approval is not enough, and the approval of the 
Consejo (or the president of the Consejo) is also required.  
First of all, within the utilities there exists an explicit or implicit work protocol, 
which has been approved by the general manager and the Consejo. When an employee 
is confronted with an issue that is dealt with in that protocol, the employee can make a 
decision following that protocol and inform his superiors of the decision made. If the 
issue is not addressed in that protocol, than the employee is to refer the issue to his 
superiors.  
Secondly, all decisions which have financial consequences, which basically include 
all decisions regarding procurement, human resources or any other activity that may 
result in costs to the utility, requires approval of the general manager and Consejo. 
What this basically means is that in all utilities, including SIMAPAG, the employees 
operate following strict procedures.  
Because the policies/protocol for the area of customer management has been 
developed, by necessity, in more detail, more decisions regarding customer 
management are taken at lower levels within the organization. However, here too the 
principle applies that employees are only allowed to apply existing company policy to a 
particular case that is brought forward by a customer. As long as the specific problem is 
covered by this policy the employee can address the situation himself by strictly 
following company policy (and subsequently informing his superiors about the decision 
he made). If the case brought forward by the customer is not covered by the existing 
company policy, the employee will have to refer this issue to his superiors. As such, 
employees in all utilities have very limited discretionary powers. 
An overview for hierachy and levels in the five utilities in Guanajuato is presented 
in table 5.7. 
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Table 5.7: An overview of hierarchy and levels 
Decentralization of 
responsibility  
CMAPADH SMAPAM SAPAM SAPAF SIMAPAG 
Decisions about tariff levels 
are made by the utility 
No No No No No 
Procurement of goods and 
service requires approval of 
the general manager 
Yes Yes Depends 
on the 
amount of 
money.  
Yes Yes 
Procurement of goods and 
services requires approval of 
the Consejo 
To some 
extent71
Yes Depends 
on the 
amount of 
money72
Yes Yes73
Decisions about promotion, 
hiring or firing of employees 
requires approval of the 
general manager 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Decisions about promotion, 
hiring and firing of 
employees requires approval 
of the Consejo  
Yes Yes Yes To 
some 
extent74
To some 
extent75
The utility has decentralized 
decisions relating to 
customer management to 
lower levels in the 
organization 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
   
5.4.2.1.1 Internal accountability for results 
The second dimension of hierarchy and levels concerns the level of (internal) 
accountability for results. Based on the case studies a number of observations can be 
made regarding the degree to which employee are accountable in the utilities. These 
observations are as follows: 
 
• SIMAPAG has a stronger internal accountability for results than the other utilities. 
This is mainly on the basis of their standard evaluation system and their use of a 
balanced scorecard.  
 
71 Because the managing director is also the chairman of the Consejo, approval of the managing 
director automatically entails approval of one of the Consejo members. 
72 Since the management change in 2003, procurement decisions require approval of the 
municipal president. 
73 Officially some decisions only require approval of the managing director. However, the fact 
that each cheque needs at least one signature from the either the treasurer or the president of the 
Consejo means that de facto one Consejo member must approve the acquisition. 
74 In case of firing and for hiring when the position is not in the budget 
75 On paper, the managing director is responsible. In practice, the Consejo does have some 
influence in hiring and firing of employees. 
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• None of the Consejos impose performance targets on the management of the 
utilities. 
• Evaluation and rewarding of employees are not necessarily related to the 
performance of the individual employees. 
• Employees are more accountable for following procedures than for the results 
obtained by following those procedures. 
 
A comparison of the different utilities shows that SIMAPAG does have the highest 
levels of accountability for results. However, the question is if this is because 
SIMAPAG’s internal system of accountability is so well developed or because of the 
very low level of accountability for results in the other organizations. Although 
SIMAPAG has a system for evaluating management and employees, the actual 
implementation does not seem very convincing. First of all, in the 1995-2000 period all 
managers always received the full 100% monthly bonus. From 2000-2003, however, 
the general manager decided not award the full bonus to everyone, but rather usually 
between 70%-90% of the monthly bonus was awarded. What remains unclear, however, 
is what exactly the bonus was awarded for and how the amount was determined. 
Essentially, the evaluation was largely dependent on the appreciation that the general 
manager had of the management employee and was not based on any objective criteria. 
One of the former managers at SIMAPAG referred to the bonus as a ‘bonus of 
appreciation’, in which, in the 2000-2003 period, a lot depended on how the particular 
employee got along with the general manager at the time of deciding the magnitude of 
the bonus. If there existed some friction or a difference of opinion between the general 
manager and the employee at the time the bonus was decided upon, the bonus was 
likely to be less than if no such friction or difference of opinion existed. 
Also the non-managerial employees are evaluated monthly. The employee can earn 
a bonus on the basis of this evaluation. In essence the employee is evaluated on the 
basis of two criteria: attendance and punctuality (30% of the bonus) and performance 
(70% of the bonus). The category of performance is subdivided into five sub-categories, 
which each represent 14% of the overall bonus. These five sub-categories are 
knowledge of work done, quality of work done, quantity of work done, initiative, and 
attitude and cooperation. Each employee is evaluated by his or her immediate boss. As 
no clear guidelines exist on how to implement the evaluation, it appears that the 
evaluation may be rather subjective. Moreover the categories of performance are not 
really related to specific results that the employee must achieve. 
Within SIMAPAG a balanced scorecard was used for setting targets and measuring 
the performance of the utility. The balanced scorecard incorporates a series of 
indicators, which provide four different ‘perspectives’ on the utility, which together are 
considered to provide a good picture of the overall functioning of the utility. These 
perspectives include a ‘client’s perspective’ (considered to be the most important), a 
‘financial perspective’, a ‘process perspective’ (which includes a number of efficiency 
indicators) and a ‘learning perspective’ (which covers indicators such as absenteeism 
and rotation of personnel). The indicators measuring the four perspectives of the 
scorecard are compiled on a monthly basis by the Department of Institutional 
Development and reported to the Council. The idea was that the balanced scorecard 
would serve as the performance measurement system in the utility and that in time, the 
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evaluations of managerial employees would be linked to indicators in the balanced 
score card. This has, however, not occurred yet. As such, although the balanced 
scorecard distinguishes SIMAPAG from the other utilities, the question is how the use 
of this performance measurement system translates into accountability? At current, the 
most likely answer seems to be that it doesn’t. During recent management changes the 
managers most supportive of the balance scorecard have left the utility and as such, it is 
unlikely that it will be used for accountability in the near future.  
Having discussed SIMAPAG’s system for (internal) accountability and raised 
questions about its functioning, it should also be noted that it is still better than the 
systems in place in the other utilities.  
CMAPADH established a ‘best worker of the month’ award in 2003. Every month, 
one person is selected from the administrative staff and one person is selected from 
operational staff as ‘best worker of the month’. ‘Best workers of the month’ are 
honored in a small monthly event during which they receive their award. There are no 
clear indicators and there is no set procedure for selecting the ‘best worker’. Partly as a 
result of the non-transparent way of awarding this monthly prize, there are some who 
feel that selection of the award winners is partly based on ‘personal feelings’ rather than 
objective indicators. In addition, a system exists to evaluate employees, but the 
evaluation is mainly focused on issues such as absenteeism and sick days and does not 
take into account the results produced by the employees  
In SMAPAM, the employees do not have to meet specified performance targets 
and also there is no system in place to evaluate the performance of the employees. 
Similarly, there is no way of rewarding an employee for good performance. Each 
employee receives a bimonthly bonus of MXP 300 regardless his or her performance. 
In SAPAM, the management of the utility can decide to give a reward for 
employees, which have shown impressive performance. Giving such a reward requires 
a decision by the general manager in consultation with the Head of Department in 
which that employee is working. The rewards are generally between MXP 300 and 
MXP 50076 and the actual allocation of such a reward is not a frequent occurrence. The 
Heads of Department are not eligible for such rewards. The employees of the utility are 
not evaluated against set performance targets. The general manager evaluates the Heads 
of Departments every year.  
In SAPAF, the only system in place for rewarding the ‘performance’ of employees 
relates to a bonus for punctuality and attendance. In essence everyone that arrives at 
work before 8:00 a.m. can receive a bonus of 10% on top of their salary. In practice, 
however, every employee gets this bonus. There is no system in place to evaluate the 
performance of employees of the utility. 
It appears that within the researched water utilities in Guanajuato there is no 
accountability for results. Rather, the way the employee is expected to operate and for 
which he may be held accountable is by following set procedures and especially by 
making sure that he is at the office on time. 
Also noteworthy, with respect to accountability, is that no performance targets 
have been imposed by the Consejos on the general managers. Apart from the utilities in 
which the management also controls the Consejo, in which setting targets would 
 
76 Between US$30 and US$ 50. 
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basically the management setting targets for itself, this is perhaps explained by the role 
played by the Consejo in ‘autonomous agencies’ in Guanajuato. As mentioned 
previously, these Consejos tend to have a relatively strong involvement in the day-to-
day functioning of the organization.  
 
Table 5.8: An overview of internal accountability for results 
Internal accountability for 
results 
CMAPADH SMAPAM SAPAM SAPAF SIMAPAG 
A system is in place to evaluate 
the performance of employees 
periodically 
Mainly focused 
on absenteeism 
and sick days 
No No No Yes77
Employees are held accountable 
for achieving specified results 
No78 No No79 No80 No 
Salary adjustments are based on 
performance of the employee 
No No No No No 
The utility systematically 
analyzes its performance in 
relation to set targets 
No No No No Yes 
Management oversight and 
management of the services 
provider are separate functions  
No Yes No Yes Yes 
Management of the service 
provider has regular meetings 
with the Consejo 
Yes* Yes Yes* Yes Yes 
Management of the service 
provider is subject to meeting 
specified performance targets  
No No No No No 
Management of the service 
provider is held accountable for 
meeting the specified targets 
n.a n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
* - The management is also represented on the Council 
 
5.4.2.2 Market-orientation 
 
Based on the case studies and the overview above, the following conclusions can be 
drawn with respect to the market-orientation of the selected utilities: 
 
• SIMAPAG does not have stronger market-orientation than the other utilities; 
• The level of outcontracting varies from about 5% to 30%; 
 
77 The system in place is partly (30%) based on absenteeism and partly (70%) on performance. 
However, no guidelines for implementation exist and almost always the full bonus is awarded.  
78 The utility does award a monthly ‘employee-of-the-month’ award. However, these are not 
awarded on the basis of ‘specified’ targets. 
79 There is a possibility of providing a reward between MXP 300 and MXP 500 for impressive 
performance. This is not a frequently awarded reward, however.  
80 The utility does provide a 10% bonus to all employees who are on time for their work. In 
practice, every employee gets this award. 
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• All utilities partake in the annual benchmarking exercise for which they submit bi-
monthly reports to the State Water Commission; 
• None of the utilities appear to systematically use the data generated by this exercise 
in the management of the utility; 
• None of the utilities engage in market-testing exercises. 
 
None of the utilities appear to have a strong market-orientation and SIMAPAG is no 
exception. Although the utility outcontracts about 20% of its operational budget, two 
utilities have higher outcontracting shares and 2 have smaller outcontracting shares. 
Although it must be stated that the level of 3%, as reported by the utility in Valle de 
Santiago seems very small for a water supply and sanitation utility. Perhaps more 
importantly, the utilities do not purposely use outcontracting as a tool (or company 
policy) to achieve specific objectives such as efficiency gains, access to new 
technology and management expertise. Rather outcontracting appears to be more 
undertaken on an ad-hoc basis when the situation of the day requires the utility to do so.  
Although all of the utilities partake in benchmarking exercises organized by 
CEAG, the results are largely used on an ad-hoc (rather than a systematic) basis. In 
other words the generated data is not used systematically.   
 
Table 5.9: An overview of market-orientation 
Market-orientation CMAPADH SMAPAM SAPAM SAPAF SIMAPAG 
What is the level of outcontracting as 
a percentage of the operational 
budget (in 2002) 
24% 7% 3% 30% 20% 
The utility actively pursues a policy 
of outcontracting services and tasks 
to third-parties81
No No No No No 
The utility engages in periodic 
benchmarking exercises  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The utility systematically uses the 
results of the benchmarking exercise 
for improving performance of the 
utility 
No No No No No 
The utility engages in market-testing 
exercises to improve efficiency of 
service provision 
No No No No No 
 
5.4.2.3  Customer-orientation 
 
The final dimension of the case studies concerns the level of customer-orientation. 
Based on the five case studies and the overview presented above we can draw the 
following conclusions: 
 
• SIMAPAG does appear to have the strongest customer-orientation; 
 
81 With this mean that the utility does not ad-hoc undertake outcontracting activities, but actively 
pursues outcontracting as a company policy based on the belief that outcontracting can provide 
benefits to the utility. 
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• Only two utilities actively try to obtain the opinions and views of their customers. 
The other utilities appear to have a more reactive approach to their customers; 
• In all cases bills can be paid in a variety of ways; 
• Apart from SIMAPAG, training of staff for the other utilities appears to be 
relatively infrequent and dependent on outside opportunities. 
 
SIMAPAG does appear to be the most customer-oriented of the utilities. In order to 
obtain the views and opinions of the customers, SIMAPAG undertakes daily surveys. 
These surveys cover about 210 to 220 users per month. This survey measures the 
following dimensions: 
 
• If the user is satisfied with the service provided by SIMAPAG. This includes 
indicating how they were attended to by personnel of SIMAPAG (plumbers, meter 
readers, reception, customer service) 
• What their opinion is of the service provided. This includes giving their views on 
the provision of potable water, quality of water delivered, attention to leakages, and 
sewerage) 
• An assessment of how important the service that SIMAPAG provides is for the 
respondent.   
 
On the basis of the survey the ‘image’ that SIMAPAG has with its users is calculated 
on a scale from 1 to 5. This ‘image’ is the most important indicator of the Balance 
Scorecard that SIMAPAG uses to measure its performance. At the beginning of 2003, 
the utility had a score of 3.4 and the target was to reach a score of 4.5 by the year 2005. 
Illustrative of SIMAPAG's customer-orientation is the fact that the ‘image’ that the 
consumer has of the company is considered the most important indicator to measure 
performance. With the recent changes in management, however, the use (and 
development) of the balanced score card appears less of a priority of the organizations.  
According to the chairman of the Consejo of SIMAPAG in 2003, the reason why 
SIMAPAG developed its strong customer orientation is because the customers have 
become more demanding as a result of the relatively high tariffs. Users were willing to 
pay higher tariffs, but became much more vocal in demanding better services. As s 
result, the utility had to develop more customer-friendly practices. As mentioned 
previously, SIMAPAG introduced monthly tariff increases in the 1990s. Although the 
customers were willing to pay this relatively high tariff, they also started forcing the 
water utility to adopt more customer friendly billing and collection methods. The 
existing system for payment of bills in the 1990s was very customer-unfriendly. In 
order to mitigate this situation, SIMAPAG established an automated system to charge 
for water services and made it easier for consumers to pay their bills (Aguiñaga 2003). 
In comparison with the customer management system and customer focus 
developed and implemented by SIMAPAG, the other utilities do not appear to have a 
strong customer orientation. In the case of SAPAM, the utility undertakes customer 
services twice a year and in 2002 the utility implemented a complaint tracking system. 
It should be remembered that in years just prior, the utility also sharply increased its 
tariffs. Other utilities, however, have no system in place to actively obtain the views 
and opinions of the customer, apart from suggestion boxes, which are rarely used. 
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Table 5.10: An overview of customer-orientation 
Customer-orientation CMAPADH SMAPAM SAPAM SAPAF SIMAPAG 
The utility is dependent on its 
customers for its revenue 
For O&M and 
matching funds 
For O&M and 
matching funds 
For O&M and 
matching funds 
For O&M and 
matching funds 
For O&M and 
matching funds 
The utility offers different levels 
of service provision to its 
customers 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
In what ways can the customer 
pay their bills CMAPADH Office, Banks, Cajas 
Populares, selected 
small businesses 
SMAPAM’s 
Office, Banks, 
Cajas Populares, 
selected small 
businesses 
SAPAM’s office, 
Banks, Cajas 
Populares 
SAPAF’s office, 
Banks, Cajas 
Populares 
SIMAPAG Office, 
Banks Cajas 
Populares82, selected 
small businesses 
The utility undertakes surveys to 
proactively obtain the 
customer’s views and 
perceptions of the services 
provided 
No No Yes, twice per year No Yes, 200 per month 
What other means exist to obtain 
opinions from users None Suggestion box None 
Town hall meetings, 
suggestion box Suggestion box 
Customer complaints are 
addressed  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Customers are engaged in 
decision-making procedures in 
the utility 
Partial representation 
on the Council 
Representation 
on the Council No 
Representation on 
the Council 
Representation on the 
Council 
The utility trains its employees 
to manage customers 
Infrequent training of 
staff No 
Infrequent training 
of staff 
Infrequent training 
of staff 
Frequent training of 
staff 
In what ways does the utility 
inform its customers about 
relevant issues for service 
provision 
Radio 
Flyers added to 
the receipt, radio, 
perifoneo 
Flyers added to the 
receipt, 
newspaper, radio, 
perifoneo 
Flyers added to the 
receipt, radio, on 
rare occasions 
newspapers 
Flyers added to the 
receipt, newspaper, 
radio, perifoneo83
 
82 Small local banks 
83 A perifoneo is a car with speakers that drives around the city providing information through its speakers. 
5.5  Preliminary Conclusions of the Cross-case Comparison 
 
In this section the preliminary conclusions regarding the propositions stated in chapter 
three are presented. In the first part of this section, the findings of relevance for drawing 
preliminary conclusions about the propositions are summarized and the preliminary 
conclusions regarding specific propositions are presented. In the second part of this 
chapter these conclusions are briefly interpreted.  
 
5.5.1 Autonomy, Stability, Politics and Vocation: Propositions 1, 7, 9 and 12 
 
One element that surfaces in all cases is the role played by the municipal president and 
the Consejos. As was mentioned in chapter two, it is difficult to separate politics from 
the service provision process. But with utilities operating at the municipal level, 
municipal elections each three years, the powerful position of the municipal president, 
and the ability of the municipal president to influence the composition of the Consejo 
(even in violation of the utilities regulations) mean that for the cases of Guanajuato the 
provision of water services is highly politicized and will continue to be so in the future. 
Even if a utility is able to escape the strong interference from the political realm as 
SIMAPAG did between 1995-2003, there is no guarantee (or institutional safeguard) 
that the utility will not be subject to political capture in the very near future. Although 
in many middle and low-income countries it is unlikely that separation of politics from 
service provisions is possible, the institutional mechanisms at work in the State of 
Guanajuato seem to culminate in a very severe politicization of management. 
As discussed in chapter three, Schick (1998) and Wallis and Dollery (2001) found 
that a shift from external to internal control is only realistic if certain ‘basics’ have been 
mastered by the public organization. Other authors have highlighted the importance of 
the legal framework. Although this perspective is convincing, and I for one would agree 
with it, the findings in Guanajuato highlight another dimension. Added to the basics 
identified by these authors, one must highlight the institutional settings and add, at least 
for the provision of water services, that without relatively stable public water utilities, 
which have the chance to develop and implement reforms, no reforms, be they NPM-
style reforms or not, will succeed. The benefits of such stability were illustrated by 
SIMAPAG in the 1995-2003 period. In this period the level of autonomy that 
SIMAPAG enjoyed, and especially its financial autonomy, was crucial in improving 
service provision. This autonomy contrasts sharply to the level of autonomy of the other 
utilities.  
As such, proposition 1, which reads that well performing public utilities have a 
large degree of external autonomy has not been not falsified by the research findings. 
Of specific importance appears to be the degree of financial autonomy, as was also 
illustrated by the performance improvement of SAPAM in the 2000-2003 period. 
At the same time, proposition 7, which states that poorly performing utilities are 
apolitical has been falsified. In the case of Guanajuato, all poorly performing utilities 
proved to be highly politicized, whilst the only utility able to escape this politicization 
was SIMAPAG in the aforementioned period.  
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Furthermore, little evidence was found to support proposition 9, which proposes 
that poorly performing utilities are characterized by permanence and stability. Three out 
of the four poorly performing utilities in Guanajuato were relatively unstable 
organizations with frequent changes in the management of the utility. The well 
performing utility, SIMPAG, on the other hand was relatively stable in the 1995-2003 
period. 
In terms of vocation, it was found that the main reasons why the poorly performing 
public utilities were attractive employers was their favorable working hours and the 
promise of job security, which was especially valued in the more industrialized towns, 
which were experiencing the stress of global competition in their industries. As such, 
little support could be found for proposition 12. 
 
5.5.2 “Upward” Accountability: Proposition 2 
 
All utilities in Guanajuato have a strong accountability to the municipalities who 
remain firmly in control of the utility. Also accountability to financial institutions that 
have lent or granted money to the utility is considerable. In this sense there is no 
difference between a well performing utility like SIMAPAG and the poorer performing 
utilities in the State of Guanajuato. Furthermore, this accountability was not based on 
achieving specified results. The accountability to regulatory agencies, to customer 
agencies and to NGOs is similar for all cases. In all cases, this accountability appears to 
be very limited.  
What should be added, however, is that what distinguished SIMAPAG was its 
accountability to individual customers. The relatively high tariff levels result in a strong 
accountability to individual customers, who demand a relatively high level of service 
for the tariffs they are paying. This accountability exists in addition to the ‘upward’ 
accountability to the municipal president and the other government agencies.  
Proposition 2 stipulates that a well performing utility is strongly accountable for 
results to external organizations. As such, in the understanding that individual 
customers do not represent external organizations and in light of the fact that the 
utilities were not subject to meeting specified results, this proposition is falsified.  
 
5.5.3  Levels and Hierarchy: Proposition 5, 6, 8, 10 and 11  
 
In all researched cases the employees working in the public utilities operated within and 
according to the limits set by the established procedures. Making decisions was largely 
limited to applying the exiting procedure for a specific decision. If the issue to be 
decided upon concerned something not covered by existing procedures and policies, the 
matter would need to be referred to the superiors of the employee. As such, proposition 
5, which suggests that a well performing utility has a strong decentralization, is 
falsified, as the level of decentralization in SIMAPAG is not very high. 
Although SIMAPAG was more advanced in developing and implementing 
(internal) accountability mechanisms, these mechanisms did as of yet not hold the 
employees, be they management employees or not, accountable for results. Both the 
evaluation of management employees as well as non-management employees was 
relatively subjective. In the understanding that the accountability system in SIMAPAG 
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does not hold the employees accountable for results, no evidence was found in the case 
of SIMAPAG to support proposition 6, which finds that well performing public utilities 
have a strong accountability for results within the organization. 
Proposition 8 puts forward that poorly performing utilities are characterized by 
hierarchal levels and organized on a rule-governed basis. When analyzing the poorly 
performing cases, all cases were indeed characterized by hierarchical levels in which 
lower offices were subordinate to higher offices. As such, the proposition as stated is 
not falsified.  
In terms of the remuneration of employees the research found that poorly 
functioning utilities indeed mainly remunerated the employees according to a fixed 
salary. Although a few schemes for bonuses were established, remuneration 
overwhelmingly follows fixed salaries or the bonus schemes were such that they were 
de facto part of the fixed salaries. This means that proposition 11 has not been falsified. 
This then brings us to one of the more problematic propositions (number 10), 
which states that poorly performing utilities operate following internal regulations. On 
the one hand, this proposition has been falsified as the discussion concerning, for 
example, the appointment of the Consejo shows that the regulations on paper are not 
necessarily enacted in practice. In fact, in quite a few decisions made by the owner 
and/or the Consejo, the regulations have not been followed. On the other hand, at lower 
levels within the organization, the regulations are more strictly adhered to. These 
regulations basically form the guideline for the employees and these generally follow 
these regulations. As such, if the proposition had been limited to lower levels within the 
organization, the proposition would not have been not falsified. Within the context of 
this research, however, the proposition, which is assumed to cover the entire 
organization, is considered falsified.  
 
5.5.4 Market-orientation: Proposition 3 
 
The level of market-orientation is low for all organizations, be they poorly performing 
or well performing. SIMAPAG’s level of outcontracting is at a level (about 20%) that is 
quite common for water utilities. Although the utility submits performance data to 
CEAG for annual performance comparisons, this information is mainly used on an ad-
hoc basis and not incorporated systematically in the (strategic) management of the 
utility. The utility does not engage in market testing. Based on these considerations the 
proposition (number 3) that a well performing utility has a strong market-orientation is 
not supported by the findings from the cases. 
 
5.5.5 Customer-orientation: Proposition 4 
 
SIMAPAG is certainly the most customer-oriented of the utilities. As the chairman of 
the Consejo of SIMAPAG highlighted in 2003, the reason why SIMAPAG developed 
its strong customer orientation is because the customers have become more demanding 
as a result of the relatively high tariffs. This customer orientation is best visible in the 
monthly surveys that are held and the use of the company’s ‘image’ as the most 
important indicator in the balanced scorecard. These observations lead to the conclusion 
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that proposition number 4, regarding the level of customer orientation of well 
performing utilities has not been falsified. 
 
5.5.6 Preliminary conclusions 
 
If the preliminary conclusions based on the five cases are summarized, the result is the 
table listed below. Essentially, only proposition 1, 4, 8 and 11 have been supported by 
the research findings.  
 
Table 5.11: Preliminary conclusions based on the narrow testing of propositions 
Proposition Preliminary 
conclusion 
1. Well performing public utilities have a large degree of external autonomy Not falsified 
2. Well performing public utilities are strongly accountable for results to 
external organizations. 
Falsified 
3. Well performing public utilities have a strong market-orientation. Falsified 
4. Well performing public utilities have a stronger customer-orientation. Not falsified 
5. Well performing public utilities have decentralized decision-making 
within the organization.   
Falsified 
6. Well performing public utilities have a strong accountability for results 
within the organization. 
Falsified 
7. Poorly performing utilities are apolitical. Falsified 
8. Poorly performing utilities are characterized by hierarchal levels and 
organized on a rule-governed basis. 
Not falsified 
9. Poorly performing utilities are characterized by permanence and stability Falsified 
10. Poorly performing utilities operate following internal regulations Falsified 
11. Employees in poorly performing utilities are remunerated according to 
fixed salary levels 
Not falsified 
12. Employees in poorly performing utilities opt for working in water supply 
and sanitation companies in terms of vocation or sense of duty  
Falsified 
 
However, an important qualification needs to be made regarding these preliminary 
conclusions. Apart from the aforementioned doubts regarding proposition 10, the 
preliminary conclusions say little about the comparison between poorly functioning and 
well functioning utilities. This is because the propositions have been interpreted in a 
narrow sense. What that means is that although the proposition says something about 
either well performing or poorly performing utilities, it does not really compare the 
two. Without this comparison it is not possible to see if a particular proposition 
sufficiently discriminates between a poorly performing utility and a well performing 
utility.  
This is perhaps best explained by looking at proposition number 8, which concerns 
the remuneration of employees. If this proposition is not falsified, it does not 
necessarily mean that in well performing utilities employees are not remunerated 
according to fixed salary levels. If a proposition is not falsified or falsified for both 
poorly performing and well performing than the only conclusion can be that the 
particular dimension highlighted by that proposition does not contribute towards 
explaining differences in performance.  
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In order to gain more insight in the comparison of poorly and well functioning 
utilities, the propositions have been slightly altered and tested for both well performing 
and poorly performing utilities. The preliminary results are displayed below. 
 
Table 5.12: Preliminary conclusions based on comparing all utilities 
Proposition Preliminary 
conclusion for poorly 
performing utilities 
Preliminary conclusion 
for well performing 
utility 
1. The utility has a large degree of 
external autonomy 
Falsified Not falsified 
2. The utility is strongly 
accountable for results to 
external organizations. 
Falsified Falsified 
3. The utility has a strong market-
orientation. 
Falsified Falsified 
4. The utility has a stronger 
customer-orientation. 
Falsified Not falsified 
5. The utility has decentralized 
decision-making within the 
organization.   
Falsified Falsified 
6. The utility has a strong 
accountability for results within 
the organization. 
Falsified Falsified 
7. The utility is apolitical. Falsified Not falsified 
8. The utility is characterized by 
hierarchal levels and organized 
on a rule-governed basis. 
Not falsified Not falsified 
9. The utility is characterized by 
permanence and stability 
Falsified Not falsified 
10. The utility operates following 
internal regulations 
Falsified Falsified 
11. Employees in the utility are 
remunerated according to fixed 
salary levels 
Not falsified Not falsified 
12. Employees opt for working in 
water supply and sanitation 
companies in terms of vocation 
or sense of duty  
Falsified Falsified 
 
What table 5.12 clarifies is that on only four propositions did the two categories of 
utilities, well performing and poorly performing, score differently. These are: 
 
• The level of autonomy;  
• The degree of customer orientation; 
• The separation of the political realm from management of the service provider; and  
• The stability and permanence of the organization.  
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5.5.7 Interpretation of the Preliminary Conclusions 
 
The preliminary conclusions above highlight four differences between the well 
performing case and the poorly performing ones in the 12 ‘dimensions’ that were 
covered by the propositions. In analyzing these four differences, it appears possible to 
identify an explanation why these four dimensions are important and how these 
dimensions are connected. 
As mentioned in the discussion of the findings the degree of autonomy, and 
especially financial autonomy, was found to be highly important. It was also argued 
that this (financial) autonomy had strong implications for the level of customer-
orientation. Customers were willing to pay a higher tariff, but demanded better services. 
This forced the well performing utility to adopt a stronger customer-orientation. 
Linked to the issue of autonomy is the degree to which the political realm can 
influence the day-to-day functioning of the water utility. If a utility is autonomous, this 
influence is likely to be limited. In other words, the combination of having a high 
degree of autonomy and a relatively strong separation of the political realm from the 
management of the service provider seems quite logical. The nature of Mexico’s 
political institutions provides an explanation why an organization in which the political 
realm has relatively limited influence on the management of the utility is characterized 
by relative stability and permanence. Much of the instability witnessed in (specifically 
the poorly performing) utilities can be linked to changes in the municipal government. 
A new municipal president often replaces the management and Consejo of a utility. If 
the influence of the political realm is limited, however, then most likely the possibilities 
for replacing existing management becomes more difficult. The result would be a more 
stable organization. As such, it appears that the four dimensions that distinguish the 
poorly performing utility from the well performing utility are connected. 
Another interesting conclusion coming out of the findings is that, interestingly 
enough, the results also seem to indicate that the well performing utility adheres more 
strongly to the bureaucratic model as identified in chapter three of this study than the 
poorly performing utilities. In other words, SIMAPAG seems to operate closer to the 
bureaucratic model than the poorly performing utilities. 
5.6 Additional Salient Findings 
 
In this section, salient findings from the cases, which are of importance for this 
research, but which do not directly relate to the formulated propositions are presented. 
The importance of the findings presented below is that they impact the performance of 
the research water utilities. The first of these issues relates to the scale at which the 
water utility is operating. In the case of the water utilities in Guanajuato, it appears that 
municipal water utilities may be too small to allow for good performance. The second 
section looks at the sequence of reforms as they took place in the case of SIMAPAG. 
The sequence of reforms highlights the roles of crisis, new management and financial 
autonomy. 
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5.6.1 Too Much Decentralization? 
 
It has been mentioned earlier that the municipalities in Mexico derive their authority for 
providing water services from article 115 of the Constitution. It has also been 
mentioned that the decentralization policies in Mexico, like those in many other 
countries, were implemented for largely political reasons. The impact of these 
decentralization processes on the water services sector cannot be underestimated, as it 
has truly placed municipal water utilities for an almost impossible task. First of all, the 
strong position of the municipal president means that only a formidable coalition of the 
Consejo and the management of the utility could limit political interference in the 
utility. With the municipal president changing every three years, and the tradition of 
replacing the management of public organizations, does not make the creation of such a 
coalition any easier. Secondly, even if the utility is able to ward off the municipal 
president, the utilities in the State of Guanajuato are so small that the capacity of these 
water utilities to really improve services is very limited84. Yepes (1990) already found 
that in the water services sector in Latin America substantial economies of scale existed 
in construction, research and development, and operation of water services. In the 
Netherlands the national government insisted as far back as 1975 that all water utilities 
have “at least 100,000 connections in order to produce potable water on a larger and 
more efficient scale” (Dane and Warner 1999:50). An analysis of the water services 
sector in Guanajuato cannot lead to any other conclusion than that the water utilities are 
too small to improve services.  
In this sense, it would seem appropriate for the water services sector in the State of 
Guanajuato to consider reorganization for especially the smaller municipalities. This 
reorganization would mean aggregating several smaller municipalities to form a 
regional water supply company. Recognizing that political control over water services 
remains important and unavoidable, ownership of such a regional water utility would 
remain in the hands of municipalities that are served by this organization. If the limit of 
100,000 connections were adhered to, it would mean for the case of Guanajuato that a 
regional utility would cover five or six municipalities. Apart from providing a degree of 
insulation against political interference, such a water utility would also have a 
significantly larger capacity to improve services, both in financial terms (assuming that 
tariff levels are realistic, meaning that they cover at least operation and maintenance 
costs and a part of the investment costs) as well as human resources. 
 
5.6.2 The Sequence of Reforms 
 
Another interesting observation coming from the five cases and especially the case of 
SIMAPAG is the sequence of reforms in these water utilities. In the case of SIMAPAG, 
the first step in the reform process appears to be the arrival of a new general manager in 
 
84 The scale of utilities is not only a problem for the State of Guanajuato, but rather a nation wide 
problem. Mexico counts 2427 municipalities, of which only 7% are inhabited by more than 
50,000 people. 61% of the municipalities have less than 2,500 inhabitants (Cabrero 2005:81). If 
the scale of the utilities is a problem for municipalities as those five researched in the state of 
Guanajuato is a problem, it will be even worse for the 93% of municipalities which have less than 
50,000 inhabitants.    
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1995. The first emphasis of the new management was to improve the financial situation 
of the utility. This meant increasing tariffs and improving the billing and collection 
system. Important for the ability to improve tariffs was the water crisis in the 1980s, 
which confronted the inhabitants of the municipality of Guanajuato with the importance 
of water services and which tremendously increasing their willingness-to-pay for water 
services. Although the higher tariffs were accepted, the customers also forced the utility 
to improve the service level provided, which forced the utility to adopt a stronger 
customer focus. In the case SIMAPAG, the utility had started the implementation of the 
balanced scorecard as a main system for measuring performance and holding the 
employees accountable for the results they produced in their job. However, with the 
changes in 2003, in which a large part of the management team left the utility, the 
momentum for strengthening this system appears to have disappeared.  
In the case of SAPAM, the first two steps appear similar. New management arrived 
following a period of extremely poor performance and the initial emphasis in improving 
performance was by increasing the financial autonomy of the organization. However, 
before the utility could progress to other reforms, management was replaced in 2003. 
The other three utilities seem to be largely stuck in the low-level equilibrium as 
described by Spiller and Savedoff (1999) in chapter one. 
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6 Four Cases of Well Performing Utilities  
As mentioned in chapter three, this research follows a two-step approach. The first step 
consisted of analyzing five case studies in the State of Guanajuato, Mexico and drawing 
preliminary conclusions regarding the formulated propositions. In this chapter, the 
preliminary conclusions are checked by analyzing four cases of utilities, which have 
been recognized and promoted by (inter)national agencies as being well performing.  
The cases presented below were all researched either for the BNWP Public Modes 
of Engagement project or as part of MSc. Theses or a combination of these two. In all 
cases the same guideline was used for data collection. What makes these cases 
interesting for this research is that they allow for a comparison with the findings in the 
previous chapter. One of the conclusions of the previous chapter was that the poorly 
performing utilities did appear to be stuck at a low-level equilibrium. These well 
performing cases, however, can be viewed as either having maintained a high level 
equilibrium for a long period of time (SADM) or which have managed to escape the 
low-level equilibrium and progressed to a higher-level equilibrium (NWSC, HPWSC, 
SANASA). What also makes these cases interesting is that they represent utilities 
operating in different institutional environments. If these cases provide findings similar 
to those of Guanajuato, then it would greatly enhance the generalizability of the 
findings. Do these well performing cases confirm the findings in the previous chapter or 
do they provide a completely different picture?  
One observation, however, can be made at the outset. This relates to the scale of 
the utilities. All these utilities, which have received recognition as well performing 
utilities, have close to 100,000 connections. Only NWSC is below this threshold. This 
in itself may appear surprising, as the N in NWSC indicates that the utility has a 
national mandate in the country of Uganda. However, the characteristics of service 
provision in Uganda (and in much of sub-Saharan Africa for that matter) differ from 
those in Mexico. This becomes clear if the population served in relation to the number 
of connections is compared. For the NWSC, 1.3 million people are served by 87 
thousand connections, meaning that a connection serves almost 15 people. In the case 
of SADM, 3.5 million people are served by 850 thousand connections meaning that 
each connection serves just over 4 people per connection. There appear to be very few 
urban water utilities (in fact, none to my knowledge), which have less than 20,000 
connections and which are recognized and promoted as being exemplary public water 
utilities.  
In this chapter, the well performing utilities will first be presented briefly. The 
second part of this chapter consists of comparing the utilities to one another. The third 
part of the chapter consists of some conclusions regarding the propositions. 
6.1 Case descriptions of the Four Well Performing Cases 
 
The cases presented in this section have all received recognition at a variety of fora for 
their performance or their performance improvements over the past years. The National 
Water and Sewerage Corporation has received considerable attention regarding its 
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achievements in improving the provision of water services. Indicative is that the utility 
was requested to present itself as a ‘turn-around’ company during the Water Forum at 
the World Bank in 2003.  
SANASA has been recognized by a variety of sources as being a ‘turn-around’ 
utility. The Correio Popular newspaper recognized it as being an outstanding public 
organization in 2003. It was acknowledged by ‘Environmental Sanitation’ Magazine as 
the municipal operator of the year in 2004 and was recognized for its performance by 
the Campinas municipal council in 2004.  
The Hai Phong Water Supply Company was presented as a ‘turn-around’ case at 
the 24th WEDC Conference, held in Islamabad in Pakistan in 1998. In addition, the 
utility received recognition in 2003 from the Vietnamese national government for being 
an outstanding public organization. Furthermore a benchmark study of the Vietnamese 
water services sector and monitored by independent auditors found that HPWSC was 
one of the best performing utilities in Vietnam.  
The water utility serving the State of Nuevo Leon  (SADM) in Mexico was 
recognized as being one of the best run in the sector as far back as 1990 (Yepes 1990). 
In 2003, the Mexican Commission of Environmental Infrastructure and the National 
Water Commission undertook a performance assessment of 72 utilities, which served 
more than 100,000 people. The criteria used for this assessment included, amongst 
others, indicators on service coverage, wastewater treatment coverage and efficiency of 
service provision. In the final ranking the SADM was ranked first (Rangel 2005). 
 
6.1.1 National Water and Sewerage Corporation, Uganda85 
 
In Uganda, water management is a task of the Ministry of Water, Lands and 
Environment (MWLE), whose mandate is “to promote and ensure the rational and 
sustainable utilization and development and safeguard of Land and Water Resources 
and Environment, for social and economic welfare and development as well as for 
regional and international peace”86. The MWLE consists of one Minister and three so-
called Ministers of State.  
These Ministers of State include one State Minister for Water, one State Minister 
Lands and one State Minister for the Environment. At the operational level the 
ministry’s structure consists of two Directorates, The Directorate of Water 
Development87 and the Directorate of Land and Environment. The Heads of these 
Directorate report to the Permanent Secretary, who is the Chief Executive and 
Accounting Officer. The MWLE supervises three statutory bodies. One of these 
statutory bodies is the National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC) (Philips 
2003).  The NWSC was established in 197288 with the responsibility of delivering 
 
85 The case of NWSC is based on Mwoga (2003), Mwoga (2004) and Philips (2003).  
86 www.mwle.go.ug 
87 Water services in rural areas and urban areas not entrusted to the NWSC are managed by the 
Directorate of Water Development (Philips 2003). 
88 The NWSC was founded by Decree no. 34 of 1972. This Decree was repealed by Statute No. 8 
of 1995. This Statute, also known as the NWSC Statute governs all operations of the NWSC 
(Mwoga 2004) 
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water supply and sewerage services in 15 large urban centers89.  The 15 centers in 
which the NWSC provides services count a population of 2.1 million people, which 
represents about 75% of the population in urban centers (Mwoga 2004). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Governance structure of the National Water and Sewerage Corporation 
 
The functioning of the NWSC is overseen by a Board of Directors, which is also the 
policy making body of the NWSC. The Board of Directors consists of 8 people 
including the Managing Director of the NWSC90. Of the seven other members, one 
must be the Director of the Directorate of Water. The other six members are appointed 
by the MLWE. These 6 Board members serve terms of 3 years and may be re-appointed 
for a second term. Selection of the Board members takes place on the basis of expertise 
in the fields of water utility management, public finance, engineering or public health 
Mwoga (2004). Although appointment of the Directors is on the basis of expertise, it is 
noteworthy that most of the members have a political background or are in some way 
involved with the Government of Uganda (Philips 2003). The Managing Director is 
appointed on the basis of competitive selection. In principle the Managing Director 
serves a contract term of five-years, but the contract can be renewed after the contract 
term has expired.  
 
 
 
89 The 15 towns served by the NWSC: Kampala, Jinja, Njeru, Entebbe, Mbale, Mabarara, 
Masaka, Tororo, Gulu, Lira, Kasese, Fort Portal, Kabale, Bushenyi, Soroti and Arua 
90 Philips (2003) states that the Board consists of 11 members. The other members are a 
Corporation Secretary and a member of the Utility Reform Unit within the Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Development and the chairman. 
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Table 6.1: General characteristics NWSC 2000-2003 
Indicator 2000/01 2001/02 22002/03 
Population served   1,315,000 
Connections   87,172 
No of employees   950 
Unaccounted for Water 43% 40% 39% 
Working ratio 0.85 0.79 0.79 
Staff per 1000 connections 17 12 11 
Staff per 1000 population served   0.72 
Accounts receivable as a share of annual revenue, 
expressed in months sales 
4.9 5.6 4.7 
Service coverage – water supply n.a. n.a. 63% 
Average domestic tariff (US$/m3) 0.38 0.38 0.40 
Source: Mwoga 2004 
 
During the 1970s and early 1980s Uganda was subject to considerable political and 
economic turmoil and the performance of NWSC, like that many other institutions, 
declined significantly. Between 1986 and 1997, NWSC embarked on major 
rehabilitation and expansion of its water supply and sewage systems with the support of 
international donor agencies. Although water supply and sanitation infrastructure was 
rehabilitated and expanded, performance of the utility was still lacking. This resulted in 
poor service provision despite improved infrastructure.  
In 1998, a new Board of Directors was appointed. The Board, in turn, appointed a 
new Managing Director, after the position fell vacant upon the expiry of the contract of 
the previous Managing Director. With a new Board and management a rare opportunity 
existed to review past performance and implement new strategies for improving 
performance of the utility. At the same time, external pressure was applied to improve 
performance. This external pressure came from: 
 
• Donor agencies who wanted NWSC to improve performance levels in order for it 
to be able to meet its debt obligations and be more credit worthy;  
• The Government who wanted the NWSC to service the customers better; and 
• The possibility of increased private sector participation, meaning that the NWSC 
had to show it could perform as well as a private operator.  
 
6.1.2 Sociedade de Abastecimento de Água e Saneamento S.A., Campinas, 
Brazil91 
 
The city of Campinas is located in the Brazilian State of Sao Paulo. The water services 
in this city of about 1 million inhabitants are provided by the Sociedade de 
Abastecimento de Água e Saneamento S.A (SANASA). SANASA, which was formed in 
1974, is a so-called ‘empresa-mixta’92. Although the empresa-mixta usually involves 
 
91 The case of SANASA is based on Aguiñaga (2004) and Ramos (2004). 
92 The ‘empresa mixta’, or ‘mixed ownership company’, originated in Spain. It has subsequently 
spread to other countries in Latin America (Ringskog 2002). 
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substantial private ownership, in the case of SANASA, the overwhelming majority of 
shares are owned by the Municipality of Campinas, which owns 99.99% of the 
shares93. Other persons and organizations, varying from the Mayor of Campinas in 
1973 to the Municipal Company for Development of Campinas, own the remaining 
0.01% of the shares. As mixed-ownership company, SANASA has both an 
Administration Council as well as an Inspection Council.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Governance structure SANASA 
 
The Administration Council sets the general direction that SANASA follows, approves 
the annual plan and supervises the Executive Team. The Inspection Council is a 
consultative body that analyses proposals and decisions on a range of issues. The 
Inspection Council reports to the Administration Council and once a year to the 
Shareholders Meeting. The Administration Council has a minimum of three and no 
more than five members who are elected or dismissed by the shareholders. The 
members of the Administration Council represent the executive team of SANASA (two 
members appointed by the Municipality), the employees of SANASA (one member) 
and two members are external members who are appointed on the basis of professional 
experience. The majority shareholder, in this case the Municipality of Campinas, 
appoints the president of the Administration Council who is also the president of 
SANASA. 
 
93 Although SANASA is on paper an 'empresa mixta', the fact that shares are so heavily 
concentrated with the Municipality of Campinas, means that it functions more like a government-
owned company than a joint-stock company. Potential benefits that are often cited by promoters 
of the ‘empresa mixta’ (such as access to private sector capital and private sector expertise) are 
unlikely to be achieved with the current ownership structure. 
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Management of the utility is the responsibility of a four-member Executive Team, 
which is appointed by the Administration Council every year. The Inspection Council is 
a consultation body without decision-making powers. They report their views to the 
Administration Council and at least once per year to the shareholders meeting.  
 
Table 6.2: General characteristics of SANASA 
Indicator  2000 2001 2002 
Population served   982,977 
Water supply connections   209,091 
Sewerage connections   186,652 
No Of Employees   1,609 
Unaccounted for Water 26.66% 26.62% 26% 
Working Ratio 0.65 0.81 0.79 
Staff per 1000 connections 4.16 4.11 4.13 
Staff per 1000 population served 1.65 1.73 1.68 
Accounts receivable as a share of annual revenue, expressed 
in months sales 
2.5 3.5 3.2 
Service coverage – water supply 98.54% 98.60% 98.89% 
Service coverage – sewerage 87.06% 87.47% 88.09% 
Average domestic tariff (US$/10m3) 1.75 2.39 2.62 
Source: Aguiñaga 2004 
 
6.1.3 Hai Phong Water Supply Company, Hai Phong, Vietnam94 
 
Located on the northeastern coast of Vietnam, Hai Phong is the third largest city in 
Vietnam and it is one of four cities with a provincial status95. The Hai Phong Water 
Supply Company (HPWSC) has the responsibility of providing water services to the 1.7 
million inhabitants of the city of Hai Phong. The HPWSC is a statutory body owned by 
the Hai Phong Provincial People’s Committee (HPPC).  
As a state-owned enterprise, the HPWSC has to observe the Law on State 
Enterprises of April 20th, 1996. According to this law, state-owned enterprises are 
granted larger autonomy in decision making, to procure inputs, to introduce new 
technologies, to borrow, to acquire or less assets, to hire and fire employees, and to 
allocate after-tax profits. On the other hand, it has the obligation of using capital and 
other resources provided by the government for production and delivery of services 
with tariffs regulated by the government. 
 
94 The case description of the Hai Phong Water Supply Company (HPWSC) is based on the 
Master of Science thesis of mr. Do Nhat Hoang, which was undertaken in the period September 
2003-April 2004. In addition, the HPWSC was visited in November 2003, during which 
interviews were held with managers and the former managing director. 
95 The provincial status means that the Hai Phong People’s Committee reports directly to the 
national government 
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Figure 6.3: Governance structure Hai Phong Water Supply Company 
 
The Transport, Urban and Public Works Department (TUPWS), which operates under 
the HPPC, oversees the management of the service provider. The vice-director of 
TUPWS, who is responsible for overseeing the management of HPWSC, is appointed 
by the HPPC. HPWSC employs 762 employees divided over 5 main departments 
(production, construction, support, project management and consumption). The largest 
of these departments is the consumption department, which is responsible for water 
distribution and customer relations.  
 
Table 6.3: General characteristics HPWSC 2000-2002 
Indicator 2000 2001 2002 
Population served 460900 480000 538,600 
Water supply connections 94724 112,427 131,136 
No of Employees 713 730 762 
Unaccounted for water 44 41 32% 
Working Ratio   = (Annual Operating Costs – Depreciation – 
Funding Charges)/ Annual Gross Revenues) 
0.82 0.67 0.62 
Staff per 1000 connections 7.20 6.49 5.66 
Staff per 1000 population served 1.55 1.382 1.27 
Accounts receivable as a share of annual revenue, expressed 
in months sales 
1 1 0.1 
Service coverage – water supply 75% 
(estimated)
80% 85% 
Average domestic tariff (US$/m3) 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Source: Hoang 2004 
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In the summer of 1993, the city of Hai Phong was faced with an acute water shortage 
resulting in rioting directed against the utility (which even resulted in the death of a 
company employee). As a result, the owner (HPPC) changed the utility management 
team and gave a clear mandate to the new director to produce results. Pressure from 
both the owner and the customers were the initial driver for change in management of 
the utility, with the new managing director as a major instigator of change. The first 
institutional reform was made in 1993. 
The first step in reforming the utility really consisted of a number of steps. The 
managing director received support from the HPPC (as is illustrated by allowing three 
tariff increases in the 1993-1997 period) and received the leeway to implement a new 
model for managing the utility (the ‘phuong’ model) (Ahn Thu and Luy 1998). The 
‘phuong’ is the smallest administrative unit in the Vietnamese administration system 
and encompasses between 10,000 and 15,000 inhabitants. In the ‘phuong’ model, on a 
phuong by phuong basis, the network in the phuong is upgraded and rehabilitated and 
the household connections in that phuong are provided with meters. Each phuong is 
connected to the main network by no more than 3 connections. The limited number of 
connections between the phuong and the main network allow the utility to accurately 
establish the amount of water going into a phuong and the meters at the household 
connections allow the utility to determine the actual consumption by the users. As a 
result the utility is able to accurately monitor the unaccounted-for-water levels per 
‘phuong’. At the same time, customer agencies are established at the ‘phuong’ level. 
These customer agencies both collect the bills that users have to pay as well as receive 
complaints from users. 
In addition to introducing the ‘phuong model’, the new management worked hard 
on changing the corporate culture of the utility (basically convincing everyone of the 
need for change). Training of utility staff, by using international donor support, formed 
an important component of this change process. As a result of the reforms in Hai 
Phong, performance of the HPWSC showed impressive improvements over the 1993-
2002 period as is illustrated by table 6.4. 
 
Table 6.4: Performance Improvements for HPWSC 1993-2002 
Indicator 1992 2002 
Unaccounted for water 73% 32%* 
Service coverage 68% 85% 
Metering  0% 91% 
Staff per 1000 connections n.a. 5.3 
* - Figure for 2003 (Hoang 2004); Source: Hoang 2004 
 
6.1.4 Servicios de Agua y Drenaje de Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, Mexico96 
 
The state of Nuevo Leon is located in the North of Mexico, on the border with the 
United States. Although the State counts 51 municipalities, political and economic life 
in the State is dominated by the city of Monterrey, which state houses 85% of the 
State’s inhabitants. The Servicios de Agua y Drenaje de Monterrey (SADM) initially 
 
96 The case description of SADM is largely based on Rangel (2005). 
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was responsible for providing service only to the Monterrey Metropolitan Area. 
However, in 1995, its mandate was extended to cover the entire state of Nuevo Leon. In 
addition to providing water services to the population of Nuevo Leon, the utility was 
attributed storm water management functions in 2000. SADM provides these services 
to approximately 3.5 million people.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Governance structure SADM 
 
SADM is a statutory body, owned by the State of Nuevo Leon. As a statutory body, the 
utility is monitored by a Consejo consisting of 7 members. In addition to being on the 
Consejo himself, the State Governor appoints one other representative of the state 
government and one representative of the water users97. Different Stakeholders appoint 
the other four members. One member represents the municipalities and is appointed by 
the municipality of Monterrey in which 85% of the population resides. The Nuevo Leon 
Real Estate Owners Chamber appoints one representative, one representative is 
appointed by the Nuevo Leon Industry Chamber and the regional office of the National 
Commerce, Services and Tourism Chamber appoints the final representative. The terms 
of the members of the Consejo vary depending on their appointment. For the members 
appointed by the State Governor their terms coincide with the 6-year term of the 
Governor himself, the Consejo member for the municipalities has a three-year term 
(coinciding with the terms of the mayors) and the Chambers are able to replace their 
representatives at any time. 
 
 
97 There is no standard procedure by way of which the governor appoints the other two Board 
members. They typically tend to be “people of the Governor’s confidence” (Rangel 2005:89) 
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Table 6.5: General characteristics SADM 
Indicator 2003 2002 2001 
Population served (in millions): 
Water supply 
Wastewater  
 
3.428  
3.373  
 
3.363 
3.373 
 
3.327 
3.263 
Water supply connections 853,752   
No of Employees 3,220 3,187 3,082 
Unaccounted for water 24.9% 23.5% 27.5% 
Working Ratio   0.73 0.73 0.68 
Staff per 1000 connections (water supply) 3.77 3.83 3.85 
Staff per 1000 population served (water supply) 0.94 0.95 0.93 
Service coverage – water supply98 99.18%   
Average customer bill water and wastewater US$10.40   
Source: Rangel 2005 
6.2 Cross-case Comparison of Four Well Performing Utilities 
 
Having introduced the four case studies, which are considered well performing, this 
section makes a comparison between these cases. The first part of this section discusses 
the autonomy and accountability of the utilities. This discussion also touches upon 
elements such as the degree to which the utility is ‘apolitical’ and the permanence and 
stability of the utility. The second part of this section focuses on elements such as 
hierarchy and levels within the utility, the degree of market-orientation and the level of 
customer-orientation. 
 
6.2.1 Autonomy and Accountability of the utilities 
 
The section on autonomy and accountability is subdivided in two main parts. The first 
parts concerns findings related to the autonomy of the utility. Points of discussion that 
will be raised in this section include financial autonomy and tariff levels, the role of 
external financiers, the stability of the organization, the role of crises for the utility and 
how this impacts the reform process, and the decline of political support following a 
crisis or external shock. The section dealing with accountability discusses the 
accountability of the utilities for the quality of water services provided, the use of 
performance targets in the management of the utilities, and the degree to which the 
service providers are accountable to financial institutions. 
 
6.2.1.1 Autonomy 
 
Based on the case studies the following observations can be made: 
 
 
98 Although SADM has the authority to provide water services to the whole state, there are areas 
where SADM has no infrastructure. In these areas, SADM provides (metered) bulk water to the 
municipality, which further distributes the water to the local inhabitants (Rangel 2005:86). 
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• None of the utilities are able to determine their tariffs; 
• All utilities seem able, at least to a large extent, to attract and maintain qualified 
staff; 
• All utilities are relatively stable in the sense that the management of the utility and 
the Board of Directors do not change frequently; 
• All utilities have a relatively high degree of financial autonomy, although external 
funding for investment purposes remains important in at least two of the cases; 
• The availability of water resources does not pose a major problem for the utilities; 
• All utilities received considerable political support over the past years. 
 
6.2.1.1.1 Financial Autonomy and Tariff Levels 
The four utilities are all characterized by a high degree of autonomy. In fact, the only 
two areas where the utilities do not appear to have much autonomy relates to the tariff 
levels and the ability to take out loans without prior approval of the owner. The fact that 
the utilities cannot address these issues is perhaps not without reason. The level of the 
tariffs remains a highly political issue and as such, it is not surprising that the 
government-owners want to keep control over the tariffs. The issue of being able to 
take out loans would appear to be related to the risks that are run by the government-
owners when the utility takes out loans. Basically, a water utility is almost never 
allowed to go bankrupt and cease its operations, as this would have a devastating effect 
on the well being of the local population. As such, when a utility would default on their 
loans, the government-owners would have to intervene and bail out the utility. This 
essentially means that a large part of the risks involved in taking out loans lies with the 
government-owners. 
All utilities had tariff levels, which at least covered operation and maintenance 
costs and part of the investment costs. Although, the utilities do have a high degree of 
financial autonomy, some of the utilities face some difficulties in their attempts to 
increase tariff levels in line with inflation levels. In an interview with the former 
managing director of HPWSC in November 2003, he expressed a need to raise tariffs in 
order to ensure expansion of the water and sanitation network to currently unserved 
areas in the Hai Phong area. However, although realizing that without tariff increases 
this expansion could not take place he also acknowledged that the Hai Phong People 
Committee (HPPC) would not approve this tariff increase. Between 1994 and 2003 
there had been 5 tariff increases and getting the HPPC to accept a sixth tariff increase 
would be highly unlikely. More so, because the current level of water services 
provision is not bad and quite impressive in comparison with the performance in 1994. 
This has meant that the issue of water services has been losing ground on the public 
agenda. With water services being surpassed by other issues (roads, education, etc.) on 
the public agenda, the support from the HPPC for further tariff increases for water 
services dwindles. Illustrative for the diminishing willingness to increase tariffs is when 
and why the five tariff increases in the period between 1994 and 2003 took place. Three 
out of the five tariff increases took place in the first three years, meaning that in the last 
six years only two tariff increases were implemented (Hoang 2004). Furthermore, the 
last two tariff increases were partly or wholly implemented as part of a commitment in 
order to ensure a World Bank project loan (Hoang 2004), leading to the question if the 
tariff increases would have occurred at all were it not for this outside pressure. 
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Whereas HPWSC has to wait and see if its proposed tariff increases are accepted, 
the tariff charged by SADM is automatically adjusted every month using a formula 
stipulated in the State Water Law of Nuevo Leon. The formula incorporates the 
inflation of operating costs for the utility (especially electricity and salary costs) and the 
national inflation index (as reported by the Mexican Central Bank). Adjustments in the 
tariff based on this formula do not require the approval of any authority. However, the 
Board has intervened a few times when they considered further increases inappropriate. 
In 1995, when national inflation levels increased drastically, the Board refused to let 
that increase translate into large tariff increases. A second example of intervention took 
place in 2004, when it was proposed that SADM would not apply the monthly tariff 
increases as long as its surplus finances were healthy enough to absorb the lower real 
tariff rates. SADM started applying the automatic increases again in December 2004 
(Rangel 2005).  Also in Uganda the water tariff has been indexed since April 2002. The 
tariff is indexed annually and takes into account inflation, and the depreciation of the 
Uganda Shilling against foreign currency. 
 
6.2.1.1.2 Stability of the Organization 
In contrast to the utilities in Guanajuato, most of the utilities are relatively stable in the 
sense that management and the management oversight entity (the Board of Directors or 
Councils) do not change frequently. This should allow the management of the utility to 
develop a medium-term to long-term strategy for improving performance or 
maintaining a high-performance level. In Hai Phong the managing director held his 
function from 1993 until 2002, when he was promoted. The deputy director 
subsequently succeeded him. In the case of NWSC, the current managing director has 
held his office since 1997. The exceptions to this are the Latin American cases. In the 
case of SADM, the appointment of the general manager does appear to be influenced 
by political changes as “the general manager usually changes when the State Governor 
does” (Rangel 2005:91). In fact, the general manager can be removed by the State 
Governor at any time the State Governor desires to do so. This essentially ensures that 
the general manager will be loyal to the State Governor. However, although the General 
Manager tends to alternate with changes in the State Government, other managers in the 
organization do not change that frequently, not even when the political party in power 
changes. This provides a measure of stability to the management team of the utility. 
According to the management of the utility this is one of the success factors of the 
utility (Rangel 2005). According to the management of SADM, the utility has not been 
the subject of large-scale political intervention, as electoral candidates have not used 
the utility to promote their own image. The management believes that this ‘insulation’ 
from political influence is a result of an awareness campaign started in the 1980s, 
which aimed to inform the population about providing water services (and the need for 
them to pay their water bills). Another way of mitigating political influence is that the 
SADM tries to fill vacancies internally prior to offering these vacancies external 
candidates. This system of giving preference to internal candidates also acts as a buffer 
against political interference as politicians have limited means to offer ‘supporters’ jobs 
at the SADM. 
In the case of SANASA, the utility has been subject to more turbulence. As with 
the Mexican utilities, the management of SANASA is also impacted by the change in 
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municipal government. Instead of elections every three years, however, municipal 
elections are held every four years.   
 
6.2.1.1.3 The Role of External Financiers 
Similar to the cases in Guanajuato, external financing remains crucial for these four 
utilities. Many ‘turn-around’ utilities, which showed impressive performance 
improvements, would not have been able to do so without outside financial assistance. 
In the case of Hai Phong for example, the World Bank and DANIDA provide 
considerable assistance (although it should also be emphasized that the utility of Hai 
Phong proved capable of making the most of that assistance). In Uganda the NWSC 
received financial assistance from the World Bank, the German Government through 
KfW and GTZ and the European Union through the European Development Fund. In 
Nuevo Leon, SADM managed to obtain a loan from the Inter-American Development 
Bank for US$180 million in the early 1990s. SANASA has also depended on financial 
resources from government agencies. Contributions and loans were received from the 
State Fund for Water Resources (FEHIDRO), the Federal Economic Bank (CEF) and 
the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES).  
Linked to the issue of external assistance is that of the role played by the 
government of the country in which the utilities operate. In most cases, external 
assistance is only possible if the government provides support and guarantees to the 
external agency providing the assistance99. As a result, without political support a 
utility is unlikely to have access to external assistance and as such is unlikely to be able 
to ‘turn around’ performance. As an example we can refer to the discussion of the 
tariffs in Hai Phong above. Raising tariffs appears to have been a condition in order for 
HPWSC to gain access to a World Bank loan. The HPPC supported the water utility in 
order to obtain this external financing. 
 
6.2.1.1.4 Crisis and Punctuated Equilibria  
A review of the cases shows that reform processes to turn around utilities are frequently 
preceded by some form of crisis or external shock. Crisis appears to both generate a 
need for change and also to open up windows of opportunity by throwing the normal 
rules of the game into flux (Bately and Larbi 2004)100. The reason why normal rules are 
thrown into flux appears to be that crises weaken or undermine supporters of the status 
quo (Tomassi 2002). With the position of the supporters of the status quo weakened, 
more room is available (at least for a limited time) for the proponents of reform. 
The nature of that crisis can vary. In the case of Hai Phong for example, the crisis 
consisted of a water service crisis in 1993 in which the utility had tremendous difficulty 
supplying the citizens of Hai Phong with water. The crisis lead to civil unrest and 
during protests one employee of the utility even lost his life. This put enormous 
pressure on the Hai Phong People Committee to improve service provision. In the 
 
99 This not only applies to funds from international lending agencies and donors, but also to 
private banks. In case a utility would want to take out a loan with a private bank, the government-
owner is likely to have to provide guarantees to the  
100 These findings concerning reform processes in nine countries illustrate the importance of 
crisis prior to reform as they found that ‘economic’ crisis was “a key catalyst in bringing about 
reform” (Batley and Larbi 2004:39). 
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‘window of opportunity’ a new managing director, Mr. Thuy, was allowed to 
implement his ideas concerning the ‘phuong model’ and received both political support 
and support from international agencies to do so. 
In Uganda the NWSC was under threat of being privatized by way of a lease 
contract in the late 1990s. This put a lot of pressure on NWSC to show that it could turn 
around performance in order to avoid plans of introducing a lease contract. In 1997, a 
new managing director entered the utility, and with government support and that of 
external agencies, initiated a series of reforms in the utility.   
In some utilities, reform starts with the arrival of a new municipal government, 
which makes improvement of service provision one of its priorities. In essence a change 
in municipal government then forms the crisis (or external shock) that can initiate the 
reform process. An example of such a utility is SANASA, which made major 
improvements in service provision in the 1996-2000 period. Over the 2000-2004 period 
the policy of the previous administration was largely continued. What is noteworthy is 
that here too, the arrival of a new managing director in 1996 signaled the beginning of 
the ‘turn-around’ of the water utility.  
In this sense, these findings confirm the findings for the case of SIMAPAG, where 
the decentralization of service provision to municipal government and the arrival of a 
municipal government in 1996 preceded a period of considerable performance 
improvement, again under the guidance of a new managing director. 
In fact, it is possible to identify a number of ‘triggers’ for reform. These include water 
sector crises (such a droughts and low service levels), political shifts (such a 
decentralization programs or changes following an election) and outside threats and 
opportunities (such as the threat of privatization or possible donor assistance). What is 
also noteworthy is that political support immediately following the external shock is 
high. However, as the tremors of the external shock fade and diminish, so does political 
support for further reforms. Immediately after a crisis or major event there is a ‘window 
of opportunity’ to implement a wide range of relatively radical reform measures. But as 
the memory of the crisis fades, this window of opportunity disappears. The closing of 
the ‘window of opportunity’ is perhaps best illustrated by the support for further tariff 
increases. Immediately after a crisis, broad political support exists for implementing 
measures such as tariff increases as the issue of water services provision figures 
prominently on the public agenda, as was seen in Hai Phong and SIMAPAG. However, 
as time passes and a ‘sufficient’ level of performance is achieved, other issues (housing, 
roads, employment, healthcare, etc.) surpass water services in prominence on the public 
agenda101. When that happens, political support for the water services sector is likely to 
 
101 In this sense it is important to realize that it would seem that the ‘crisis’ should be sufficiently 
large to not only affect the low -income households often living in informal settlements, but also 
affect the middle and higher-income households. Only then is the crisis sufficiently severe to be a 
trigger for reform and lead to political support for the water utility. As long as the crisis is limited 
to low-income households, with little political power, it is not likely that the issue of water 
services will figure prominently on the political agenda. Only when interests of middle and 
higher income consumers, who are likely to wield considerable political influence, become 
threatened does the issue of water services really become prominent on the political agenda. 
Political support will then decline once the interests of the middle and higher-income households 
have been safeguarded. 
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dwindle and the utilities face much more difficulty in getting approval for tariff 
increases.  This process, as identified in a number of utilities, seems to give support to 
the theory of seeing institutional evolution or change as punctuated equilibria rather 
than steady, gradual change102. The idea behind the theory of institutional evolution as 
punctuated equilibria is that “[o]nce a particular system (institutional or biological) is 
established, it tends to sustain itself. Change in the system may more likely be initiated 
by a large external shock that triggers the activation of internal change, cumulative or 
new, rather than something continual or gradual” (Aoki 2000:29). Strongly linked to the 
idea of institutional evolution as punctuated equilibria is the idea of resilience. 
Resilience can be defined as “the amount of disruption needed to transform a system 
from one stability domain (characterized by a configuration of mutually reinforcing 
processes and structures) to another” (Ostrom and Janssen 2002:14). If we link these 
two ideas with Spiller and Savedoff’s ‘low-level equilibrium’, as discussed in chapter 
one, we can perhaps view the turn-around of utilities such as the one in Hai Phong, 
SIMAPAG, SANASA and the NWSC in Uganda as examples were a low-level 
equilibrium was punctuated and a higher level equilibrium resulted. In Hai Phong the 
civic unrest, in SANASA the onset of a new municipal government and in Uganda the 
threat of privatization could then have provided ‘the amount of disruption required’ to 
reach a higher-level equilibrium.  
Having said this, questions remain about the exact role of the noted external 
shocks. Although, external shocks could be identified, the role played by these shocks 
is not clear. The question is if the external shocks are ‘necessary’ for successful reform 
to take place, if they are ‘sufficient’ in themselves to cause reform or if these shocks 
can be seen as no more than ‘facilitating’ reform (Drazen, as cited in Tomassi 2002).   
 
6.2.1.1.5 Punctuated Equilibria and Declining Political Support 
In the previous section the existence of external shocks prior to utility reform was 
discussed. It was argued that external shocks often preceded the achievement of a 
‘higher-level’ equilibrium (i.e. a situation of improved performance). Although this 
may be the case, similar to performance improvements being triggered by a crisis or 
external shock, so can a performance decrease be triggered by an external shock. In 
other words, the question is how stable the higher-level equilibrium is. Can the higher-
level equilibrium not be ‘punctuated’ again and lead to a shift back to a lower-level 
equilibrium. For example, the municipal elections of 2003 left SIMAPAG with a level 
of monthly-tariff increases, which is well below the rate of inflation and with a largely 
new management team (headed by the municipal president’s cousin). Similarly, 
SANASA, which managed impressive performance improvements in the 1996-2004 
period, witnessed an almost complete change in management following the 2004 
elections. Although, it is at the moment too soon to state that these events will lead to a 
decline in performance (and, as such, to lower-level equilibria), the main point is that 
external shocks can work in all directions triggering not only performance increases, 
but also decreases.  
 
102 “The actual process of institutional evolution may thus be seen analogous to the biological 
evolutionary process that biologists Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Elridge […] conceptualized as 
punctuated equilibria” (Aoki 200:28). Aoki does indicate that biological metaphors and analogies 
cannot be perfect. He does find them, however, highly relevant and appropriate.  
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Noteworthy in this context is the ‘vulnerability’ of public water utilities to external 
shocks. The fact that many public water utilities are strongly controlled by the 
government-owners would lead to the conclusion that in many cases public water 
utilities may be quite vulnerable to external shocks relating to the owner. This would 
especially be the case if ownership were concentrated in one person or organization. In 
SIMAPAG and SANASA ownership essentially rests with the municipal government, 
which is dominated by the municipal president. This concentration of ownership makes 
the utility highly vulnerable to the impact of external shocks, as is illustrated by the 
frequent changes in management. In SIMAPAG, the collaboration between the general 
manager and the Consejo was able to ‘insulate’ the utility against external shocks in the 
1995-2000 period. But since then successive municipal governments have slowly 
eroded the ‘layer of insulation’. 
Interestingly enough, the one utility that does not fit the mold is SADM, which has 
been recognized as a well performing utility at least since 1990. The fact that it is 
recognized as a well performing utility basically means it operates at a high-level 
equilibrium (to use Spiller’s and Savedoff’s terminology) and has done so for a very 
long time. As such, what is interesting in the case of SADM is not so much identifying 
an external shock, which preceded reform, but rather to identify how the utility has 
managed to insulate itself against external shocks, which may precede a sharp decline 
in performance. In other words, whereas SIMAPAG and SANASA have, as a result of 
external shocks, entered an era of instability, which may have severe consequences on 
the levels of water services provided, SADM has managed to remain stable. As 
mentioned, the management believes that this ‘insulation’ from political influence (and 
as such from the external shock of political origin) is a result of an awareness campaign 
started in the 1980s, which aimed to inform the population about providing water 
services. It would appear that, over time, SADM has managed to establish an 
institutional culture, not only internally but also among its clientele and its owners, that 
essentially insulates it against the external shocks deriving from changes in the State 
Government of Nuevo Leon. 
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Table 6.6: An overview of autonomy 
External Autonomy HPWSC SANASA NWSC SADM 
The utility is able to attract and 
maintain qualified staff on its own 
account 
Yes Yes To a large 
extent 
To a large 
extent 
The utility and the Board can set 
the pay scales for the utility 
Yes103 Yes Yes Yes 
The level of actual income is 
equal to required income 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The utility is able to set its own 
tariffs 
No No No No 
The utility has access to sufficient 
raw water resources 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The income generated by the 
utility can only be used for 
provision of water services by the 
utility. 
No104 Yes Yes Yes 
The tariffs have been sufficient to 
meet at least O&M costs 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
There have been few changes in 
management of the utility over the 
past years 
Yes Yes105 Yes Yes 
There have been few changes in 
the Board of Directors over the 
past years 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The utility is able to cut off 
service provision to consumers 
who have not paid their bills 
Yes Yes Yes No 
The utility is able to take out 
loans without prior approval from 
the owners? 
No No Yes Yes 
  
6.2.1.2 External Accountability 
 
The most salient findings regarding the level and nature of accountability are as 
follows: 
 
 
103 Although the government sets the official salary, the utility can set the ‘soft’ salary, which can 
make up two-thirds of the employee’s income. 
104 At least part of the income needs to be used for a “contribution to the budget” of the HPPC 
(Hoang 2004:25). As such, not all of the income is used for the provision of service delivery. 
105 Considerable changes were made in the beginning of 2004.  
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• All utilities are accountable to the agencies regulating the quality of potable water. 
However, none of the utilities has ever been fined or sanctioned by these agencies. 
All utilities are also strongly accountable to the government-owners; 
• The utilities are also accountable to financial institutions from whom they have 
received or loaned funds. In three out of four cases, the agreement between the 
funding institution and the utility incorporates performance targets that the utility is 
to meet; 
• Although the rights and obligations of customers tend to be stipulated in contracts 
or customer charters, few utilities promise to meet specific performance targets and 
compensate failure to meet such targets financially; 
• None of the utilities is very accountable to local non-governmental organizations. 
 
6.2.1.2.1 Accountability for Quality 
The finding that none of the utilities have ever been fined or sanctioned by any 
regulators responsible for regulating water quality is somewhat surprising. It also leads 
to the question how strong the accountability for water quality really is?  
A number of reasons can be brought forward to explain why no fines have been 
imposed. One reason, which is the case in Hai Phong, is that the regulator is simply not 
able to impose fines. The Hai Phong Preventive Medical Center is the regulator for 
water quality. This agency takes water samples in various locations and tests these in 
their laboratory. If these samples fail to meet national standards, the agency has no 
authority to apply any penalties on the utility. They can only inform the utility and 
TUPWS, which is the entity monitoring the performance and functioning of HPWSC. 
In the other cases, as in the Mexican cases, regulators are able to impose sanctions 
but have never done so. A second reason why no sanctions have been imposed is 
because the regulator does not actually monitor the quality of the drinking water 
produced. In the case of the NWSC, a set of clear criteria exists for the quality to which 
the drinking water produced by the NWSC must adhere. These criteria are set by the 
Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS) and are considered realistic by the 
NWSC. The monitoring of NWSC’s performance in comparison to these standards falls 
under the responsibility of the Directorate of Water Development. However, although 
the DWD is officially responsible for monitoring NWSC’s performance on meeting 
these water quality targets, this monitoring effectively does not happen. As such, also 
no sanctions are imposed. A third reason why sanctions have never been imposed is 
that the regulators simply did not have a reason to impose sanctions. The idea being that 
either the utility has always managed to meet standards set by the regulator (which 
appears unlikely) or the utility has addressed any shortcomings within the time 
demanded by the regulator. A fourth reason would be that the instrument of imposing 
fines is for government agencies either makes little sense or is (politically) undesirable. 
In essence, having one government agency sanction or fine another government agency 
may make little sense, as the government would then be basically fining itself. This 
would appear to specifically be the case when the regulator and the utility operate at the 
same level government.  
In any case the fact that none of the utilities studied ever have been sanctioned by 
the regulator for water quality, raises some questions about the actual level of 
accountability of these utilities. 
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6.2.1.2.2 The Use of Performance Targets 
Also noteworthy, is that the relationship of accountability to the owner does not appear 
to really be based on specific performance targets that the utility must meet. In the four 
well performing cases studied, only two actually were officially subject to achieving 
performance targets that were set by the owner. However, a careful analysis of the way 
these performance targets are implemented and monitored reveals that in actuality, the 
performance targets are not used to hold the management of the utility accountable for 
the results that produce. The two utilities subject to performance targets set by the 
owners are the HPWSC and the NWSC. 
The Hai Phong People Committee sets annual performance targets that the 
HPWSC has to meet. These targets include total revenue, water production, water 
consumption, new connections and contribution to the owner’s budget. However a 
review of the actual targets shows that these targets appear to be quite low in 
comparison with actual achievements. It appears that the Hai Phong People Committee 
does not view performance targets as an instrument to pressure the HPWSC to achieve 
greater efficiency. The table below shows the performance targets for revenue 
collection for 2002 that the HPWSC has to achieve. The table provides the achieved 
result for 2001, the target for 2002 and the actual achieved result for 2002. 
 
Table 6.7: Performance targets and achievements of the HPWSC for revenue in 2002  
Indicator Unit Achievement 
2001 
Target for 2002 Actual 
achievement 2002 
Revenue 
collected 
VND 
(millions) 
60,813 60,100 84,800 
Source: Hoang 2004 
 
What the table shows is that the performance target set for revenue collection in 2002 is 
actually lower than the achieved revenue collection in 2001. Not surprisingly the 
HPWSC was able to meet the targets set. Setting targets, which are easy to achieve is 
not uncommon in government-owned organizations. In discussing why contracts often 
fail to improve performance in the public sector, the World Bank (1995) mentions 
evidence that performance targets are often ‘soft’ and set at levels that are easy to 
achieve. 
In the case of the NWSC, the system works a bit differently. In Uganda, the 
Ministry of Water Lands and Environment (MWLE) sets clear and measurable targets 
for service that that the NWSC has to achieve. Since 2000, a performance contract 
between the MWLE and the NWSC was introduced. The performance contract brought 
considerable benefits to the NWSC as, at the suggestion of the World Bank, the NWSC 
was allowed to postpone repayments of loans to the Government of Uganda during the 
running time of the performance contract. The idea was that the NWSC would only be 
able to obtain the required level of performance required by the contract if the debts of 
the NWSC could be frozen (Philips 2003). Annually the NWSC reports the 
performance in relation to these targets in the annual report, which is submitted to the 
Minister. The recourse that the Minister has in case the NWSC fails to meet the 
specified standards is that the MWLE can remove the Board or pressure the Board into 
removing the Managing Director. However, the actual implementation of the 
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Performance Contract raises some questions about the effectiveness of this contract. 
Formally, a review committee should exist to monitor and review the contract. 
However, this Review Committee was never established and as such, performance of 
the NWSC has never really been monitored (Philips 2003). 
 
6.2.1.2.3 Accountability to Financial Institutions 
In addition to a strong accountability to the owners of the water utility, a number of the 
utilities also had a strong accountability to financial institutions, which donated or 
loaned money to the utility. What makes the ‘well performing’ cases interesting is the 
use of performance targets in the loan or grant agreements. In the cases of the NWSC, 
SANASA and HPWSC the utilities have to meet certain performance targets or report 
in detail in their performance. 
In the case of SANASA, for example, the water utility is able to obtain funds from 
the Federal Economic Bank (CEF). The CEF is part of the Ministry of Finance and has 
the objective to improve the quality of life for the citizens of Brazil by stimulating the 
development of urban infrastructure. When SANASA enters into a loan with CEF, 
however, performance targets for service are specified. These performance targets are 
included in the loan agreement. Possible performance targets can relate to unaccounted-
for-water, operational margin, margin of staff expenditure, uncollected bills, labor 
productivity, number of water and sewage connections and percentage of treated 
wastewater. If SANASA does not manage to achieve the specified targets, they become 
ineligible for further funding from CEF. Table 6.8 provides an overview of the 
performance of SANASA in previous years and how past performance is use for 
developing performance targets, which are specified in the loan agreement with CEF. 
 
Table 6.8: Example of performance targets set by CEF for SANASA in 2002 
Previous performance Targets Indicator Formula 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Non revenue 
water 
Water billed/water produced 24.47 24.5 24.4 23.3 
Margin of 
staff 
expenditure 
Staff costs/Operational expenses 
0.37 0.35 0.35 0.34 
Labor 
productivity 
Total number of 
connections/number of employees 
and contracted services 
247.09 240.41 240.42 243.3 
Increase in # 
of water 
connections 
Water connections at the end of 
the year -Number of water 
connections at the beginning of 
the year 
2.58 2.22 1.85 2.11 
Increase in # 
of sewage 
connections 
Sewage connections at the end of 
the year -Number of water 
connections at the beginning of 
the year 
2.11 2.18 1.41 1.58 
Percentage of 
treated 
wastewater 
Volume of sewage treated/volume 
of sewage collected 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.11 
Source: Aguiñaga 2004 
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Also in the case of the NWSC, agencies, which lend money to the NWSC, impose 
performance targets on the utility. These targets can include requirements of matching 
funds, such as including a minimum of 20% of funds from internal sources to be used 
for either capital investment or counterpart funding, reducing employee related costs by 
18%, and timely submission of audited accounts to the lender. Different loans and 
grants will have different requirements (Mwoga 2004). 
In the Mexican water services sector, financing institutions similarly try to use 
access to funds as an instrument to promote service improvement. One such program is 
called PROMAGUA and is managed by the CNA. Under the PROMAGUA program a 
utility can apply for funds as long as they have a ‘global efficiency rate’ above 60%. 
The global efficiency rate is based on both physical efficiency (physical water losses) 
and commercial efficiency (billing/collection ratio). In essence, a Mexican water utility 
that manages to collect revenue for 60% of the water it produces qualifies for the 
program. Of the poorly performing Mexican cases, however none qualified (or have not 
applied) for this program.  
What is evident, however, is that whereas the owners may not hold the utilities 
accountable for results, in a number of cases, this task is subsequently administered by 
the financial institutions active in the water services sector. 
 
Table 6.9: An overview of external accountability 
External Accountability HPWSC SANASA NWSC SADM 
The regulator sets specified performance 
targets, which the utility must meet.  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Failure to meet these targets can result in 
penalties being applied. 
No Yes No Yes 
These penalties have also been applied No No Not 
applicable 
No 
The utility reports frequently to these 
regulators  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The owner sets performance targets, 
which the utility must meet.  
Yes No Yes No 
Failure to meet these targets results in 
penalties being applied. 
No n.a. Yes, in 
principle 
n.a. 
The utility reports to the owner 
periodically 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
A representative of the owner is present 
at Board meetings 
No No Yes Yes 
Financial institutions require specified 
performance targets to be achieved.  
Yes Yes Yes No 
The utility is actively accountable to 
customer organizations  
No No No No 
The customer’s rights and obligations are 
stated in a customer charter or contract 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The charter or contract contains 
performance targets which the utility 
must meet 
No No Yes No 
The utility is actively accountable to 
non-governmental organizations 
No No No No 
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A review of the findings in the four well performing cases lead to the conclusion that, 
in the understanding that individual customers do not represent external organizations, 
well performing public utilities are not strongly accountable for results to external 
organizations. Only external financial agencies seem to impose performance targets for 
which the utility can be held accountable. 
 
6.2.2 Hierarchy and Levels, the Market and Customers 
 
In the section below, the focus shifts to the internal functioning of the utility. As 
mentioned before, it is realized that dimensions such as ‘markets’ and ‘customers’ are 
also external to the organization. However, the focus of this section is more on the 
policies and practices of the organization in dealing with customers and markets. The 
first section looks at hierarchy and levels, which can be distinguished in two parts. First 
of all, attention is paid to the distribution of decision-making powers in the organization 
and the roles played by different levels within the organization. The second aspect 
looks if and how the employees (in different levels) are accountable for their 
performance. 
 
6.2.2.1 Hierarchy and Levels 
 
Based on the case studies the following observations can be drawn: 
 
• Considerable variation exists in the degree of decentralization within the 
organization 
• The utilities tend to keep decisions, which can have significant financial 
consequences relatively centralized, at least to the point that the managing 
director/general manager needs to be informed and needs to approve a certain 
expense. 
• Customer management appears to be relatively decentralized and in most cases 
seems to follow established processes and standards. 
  
6.2.2.1.1 Centralized Decision-making 
Although, the degree of decentralization shows considerable variation between the 
utilities, it seems likely that part of this variation is caused by the administrative level at 
which the utilities operate. The four ‘well performing’ cases have different mandates, in 
the sense that a utility like the HPWSC serves only the city of Hai Phong, whilst the 
NWSC has a national mandate. The HPWSC serves one city and the network it 
operates and maintains can be viewed as one single network. In order to execute their 
national mandate in Uganda, however, the NWSC incorporates fifteen separate service 
areas, which are spread out over the country. As such, these service areas, in 
operational terms, are not connected, but can be seen as separate operational units. 
These differences obviously have an impact on how the utility is managed and 
especially on the way decision-making authority is distributed over the various levels 
within the utility. Not surprisingly, the NWSC seems to have decentralized more 
decision-making powers to lower levels within the organization. The area service 
providers (ASPs) have their billing centers and produce their own bills. They can also 
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outsource activities and functions, below a certain amount, without the interference of 
the Head Office in Kampala, including hiring of guards and collectors, maintenance of 
premises, office equipment or vehicles. The ASPs also carry out expansion and minor 
rehabilitation of the network and existing facilities in their area. The ASPs also 
formulate and implement strategies for reducing unaccounted for water. And finally, 
the ASPs have the power to disconnect non-paying customers and they can determine 
the way in which customer complaints are dealt with, provided they achieve the 
response time targets. Also decisions regarding the procurement of goods and services 
are made at different levels depending on the monetary value. The ASPs procure goods 
and services up to values of US$2,500. The NWSC Head Office Management procures 
goods up to values of US$9,000 and the Board of Directors procures goods and services 
up to values of US$25,000. Beyond this latter threshold, the Solicitor General must 
clear the NWSC Management procurement decisions before the NWSC Board can 
endorse them. Currently the managers of the ASPs can hire and fire contract staff as 
well as staff below a specified salary position. The staff on higher salaries are hired and 
posted to the ASPs by the Head Office in consultation with the managers of the ASPs.  
It should be recognized, however, that also between the three utilities operating at 
city and state level there is also some variation exists in the distribution of decision-
making powers over various levels. Specifically, SANASA, which operates according 
to system of working groups, appears to be more decentralized than the utilities in Hai 
Phong and Nuevo Leon. In general, decisions within SANASA are prepared by 
working groups. These working groups consist of employees from various departments, 
which are considered important to be involved in a particular decision. Ideally, these 
working groups or working committees will incorporate the most qualified personnel 
for that particular issue. These working groups tend to work on one specific issue. Once 
the working groups have agreed on a decision, the group submits a proposal regarding 
that issue to the Executive Team and/or Administrative Council for approval and 
endorsement. Although, the ‘higher levels’ in the organization still need to approve the 
proposal submitted by the working group, it is quite rare that management rejects 
proposals of working groups.  
Also of interest is to see in which areas the utilities remain strongly centralized and 
in which they have decentralized decision-making authority. Similar to the utilities in 
Guanajuato, decisions, which have direct or indirect financial consequences, tend to be 
centralized within the four utilities. The fact that such decisions are centralized is not 
surprising. Ultimately management is responsible for keeping the utility financially 
viable, and doing so means that it does not want to be surprised by the consequences of 
decisions taken in lower levels of the organization. Decisions in the customer 
management on the other hand tend to be decentralized to lower levels. Here too there 
is a similarity with the cases from Guanajuato. It is also easily understandable why the 
utilities have done so. When a customer approaches the utility with a problem and 
complaint, the utility will want to address this as quickly as possible. This means there 
is little time to ‘send’ the decision up the hierarchy to higher levels of the organization. 
As such, the decisions have to be made at lower levels in the organizations. However, 
also employees in the four well performing utilities have very little room for discretion 
when they do make decisions. The company policy or protocol leads the employee to 
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the decision. If the issue or problem is not covered by existing guidelines, the employee 
will refer the decision to his/her superiors. 
 
Table 6.10: An overview of decentralization within the utility  
Decentralization of authority within 
the utility 
HPWSC SANASA NWSC SADM 
Decisions about tariff levels are made 
by the utility 
No No No No 
Procurement of goods and service 
does not require approval of the 
managing director 
No Yes Depends 
on the 
amount 
Depends on 
the amount  
Procurement of goods and services 
does not require approval of the 
Board/Council 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Decisions about promotion, hiring or 
firing of employees does not require 
approval of the managing director 
No Yes For some 
positions 
No 
Decisions about promotion, hiring and 
firing of employees does not require 
approval of the Council/Board  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The utility has decentralized decisions 
relating to customer management to 
lower levels in the organization 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
6.2.2.2  (Internal) accountability for results 
 
On the basis of the case studies and the overview provided above, the following 
conclusions can be drawn with regard to the level of (internal) accountability for results 
of the researched well performing utilities: 
 
• The degree to which employees are held accountable shows some variation. In 
some cases (HPWSC and NWSC) this accountability is quite strong. In another 
case (SANASA) this accountability is virtually non-existent. 
• The impact of performance on the salaries that the employees receive also shows 
considerable variation.  
• All utilities have a separate oversight agency. These do not appear to set realistic, 
clear and measurable targets for the utility, however. Moreover, management does 
not always appear to be held accountable for meeting specified performance 
targets. 
 
6.2.2.2.1 A Mixed Picture of Accountability 
Overall, the picture emerging from the level of (internal) accountability appears to be 
mixed. The utilities seem to have developed mechanisms for accountability for results 
to varying degrees. HPWSC and NWSC seem to have developed a high level of 
accountability for results and SANASA and SADM seem to have a weaker 
accountability for results.  
Of particular interest is the case of the HPWSC. Firstly because the utility has 
developed a strong system of internal accountability for results and secondly the way in 
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which this system works. In state-owned enterprises in Vietnam, the income of an 
employee consists of two parts: an official or ‘hard’ part and an unofficial or ‘soft’ part 
of the salary. Nationally, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs sets the ‘hard’ part of 
the salary. This pay scale is applicable for all employees of state-owned enterprises and 
a water utility has little option but to follow the levels set by that Ministry. ‘Soft’ salary 
comes from internal cash of the company. ‘Soft’ salary levels vary from company to 
company depending on the specific policy of each company. According to a study by 
the Ministry of Finance, the ‘soft’ salary is on average two to three times higher than 
the ‘hard’ part of the salary (Hoang 2004:23). What makes the HPWSC different is that 
they have taken an existing practice of Vietnamese public enterprises (the existence of a 
hard and soft part of the salary), and developed it into a system for (internal) 
accountability for results. In the case of the HPWSC, the management of the utility has 
connected the ‘soft’ part of the salary to individual performances. In the production 
sector, for example, individual performance is measured based on an agreed set of 
indicators such as chemical and energy consumption, and monthly water production. 
Achievement of set targets will decide the magnitude of the ‘soft’ salary. The better the 
performance, the higher the ‘soft’ salary given to the employees working in that 
particular area. The income of bill collectors, for example, is connected to the amount 
of money collected by these collectors. The more money collected by these bill 
collectors, the higher the ‘soft’ part of their salary will be. This provides a considerable 
incentive for individual employees. An interesting detail is that the system is applied to 
all employees and as such is applied at different levels within the organization. At the 
same time, the system of the ‘soft’ salary can be questioned, as the criteria for 
establishing the magnitude of the ‘soft’ salary are not always transparent and are not 
documented. In the case of the HPWSC, the management has elected, as a company 
policy, to link the ‘soft’ part of the salary to performance. Moreover, the individual 
employees know on what basis the level of their salary will be determined (despite the 
fact that the criteria are not officially documented). However, company policy can 
change as quickly as the management of the utility and it remains to be seen if future 
general managers will be implementing the same system in the same way. The lack of 
transparency in the existing system would seem to make it vulnerable to corruption, 
meaning that the effectiveness of this system is very much dependent on who is 
managing the organization.  
In Uganda, the NWSC has introduced two main systems for accountability for 
results. Firstly, the Head Office in Kampala has developed ‘internal’ performance 
contracts between the Head Office and the fifteen areas that make up the operational 
part of the NWSC. These internal performance contracts are based on the performance 
contract that the NWSC has with the government of Uganda. The principle used by the 
NWSC Head Office is to set higher targets for the area service providers than stipulated 
in the performance contract between the NWSC and the government of Uganda. 
Therefore, when the ASPs achieve or exceed their individual targets, NWSC will 
automatically achieve the targets as stipulated in the performance contract. In addition 
to the internal performance contracts between the ASPs and the Head Office, the 
performance of employees is also evaluated annually using standardized performance 
appraisal systems. The recently introduced ‘One Minute Management Concept’ has 
strengthened this process: Every employee has an individual ‘pseudo contract’ outlining 
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specific key verifiable tasks and deliverables. Achievement of the performance targets 
is accompanied by incentive payments that can be as high as 50% of the basic salary. 
On the other hand, under-achievement of the performance standards below a certain 
threshold may lead to members of the ASPs forfeiting 25% of their basic pay.  
In contrast to the HPWSC and the NWSC are the practices of SADM and 
SANASA. In SADM, the nature of evaluating performance of the employees depends 
on the position of the employee. Employees working in operational positions are 
required to strictly follow the work procedures and instructions that they are given. As 
such, they are strictly accountable for following set procedures. Employees in 
managerial positions are evaluated more on the results that their sections or 
Departments produce. Although no performance contracts exist within the utility, each 
Department and section do have performance indicators (such as electricity use, 
chemicals use, trained employees per year, etc.), which are monitored to evaluate the 
performance of the utility’s managers. The managers are furthermore evaluated by their 
superior every year. The performance evaluation by the superior determines the bonus 
(of up to one month’s salary) that the employee may receive. The evaluation of 
managerial staff is not only based on performance but also on aspects such as 
responsibility, productivity and willingness to work overtime (which is not paid). In the 
case of SANASA, there is no set mechanism for evaluating the performance of the 
employees. Although some managers undertake evaluations at their own initiative, 
these evaluations are not structured or standardized. All employees have a contract 
detailing their duties and tasks, but not the performance that is expected of them. 
 
Table 6.11: An overview of (internal) accountability 
Internal accountability for results HPWSC SANASA NWSC SADM 
A system is in place to evaluate the 
performance of employees periodically Yes No Yes Yes 
Employees are held accountable for achieving 
specified results Yes No Yes Yes 
Salary adjustments/promotions are based on 
performance of the employee Yes No 
Yes, 
partly No 
The utility systematically analyzes its 
performance in relation to set targets Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Management oversight and management of the 
services provider are separate functions Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Management of the service provider has 
regular meetings with the management 
oversight entity 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Management of the service provider is subject 
to meeting specified performance targets  Yes Yes Yes No 
Management of the service provider is held 
accountable for meeting the specified targets Limited No Yes No 
 
6.2.3 Market-orientation 
 
Based on the case studies, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
 
• There is a wide range in the level of outcontracting; 
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• None of the utilities appear to pursue outcontracting as a company policy; 
• Almost all utilities partake in benchmarking exercises, but only one actually uses 
benchmarking systematically as a tool for performance improvement. The other 
utilities appear to be involved in benchmarking mainly because the benchmarking 
exercises are arranged by an umbrella-organization. 
• Market testing is virtually non-existent.   
 
6.2.3.1.1 Outcontracting 
The level of outcontracting shows some utilities outcontracting less than 6% of its 
operational budget whilst a utility like NWSC reaches between 30% and 40%. The 
level of outcontracting appears to be partially linked to particular characteristics of the 
utility.  
In the case of HPWSC, which only has an outcontracting level of about 6%, the 
management of utility considers the staffing levels too high. However, an overview of 
staffing levels between 1998 and 2003 shows that every year the number of staff has 
increases, as table 6.11 shows. 
 
Table 6.11: Staffing levels in the Hai Phong Water Supply Company 
Year  Number of Staff Staff increase Staff decrease 
1998 652   
1999 667 19 4 
2000 679 23 11 
2001 713 53 19 
2002 729 30 14 
2003 762 40 7 
Source: Hoang 2004 
 
The increase in staffing levels, despite the fact that management already considers the 
utility overstaffed, is largely an effect of what the management of the utility described 
as “outside pressures”, basically meaning that the government-owner, in this case the 
HPPC, insists that the utility absorb additional staff. Faced with high staffing levels and 
pressure to increase these levels even further, the utility has, in the past, actually 
pursued a policy of paying employees not to show up for work. As mentioned 
previously, Vietnamese public enterprises adhere to a salary system in which the salary 
is consists of a ‘hard’ part and a ‘soft’ part. By paying employees the ‘hard’ part of their 
salary to stay away, these employees do not have to be paid the ‘soft’ part of the salary. 
In the context of this situation, the HPWSC obviously has little incentive to actively 
pursue of outcontracting tasks and activities to the private sector. As such, the only 
reasons for the HPWSC to engage in outcontracting would be for specialized tasks and 
to have access to new practices and technologies. This would explain the relatively low 
outcontracting percentage of 6%. 
The case of Hai Phong is perhaps a bit extreme, but it appears that existing staffing 
levels and the issue of job security are quite important in determining the level of 
outcontracting. Public sector employees often have considerable job security. The water 
supply sector is no exception and the four well performing utilities are not an exception 
to that either. With outcontracting, tasks and activities are shifted to the private sector. 
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However, if the utility were not able to decrease staffing levels at short notice, the main 
result of outcontracting would be that salary costs stay the same whilst the water utility 
has additional costs for the outcontracted activities. This would mean that the main 
benefits of outcontracting for a public utility under these circumstances would be to 
meet peak demands and cater to specialized tasks.  
The main exception in this list of four utilities is the NWSC, which has a relatively 
high level of outcontracting at approximately 35% of the operational budget. It should 
be noted, however, that 40% of this is related to management contract that the NWSC 
has awarded for the city of Kampala (Mwoga 2004). Except for the NWSC’s 
management contract for the city of Kampala, none of the utilities pursue a company 
policy on outcontracting. What this means, is that the outcontracting is usually based on 
ad-hoc decisions, rather than a strategic policy of the utility. 
 
6.2.3.1.2 Benchmarking 
Apart from SADM, all utilities partake in annual benchmarking exercises. These 
benchmarking exercises cover a wide array of performance indicators. Although three 
out of four utilities partake in benchmarking exercises, the utilities do not appear to use 
the results of these exercises in a very systematic manner.  
In the Vietnamese water sector benchmarking was in an infant stage in 2003. That 
year was the first time HPWSC participated in a national benchmarking exercise. In this 
exercise data is collected from all 67 Provincial Water Companies in the country. 
Participation in the exercise was voluntary. This benchmarking exercise covered 
technical, financial and commercial performance. The nature of this exercise is to 
analyze the range of performance currently achieved across the urban water sector, in 
preparation for a proposed World Bank Project. The outcomes of the exercise would be 
used for the World Bank to identify what utilities it will engage itself with. The data 
collected also serves to create a national and centralized database of Provincial Water 
Companies of Vietnam. For the management of the HPWSC, however the reliability of 
data submitted by other water companies is questionable. They are of the opinion that 
some of other water companies are submitting data, which does not reflect the actual 
state and performance of the companies. As a result, the data included in the 
benchmarking exercise is not used by the HPWSC106. In a sense, the experience at the 
HPWSC highlights some of the difficulties that benchmarking may encounter. 
Benchmarking exercises can have a ‘political’ origin and a ‘political’ purpose 
(Schwartz and van Dijk 2005). These benchmarking exercises tend to place emphasis 
on performance dimensions which are of particular importance in the political arena 
and may be arranged in such a way that the results appear more positive than an 
objective in-depth analysis would permit107. Apart from political motives, 
benchmarking exercises may make an organization more vulnerable as its performance 
becomes more transparent (de Bruijn 2002). In order to save face, some utilities may 
then decide to portray themselves better than their actual performance may allow. In the 
case of Hai Phong, the management has resorted to using performance comparisons 
 
106 It should be noted that the World Bank has hired independent auditors to check the data 
submitted by the water companies for their purposes. 
107 Personal interview with a source of a Dutch water supply company who was critical of the 
annual VEWIN benchmarking exercise.  
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with utilities in neighboring countries like Malaysia. Although these comparisons do 
take place on an ad hoc basis no system exists to translate the results of such a 
benchmarking exercise into strategic or operational policy (Hoang 2004). The only 
utility, which really uses the outcomes of benchmarking exercises systematically to 
develop (strategic) policy, appears to be SANASA. SANASA partakes in the ‘analysis 
of water and sewage services’, a national benchmarking exercise undertaken annually 
by the National Information System of Sanitation Companies (SNIS). SANASA uses 
the results of the benchmark exercise prioritize its future plans. 
 
Table 6.12: An overview of market-orientation 
Market-orientation HPWSC SANASA NWSC SADM 
What is the level of outcontracting as a 
percentage of the operational budget (in 
2002) 
<6% 20.8% Between 
30%-40% 
<10% 
The utility actively pursues a policy of 
outcontracting services and tasks to 
third-parties108
No No No No 
The utility engages in periodic 
benchmarking exercises  
Yes Yes Yes No 
The utility systematically uses the 
results of the benchmarking exercise 
for improving performance of the 
utility 
No No Yes No 
The utility engages in market-testing 
exercises to improve efficiency of 
service provision 
No No Partially No 
 
6.2.4 Customer-orientation 
 
Based on the case studies, the following conclusions regarding the extent of customer-
orientation of the cases are drawn: 
 
• All utilities depend on their customers for the income of the utility 
• All utilities offer its customers a variety of ways to pay their bills 
• HPWSC and SADM offer only in-house connections and bulk water to selected 
customers. SANASA and (especially) NWSC show more variety in the levels of 
service they offer their customers. 
• All utilities proactively try to obtain the opinions of the customers. The way in 
which this is done varies from location to the next. 
• The utilities also implement a wide variety of measures in order to inform the 
customer of changes in service provision. 
• All utilities train staff who deal with customers in the field of customer 
management. 
 
108 This mean that the utility does not undertake outcontracting activities in an ad-hoc manner, 
but actively pursues outcontracting as a company policy based on the belief that outcontracting 
can provide benefits to the utility. 
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• Only in the case of SADM are representatives of civic groups represented in 
decision-making bodies of the utility. 
 
6.2.4.1.1 Levels of Service 
One of the few areas, where there is some variation in the findings is the level of 
service provided to the customers. It would appear, however, that this variation might 
be more a reflection of the particular characteristics of the local service provision 
process then of the degree of customer-orientation of that particular water utility.  
In Hai Phong, the ‘turn-around’ of the utility in the 1990s followed the so-called 
‘phuong-model’. As part of this ‘phuong model’ existing infrastructure was 
rehabilitated in a zone-by-zone (or phuong-by-phuong) manner. Existing infrastructure 
was rehabilitated and meters were installed for individual household connections. 
Following rehabilitation of a ‘phuong’ all households had a (metered) individual or 
block connection. As such the levels of service within that Hai Phong are relatively 
few.  
In the case of SADM, one has to realize that the state of Nuevo Leon is one of the 
higher-income states in Mexico with a per capita income of US$ 13,033. If the state of 
Nuevo Leon would be considered in itself, its per capita GNP would even place it 
outside the categories of middle and low-income countries. In comparison, the 
municipality of Guanajuato has a per capita income of less than US$ 7,000 per year and 
the state average for Guanajuato stands at US$5,376 (Instituto Nacional para el 
Federalismo y el Desarrollo 2003). Water utilities serving areas with a relatively high-
income tend to have a more limited array of service levels, as most consumers will 
prefer to have in-house connections. As such, the 
In the case of SANASA, the variety of service levels appears to be partly explained 
by some peri-urban areas in the municipality, where service provision through public 
stand-posts takes place. 
 
6.2.4.1.2 Customer-involvement in decision-making 
Three out the four utilities have a way of allowing customers to express their voice 
concerning the provision of water services. The way in which the customers are 
involved differs considerably, however.  
In Uganda, customers are involved in the decision making in NWSC mainly 
through what is known as “strategic alliance meetings”. Within NWSC different 
customer segments have been identified, such as water vendors, water kiosk and public 
stand pipe operators, urban authorities, large government consumers, urban poor 
communities, restaurant operators, industries, education/academic institutions, etc. The 
management of the ASPs conducts regular strategic alliance meetings with the different 
customer segments. From the strategic meetings customers make statements of what 
they require from NWSC. These requirements are taken as action items for the 
management of that particular area. The action items sometimes require the 
management of an ASP to discuss the ideas from the strategic alliance meetings with 
the NWSC Head Office as their assistance and support may be needed in order to 
implement these ideas. 
In SANASA, customers are able to express their views and influence decision-
making by way of the ‘Participatory Budget’ initiative. The Participatory Budget 
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initiative revolves around public meetings in the municipality of Campinas in which the 
community can prioritize the allocation of public resources in the municipality of 
Campinas for urban infrastructure. The outcomes of the Participatory Budget initiative 
are binding in the sense that SANASA is expected to address the issues raised and 
agreed upon during these meetings. 
In SADM, customers are represented (to a certain degree) on the Consejo 
overseeing the functioning of the utility. Of the seven members of the Board, the State 
Governor appoints one other representative of the State Government and one 
representative of the water users in addition to sitting on the Consejo himself. The other 
four members are appointed by different stakeholders. One member represents the 
municipalities and is appointed by the municipality of Monterrey in which 85% of the 
population resides. The Nuevo Leon Real Estate Owners Chamber appoints one 
representative, one representative is appointed by the Nuevo Leon Industry Chamber 
and the regional office of the National Commerce, Services and Tourism Chamber 
appoints the final representative. 
6.3 Salient Findings from the Four Well Performing Utilities 
 
Prior to comparing the results of the four well performing utilities to those found in the 
five cases of Guanajuato, a number of salient findings from these cases will be 
discussed. Following these salient findings, which largely relate to the ‘characteristics’ 
of ‘turn-around’ utilities, attention will be drawn to the preliminary conclusion in 
chapter five and the comparison of these conclusions with those drawn from the four 
well performing cases. The importance of discussing the salient features lies in the fact 
that they shed light one of the original research questions, which sought to answer if 
public water utilities perform better because they adhere to the New Public 
Management. 
 
6.3.1 The Importance of External Shocks 
 
Earlier in this thesis, the situation of many public water utilities, especially in low- and 
middle-income countries, was described as being stuck in a low-level equilibrium. The 
idea being that these utilities are stuck in state from which it is very difficult to escape. 
In fact, the findings from the three ‘turn-around’ cases (HPWSC, NWSC, and 
SANASA) all share an external shock prior to the turn-around of the utility. This 
external shock came in various forms, such as the threat of privatization in Uganda, a 
water crisis in Hai Phong and a change in the municipal government in SANASA. 
Although the shocks may have had different forms, they do appear to have had a similar 
result, namely the creation of a window of opportunity, in which relatively radical 
reforms could be implemented with the (political) support of the owners. The findings 
in these three utilities reflect the findings in SIMAPAG. 
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Table 6.13: An overview of customer-orientation 
Customer-orientation HPWSC SANASA NWSC SADM 
The utility is dependent on its 
customers for its revenue 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
What different levels of service 
provision does the utility offer to 
its customers 
In-house 
connections and 
block connections 
In-house connections, 
block connections and 
some public standposts 
In-house connections, yard taps, 
public standposts, water kiosks, 
bulk connections and water 
vending 
In-house connections, bulk 
water delivery to some 
municipalities 
In what ways can the customers 
pay their bills 
Bill collector, 
bank transfer, 
‘ward’ offices 
Banks, lottery selling 
points 
NWSC offices, banks, ATMs SADM offices, convenience 
stores, supermarkets, 
internet, banks 
The utility undertakes surveys to 
proactively obtain the 
customer’s views and 
perceptions of the services 
provided 
Suggestion boxes Customer surveys 
 
Annual surveys, suggestions 
boxes and strategic alliance 
meetings 
Suggestion boxes, annual 
survey, comments through 
internet. 
Customer complaints are 
addressed  
95% 100% Between 95% and 100% 100% 
Customers are engaged in 
decision-making procedures in 
the utility 
No Yes Yes Consejo members represent 
civic groups 
The utility trains its employees 
to manage customers 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
In what ways does the utility 
inform its customers about 
relevant issues for service 
provision 
Newspaper 
advertisements, 
radio, letters 
Newspaper, internet, 
radio, ‘speaker car’ 
Flyers, Newspaper 
advertisement, radio and 
strategic alliance meetings 
Newspaper advertisements, 
radio, and leaflets 
6.3.2 Leadership 
 
In a way linked to the issue of external shocks is that of leadership or competent 
management. Whereas it is important to realize that external shocks have preceded the 
turn-around in all utilities, an external shock or crisis in itself is by no means a 
guarantee that service provision will improve following this shock. What also 
distinguished these utilities is the fact that immediately after the shock, a new general 
manager was appointed who, through a combination of charisma and professional 
leadership, managed to make the most of the window of opportunity created by the 
shock. In the NWSC, dr. Muhairwe drastically changed the way the utility was 
managed following his appointment in 1997. In Hai Phong, mr. Dam Xuan Luy, was 
appointed as general manager and was able to implement the ‘phuong model’ with 
impressive results. In SANASA, Vicente Andreu Guillo initiated the ‘turn-around’ in 
1996 following his appointment after a municipal election. In the case of SIMAPAG, 
Raul Silva has been credited as initiating a sweeping change within the utility following 
his appointment as general manager in 1995. All ‘turn-arounds’ started with new 
general managers who made the most of the opportunities provided in that particular 
situation. As such, the findings from these cases appear to support Halligan (2002), who 
finds that fundamental change inevitably means new leadership109. 
 
6.3.3 Capacity 
 
Having highlighted the importance of the external shocks and advent of a capable new 
management it should be noted that the combination of these two is in itself also no 
guarantee that service provision will improve. As mentioned in the introduction, the 
four well performing utilities all share that they have a large number of connections. 
Three out of four have more than 100,000 connections. The only exception being the 
NWSC, which seems to be limited by the fact that there simply are not any more 
connections in Uganda. Moreover all well performing utilities had tariffs, which at least 
covered operations and maintenance and some investment. What that means is that 
these are relatively large utilities, whose customer base allows them to generate 
considerable financial resources. These in turn provide substantial financial capacity. In 
addition (but also linked to this) is that these utilities tend to have considerable capacity 
in terms of human resources.  In this sense the findings from these utilities largely 
support Israel (1994) who highlights the importance of at least a minimum level of 
financial and especially human resources. 
 
 
 
 
109 In a more general comment, this finding also raises a question, which revisits Weber’s ‘ideal 
types’ as presented in chapter three. Weber distinguished between rational-legal authority, 
traditional authority and charismatic authority as the basis for ‘legitimacy’. In light of the finding 
about leadership the question is to what extent charismatic authority is necessary (or facilitating?) 
for the reform of public water utilities and how this impacts the staff in the utility. Unfortunately, 
however, this question is beyond the scope of this research.  
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6.3.4 External Support 
 
But even in cases where there is a window of opportunity for reform, and there are 
charismatic and knowledgeable management and the utility has the human resources to 
implement changes and tariffs are such that they cover operations and maintenance and 
some investment, then still there would be no guarantee that service provision would 
improve. What all turn-around cases have shown is that they would not have been able 
to reach a higher-level equilibrium, if it were not for external support. This external 
support included donor support and loans from international lending agencies. The 
rehabilitation of the infrastructure in the various ‘phuongs’ in Hai Phong, and the 
extensive metering could not have been accomplished without outside financing.  Even 
SADM, the one utility that has long been recognized as being well performing, has not 
been without external assistance.  
 
6.3.5 Political support 
 
Last, but most certainly not least is the role of the government-owner. Simply stated, 
without political support any reform effort is doomed to fail. An external shock can 
provide a window of opportunity. However, there is no guarantee that it actually will. 
For the existence of a window of opportunity, and the magnitude of this opportunity, is 
for the public water utilities studied in the context of this research, first and foremost 
decided upon in the political realm. This finding very much supports the existing 
evidence that major change requires the intervention of politicians (Christensen and 
Laegreid 2002: see also Aucoin 1990) 
6.4 Conclusions of the Cross-case Comparison 
 
In this section the conclusions drawn from the four cases regarding the propositions are 
presented and compared with those from SIMAPAG in the State of Guanajuato, 
Mexico. This comparison is done in the form of Table 6.14. As the utilities are all 
considered well performing utilities, it is only possible to test the first six propositions. 
Those propositions concerning poorly performing utilities and the elements of the 
bureaucratic model of public management cannot be tested.  
The table shows that the findings from the case of SIMAPAG are largely supported 
by the findings from the four well performing utilities. However, some qualifications 
regarding this broad conclusion should be made. These qualifications relate to four out 
of six propositions and are presented below.  
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Table 6.14: Comparison of conclusions from the well performing cases 
Proposition Conclusion from 
SIMAPAG 
Conclusion well 
performing cases 
1 Well performing public utilities have a large 
degree of external autonomy 
Not falsified Not falsified 
2 Well performing public utilities are strongly 
accountable for results to external 
organizations. 
Falsified Falsified 
3 Well performing public utilities have a 
strong market-orientation. 
Falsified Falsified 
4 Well performing public utilities have a 
stronger customer-orientation. 
Not falsified Not falsified 
5 Well performing public utilities have 
decentralized decision-making within the 
organization.   
Falsified Falsified 
6 Well performing public utilities have a 
strong accountability for results within the 
organization. 
Falsified Mixed 
 
 
6.4.1 Comments regarding external autonomy: proposition 1 
 
Although the proposition regarding external autonomy has not been falsified, this 
conclusion is subject to some comments. The concept of (external) autonomy as used in 
this research is composed of a few dimensions and some dimensions appear to be more 
important than others. Most important appear to be financial autonomy of the utility and 
stability in the management of the utility (which can be interpreted as a reflection of 
political support for the management of the utility). Also all ‘well performing’ utilities 
were able to attract qualified staff to work for the utility. This indicates that both in 
terms of financial resources and human resources the utilities had considerable capacity 
for providing water services110.  
Dimensions of autonomy that seemed less important relate to the availability of 
water resources and the role played by regulatory agencies. Although, one could argue 
that problems relating to insufficient availability of water resources will become much 
more severe in the long-term, the cases indicate that, at least at current, they do not 
inhibit good performance as defined in section 4.2 of this thesis111.   
 
6.4.2 Comments on external accountability: proposition 2 
 
Well performing public utilities do appear to have a strong accountability to the 
government-owners who remain firmly in control of the utility. However, this control 
does not incorporate the use of performance targets to hold the management of the 
 
110 Although none of the utilities are able to set tariffs and take out loans without approval of the 
owners. 
111 It is possible to argue that, from an environmental perspective, performance is inhibited. 
However, this environmental dimension was not included in the definition of good performance 
as used for this research.  
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utility accountable for results produced. Moreover, accountability to regulatory 
agencies (who have never imposed sanctions), to customer agencies and to NGOs 
appears to be very limited.  
The only real accountability for results found was accountability to financial 
institutions that have lent or granted money to the utility. In the well performing cases 
these institutions often did impose performance targets. However, once a utility is able 
to operate without continued assistance of external financial agencies (such as SADM), 
then this accountability automatically diminishes.  
 
6.4.3 Comments on decentralization of decision-making authority within the 
utility: proposition 5 
 
The reasoning behind the conclusion that well performing utilities have not 
decentralized authority for decision-making is that in many areas, such as procurement, 
hiring and firing of staff, all of the utilities are highly centralized. In summary, 
decisions, which have financial implications, remain centralized. Moreover, in the areas 
where decision-making has been decentralized, i.e. customer management, employees 
can do little else than apply existing guidelines. For this reason, the conclusion is that 
the proposition about decentralization of authority has been falsified.    
 
6.4.4 Comments on internal accountability for results: proposition 6 
 
Similar to the preliminary conclusions at the end of chapter five, interpreting the 
findings for internal accountability for results presents something of a challenge. This is 
because the findings do not lead to a clear-cut conclusion regarding the proposition. In 
the State of Guanajuato, SIMAPAG had the strongest level of internal accountability on 
the basis of the employee evaluations and the balanced scorecard, which presented the 
utility with targets they were to meet. At the same time the actual implementation of 
these mechanisms raised some doubts about the actual level of accountability. For the 
‘well performing’ cases the picture is mixed, with some utilities having strong levels of 
accountability related to performance, whilst the remaining utilities have fewer 
mechanisms for accountability.  
6.5 Comparison with the Bureaucratic Model 
 
In the preliminary conclusions of chapter six it was mentioned that the propositions, if 
viewed in a narrow sense, say little about the comparison of poorly performing utilities 
with well performing utilities. In order to address that, an overview was provided in 
section 5.5.6 based on an adjusted propositions, which allowed SIMAPAG to be 
compared with the bureaucratic model. Below, the adjusted propositions for the 
bureaucratic model are presented for the four poorly performing cases from 
Guanajuato, SIMAPAG and the four well performing cases highlighted in chapter 6 
(i.e. HPWSC, NWSC, SANASA and SADM). 
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Table 6.15: Preliminary conclusions for all cases 
Proposition Poorly 
performing 
utilities 
SIMAPAG Well performing 
cases 
The utility is apolitical. Falsified Not falsified Not falsified 
The utility is characterized 
by hierarchal levels and 
organized on a rule-governed 
basis. 
Not falsified Not falsified Not falsified 
The utility is characterized 
by permanence and stability 
Falsified Not falsified Not falsified 
The utility operates 
following internal 
regulations 
Falsified Falsified Not falsified 
Employees in the utility are 
remunerated according to 
fixed salary levels 
Not falsified Not falsified Mixed  
Employees opt for working 
in water supply and 
sanitation companies in 
terms of vocation or sense of 
duty 
Falsified Falsified Falsified 
 
Although the four cases do show some differences in comparison with SIMAPAG, the 
comparison indicate that the well performing cases adhere more strongly to the 
bureaucratic model than poorly performing utilities. The consequences of this finding 
are discussed in the next chapter. 
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7 Bureaucracy, the New Public Management 
and Utility Reform 
In this chapter, the main findings from the research are discussed and analyzed. These 
findings mainly relate to the reform of public water utilities, the bureaucratic model and 
the New Public Management. The chapter starts with revisiting Niskanen’s theory of 
budget-maximization and tries to establish if it is supported by the findings from the 
public water utilities research in this thesis. The second section comments on the 
principal-agent relationship in Mexican municipalities. The argument made is that, 
contrary to the views forwarded by the Public Choice School, the agent in Mexican 
municipalities does not have a strong advantage over the principal. The third section 
addresses the question of the impact of the New Public Management for public water 
utilities. The findings suggest that the New Public Management, by itself, may not be 
sufficient to improve performance. The fourth part of this chapter briefly covers the use 
of contracts in the water services sector. Although in some sectors contracts may be 
viewed as being ‘the medium of communication’, this certainly does not seem to apply 
to the water services sectors researched for this thesis. The fifth section revisits the 
required pre-requisites for implementing NPM-style reforms. The Mexican cases 
indicate that necessary pre-requisites do not currently exist. Add to this the finding that 
well performing utilities adhere more strongly to the bureaucratic model than poorly 
performing utilities, and the question is raised if public water utilities are sufficiently 
bureaucratic? The sixth part of this chapter discuses the issue of accountability for 
results. The seventh section focuses on the question if a ‘paradigm shift’ from the 
bureaucratic model to that of the New Public Management has taken place. The 
research presented in this thesis suggests such a shift has not taken place. The eighth 
section touches upon the importance of crises prior to the implementation of reform. All 
‘turn around’ cases faced some form of crisis prior to ‘turning around’, and this section 
discusses the implications of this finding. This chapter concludes by highlighting the 
issue of politics in the provision of water services. Contrary to what has been promoted 
by some international agencies, such as the World Bank (2004b), this section argues 
that achieving a stringent separation between politics and service provision is 
unrealistic. 
7.1 Water Utilities and Niskanen’s Budget-Maximization 
 
In chapter three, Niskanen’s criticism of the bureaucratic model was presented. 
Niskanen’s argument was that weak monitoring of the bureaucracy’s activities and little 
incentive to improve efficiency would stimulate bureaucrats to strive for budget-
maximization leading to an oversupply of a certain good or service. 
Although the issue of oversupply has been a cornerstone in the criticism of 
Weber’s bureaucracy, the question is how relevant it is for the water supply and 
sanitation sector in low- and middle-income countries. The relevancy can be questioned 
on both a theoretical as well as an empirical basis.  
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The theoretical argument is based on Niskanen’s assumption that the output of a 
(public) good is based on levels of activities from which the actual output must be 
inferred. This assumption simply does not hold for the water supply and sanitation 
sector. An important reason is that the provision of water supply and sanitation services 
are subject to generally accepted indicators for measurement of the output. Although 
questions may persist about what achievement of these indicators constitutes ‘good 
performance’ (see section 3.3), the measurement of outputs for water supply and 
sanitation is much less problematic as for goods such as peace, security, and law and 
order. With outputs being measurable, the potential for budget-maximization becomes 
much more limited. 
The empirical argument is provided by the current levels of service provision in 
low- and middle-income countries. Niskanen’s criticism predicts oversupply of 
services. However, the reality of the water supply and sanitation sectors in many low- 
and middle-income countries is one of undersupply.  As mentioned in the introduction, 
1.1 billion people still do not have access to safe water and 2.4 billion people lack 
access to sanitation services (WHO UNICEF 2001). Also, the cases elaborated upon in 
this research do not indicate oversupply of services. In fact, only one of the utilities 
(SADM) had service coverage of 99% or higher. The main issue for public water 
utilities is not one of reducing output (or input activities), but rather one of increasing 
output in order to serve those who are currently not being served.  
7.2 Water Utilities and Principal-Agent Relationships  
 
Although public choice may be seen as being part of the parentage of the NPM, the 
question is how applicable the logic of the principal-agent problem that underlies many 
of the public choice arguments is for public water utilities in the case of Mexico and 
particularly Mexican municipalities with responsibilities for providing water services. 
The crux of the principal-agent problem is formed by the question how to get the public 
organization, or ‘the bureaucracy’, to implement the policies of the principal when the 
bureaucrats have an informational advantage and have interests, which are different 
from implementing the policy formulated by the politician. Much of the criticism of the 
Public Choice School assumes that the agent will shirk from the responsibilities 
attributed by the principal. 
The Mexican municipal water utilities researched challenge this perception. In 
other words, the idea that the agent, benefited by informational advantages and 
securities provided by the position in the bureaucracy, has been able to develop a strong 
position vis-à-vis the principal does not hold for the Mexican utilities studied. Rather 
the opposite would seem to apply. If anything, the relationship between principals and 
agents in the water utilities was characterized by dominance of the principal vis-à-vis 
the agent. This relationship is largely explained by the nature of the political institutions 
in Mexican municipalities. 
In Mexican local governments, the municipal presidents have far reaching powers. 
Essentially, the Mexican municipal government can be viewed as ‘presidential 
government’ as described by Lijphart (1984). What distinguishes the Mexican 
municipalities (and the national government, for that matter) is that the executive 
powers of the (municipal) president are so strong that the legislative and judicial 
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branches have had to accept presidential dominance112 (Arellano and Guerrero 2003). 
As a result of the dominance of the municipal president, the political system revolves 
around loyalty to the person in office. This means that most of the staff of the municipal 
government come and leave with the municipal president. Because the municipal 
president is only elected for a term of three years, and re-election is not possible, it 
means that a large part of the municipal government changes every three years (Capital 
Advisors 1999). The fact that managers in the utility owe their position on the basis of 
loyalty to the municipal president means that the ‘need to reestablish the primacy of 
representative government over bureaucracy’ does not exist in Mexican municipalities. 
If anything the municipal president is too powerful and can request things of the utility 
managers, which go well beyond the objectives of the organization. This would mean 
that rather than a need to reestablish the primacy of representative government over 
bureaucracy, a need for an apolitical public service would seem to exist which could 
operate at arms-length of the representative government. Also, other cases studied in 
this research, such as Hai Phong and Campinas, were characterized by a principal-agent 
relationship in which the principal had a considerable power over the agent.  
7.3 Impact of the NPM 
 
The cases illustrate that autonomy and especially financial autonomy is crucial for well 
performing water utilities and in this respect the impact of the NPM seems significant. 
Customer-orientation, it appears, must be viewed as a necessary consequence of the 
increased (financial) autonomy, rather than a purposely-developed organizational 
objective. Simply put, if you are dependent on the customers for your revenue, you 
have no choice but to orient yourself towards them. As such, the importance of these 
elements is considerable. However, reforming poorly functioning utilities is a bit more 
complicated, involving a multitude of factors, which not only influence the success of 
the reform process, but also appear to be interdependent. Moreover, financial autonomy 
may not so much be a reform element as much as it is the outcome of other reforms. In 
other words, financial autonomy may be the ‘outward manifestation’ of other reforms.  
In the researched cases, the role of leadership surfaced prominently. The ‘turn-
around’ utilities were all, at the time of the ‘turn-around’, led by charismatic and 
capable general managers, who had just been appointed, and who were able to steer the 
utility towards improved performance. The utilities all received or were able to conjure 
up political support (or at least tolerance) during the initial stages of the turn-around. 
This support was, among others, visible in terms of approval of tariff increases. The 
utilities were (and still are) dependent on external financing in order to rehabilitate and 
expand infrastructure. Without these elements, it is unlikely that financial autonomy 
would be achieved. And without these elements it is unlikely that substantial 
performance improvements would have materialized. As such, although, the elements 
of (financial) autonomy and customer-orientation are of crucial importance, achieving 
these elements requires other elements to have been implemented first. 
 
112 The weak legislative and judicial branches are not something that is specific for Mexico but is 
a characteristic of many developing countries (World Bank 1997a). 
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Moreover, the research has illustrated that some elements of the NPM model have 
not played a large role in turning around performance. Most notably market-orientation 
and decentralization of authority within the organization did not figure significantly in 
the cases studied. Also external accountability (apart from that to the financing 
institutions) was limited. 
7.4 The Use of Contracts 
 
The cases have highlighted that in the water services sector of the locations studied, 
contracts are not ‘the medium of communication’. The only case, which would perhaps 
qualify for such a description is the NWSC, which over the past years has developed a 
system of performance contracts both between the utility and the government as well as 
within the utility. However, the actual implementation of the contract between the 
utility and the government raises some questions about the effectiveness of this 
contract. Formally, a review committee should exist to monitor and review the contract. 
However, this Review Committee was never established and as such, performance of 
the NWSC was never really monitored. 
7.5 Pre-requisites for Implementing the New Public Management 
 
In this research little evidence was found which supported the idea that poorly 
performing utilities adhered to the bureaucratic model. This finding in itself is not 
necessarily a very interesting observation. If this finding, however, is combined with 
analyzing the degree to which well performing water utilities adhere to elements of the 
bureaucratic model, the conclusion that can be drawn becomes more interesting. The 
adherence of well performing utilities to a selection of the elements of the bureaucratic 
model can be presented as follows: 
 
• External Autonomy/Apolitical Civil Service - One of the main differences was the 
level of (external) autonomy. This autonomy means that the utility has both the 
resources and the managerial freedom to arrange for the provision of water services 
in line with its mandate. In a sense this autonomy resembles the apolitical civil 
service that figures prominently in the bureaucratic model, in which the civil 
service executes the policy (the mandate for service provision) formulated in the 
political realm.   
• Stability and Permanence - The case studies from the State of Guanajuato 
highlighted that the period of performance improvement of SIMAPAG was 
characterized by relative stability at the management level, whilst most of the other 
poorly performing utilities were subject to considerable turbulence at that same 
level113. The cases of well performing utilities also illustrated the importance of 
stability in management. During the ‘turn-around’ in Hai Phong the managing 
director held his function from 1993 until 2002. In the case of NWSC, the current 
managing director has held his office since 1997. Even in the case of SADM 
 
113 In both well performing and poorly performing utilities the turnover among non-managerial 
staff is very low, meaning that at those levels the utilities are all stable. 
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where, “the general manager usually changes when the State Governor does”, does 
stability within the managerial level of the organization persevere as other 
managers in the organization do not change that frequently, not even when the 
political party in power changes (Rangel 2005). From this perspective, well 
performing utilities are more stable than poorly performing utilities.  
• Hierarchy and Levels - It has also been established in the case studies that well 
performing utilities, like the poorly performing ones, are characterized by 
hierarchical levels. 
 
For these elements, well performing utilities showed a stronger adherence to elements 
of the bureaucratic model than poorly performing utilities. In chapter three Jaques 
(1990) was quoted as he found the bureaucratic model to be the most efficient and the 
most natural structure for large organizations. Moreover, he continues to explain that 
the problems facing many public sector organizations are not because they are too 
bureaucratic, rather the problem is that they are not bureaucratic enough. The findings 
in this research would suggest that Jaques has a point. Poorly performing utilities may 
not suffer from being too bureaucratic. Rather poorly performing utilities may not be 
bureaucratic enough. 
Moreover, this finding also provides support for Shick’s observations in chapter 
three regarding the pre-requisites of implementing NPM-style reforms. Before elements 
of the New Public Management become feasible options for reform, the utility in 
question should have already ‘mastered the basics’. The findings from this research 
suggest that in poorly performing utilities these basics have not been mastered. Apart 
from supporting Shick’s statement on the pre-requisites for NPM-style reforms, the 
consequences of this finding are far-reaching, in the sense that they can also be 
translated to practical reform measures for poorly performing utilities. What these 
findings suggest is that rather than view the NPM as a way of improving performance 
of poorly performing utilities, elements of the bureaucratic model, such as permanence 
and stability and internal regulations, would appear to be a more promising first step in 
the reform process. Cabrero (2005:85) also acknowledges the usefulness of strategies of 
‘bureaucratic reform’ in the Mexican context. In his analysis of Mexican municipalities 
he finds that “[b]ureaucratization is still necessary in a large number of municipal 
governments across the country, because they strengthen and clarify a formal point of 
reference of local administration”.  
In this context the frequent changes in management following elections in Mexico 
appears of importance. In Mexico, public managers always understand that their job is 
only guaranteed until the next election (if things go well). Once the election has taken 
place the chances are that the public manager will be replaced by one of the loyalists of 
the incoming public official. Often this means that around election time (and especially 
in the immediate aftermath) an informal carrousel takes place of public managers 
seeking new positions for the coming period (or possibly positions with private 
companies). Because all public managers know that this will happen and that their time 
in a certain position is limited, these public managers will, over time, develop a large 
and well-developed network of contacts in order to obtain good positions for when the 
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need arises114. In other words, a career civil service does not exist in Mexico at any 
level of Government (Arellano and Guerrero 2003). If, as Schick argues, a formal civil 
service system that governs how public employees are hired and paid is an essential 
precondition for NPM-style reforms to succeed, then the municipal water supply and 
sanitation companies in Mexico perhaps do not ‘lend’ themselves for NPM reforms as 
much as Nickson and Franceys (2003) claim.  
7.6 Accountability for results 
 
The cases presented a mixed view of ‘accountability for results’. On the one hand 
utilities such as the HPWSC and the NWSC had developed mechanisms to hold the 
employee accountable for the results produced. At the same time, other well performing 
utilities kept more emphasis on accountability for procedure. 
What was visible in many of the cases is that ‘the results’ that were to be obtained 
by a utility were often not linked to actual levels of service provision, but rather 
emphasized the construction of infrastructure. Illustrative of this tendency to focus on 
the construction of infrastructure as a measure of performance is provided by the annual 
‘Informe de Gobierno’ in Mexico. The ‘Informe de Gobierno’ serves a similar purpose 
as the ‘State of the Union’ address in the United States, namely that of informing the 
electorate of the performance of the government, with the main difference that the 
‘Informe de Gobierno’ takes place at all levels of government, including the municipal 
level. The second ‘Informe de Gobierno’115 held by the Municipal President of the 
Municipality of Valle de Santiago was held in 2005. In it the achievements for the 
municipal government’s second year are summarized. The section regarding water 
services reads as follows: 
 
“Regarding drinking water supply, more than 10 kilometers of 
distribution network have been constructed, four elevated tanks were 
built, six wells were fully equipped and 12 more were drilled. 
Moreover, the drainage network has been expanded by 37 kilometers 
[…]”116 (Arredondo Franco 2005:2). 
 
As this section shows, the municipality emphasizes the construction of infrastructure 
measured in kilometers and the number of wells equipped and dug. Not only is it 
unclear if this infrastructure is actually operational, but these figures also say little 
about the actual service level received by the citizens of Valle de Santiago. 
The emphasis on the construction of infrastructure is interesting for a number of 
reasons. First of all, it could be viewed as supporting Niskanen’s and Tullock’s 
criticism of the bureaucracy. However, the consequences they predict (budget-
maximization, oversupply and uncontrollability) have not been observed. Second the 
 
114 The importance of informal networks is not only limited to the public sector. Also in the 
private sector such networks are crucial. 
115 With municipal presidents being elected for a three year period spanning 2003-2006, each 
president holds three ‘Informes del Gobierno’. The second ‘Informe’ was held in 2005.  
116 Author’s own translation 
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finding is interesting as, from the perspective of water professionals and as illustrated 
by the cases of HPWSC and NWSC, more output-based indicators exist. A possible 
explanation would be that the emphasis on construction is largely aimed at impressing 
the electorate who are unlikely to understand (or be impressed by) the output-based 
indicators used by water professionals. 
7.7 The Paradigm Shift? 
 
In chapter three, Hughes (2003) was cited to present the view that the bureaucratic 
model is obsolete and has effectively been replaced by the New Public management. 
These views are echoed by an array of other authors who find the replacement of the 
bureaucratic model with that of the NPM to constitute a ‘paradigm shift’ (Barzelay 
1992; Borins 1997; Aucoin 1990; see also Hood 1995). Interestingly enough, this 
research not only did not find evidence of a ‘shift’, this research not even found 
evidence for the original ‘paradigm’, meaning that none of the public utilities studied 
operated in accordance with the bureaucratic model. As Pollitt (2003) was quoted 
earlier in this research, the idea that the traditional bureaucratic organization ruled the 
earth, ‘like some ponderous dinosaur’, prior to the advent of NPM, is to be challenged. 
In line with Pollitt’s statement, the results of this research show that the bureaucratic 
model certainly did not and does not rule the water services sector. 
In fact, the only location where evidence of a ‘paradigm shift’ was observed during 
this research is in the literature reviewed for this study. Whereas the reality of public 
water utilities (and perhaps public sector organizations in general) is one of mixed 
models and forms, the literature tends to present and highlight ‘mirror images’ which, 
at least in the water sector, simply do not exist. 
The only indication of a shift was found in relation to an increased accountability 
to individual customers. With customers having to pay higher tariff levels in order to 
improve the financial viability of the company and its ability to provide water services, 
the water utilities were forced to adopt a stronger customer orientation. This shift 
would, at first glance, appear to be in line with a shift to the NPM model, namely that 
hierarchical control is replaced by the market as the means of coordinating activity 
(Deakin and Walsh 1996:36). In this sense, hierarchical control refers to the role played 
by the government-owner and the market to the role played by the customers. However, 
the findings indicated that hierarchical control did not diminish. Rather the shift was not 
from hierarchy to market, but from hierarchy to hierarchy and market. Or as Hogget 
argued, instead of “witnessing the replacement of hierarchy by market, what we 
observe is the development of a ‘plural mode of governance’ in which elements of the 
market are combined with elements of hierarchy” (Hogget 1996:16).  
7.8 Reform as Punctuated Equilibria 
 
In much of the literature regarding the ‘turn around’ of public sector organizations it is 
often assumed that performance improvement varies with the content of management 
strategies. As such, ‘turn around’ is seen as being driven by internal choices rather 
external constraints. A new management style or practice will then, ceteris paribus, 
lead to performance improvements. To some extent the case studies support the 
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importance of internal factors. The importance of leadership, for example, has been 
highlighted a number of times in this research. At the same time, the case studies also 
displayed striking similarities in how the turn-around occurred and these findings not 
only nuance the idea that turn around is driven by internal choices, rather, these 
findings suggest that changes in the external environment must occur before internal 
forces can contribute to performance improvement. 
In all of the turn-around cases, external shocks occurred which generated both a 
need for change and also provided a ‘window of opportunity’ by throwing the normal 
rules of the game into flux (Bately and Larbi 2004). The ‘need for change’ in this 
context can be read in different ways and, in fact, ‘the need for change’ did differ from 
one case study to the next.  
Although the research results obtained from the case studies are insufficient to shed 
light on the exact impact and role of the external shocks and how they interact with 
internal choices, they do hint towards viewing external shocks as a trigger for reforms 
rather than being ‘sufficient’ in themselves to cause successful reform. Successful 
reform seemed to encompass a mix of ingredients including capacity, external financial 
and political support, and charismatic leadership, which come together in the aftermath 
of an external shock. 
 
7.8.1 Sustaining High-level Equilibria 
 
In this research, the importance of external shocks and the resilience of public water 
utilities have been highlighted. The findings suggest that cases of drastic performance 
improvements were preceded by external shocks, which forced the water utility, under 
new management, to address the issue of service provision. These external shocks had a 
dual effect. On the one hand, these shocks resulted in political support for the utility, 
allowing the water utility to implement measures which were necessary for improving 
performance but which were unlikely to have received support without the preceding 
crisis. On the other hand, the shocks likely led to a convincing wake-up call to the 
employees of the utility, who often found themselves being led by a new manager in the 
immediate aftermath of these shocks. 
Interestingly enough, however, there does appear to be something of a 
contradiction in the potential for ‘turning around’ performance and the potential for 
sustaining improved performance. As mentioned, ‘turning around’ performance 
requires an external shock and sufficient ‘vulnerability’ to allow “the disruption needed 
to transform a system from one stability domain” to another, as Ostrom and Janssen 
(2002:14) expressed it. So for the initial performance improvement, vulnerability to 
external shocks was a good thing. However, as the four well performing cases and the 
case from the city of Guanajuato highlighted, political support for improving 
performance declines as the issue of water services becomes less prominent on the 
political agenda. As political support dwindles, the utility, despite improving 
performance, may become more vulnerable to external shocks and pressures. In order to 
sustain higher-level equilibria, that same organization, be it under new management, 
would have to be insulated from shocks of the external environment, which may 
negatively impact performance. In other words, an improved level of performance can 
only be maintained if the utility is sufficiently resilient to withstand external pressures 
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and shocks, which can adversely impact its performance. This tightrope act would 
appear to be a difficult feat to accomplish and the findings of this research suggest that 
it is questionable if all the public water utilities, presented in this study, as well 
performing utilities will manage to sustain high-level equilibria. The fact that many 
public water utilities are strongly controlled by the government-owners would lead to 
the assumption that in many cases public water utilities may be quite vulnerable to 
external shocks deriving from the owner, and as such, these utilities are unlikely to be 
able to stay on the tightrope long.  
7.9 The Politics of Service Provision 
 
The NPM model places strong emphasis on autonomous organizations and agencies 
providing services. Although it is recognized, as has been discussed in the first chapter, 
that political interference (or politicization of management) is considered by many to be 
one of the main causes of poor performance, the research has highlighted the 
impossibility of isolating the functioning of a water utility from the political realm. 
Moreover, the research highlighted the important role played by the political realm in 
‘turning around’ utility performance. 
The cases researched were all examples of organizations that, at least on paper, 
were meant to operate as autonomous organizations under the public sector umbrella. 
However, as these cases show the creation of autonomous agencies does, in itself, not 
mean very much. Apart from the research observations a number of other arguments 
can be presented to argue that a stringent separation of the water utility from the 
political realm is unrealistic.  
The most convincing of these arguments is that the reality of the water services 
sector is that there are numerous interest groups and stakeholders who have an interest 
of some kind in the sector. These stakeholders concern the powerful producer 
stakeholders (politicians, trade unions and engineers) mentioned by Nickson (2002), but 
also consumer stakeholders and groups such as private service providers (from small-
scale vendors to multinationals). All these stakeholders will guard and promote their 
interests. Brown (2002:126), in arguing why privatization does not lead to a separation 
of politics from service provision, provides the following observation:  
 
“It is absurd to think that a private [operator] will sink a large amount 
of capital into an enterprise and then unilaterally disarm himself 
politically. Obviously investors will use all legal means, including 
political, to protect their interests. Similarly, it is unreal to expect that 
social expectations will terminate or diminish merely because 
[responsibilities] have been transferred to the [private sector]. It seems 
obvious that investors will seek to manipulate a system to their benefit, 
and equally obvious that politicians, interest groups, advocacy 
organizations, and others will continue to push for their own 
objectives”. 
 
The arguments raised by Brown not only hold for private stakeholders, but apply to all 
stakeholders, including consumers. In pursuing their interests consumers may draw 
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politicians “back into the debate” leaving it “difficult [for the politicians] to escape 
being called to account for the performance of services” (Deakin and Walsh 1996:35). 
Even if the tasks of service provision and regulation were allocated to a separate 
agency, politicians would still be held accountable by the general public with respect to 
the actual services provided. These citizens would demand action if they consider the 
quality of services provided to be inadequate. This accountability draws the politicians 
back into the actual provision process of water services. Pollitt and Bouckaert 
(2000:146-147) seem to echo this sentiment when they find that: 
 
 “[A]ny suggestion that public management can be radically 
depoliticized […] is either a misunderstanding or flies in the face of 
evidence from many countries. The allocation of say, health care 
resources or decisions about educational standards or major public 
infrastructure projects are all inherently ‘political’ decisions, whether 
they are taken by powerful politicians or tough public managers […]. 
The public will often see the political authority as ultimately 
responsible – or at least sharing responsibility – however many 
ministers may protest that these are technical or professional decisions 
which have been taken by the appropriate officials.” 
  
The only situation in which a stringent separation of politics from service provision 
seems realistic (and sustainable over a longer period of time) is where water services 
are not a prominent issue on the political agenda and where the income of the utility is 
stringently separated from the political realm. An example of such a situation is the 
provision of water supply in the Netherlands (Blokland and Schwartz 1999; Schwartz 
and van Dijk 2005). However, for water not to be prominently on the public agenda, a 
utility would have to have: 
 
• Service coverage of 100%  
• Reliable service provision to the extent that customers are highly satisfied with the 
level of service provided to them; and  
• Tariffs at cost-recovery levels whilst still being low enough that consumers cannot 
only afford them, but are also willing to pay them.  
 
But even satisfying these criteria may not be enough as other elements can be identified 
which have ‘depoliticized’ water services in countries such as the Netherlands. In the 
Netherlands, the mayor of a municipality is still not elected by the electorate, but rather 
appointed by the national government for a term that does not run congruently with 
those of elected municipal council members117. This means that the mayor has little 
incentive to use the water services sector for political gains. Moreover, the Netherlands 
has never had a ‘free-water’ legacy meaning that there is a long tradition charging cost-
recovering levels (which influences the willingness-to-pay of consumers). 
 
117 Interesting to note is that Awortwi (2003) argues that appointed mayors in the case of Ghana 
have a negative impact on (solid waste) service provision. The reason he gives is that these 
mayors would be less accountable to the citizens for the services provided. 
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Unfortunately, the situation that holds for the Netherlands is not universal. In fact, 
basically all middle and low-income countries, including Mexico, do not meet the 
criteria sketched above.  
 
 
 163 
8 Conclusions  
In this concluding chapter we will combine the results obtained from the two clusters of 
case studies presented in chapters five and six and on the basis of those results draw 
final conclusions regarding the validity of the propositions stipulated in chapter three. 
In addition, the question if the water supply and sanitation sector in low- and middle-
income countries  ‘lends’ itself NPM reforms will be discussed in greater detail. 
8.1 Conclusion 
 
In the introductory chapter to this research, the problems facing public water utilities 
were highlighted. Furthermore, the questions were raised if poorly performing utilities 
are managed in-line with the ‘traditional’ bureaucratic model of public management 
and if well performing public water utilities adhere more to the New Public 
Management model of public management. The underlying reason for answering these 
questions is to establish if performance of poorly performing utilities can be improved 
by introducing NPM-style reforms. 
The researched case studies did not provide a coherent picture of well performing 
utilities implementing the NPM model as defined earlier. Rather the well performing 
utilities appear to adhere to only a few of the elements of the NPM (in particular 
external autonomy and customer-orientation). An important qualification that has to be 
raised in relation to this finding is the question if these elements can only be traced back 
to the NPM. The main point here is that a dimension such as ‘autonomy’ may be an 
important element of the NPM model, but the NPM does not have a monopoly on the 
concept of ‘autonomy’. The conclusion, which I draw, reads that the hypothesis that 
well performing utilities adhere to the NPM model is falsified.  
In addition to finding that well performing utilities have only implemented a few of 
the elements of the NPM model, the research showed that the only elements of the 
bureaucratic model that poorly performing utilities adhere to is that they are 
characterized by hierarchy and levels and operate according to internal regulations. 
However, this also applies very much to well performing utilities and as such, this 
characteristic does not differentiate between well performing and poorly performing 
utilities. As such, the hypothesis that poorly performing utilities adhere to the 
bureaucratic model of public management is also falsified.  
8.2 Financial Autonomy and Customer Orientation 
 
The dimensions of external autonomy (specifically financial autonomy) and customer 
orientation were strongly visible in the well performing utilities and noticeably absent 
in the poorer performing utilities. The finding concerning the importance of financial 
autonomy supports earlier research (Cullivan et al. 1988; Islam 1993; Hoffer 1994; 
Bately 1999; Eybergen 2005). The case of SIMAPAG, in turn, has shown the strong 
link between financial autonomy, meaning dependency on the consumer for financing a 
large part of the utility’s income, and customer orientation. The customers of 
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SIMAPAG were willing to pay tariffs which cover a large part of the costs but insisted 
on receiving better services in return. This required SIMAPAG to adopt a strong 
customer orientation. 
Having emphasized the importance of financial autonomy and its relationship with 
customer orientation, these findings should not be overstretched to conclude that well 
performing utilities operate on the basis of full cost recovery. All of the cases of well 
performing utilities studied in this research at one time or another depended on external 
financing to fund investments. In fact, apart from SADM, all of these well performing 
cases still have and need regular access to external financing. As such, although 
increased financial autonomy is important, this does not mean that national and 
international financial institutions have no role to play in assisting public water utilities. 
The fact that almost all well performing utilities studied in this research are still 
dependent on outside financing suggests that without such assistance it is difficult to 
improve performance or maintain good performance.  
8.3 The Suitability of NPM Reforms 
 
In the Introduction of this research, it was highlighted that the New Public 
Management is viewed by many as way of improving service provision by public water 
utilities. The clearest illustration of this perspective is the conclusion from Nickson and 
Franceys, two respected academics whose area of expertise is that of the water supply 
and sanitation sector water in developing countries. They conclude that “the [water 
supply and sanitation] sector lends itself to the introduction of NPM reforms” and that 
“it is proving to have a significant impact on improving service provision the world 
over” (Nickson and Franceys 2003:182). In the two sections below, this conclusion is 
challenged as the research documented in this thesis suggests that Nickson and 
Franceys’ finding is not as generally applicable as they claim it to be. Though it is not 
possible to refute or support the possible contribution of the New Public Management 
in improving service provision in general, this research suggests that the impact of the 
NPM is likely to be limited, in cases where the principal-agent relationship is such that 
the power of the bureaucracy (the agent) is small in comparison with that of the agent. 
Moreover, in many countries, an approach combining Weberian reform measures with 
NPM reforms may hold greater promise for improving service provision than simply 
focusing on the New Public Management reforms. 
 
8.3.1 Principal-Agent Theory and the New Public Management 
 
The criticisms deriving from Public Choice theory have in common that they share a 
particular perception of the principal-agent problem. This perception “is one in which 
the problem is bureaucratic power” (Aucoin 1990:126). Thus the power of the agent, 
which is seen as being inherent in public sector agencies, leads to poor service 
provision because of rigidity and inflexibility of the organization, an uncontrollable 
organization which pursues its own survival rather than organizational goals, and an 
internal orientation of staff who focus more on maximizing budgets and chasing their 
self-interests rather than serving the public (Metcalfe and Richards 1990; Kettl 2000; 
Lane 2000). 
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In light of the fact that Public Choice theory sees the power of the agent as 
underlying inefficiency in the public sector it is not surprising that the aim of the 
reforms deriving from this theory aim to “reestablish the primacy of representative 
government over bureaucracy” (Aucoin, 1990:115). Reestablishing this primacy of the 
principal over the agent is to be achieved by way of reducing or restricting the power of 
the agent, rather than by increasing the power of the principal. As such, the reforms 
emanating from Public Choice theory and featuring prominently in the New Public 
Management aim to reduce or restrict the power of the agent (or in the case of the water 
supply and sanitation sector, the power of the public water utility). For example, 
decentralization of service provision leads consumers or users of a particular service to 
better hold the service provider accountable for the services provided. This increased 
accountability essentially entails a restriction of the utility’s power (or discretion). In a 
similar vein, introducing competition and quasi-competition essentially reduces the 
(monopolistic) power of the water utility. Competition forces the agent to ensure that 
they are following the goals set by the principal at the risk of being replaced by a 
competitor who is better able to do so. 
If the argument that the NPM reforms deriving from Public Choice theory are 
aimed at weakening the power of the agent is accepted it would seem that strong 
bureaucratic power and relatively weak elected officials who have difficulty in steering 
and controlling the bureaucracy are an important presupposition for implementing NPM 
reforms. After all, these reforms are aimed at mitigating this situation. In this research, 
however, it was found that this presupposition does not necessarily hold for the 
provision of water services in low- and middle-income countries. The example of the 
State of Guanajuato in Mexico illustrated that the political institutions in these 
municipalities are such, that a primacy of the principal (elected official) over the agent 
(management of the utility) exists. Similar conclusions can be drawn for the cases of 
Hai Phong in Vietnam, Campinas in Brazil and SADM in Mexico. The question is then 
how beneficial New Public Management reforms, which result in weakening the 
position of the agent further, will be in these countries? Do the water supply and 
sanitation sectors operating in the context of such political institutions ‘lend themselves 
to NPM reforms’? This research suggests that they may not.  
 
8.3.2 The Bureaucratic Model – New Public Management Dichotomy 
 
Linked to the principle-agent discussion is the issue of viewing the NPM as a “mirror 
image” of the bureaucratic model. Such sentiments are shared by a considerable 
number of proponents of the New Public Management, some of whom have even 
argued that the bureaucratic model is obsolete and has effectively been replaced by the 
New Public Management.  
The findings of this research provide something of a different perspective as they 
suggest that viewing the NPM and the bureaucratic model as competing models is not 
very useful when addressing the reform of public water utilities in low- and middle-
income countries. In this sense the research supports Kaufman’s findings (2003:284) 
who suggests that the ‘competition’ between the New Public Management and 
Weberian reforms is more relevant for ‘developed countries’ and less so for the 
countries of Latin America. The main issue is that, as Kaufman (2004:284) argues, the 
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problems “posed by rigid Weberian bureaucracies are less serious than those created by 
highly politicized and patrimonial structures, in which hiring and dispensing of 
resources is part of particularized exchanges of support for services”. In the five public 
water utilities studied in the Mexican State of Guanajuato, the problems associated with 
the role played by the municipal president do appear to be much more significant than 
often-heard complaints about rigid bureaucratic organizations. In fact, one of the most 
salient findings of this research is that well performing public utilities tend to display a 
stronger adherence to the Weberian ideal-type than poorly functioning public service 
providers. This lead to the perspective that instead of seeing the NPM as the mechanism 
to improve service provision in public water utilities in Latin America, perhaps 
Weberian reforms need to be revisited? 
In fact, it would seem that the utilities in Guanajuato would benefit from Weberian 
reforms, which emphasize “entrance by examination or other professionally sanctioned 
qualifications, promotion by merit, job tenure, reasonable and predictable salaries, and 
administration based on written rules” (Schneider and Heredia 2003:7). Such reforms, 
if implemented successfully, could have the effect of addressing the politicized and 
patrimonial structures of the public water utilities in Guanajuato. Cabrero (2005:85) 
also acknowledges the usefulness of strategies of ‘bureaucratic reform’ in the Mexican 
context. In his analysis of Mexican municipalities he finds that “[b]ureaucratization is 
still necessary in a large number of municipal governments across the country”. Such 
reforms essentially strengthen the position of the public agency vis-à-vis the elected 
politician, i.e. strengthen the position of the agent vis-à-vis the principle. 
However, in the water services sector particular attention needs to be paid to the 
‘outputs’ of a water utility. These cannot be assessed, as the municipal president of 
Valle de Santiago did in his second ‘Informe de Gobierno’, in terms of the expansion of 
distribution network or the number of elevated tanks. Rather, these outputs must be 
appraised in terms of the level of service delivered to the consumer (which includes the 
tariffs charged for that particular level of service) and the overall consumer satisfaction 
for the services provided. It is particularly in this sense, i.e. in holding the utility 
accountable for the quality of services it produces (i.e. the services provided to the 
consumers, customer satisfaction with the services, etc.), that I consider the New Public 
Management to hold promise for public water utilities in Guanajuato (and in many low 
and middle income countries for that matter).  
As such, when addressing the reform of public water utilities in Mexico, or in 
many other low- and middle-income countries, rather than viewing Weberian reforms 
and NPM-style reforms as ‘opposite’ or ‘competing’ reform strategies, they are better 
viewed as complementary, focusing on the one hand on reducing patronage and 
depoliticizing the management of the utility, whilst at the same time emphasizing the 
levels of service that must be delivered by the utility.  
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9  Annex 1: Case Studies Guanajuato 
In this Annex, the five case studies undertaken in the Mexican State of Guanajuato are 
presented.  
9.1 Comité Municipal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de Dolores 
Hidalgo118 
 
In presenting the case of CMAPADH, first an overview of the governance structure is 
provided. Then we present the general characteristics of the utility. Finally we present 
the findings in relation to the two models of management discussed in chapter three. 
The general characteristics of the CMAPADH are presented in table 9.1. The 
number of connections appears to be quite low in relation to the total population of the 
municipality of Dolores Hidalgo. This could mean that the utility is providing bulk 
water to the more rural areas of its municipality.  
 
Table 9.1: General characteristics CMAPADH 
Indicator  2000 2001 2002 
Annual water abstraction (million cubic meter) 4.9 3.7 4.1 
Water supply connections 15,094 16,266 16,050 
Sewerage connections 14,635 15,771 14,522 
No. Of Employees 61 64 64 
Service coverage – water supply 95.6% n.a. n.a. 
Service coverage – sewerage 53% n.a. n.a. 
Average domestic tariff (MXP/m3) 1.27 1.47 1.88 
Sources: CMAPADH 2003; CEAG 2002 
 
9.1.1 Governance Structure CMAPADH 
 
Water services to the 129,000 inhabitants of Dolores Hidalgo are provided by the 
Comité Municipal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de Dolores Hidalgo 
(CMAPADH). The utility was established as a statutory body in 1992 by way of the 
Reglamento de la Junta de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado para el Municipio de 
Dolores Hidalgo. These statutes not only established the CMAPADH but also arrange 
the internal functioning of the utility. Article 6 of the statutes of CMAPADH state that 
management of the utility shall be overseen by Council consisting of a chairman, a 
secretary, a treasurer and 2 external members. The tasks of the Council include: 
 
• Management of CMAPADH according to general guidelines, which are to be 
respected by the members of the Board and the personnel of CAMAPDH; 
• Discus and approve the annual budget, which is subsequently submitted for 
approval to the municipal government; 
 
118 Unless otherwise mentioned, the information contained in this document derives from 
interviews held with management of the CAMAPDH.  
 179 
• Formulate and approve the proposal for tariffs of water services as well as of fess 
and fines that may charged by the utility; 
• Address complaints received from consumers about the services provided to them; 
• To determine the conditions of collective or individual work agreements with 
personnel in the utility; 
• Formulate the infrastructure projects for the maintenance and expansion of service 
network; 
• Monitor the use of resources by the utility; 
• To monitor the provision of water services in accordance with the corresponding 
laws, regulations and tariffs 
 
Council members have a term for two-years with a possibility of re-election. The 
secretary of the Council is named and removed by the Municipality. Council members 
are officially supposed to be elected from a variety of organizations representing civic 
society, such as: 
 
• Chamber of commerce 
• Neighborhood associations 
• Banks 
• Professional organizations 
• Unions 
• User groups 
 
However, in reality, the Municipality has not adhered to this process. An assembly for 
selecting Council members was held in 2000, but became so politicized that the 
municipality decided to suspend the election of Council members and eventually 
decided to appoint the members directly. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1: Governance structure CMAPADH 
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The actual functioning of the Council is arranged in the Reglamento del Consejo 
Directivo Comité Municipal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de Dolores Hidalgo. 
These regulations reiterate the composition of the Council as specified in Article 6 of 
the Reglamento de Junta, but also specify in greater detail the obligations of the 
Council in general and the individual Council members. All of the members of the 
Council have one vote and decisions are to be taken by majority voting. Decisions by 
the Council are to be executed by the general manager of the utility. Although the 
Reglamento de Junta does prescribe a separation of functions between management 
oversight and management of the actual service provider, this separation in reality does 
not exist. Reason for this is that the chairman of the Council is currently also the 
general manager of the utility. Moreover, also the secretary and the treasurer are 
employees of CMAPADH. Above an overview of the governance structure of 
CMAPADH is provided. The chart takes into account that the management of 
CMAPADH also holds the majority of the seats on the Council of Directors.  
 
9.1.2 The Degree of Autonomy and Accountability of CMAPADH 
 
9.1.2.1 External Autonomy 
 
CMAPADH is subject to the official norms for water supply and sanitation issued by 
the Ministry of Health and the National Water Commission. CMAPADH has sufficient 
access to raw water resources. CMAPADH uses only groundwater resources, which it 
abstracts by way of 12 wells. Annually between 4 and 5 million cubic meters of 
groundwater is abstracted by these wells. At full capacity CMAPADH can abstract up 
to 6.9 million cubic meters per year. However, there are some problems with depletion 
of the aquifer however. It is estimated that the water level in the aquifer is dropping by 
about one meter per year. 
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Source: CMAPADH 2003 
 
Figure 9.2: Actual versus required income CMAPADH 1995-2002 
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In 2002, CMAPADH has a working ratio of 1 (CEAG 2002) indicating that its 
operational expenditure matched its operational revenue. In essence, this means that the 
utility generates sufficient funds to operate the existing system but that it is dependent 
on outside financiers for new investments in the system. The operational income 
derived mainly from tariffs, arrears, new connections, and penalties/reconnections119. 
External funds in 2001 amounted to MXP 5.4 million, all of which came from the State 
government. In 2002, the utility received MXP 1.67 million from external agencies of 
which 42% derived from the municipal government and the remaining 58% from the 
State Government. In 2002, the internally generated funds for CMAPADH were 
approximately MXP 8 million. With the external funds, this puts the total budget for 
CMAPADH at about MXP 9.7 million. This means that ca. 18% of CMAPADH’s 
funds comes from external agencies. What is also evident is that the amount of external 
funds shows considerable fluctuation, as is illustrated by the fact that external funds in 
2002 were less than one-third of what they were in the previous year. This means that 
there is considerable insecurity for the utility regarding the availability of future funds. 
In 2002, the utility tried to take out a private loan. However, they were unable to satisfy 
the requirements for obtaining that loan.  
CMAPADH cannot take out loans without prior approval from the municipal 
government, as the municipal government has to provide guarantees for the loan. 
Although CMAPADH offers relatively good benefits and convenient working 
hours (from 8:00-16:00) the utility still has some difficulties attracting qualified 
personnel as the salaries are relatively low compared to other sectors. Moreover, the 
utility is relatively small and as such there little room for promotion and development 
of staff. Most employees tend to keep the same position for years. Salaries are proposed 
by the general manager based on a comparison with other water utilities. The proposal 
is then forwarded to the Council for approval. The general manager is able to hire staff 
for existing positions without prior approval from the Council or the municipality. Only 
when a new position is created is approval from the Council required. 
Prior to 2000, there was considerable political interference in the utility. Most 
illustrative is that up to 2000, the general manager was replaced frequently with almost 
no general manager lasting more than a year. In the beginning of 2003 the general 
manager changed again in 2003. The current general manager appears to have a good 
relationship with the municipal president. The level of support provided by the 
municipal president is also visible in the degree to which tariff increases are supported. 
In the period 1995-2000 the average tariff increased by 33.8% with considerable 
fluctuations from year to year120. However, over this same period, the rate of inflation 
measured 110% (CEAG 2001). In other words, the increase in the tariff level is 
considerably less than that of inflation over the same period.  
The utility is officially not allowed to terminate service provision to defaulting 
consumers. However, according to the statutes of CMAPADH the level of service can 
be reduced to a basic minimum. The current policy is to limit service provision to 
 
119 It is noteworthy that article 115 of the Mexican Constitution states that government 
organizations at the federal, state and municipal level do not have to pay for water.  
120 For example, an increase of 18% in 1997 was offset by a reduction of 26% in 1998 and much 
of the increase over the 1995-2000 period is due to an increase in the average tariff of 46% in 
2000  (CEAG 2001). 
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consumers who owe more than MXP 100 or are more than 3 months behind on their 
payments. 
 
Table 9.2: An overview of external autonomy  
Indicator Value 
Who determines the pay-scales for the various levels within the 
utility? Municipality 
What is the basis for appointing members to the Council? Management team 
dominates Council 
Is the utility able to take out loans without prior approval from the 
owner? No 
Is the utility allowed to limit service delivery to defaulters? Yes 
Who is responsible for setting tariffs? Municipality and the 
State Congress 
Does the utility follow public sector procurement rules? Yes 
 
9.1.2.2 External Accountability 
 
The NOM’s issued by the Health Ministry and the National Water Commission contain 
the standards to which CPADAH must adhere. CMAPADH undertakes daily sampling 
and monitoring to ensure that the standards. The results are sent to the local office of 
the Ministry of Health once a month. In addition, they send water samples to the local 
office of the Ministry of Health, which are checked by that office. The reporting 
requirements to the National Water Commission mostly concern the amount of water 
abstracted121. These reports are sent to the CNA every 3 months. Reports for the 
ministry of Health and the CNA are not publicly accessible. In addition to receiving 
reports from CMAPADH, the Ministry of Health (daily) and the CNA (twice per year) 
undertake inspections in Dolores Hidalgo. 
In case CMAPADH does not meet the prescribed standards the Ministry of Health 
sends a notification to the utility with recommendations to address the problem. If 
CMAPADH does not take the necessary steps to mitigate the problem they can be 
fined. Until now, no fines have been applied by the Ministry of Health.  
No service standards are set for CMAPADH. On paper, the utility is to send a 
report to the Municipality every three months, regarding performance of the utility. 
However, at the time of the interviews the last report had been sent to the Municipality 
five months previously. 
One way in which the utility is stimulated to produce results is by way of a 
program named PROMAGUA that is managed by the CNA. Under the PROMAGUA 
program a utility can apply for funds as long as they have a ‘global efficiency rate’122 
 
121 Utilities are to pay the National Water Commission for the water they abstract. At current, 
however, based on a 2002 Decree, the National Water Commission returns these payments as 
long as they are used (on a matching-fund basis) for the construction of wastewater treatment 
facilities. 
122 The global efficiency rate is based on both physical efficiency (physical water losses) and 
commercial efficiency (billing/collection ratio). 
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above 60%. The utility has not submitted applications for funds under this program, 
however, as they do not monitor their ‘global efficiency’.  
The financing institutions do impose covenants on the utility. Both CEAG and the 
CNA tend to offer funds only when their contribution is matched by a contribution from 
CMAPADH. Moreover, most of these funds have specific allocations (the CNA funds 
coming from groundwater charges for example, must be use for the development of 
wastewater treatment facilities). In the case of CEAG, the funds and their spending are 
largely managed by CEAG themselves. This means that many of the contractors and 
consultants required to undertake an activity will actually be contracted by CEAG. 
CEAG then also supervises and monitors these contracts. When the CMAPADH uses 
its own funds for investment they manage the spending of these funds themselves.  
The utility is not audited by an external auditor. Only the treasurer of the Council 
checks the accounts. Two municipal agencies have the authority to check the accounts 
as well. These are the Controlario Municipal and the Controlaría Mayor de Hacienda.  
CMAPADH does not have a customer charter. However, the contract that the 
consumer signs when requesting service provision does contain rights and obligations 
of both CMAPADH and the users. 
There is not a formal customer organization to which CMAPADH is accountable. 
Generally consumers will approach the Customer Department of CMAPADH if they 
encounter any problems of service provision. In case their complaint is not solved the 
consumer can choose to present their complaint to a Municipal Control Agency123 or in 
rare cases to the federal consumer agency124. These agencies, which do not have a 
specific focus on water, represent the consumers if their complaints are considered 
valid. Also, neighborhood associations exist and these, at times, address the issues 
relating to the provision of water services for that particular neighborhood. However, 
these associations do not discuss individual difficulties of consumers. 
 
Table 9.3: An overview of external accountability 
Indicator CMAPADH 
Does the utility have a customer charter, which specifies performance targets 
and are there any financial penalties for non-performance? No 
Does the utility have to meet specified performance targets set by or agreed 
upon with the owners? No 
Is an annual report produced, which is audited by an external accountant? No 
Are external groups represented in advisory or management oversight bodies 
of the utility? Yes 
Has the utility secured loans in the commercial market on its own 
credentials/ability? Yes
125
Does the utility participate in some form of credit rating scheme? No 
Does the lender impose financial covenants on the utility? Yes 
 
 
123 Controlaría Municipal 
124 Procuradoria Federal de Consumidor 
125 It should be noted that these loans were secured considerable time ago. With the (financial) 
performance of recent years securing such a loan would be more difficult and in 2002 was unable 
to secure a loan with a private bank. 
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9.1.3 Hierarchy and Levels, the Market and Customers 
 
9.1.3.1 Decentralization of Authority 
 
Most of the financial decisions are made by the management of the company. Although 
in a number of cases the approval of the Council is required, this requirement is largely 
a formality as the management of CMAPADH also controls the Council. Tariffs and 
loans need to be approved by the municipality (and in case of tariffs also go through the 
State Congress). The Manager of Human Resources in CMAPADH arranges 
procurement of goods and services. Other Departments send their requests to the human 
resources manager and she will arrange procurement. For this purpose she will find 
three quotations from which the best one is selected. As long as the request is for less 
than MXP 20,000126 and if the amount is within the established budget the human 
resources manager can arrange procurement after approval from the general manager. If 
the amount is higher than MXP 20,000 or if the amount is not considered in the budget 
approval is required from the Council. 
Hiring of staff is done by the general manager after consultation with the relevant 
department where the new employee is to work. For firing of staff the general manager 
consultation with the Council in order to ensure that no misunderstandings exist about 
why that step was taken. The promotion of staff members is also the responsibility of 
the general manager in consultation with the treasurer and the secretary. The Council is 
then informed of this decision. The general manager can determine financial incentives 
for employees as long as the amount is less than MXP 500127. Salaries are defined by 
the Council and are mentioned in the budget, which needs to be approved by the 
Municipality and the State Congress. 
Reducing the level of service provision to consumers who have not paid their bills 
is done automatically. The billing and collection section sends a notification to the 
consumer, and if the consumer has not either paid his debts or agreed with the treasurer 
about a solution to the payment problems, the technical department will limit service 
provision. 
 
Table 9.4: An overview of decentralization of authority 
Indicator CMAPADH 
What is the purchasing ceiling for procurement of operational 
departments as a percentage of operational budgets? 
Above MXP 20,000128 approval 
of the Consejo is required  
Does the hiring of staff members in departments require prior 
approval from the general manager? Yes 
How many layers of management separate the general 
manager and the entry-level workers? 
Two Levels 
At what level are internal work processes and standards 
defined? 
Management and department 
level 
In what areas does field-staff have decision-making powers? Customer-service, maintenance, 
billing and collection, storage of 
materials 
 
126 US$ 2,000 
127 US$ 50 
128 Approximately US$ 2,000 
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9.1.3.2 Internal Accountability for Results 
 
The relationship between the Council and the general manager in terms of 
accountability is a bit complicated as the general manager is the same person as the 
chairman of the Council. Moreover, two other employees of CMAPADH are in the 
Council, meaning that in essence the management of the utility also controls the 
Council. The Council must meet al least once per month, although on average there will 
be two Council meetings per month. The frequency of these meetings is very much 
dependent on the need for having such meetings. The Council does not establish clear 
and measurable targets for the management of the utility. 
In June 2003, CMAPADH established a ‘best worker of the month’ award. Every 
month, one person is selected from the administrative staff and one person is selected 
from operational staff as ‘best worker of the month’. ‘Best workers of the month’ are 
honored in a small monthly event during which they receive their award. There are no 
clear indicators and there is no set procedure for selecting the ‘best worker’129. 
At current there is a system to evaluate employees, but the evaluation is mainly 
focused on issues such as absenteeism and sick days and does not really take into 
account the results produced by the employees130. There is also no system of penalties 
for poor performance. 
 
Table 9.5: An overview of internal accountability for results 
Indicator CMAPADH 
How often does the Chief Executive meet with the Council? Twice per month 
Are penalties and rewards applied to the Chief Executive and Directors for 
achieving specified performance targets? No 
Are penalties and rewards applied to the staff by the management for 
achieving specified performance targets? No 
Is staff subject to annual evaluations on their functioning in the utility? No 
 
9.1.3.3 Market-orientation 
 
CMAPADH outcontracts approximately 23% of its operational budget. It does not have 
a specific outcontracting policy. Activities for which it outcontracts include 
rehabilitation and expansion of the network, tariff studies, installing new computer 
software, collecting uncollected bills and producing an operations manual. 
The utility sends a bi-monthly report to the State Water Commission concerning 
various (performance) indicators. On the basis of these reports, which are submitted by 
all utilities in the State of Guanajuato, the State Water Commission then publishes an 
annual overview of the performance of the utilities131, which allows the various utilities 
 
129 Partly as a result of the non-transparent way of awarding this monthly prize, there are some 
who feel that selection of the award winners is partly based on ‘personal feelings’. 
130 Plans do exist for establishing an annual bonus for productivity of the employee, but this has 
not been implemented yet. 
131 Diagnostico Sectorial 
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to compare their own performance with that of their neighbors. However, although this 
benchmarking information is available every year, it is not used in a systematic way132. 
The utility does not undertake any market-testing exercises. 
 
 
Table 9.6: An overview of market-orientation 
Indicator Value 
What is value of contracts outsourced as a percentage 
of the operational budget? 23.73% 
What is the nature if the functions that are outsourced? Construction works, engineering 
projects, legal services, ICT, tariff 
study, operations manual, etc. 
How often does the utility engage in benchmarking 
exercises? Once per year 
In what areas are benchmarking activities undertaken? Technical, commercial, financial and 
administrative activities 
Does the utility engage in market testing and does it 
develop internal markets? No 
 
9.1.3.4 Customer-orientation 
 
CMAPADH is dependent on the tariff it collects for covering its operations and 
maintenance costs. Payment of the bills can be done at a variety of locations including 
the CMAPADH Office, Banks, and selected small businesses. 
The utility does not have any real system of finding out what the opinions of their 
customers are regarding the service provided to the customers. There is a daily radio 
program in which citizens can call in to complain about government services (in other 
words, not only water services) and sometimes the consumers call in to complain about 
the provision of water services. Also there are plans to install a suggestion box, but this 
has not been implemented yet. 
As mentioned before, the customers do have the possibility to complain. 
Complaints can be addressed to the Customer Department of the utility, the Municipal 
Control Agency or the Federal Consumer Agency. The customer can get access to 
CMAPADH by visiting their offices, phoning or sending a letter. Although there is no 
tracking system for complaints, almost all complaints are addressed within one week. 
The lack of a tracking system means that there is no exact information about the 
number and nature of complaints coming in each month. It also means that the 
complaints are not analyzed with the aim of improving service provision. It is 
estimated, however, that between 180 and 300 complaints are submitted each month. 
These complaints mainly concern: 
 
• High bills 
• Service interruptions 
• Leaks 
• Meters, which are not functioning 
• Requests for new connections that have not been installed yet. 
 
132 Illustrative in this sense is that of the seven managers interviewed at CMAPADH two 
indicated that no benchmarking exercises existed.  
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Table 9.7: An overview of consumer-orientation 
Indicator CMAPADH 
In what ways can the bills be paid? CMAPADH Office, 
Banks, Cajas 
Populares, selected 
small businesses 
In what ways does CMAPADH pro-actively seek the 
opinions/views of its customers? 
None 
What is the menu of options for service delivery that the 
CMAPADH provides? 
In-house connections, 
block connections 
In what ways does the CMAPADH actively inform its customers 
about changes related to service provision? 
Radio 
What is the percentage of complaints that is addressed? 100% 
What are the average response times to complaints? N/A 
 
9.1.4 Conclusion 
 
During the time of the interviews in July and October 2003, CMAPADH appeared to be 
relatively stable following a prolonged period of instability in which general managers 
seemed to change every year133. Part of the stability has been achieved by de facto by 
neutralizing the Council as an oversight agency by allocating a majority of seats to 
people who are also part of the management of the utility and by bypassing some of the 
stakeholders in the service provision process when it comes to allocating members of 
the Council. 
Availability of water resources does not appear to be a very constricting issue at 
this time. CAMAPDH uses about 70% of its abstraction capacity. The declining 
groundwater levels are a reason for concern for the medium to long term. Attracting 
qualified personnel is subject to some difficulties. 
In terms of access to financial resources, the general manager does not appear to 
have much room for maneuvering. The tariff levels cover no more than operation and 
maintenance costs and have seen considerable fluctuation over the past years 
(indicating that they are subject to political interference). This means the utility is 
dependent on external funds for capital expenditure and availability of these funds is 
difficult to predict. 
In terms of accountability, CMAPADH appears to have considerable accountability 
to the Ministry of Health and the National Water Commission for meeting drinking 
water standards and reporting on the abstraction of water resources. Accountability to 
external financiers is to some extent limited, as these organizations tend to supervise the 
spending of these funds themselves. Reporting requirements to the Municipality do not 
 
133 The impact of instability was further strengthened by the fact that CMAPADH had very little 
written and standardized procedures. This meant that every time a new managing director would 
enter the operating procedures would change. 
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appear to be followed meticulously. However it is likely that informally the general 
manager will have a very strong accountability to the municipal president134. 
CMAPADH appears to be a highly centralized organization with very few 
decision-making powers decentralized to lower levels. Even when decision-making 
powers have been decentralized, the people making these decisions often still need 
approval from the general manager.  
Internal accountability for results is also very limited. Managerial accountability 
towards the Council is little more than a formality as the management dominates the 
Council. In the organization, apart from the selection of a monthly ‘best-worker’ no 
incentive structures are in place to reward or penalize good or bad performance. 
The level of market-orientation also does not appear to be quite high. Although the 
level of outcontracting is reasonable at about 23%, there is no systematic use of 
outcontracting as a utility policy. Also, the use of benchmarking is relatively limited, 
despite the fact that the State Water Commission annually publishes a ‘sectoral 
analysis’. Market-testing does not take place. 
Like the internal accountability for results, decentralization of authority and 
market-orientation, also the level of customer-orientation appears limited. Although 
customers can pay their bills in a variety of ways, their opinions are not proactively 
sought. Moreover, although customers can complain, these complaints are not tracked 
and as such are not used for improving service provision 
9.2 Sistema Municipal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de Moroleón135 
 
In presenting the case of SMAPAM, of which table 9.8 presents a brief overview, the 
governance structure of the utility is first presented. Once the governance structure of 
the utility has been discussed, the case study focuses on the different dimensions of 
adherence to the two models of management.  
 
Table 9.8: General Characteristics SMAPAM 
Indicator  2000 2001 2002 
Annual water abstraction (million cubic meter) 4.3 4.5 4.1 
Water supply connections 12,495 12,823 13,119 
No. Of Employees 32 34 38 
Service coverage – water supply 96.5% n.a. n.a. 
Service coverage – sewerage 90% n.a. n.a. 
Average domestic tariff (MXP/m3) 1.85 1.51 2.36 
Sources: SMAPAM 2003; CEAG 2002 
 
Interesting about the general characteristics is that despite the fact that SMAPAM has 
significantly fewer connections than CMPADAH, the amount of water it abstracts per 
 
134 This assumption is based on the fact that the municipal president is able to remove the 
managing director from his position (and has done so numerous times over the past decade) and 
the fact that municipal presidents have far reaching powers at the municipal level (Capital 
Advisors 1999). 
135 Unless otherwise mentioned, the information contained in this case derives from interviews 
held with the management of SMAPAM. 
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year (and subsequently also the per capita consumption) is at the same level of 
CMAPADH. This could perhaps be attributed to the presence of the textile industry. 
 
9.2.1 Governance Structure of SMAPAM 
 
SMAPAM was established on July 19th, 1994 by way of the Reglamento del Sistema 
Municipal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado. Like the water utility in Dolores Hidalgo, 
SMAPAM this Reglamento establishes SMAPAM as autonomous agency or an 
organismo decentralizado, which has a legal status separate from that of the 
municipality. Article 7 of the Reglamento, stipulates that the utility will be supervised 
by a Council, which is to consist of no less than 3 members. The responsibilities of the 
Council are stated in article 11 and include: 
 
• Monitor the functioning of the utility; 
• Discuss and approve the annual budget 
• Supervise the use of resources; 
• Formulate and approve the tariffs; 
• Address relevant user complaints; 
• Formulate infrastructure projects, which are required to guarantee service 
provision; 
• Inform the municipality every three months about the results produced by the 
utility; 
• Any other activities required by rules or regulations. 
 
 The terms of the Council members are for a period of two years with the possibility of 
re-election. The appointment procedure for the Council is laid down in article 8, which 
finds that the Council members (including the President and the Treasurer) are to be 
elected by an Assembly of Users136. This Assembly is to be organized by the 
municipality and organizations, which are to attend such an Assembly, include 
organizations such as: 
 
• Chamber of commerce 
• Labor Unions 
• Banking Institutions 
• Neighborhood associations 
• Ministry of Health 
 
 
136 The exception is the Secretary of the Council who is appointed by the municipality 
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Figure 9.3: Governance structure SMAPAM 
 
Although the procedure for electing a Council is stipulated in the Reglamento, in 
practice the municipality has bypassed the Assembly and has decided to appoint the 
Council themselves since 1998. In the 1998-2000 term, the municipality decided to 
extend the term for the previous Council. In 2000, the municipality tried to assign 
political supports to the Council. This was opposed by the existing Council members. 
In response, the municipality decided to remove the president of the Council and 
appoint someone who would agree with their selection of Council members. From 
2000-2002 the functioning of Council members was relatively stable until 2002 when 
the municipality decided to remove the president of the Council and replace him with 
the vice-president of the Council137. 
The Reglamento also arranges the functioning of the Council. The general manager 
attends the Council meetings but has not vote. Each member of the Council has one 
vote and for a meeting (and the voting) to be legal a majority of Council members must 
be present. Decisions can be made by simple majority. In case the votes tie, the 
chairman of the Council has the final say. 
Figure 9.3 provides an overview of the governance structure of the utility. 
 
9.2.2 The Degree of Autonomy and Accountability of SMAPAM  
 
9.2.2.1 External Autonomy 
 
Similar to the water utility in Dolores Hidalgo, SMAPAM is subject to the official 
norms and standards issued by the Ministry of Health and CNA. 
SMAPAM uses only groundwater for the production of potable water and has 
access to sufficient amounts of water resources. By way of 11 groundwater wells, the 
utility abstracts approximately 4.1 million m3 per year from the Moroleón Cienega 
 
137 Important in this respect is that the position of chairman of the Council is the only position on 
the Council for which compensation is received. 
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Aquifer. The utility has a capacity to abstract 4.7 million m3 meaning that SMAPAM is 
utilizing 87% of its abstraction capacity, which is quite high (SMAPAM 2003). The 
utility estimates that the Moroleón Cienega Aquifer will at least be able to supply water 
for the next 30 years and as such, the utility does not feel it faces difficulties in 
accessing sufficient amounts of raw water resources. 
Assessing the ratio between income generated by the utility and the income 
required to provide water services shows that over the past years the difference between 
what is generated and what is required is increasing. In the mid-1990s SMAPAM was 
generating about 80% of its required income. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, this has 
slipped to about 65%. The balance sheets of SMAPAM for 2002 and the first 8 months 
for 2003 indicate that the working ratio’s 0.96 and 0.82 respectively, which means that 
the utility is covering operation and maintenance costs. However, even with working 
ratios close to 1 is the utility dependent on external financing for its capital investment. 
In 2001 SMAPAM received external funds from the State Government (CEAG) 
amounting to MXP 80,000. In 2002, external financing amounted to MXP 1.75 million 
(SMAPAM 2003)138. As such in 2001 external financing made up 1.1% of the annual 
budget in 2001 and 16.2% of the budget in 2002139. 
In case the utility would want to secure loans, they would require prior approval 
from the municipality. However, since 1995 the utility tries to avoid obtaining loans 
from lending agencies as their past experience with such loans have not been positive. 
Rather they prefer to rely on matching funds schemes, which are supported by the CNA 
and the State Water Commission. It appears that the utility adheres to a policy of 
depending on the revenue it generates from its customers for operational expenditure 
and on the CNA and CEAG grants for investments in infrastructure. This is perhaps 
most strongly illustrated by the fact that the utility did not have a budget for the 2003 
year. 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Year
 
Source: SMAPAM 2003 
 
Figure 9.4: Actual versus required income SMAPAM 1995-2002 
 
138 In the period between 1995 and 2002 the percentage of external financing varied from 0% to 
30% with an average of about 10%.   
139 The fact that SMAPAM’s working ratio seems to hover around 1 and the relatively low share 
of external funds would seem to indicate that the utility has not undertaken a lot of large scale 
infrastructure project over the past years. 
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In terms of political support for the utility, it appears that despite the turbulence with 
respect to Council membership, the management of the utility is relatively stable. 
However, the general manager has expressed that political support from the municipal 
president is not necessarily a given. This is most visible in the reluctance of the 
municipality to approve increases in tariffs over the past decade. In fact, following a 
tariff increase of 50% in 1995, the next tariff increase (of 30%) was not until 2002. In 
January of 2003, a monthly tariff increase of 2% was implemented, which allows the 
tariffs to run more in line with existing inflation levels.  
All income generated by the utility must be spent on providing water services. As 
such, the municipality cannot use the revenues generated from the provision of water 
services for other purposes.  
Article 23 of the Reglamento provides SMAPAM the possibility reducing the 
provision of water services to users to a basic minimum (which would still allow the 
users to fulfill their basic needs) in case these users have failed to pay their bills. 
The utility has some difficulties attracting and retaining qualified staff. The main 
reason for this is that the salaries at SMAPAM, which are in accordance with existing 
legislation, are relatively low in comparison with those offered in the textile industry. A 
worker in the textile industry can earn in one week, what an employee at SMAPAM 
receives in a month. Over the past years, however, the textile industry has been in 
decline, and SMAPAM is becoming a more attractive employer as it offers relative job 
security and a convenient working schedule (8:00-16:00). Pay scales are proposed by 
the management of the utility and after approval from the Council the proposal is sent 
to the municipality for final approval (along with the budget of SMAPAM). Another 
drawback of working at SMAPAM is that, because it is a relatively small company, 
there is very little room for promotion within the utility.  
 
Table 9.9: An overview of external autonomy 
Indicator Value 
Who determines the pay scales for the various levels within 
the utility? Municipality 
What is the basis for appointing members to the Council? Community representatives 
Is the utility able to take out loans without prior approval 
from the owner? No 
Is the utility allowed to limit service delivery to defaulters? Yes 
Who is responsible for setting tariffs? Municipality and the State 
Congress 
Does the utility follow public sector procurement rules? Yes 
 
9.2.2.2 External Accountability 
 
SMAPAM does not take any samples regarding the quality of water supply and 
wastewater. SMAPAM only monitors the amount chlorine in the groundwater wells. 
The monitoring of the wells is done daily and the results are submitted to the local 
office of the Ministry of Health. The Ministry of Health does perform inspections of 
water quality and sometimes informs the State Water Commission of the results. In case 
the samples taken by the Ministry of Health fail to meet the prescribed standards the 
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Ministry informs the utility of the measures that it is required to take to mitigate the 
identified problem. In case SMAPAM does not implement these measures the utility 
can be fined. However, no fines have been put on SMAPAM so far. Like CMAPADH, 
SMAPAM must submit a report to the CNA every three months regarding the amount 
of water they have abstracted. In theory, SMAPAM should also report on the 
wastewater quality that it discharges. However, since the utility did not have a 
wastewater treatment plant operating in 2003, they did no report anything to the CNA 
regarding the treatment of wastewater. 
The Council sends bi-monthly reports to the municipality. These reports include 
financial statements and memorandums concerning activities that the utility is 
undertaking. The municipality also requires the utility to submit an annual report. 
Meetings between the utility and the municipality occur on a basis of need. Whenever a 
meeting is required (such as, for example, to discuss the construction of a wastewater 
treatment plant) a meeting will be arranged. In case the municipality is not pleased with 
the performance of the utility they are able to remove any of the Council members, 
even though this is not stipulated as such in the Reglamento. The municipality removed 
the Council members in 1994 and in 2000 the municipality removed the chairman of 
the Council and the general manager of SMAPAM. There are no service standards set 
which the utility must achieve. As mentioned, SMAPAM mostly uses grant programs 
managed by CNA and CEAG for obtaining external funding. These grants do with 
conditions that have to be met. Both CEAG and the CNA tend to offer funds only when 
their contribution is matched by that of the receiving water utility. As described earlier, 
most of these funds have specific allocations. In the case of CEAG, the funds and their 
spending are largely managed by CEAG themselves.  
There is a ‘user association’ which not only represents consumers of water 
services, but of ‘government services; in general. When the tariffs were raised, this 
association became very active and at one point even occupied the SMAPAM Office to 
complain against the tariff increase. At current, however, the association is less active. 
The utility does not engage an external auditor. The municipality and the State Ministry 
of Finance can audit the utility when the desire. The last audit was by the State Ministry 
of Finance in 1999. The contract that the consumer signs prior to receiving water 
services contain a series of obligations and rights to which both the utility and the 
consumer must adhere. The contract does not specify any targets, however, which the 
utility is to meet. Like the case of CMAPADH, the consumers can also complain to the 
Controlaría Municipal. 
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Table 9.10: An overview of external accountability 
Indicator Value 
Does the utility have a customer charter, which specifies performance targets and are 
there any financial penalties for non-performance? No 
Does the utility have to meet specified performance targets set by or agreed upon with 
the owners? No 
Is an annual report produced, which is audited by an external accountant? No 
Are external groups represented in advisory or management oversight bodies of the 
utility? Yes 
Has the utility secured loans in the commercial market on its own credentials/ability? No 
Does the utility participate in some form of credit rating scheme? No 
Does the lender impose financial covenants on the utility? Yes 
 
9.2.3 Hierarchy and Levels, the Market and Customers 
 
9.2.3.1 Decentralization of Authority 
 
Decisions about setting tariff levels and the tariff structure follow a set procedure in 
which the utility proposes the tariff to the Council, on the basis of a tariff study 
undertaken by an external consultant. If the Council approves this proposal the proposal 
is sent to the municipality. If the municipality agrees to this proposal as well the 
proposal is sent to the state Congress for final endorsement and published in the State 
Journal140. 
The Billing Department is responsible for negotiating about uncollected bills. In 
general the policy is to offer a discount of up to 50% for debts smaller than MXP 1,500 
and discounts up to 25% for amounts higher than MXP 1,500. 
All requests for procurement are submitted to the general manager and the 
chairman of the Council. If it is an operational expense less than MXP 50,000 the 
general manager and chairman of the Council can decide. If it concerns an expense 
larger than MXP 50,000 the complete Council has to give its approval. In such a case, 
the utility is to request at least three quotations from potential suppliers/contractors. 
Decisions about maintenance of assets are done by the general manager in 
consultation with the chairman of the Council. Generally, these decisions relate to 
maintenance activities, which cannot wait. Strategies for reducing unaccounted-for-
water are proposed to the Council by the general manager. The Council will make the 
final decision about these strategies. 
Also decisions about internal work processes and standards are made by the 
general manager in consultation with the chairman of the Council. 
In case an employee is promoted, hired or fired, the decision is made by the 
chairman of the Council on the basis of proposals from the general manager. In case it 
concerns the termination of an employee’s contract the decision has to be approved by 
the complete Council. Salary adjustments, which also require the approval of the full 
Council, are generally made once per year. The Council will agree to a general increase 
of the salary level, and the chairman of the Council and the general manager will then 
decide how this general increase is distributed over the employees.  
 
140 Periodico Oficial del Gobierno del Estado de Guanajuato 
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In case a user has not paid his bills and the Billing Department has not been able to 
negotiate a settlement with that user, services provided to that user will be reduced. The 
ultimate decision to this lies with the chairman and the general manager who jointly 
decide if services will be reduced based on a report by the Billing Department. 
Decisions regarding customer complaints are dependent on the nature of the 
complaint. If addressing the complaint requires only clarification or providing 
information the person receiving the complaint addresses the complaint on the spot. If 
further action is required the complaint will be sent to the relevant Department.   
 
Table 9.11: An overview of decentralization within the utility 
Indicator Value 
What is the purchasing ceiling for procurement of operational 
departments as a percentage of operational budgets? 
All decisions are taken by the MD 
and the Council President. Above 
MXP 50,000141 the Council needs 
to give approval 
Does the hiring of staff members in departments require prior 
approval from the general manager? Yes 
How many layers of management separate the Chief 
Executive and the entry-level workers? 
One level 
At what level are internal work processes and standards 
defined? 
general manager/chairman of the 
Council 
In what areas does field-staff have decision-making powers? Billing and collection 
    
9.2.3.2 Internal Accountability for Results 
 
The general manager meets with the Council once per month or more often if necessity 
requires additional meetings. During these meetings the general manager submits 
financial statements and reports on issues related to planning, acquisition of new assets, 
personnel issues or any other information he considers relevant.  
No performance targets for the general manager exist which he must achieve. The 
Council can decide to reward the general manager and other employees of the utility’s 
management. However, such rewards are not very common. If such awards are given 
they are more symbolic in nature (such as a diploma, etc.) than a monetary reward.  
The employees do not have to meet specified performance targets and also there is 
no system in place to evaluate the performance of the employees. Similarly, there is no 
way of rewarding an employee for good performance. Each employee receives a 
bimonthly bonus of MXP 300 regardless his or her performance. 
 
Table 9.12: An overview of internal accountability for results 
Indicator Value 
How often does the Chief Executive meet with the Council? Once per month 
Are penalties and rewards applied to the Chief Executive and Directors for 
achieving specified performance targets? No 
Are penalties and rewards applied to the staff by the management for 
achieving specified performance targets? No 
Is staff subject to annual evaluations on their functioning in the utility? No 
 
141 Approximately US$ 5,000 
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9.2.4 Market-orientation 
 
The level of outcontracting in the utility of Moroleón is relatively small and does not 
exceed 7% of its operational expenditure. In principle the utility has three methods of 
contracting third parties. The first method is that the Council can directly award the 
contract to a supplier/contractor. The second way is by way of a restricted tender, in 
which the utility requests three contractors to present (financial and technical) proposals 
to the Council. The third mechanism concerns a public tender in which any contractor 
can submit a proposal. Here too the Council makes the final decision about awarding 
the contract (in consultation with the general manager). Different tendering 
mechanisms will be used depending on the amount of the contract.  
SMAPAM sends bimonthly reports to the State Water Commission, which 
publishes the Diagnostico Sectorial annually. This publication contains an overview of 
all water utilities in the State of Guanajuato and covers: 
 
• Technical data relating to the production process: groundwater sources, volume of 
water abstracted, treated water, metered wells, etc.  
• Commercial data: number of metered connections, total volume delivered, etc. 
• Financial data: billing and collection rates, total expenditure, total income, etc. 
• Administrative data: number of employees, % of managers, etc. 
 
SMAPAM does not, however, use this information in a very systematic way. Partaking 
in this benchmarking exercise appears to be more with the aim of satisfying CEAG than 
using the results to spur improvement in SMAPAM142. 
The utility does not engage in benchmarking exercises. 
 
Table 9.13: An overview of market-orientation 
Indicator SMAPAM 
What is value of contracts outsourced as a percentage of the 
operational budget? 6.93% 
What is the nature if the functions that are outsourced? Construction works, engineering 
projects, legal services, ICT, 
tariff study, operations manual, 
etc. 
How often does the utility engage in benchmarking 
exercises? Once per year 
In what areas are benchmarking activities undertaken? Technical, commercial, financial 
and administrative activities 
Does the utility engage in market testing and does it develop 
internal markets? No 
 
 
 
 
142 Although the use of this benchmarking exercise is limited for SMAPAM, the CEAG does use 
the information from this exercise to determine their main programs of support for the following 
year. 
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9.2.4.1 Customer-orientation 
 
Income generated from revenues represents approximately 90% of the total available 
budget. The customer’s can pay their bills in SMAPAM’s Office, banks143 and small 
businesses (like a convenient store or video shop).  
The utility has a few ways of obtaining information about the opinions of its 
customers, although these methods are not very pro-active. SMAPAM has installed a 
suggestion box in its office, which is not used very often. Furthermore, SMAPAM’s 
customers can call in to a radio show144 to express complaints about service provision. 
The utility also uses that radio program to inform its customers about any service 
interruptions or other activities that the utility will undertake. The complaints and 
comments expressed through the suggestion box and the radio program are sent to the 
relevant Department to be addressed. Generally, the utility will receive about 400 
complaints a month. The complaints mainly concern: 
 
• Increases in bills (especially after the recent tariff increase) 
• Meter reading mistakes 
• Leaks 
• Service interruptions 
 
In principle, all of the complaints are addressed. Nothing is done with the complaints 
once they have been addressed. There have been no customer management trainings 
organized for employees in recent years. 
Officially, the customers should be represented in the Council, by was of elections 
in an Assembly. However, as mentioned the municipality has decided to bypass this 
election mechanism and in recent years has opted for appointing the Council members. 
 
Table 9.14: An overview of customer-orientation 
Indicator Value 
In what ways can the bills be paid? SMAPAM’s Office, 
Banks, Cajas 
Populares, selected 
small businesses 
In what ways does SMAPAM pro-actively seek the opinions/views of 
its customers? 
Suggestion box 
What is the menu of options for service delivery that the SMAPAM 
provides? 
In-house connections, 
block connections 
In what ways does the SMAPAM actively inform its customers about 
changes related to service provision? 
Flyers added to the 
receipt, radio, 
perifoneo145
What is the percentage of complaints that is addressed? 100% 
What are the average response times to complaints? N/A 
 
 
143 Including the cajas populares. 
144 The radio show is called “If the city would talk” (Si la ciudad hablara) 
145 Perifoneo is a car with speakers that drives around broadcasting messages through a 
neighborhood or city. 
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9.2.5 Conclusion 
 
Like the utility in Dolores Hidalgo, the utility in Moroleón has experienced 
considerable intervention from the municipality over the past decade. In recent years, 
however, the utility appears to be a bit more stable. A few aspects of the utility are 
especially noteworthy. First of all, the chairman of the Council appears to have a 
prominent position in the day-to-day functioning of the utility. In many cases, decisions 
are made by the general manager in consultation with the chairman of the Council. This 
not only means that the utility is very centralized, but also that the influence of the 
chairman of the Council goes well beyond overseeing the management of the utility. 
Secondly, the utility’s finances appear to be arranged on a relatively ad-hoc basis, in the 
sense that the utility did not have a budget for the 2003 year. Basically, revenue 
collected was mainly earmarked for operational expenditure, whilst CEAG and CNA 
grants were applied for in order to finance investments. Thirdly, the utility is relatively 
small with 32 employees and the labor productivity is very high with less than 3 staff 
per 1,000 connections. Although from a labor productivity point of view, such an 
indicator seems impressive, it does lead to the question if the utility has capacity to 
develop new activities, which can improve performance.  
In general the level of external autonomy for the utility is limited by the difficulty 
of obtaining qualified personnel, political intervention by the municipal president, and 
the limited availability of financial resources. However, the adoption of a monthly tariff 
index in 2003 would, if the index is actually applied and maintained, provide more 
(financial) room for maneuvering for the management of the utility. In terms of access 
to water resources the utility does not face any constraints. 
The level of external accountability appears to be very much in line with that of 
CMAPADH. The main organizations to which account is given are the Ministry of 
Health, the CNA and the CEAG. The role of the municipal president remains very 
strong and it is likely that accountability to the municipal president is strong. 
The level of market-orientation of the utility appears to be very low. Less than 7% 
of operational expenditure is outcontracted. Although the utility does provide date to 
CEAG for the annual benchmarking exercise, it does not appear that the utility uses the 
annual exercise in a systematic way.  
Decentralization of authority is very limited in the utility, which could perhaps be 
explained by the relatively small size of the utility. With just over 30 staff members, it 
would still be possible for the management to take most of the decisions and inform the 
rest of the staff relatively quickly about these decisions. What is surprising, however, is 
the prominent role of the chairman of the Council, as mentioned above. 
Internal accountability shows something of a mixed picture. On the one hand, the 
staff of the utility is neither subject to meeting performance targets nor to performance-
based rewards and penalties. On the other hand, the accountability to the Council, and 
in particular the chairman, is very strong as they are consulted in most decisions.  
Although, the utility does not seek the opinions of its customers pro-actively, it has 
instituted mechanisms for allowing customers to complain and responding to these 
complaints. Here too, the question can be asked if the utility’s size if of influence. With 
32 staff members, it is unlikely that a lot of capacity would exist to implement 
mechanisms for pro-actively soliciting information from the consumers. 
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 9.3 Sistema Municipal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado del Municipio 
de Valle de Santiago146 
 
The Sistema Municipal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado del Municipio de Valle de 
Santiago (SAPAM) was established as a statutory body147 responsible for the provision 
of water services on the 21st of June in 1996 (Orozco 2002). In presenting this case, the 
governance structure of the utility will first be described, followed by the adherence of 
the utility to the models as defined in chapter three. 
 
Table 9.15: General characteristics SAPAM 
Indicator  2000 2001 2002 
Annual water abstraction (million cubic meter) 4.9 4.9 4.6 
Water supply connections 15,569 15,487 15.650 
Sewerage connections 14,360 14,282 n.a. 
No. Of Employees 57 69 80 
Service coverage – water supply 94.5% n.a. n.a. 
Service coverage – sewerage 59% n.a. n.a. 
Average domestic tariff (MXP/m3) 1.08 1.62 3.11 
Sources: SAPAM 2003; CEAG 2002 
 
9.3.1 Governance Structure of SAPAM 
 
The statutes which determine the governance structure is the Reglamento del Sistema de 
Agua Potable y Alcantarillado del Municipio de Valle de Santiago, which was adopted 
on the 16th of January 2003. The main tasks of the organization are stipulated in article 
two and include: 
 
• detection, abstraction, transport and treatment of potable water; 
• planning, construction, maintenance, rehabilitation and extension of the networks 
and equipment necessary to provide this service to the population; 
• prevent and control pollution of water sources to which wastewater is discharged;  
• treatment and discharge of effluents. 
 
The utility is to be supervised by a Council whose members are to serve for a period of 
three years and who can be reelected. Among others the tasks of the Council include: 
 
• Monitoring the utility; 
• Examine, discuss and approve the annual budget; 
• Formulate the infrastructure projects that are to be undertaken; 
• Formulate and submit to the municipality the tariffs for service provision; 
 
146 Unless otherwise mentioned, the information contained in this document derives from 
interviews held with management of the SAPAM.  
147 Organismo decentralizado 
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• Determine the conditions for collective and individual work agreements with 
personnel of the utility; 
• Inform the municipality every three months or whenever required about the 
functioning of the utility. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.5: Governance structure SAPAM 
 
On paper the selection of Council members is done by the municipality on the basis of 
recommendations of associations, chambers and other professional organizations. The 
municipality analyzes the recommendations of these organizations and then selects the 
most suitable six candidates. The Council consists of a chairman, a treasurer, a 
secretary and three ‘externals’. However, in reality, the selection procedure was 
somewhat different. In 2000, following a period of exceptionally poor performance, the 
incoming municipal president decided to remove the Council and the general manager 
of the utility. The new general manager brought in a new management team from the 
municipality of Salamanca.  Instead of selecting Council members on the basis of 
proposals from professional organizations, the municipality decided to appoint the 
general manager as the chairman of the Council and the heads of the different 
departments of the utility as the other Council members. In other words, the 
management of the utility was also the Council, at least for the 2000-2003 period. In 
October 2003, following a municipal election and a change in municipal president, the 
entire management team of SAPAM that had been installed in 2000 was removed (and 
as such also the entire Council). The new general manager, as well as most of the other 
new managers of the utility, is not very experienced in the water supply and sanitation 
sector.  
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9.3.2 The Degree of Autonomy and Accountability of SAPAM 
 
9.3.2.1 External Autonomy 
 
Like the previous case studies SAPAM is to meet the norms and standards specified by 
the Ministry of Health and the National Water Commission.  
SAPAM uses only groundwater for the production of potable water and abstracts 
approximately 4.6 million m3 per year from 8 groundwater wells. SAPAM has a 
capacity to abstract more than 10 million m3 per year and as such, utilizes less than 50% 
of its capacity. The quality of the water abstracted is relatively good. The water level of 
the aquifer, however, is dropping about 2.7 meters per year148.  
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Figure 9.6: Level of income in relation to what is required SAPAM 1995-2002 
 
In 2001, the working ratio of SAPAM was reported as being 1.76 (CEAG 2002), which 
is quite high and would mean that the utility spent 1.7 times more on operational 
expenditure than the revenues it generated. An overview of the actual income generated 
by the utility versus the required income shows, however, that between 1998 and 2002 
the utility has been improving its financial position, though it still does not generate the 
required income. Also visible is the impact of the strong tariff increase in 2001, which 
results in a jump from meeting 72% of required income in 2001 to generating 92% of 
the required income in 2002. 
As the revenue generated by the utility is not sufficient to pay for investment, the 
utility is dependent on external financing. In 2002 the utility received a little bit over 
 
148 Other sources estimate that the average drop in water level is 1.68 meters per year, with 
declines of 3 to 4 meters in some places. It should be noted that SAPAM is not the only entity 
abstracting groundwater in the municipality of Valle de Santiago. In total the municipality counts 
1,022 wells of which the overwhelming majority (938) is for agricultural use (Orozco 2002). 
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MXP 2 million of which 29% came from the municipal government and the remaining 
71% from the state government. In percentages the external funds made up 
approximately 16% of the total budget (SAPAM 2003).  
If the utility wants to secure loans, prior approval of the municipality is required. 
As the State of Guanajuato has to ensure the financial viability of the municipality, 
which would provide guarantees to the bank issuing the loans, the State Congress 
would also have to approve these loans.  
Political support for the utility is not necessarily a given in the municipality of 
Valle de Santiago. Perhaps most illustrative is the frequent changes in the Council and 
in the management in the municipality. Between 2000 and 2004 the complete 
management of the utility has been replaced twice meaning that three different 
management teams and Council managed the utility over this period. Another indicator 
for political ‘interference’ in the utility is the support for tariff increases from the 
municipal government, which has not been very strong over the past decade. In fact, the 
tariff increase in 2000, in which the tariffs were doubled, marked the first tariff increase 
in a period of 9 years149. Moreover, at times, the municipality will request the utility to 
forego collecting bills of certain individuals. Generally, the utility has no choice but to 
obey such requests. Similar to the other utilities, however, SAPAM is only allowed to 
use the revenues it collects for providing water services. Article 32 of the Reglamento 
states that all income obtained by SAPAM is to be used exclusively for expenses 
related to construction, administration, operation, maintenance, rehabilitation and 
expansion of drinking water, sewage and sanitation services. 
Article 39 of the Reglamento provides the utility three mechanisms for dealing with 
consumers who have not paid their bills. First of all, the utility can decide to terminate 
the contract with the consumer (as the consumer has breached the contract). This means 
service to that particular connection is suspended. The utility is obligated, however, to 
inform the consumer of a nearby source for potable water (standpipe, etc.). Secondly, 
the utility may decide to reduce the level of service provision to the consumer. Thirdly, 
the utility can decide to take legal action against the consumer.   
It is not easy for the utility to attract qualified staff. The utility is relatively small 
with 69 employees in 2001 and as such does not offer a lot of room for career 
development. Moreover, the salaries are relatively low. However, the utility does 
provide job security and the working hours (8:00 – 16:00) are considered favorably. 
Up to 2000, the municipal president made all decisions regarding the pay scales 
within the utility. Between 2000 and 2003 the Council set the pay scales for 
management and this had to be approved by the municipality (as the Council was also 
the management). The salaries of the rest of the staff could be determined by the 
management (in consultation with the labor union) and the municipality only needed to 
be informed of the agreement between management and the union. With the change in 
the Council and management in 2003, the old situation in which the pay scales were 
decided upon by the municipal president was restored. 
 
 
 
 
149 The absence of tariff increases is also likely to explain the worsening of the working ration in 
the 1997-2001 period.  
 203 
Table 9.16: An overview of external autonomy 
Indicator SAPAM 
Who determines the pay-scales for the various levels within the 
utility? Municipality 
What is the basis for appointing members to the Council? Management team 
doubles as Council 
Is the utility able to take out loans without prior approval from the 
owner? No 
Is the utility allowed to limit service delivery to defaulters? Yes 
Who is responsible for setting tariffs? Municipality and the 
State Congress 
Does the utility follow public sector procurement rules? Yes 
 
9.3.2.2 External Accountability 
 
The NOMs issued by the Health Ministry and the National Water Commission contain 
the standards to which SAPAM must adhere. Both the Ministry of Health and the CNA 
perform inspections to ensure that the standards as stipulated in the NOMs are met. 
Although a possibility exists to issue a fine in case standards are not met, such a fine 
has not been imposed on SAPAM yet. 
The municipality does not provide any clear, measurable targets that the utility 
must achieve. SAPAM submits a monthly report to the municipality that includes 
information about the functioning of the utility. Every three months, financial 
statements are included in these reports. The municipality has the possibility of auditing 
or inspecting the utility at any time they feel the need to do so. During the Council 
meetings a representative of the municipality is also present.  
Investments in public works are financed by allocating any remaining financial 
resources at the end of the budgetary year for investment under the previously 
described matching fund scheme. The nature of infrastructure to be constructed is 
specified in the Master Plan. In case, funds are obtained from the CNA and CEAG it is 
often these organizations themselves that spend these funds (essentially on behalf of 
SAPAM). As such, there are no reporting requirements for SAPAM, etc., for these 
funds.  
The utility is not audited by an external auditor. 
Although the utility is not accountable to a formal customer organization, the 
utility has appointed a person within the utility to represent the users of the services 
provided by SAPAM. This person reports to the general manager and the municipality 
concerning issues raised by users of the services. Although this person did not have the 
power to impose fines or offer compensation to the user, this person can follow up on 
complaints made by customers. When the management and Council changed in 2003, 
this position was abolished150. 
According to the statutes (Reglamento) the customers should be represented in the 
Council. However, as mentioned, in previous years the municipal president has decided 
 
150 The reason for abolishing this position is that it was felt that the ‘Controlaría Municipal’ 
could undertake the role played by this person. 
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to appoint the Council directly and as such, no customers/organizations are represented 
in the Council. 
The contract, which all customers of SAPAM must sign, contains some obligations 
and rights, but these do not mention any performance targets, which the utility promises 
to meet. 
 
Table 9.17: An overview of external accountability 
Indicator Value 
Does the utility have a customer charter, which specifies performance targets and 
are there any financial penalties for non-performance? No 
Does the utility have to meet specified performance targets set by or agreed upon 
with the owners? No 
Is an annual report produced, which is audited by an external accountant? No 
Are external groups represented in advisory or management oversight bodies of the 
utility? No 
Has the utility secured loans in the commercial market on its own 
credentials/ability? Yes
151
Does the utility participate in some form of credit rating scheme? No 
Does the lender impose financial covenants on the utility? Yes 
 
9.3.3 Hierarchy and Levels, the Market and Customers 
 
9.3.3.1 Decentralization of Authority  
 
The way procurement of goods and services is arranged depends on the amount of 
money involved in procurement. If it involves small amounts, the Head of one of the 
Departments of the utility can decide to procure something. If the amount is larger, 
approval is required from the Managing Council. For some goods and services, such as 
computers, only the Council can decide to procure these goods. Following the change 
in management and the Council in 2003, the municipal president has indicated that 
procurement should have the approval of the municipality. 
The establishment of internal work processes and standards is initiated by the 
Heads of the various Departments. These Heads indicate how they would like the work 
processes and standards to be and they propose this to the general manager. In 
consultation with the general manager the final decisions are then made regarding the 
work processes. 
In relation to expansion of the service network, maintenance of assets, strategies 
for reducing unaccounted for water, etc. the Operations Department generally initiates 
the decision-making procedure by drafting a proposal and submitting this to the 
Council. The Council then decides to approve or alter the proposal. 
Hiring and firing of staff requires prior approval from the Council. For some 
positions the Heads of Departments can suggest to hire someone, but the Council must 
approve this suggestion. The salary of management and the Council members are set by 
 
151 It should be noted that these loans were secured considerable time ago. With the (financial) 
performance of recent years securing such a loan would be more difficult. 
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the municipality. The Management can set the salary levels for lower levels within the 
utility. 
A set procedure exists for terminating service provision to consumers who have not 
paid their bills. Services to users, who are more than 3 months behind in the payment of 
their bills, and who do not react to announcements sent by the utility, are terminated. 
Customer complaints are collected by the Customer Department. This Department 
then either answers the complaint themselves or distributes the complaint to other 
Departments, which are better able to address the specific complaint. 
 
Table 9.18: An overview of decentralization of authority 
Indicator SAPAM 
What is the purchasing ceiling for procurement of 
operational departments as a percentage of operational 
budgets? 
Not based on amount but on type of 
expenses152
Does the hiring of staff members in departments require 
prior approval from the general manager? Yes 
How many layers of management separate the Chief 
Executive and the entry-level workers? 
Three levels 
At what level are internal work processes and standards 
defined? 
Management and department level 
In what areas does field-staff have decision-making 
powers? 
Customer-service, maintenance, 
billing and collection, suspension of 
service, storage  
 
9.3.3.2 Internal Accountability for Results 
 
The relationship between management and the Council is not one of accountability as 
the management is also the Council. The only main difference is that during Council 
meetings a representative of the municipality is also present. In order to make decisions 
‘officially’ the Council meets twice per month. 
SAPAM measures its performance according to annual plan, which it monitors 
during the year. The Departments monitor elements of the plan that are relevant for 
them and the performance of the Departments against the indicators in the annual plan 
are reviewed and analyzed during weekly meetings of the management team. 
The management of the utility can decide to give a reward for employees, which 
have shown impressive performance. Giving such a reward requires a decision by the 
general manager in consultation with the Head of Department in which that employee is 
working. The rewards are generally between MXP 300 and MXP 500 and the actual 
allocation of such a reward is not a frequent occurrence. The Heads of Department are 
not eligible for such rewards. 
The employees of the utility are not evaluated against set performance targets and 
there is no systematic evaluation of employees. The Heads of Departments are 
evaluated every year by the general manager. However, there is no systematic method 
for evaluating their performance. 
 
 
152 In 2004 a new mayor took Office who replaced the entire management team. At current that 
mayor requests that any procurement receives his approval. 
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Table 9.19: An overview of accountability for results 
Indicator SAPAM 
How often does the general manager meet with the Council? general manager is also 
chairman of the 
Council153
Are penalties and rewards applied to the Chief Executive and Directors 
for achieving specified performance targets? No 
Are penalties and rewards applied to the staff by the management for 
achieving specified performance targets? No
154
Is staff subject to annual evaluations on their functioning in the utility? No 
 
9.3.3.3 Market-orientation 
 
The level of outcontracting in Valle is relatively low. The amount of activities that are 
outcontracted make up approximately 3% of the operational budget. If the external 
funds from the CNA and CEAG are also included this percentage increases to about 
15% as the CNA and CEAG contract parties ‘on the behalf’ of SAPAM. 
Outcontracting occurs for activities such as developing an operations manual, 
feasibility studies, legal services, implementation of software, collection of uncollected 
bills, updating the user’s list, tariff studies, etc. The funds from external agencies are 
generally outcontracted for activities such as construction of large infrastructure 
projects, and rehabilitation and expansion of the network. 
Like the other utilities in the State of Guanajuato SAPAM sends bi-monthly reports 
to the CEAG with technical data, financial data and management indicators. The CEAG 
combines the reports of the various utilities in the annual Diagnostico Sectorial. The 
results of this benchmarking exercise are not used in a very systematic way, however, 
by the utility. 
The utility does not engage in market-testing exercises. 
 
Table 9.20: An overview of market-orientation 
Indicator SAPAM 
What is value of contracts outsourced as a percentage of 
the operational budget? 2.72% 
What is the nature if the functions that are outsourced? legal services, ICT, tariff 
study, operations manual, etc. 
How often does the utility engage in benchmarking 
exercises? Once per year 
In what areas are benchmarking activities undertaken? Technical, commercial, 
financial and administrative 
activities 
Does the utility engage in market testing and does it 
develop internal markets? No 
 
 
 
 
153 The Council meets twice per month. 
154 Management can decide to give benefits between MXP 300 – MXP 500, but this does not 
happen frequently. 
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9.3.3.4 Customer-orientation 
 
The working ratio of 1.7 in 2001 indicates that although the majority of income 
generated by the utility derives from its customers, it is strongly dependent on external 
financing. Customers can pay their bills at the SAPAM office, banks and in the Cajas 
Populares. 
The utility carries out a customer survey twice per year. The survey is focused on 
issues that the management considers relevant or wants to know more about. The 
survey is implemented at the office of SAPAM as well as by making a random 
selection of households. The surveys are designed to find weaknesses of SAPAM, so 
that these weaknesses can be addressed. Usually the surveys will concern topics such as 
customer service, service levels, quality of service provision, etc. Customers also are 
requested to complete a survey after they have made a complaint in order to see if the 
customer is satisfied with the way in which the complaint was addressed. In addition 
the utility houses a suggestion box, which the customers can also use for making 
suggestions and comments. The suggestion box is not used very frequently. 
Complaints made by the customers are being tracked since 2002. Prior to that no 
tracking system was in place. In 2003 the utility was receiving about 450 complaints 
per month155. About 2% of the customers file a complaint. Out of these complaints 
about 30% relate to elderly customers who have not received a discount they are 
entitled to156, 48% relate to complaints about the meter readings and the remaining 12% 
either concern complaints about service interruptions, poor service quality or ‘other 
complaints’. 
Employees that are in contact with customers do receive some in-house training 
from more experienced employees. Also, if CEAG has a training program, employees 
may also follow that training program on customer management. 
 
Table 9.21: An overview of customer-orientation 
Indicator SAPAM 
In what ways can the bills be paid? SAPAM’s office, Banks, 
Cajas Populares 
In what ways does SAPAM pro-actively seek the opinions/views of 
its customers? 
Customer surveys twice a 
year 
What is the menu of options for service delivery that the SAPAM 
provides? 
In-house connection, 
block connection, tank 
trucks 
In what ways does the SAPAM actively inform its customers about 
changes related to service provision? 
Flyers added to the 
receipt, newspaper, radio, 
perifoneo 
What is the percentage of complaints that is addressed? 100% 
What are the average response times to complaints? N/A 
 
 
 
 
155 The number of complaints does fluctuate. In some months as many as 825 complaints were 
submitted. In other months as few as 242 complaints were received. 
156 Customers over 60 are entitled to a discount on their water bill. 
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9.3.4 Conclusion 
 
The main interviews held at SAPAM took place in July 2003 and October 2003. At the 
time of the first interview, the utility was considered by many to be an example of a 
‘turn-around’ utility. The utility was also recognized as such as is illustrated by the fact 
that it received recognition from the CEAG in 2003 for the performance improvements 
over the 2000-2003 period (see also Orozco 2002). However, by October 2003 the 
entire management team had been fired and replaced by a completely new management. 
The drastic changes in the management of the utility, which happened not only in 2003 
but also in 2000, illustrate the prominent role played by the municipal president in the 
municipality of Valle de Santiago.  
In terms of financial viability SAPAM seems to recovering from very poor 
performance in the late 1990s. In 1998, the ratio between revenue generated and 
revenue required barely surpassed 40%, four years later this had increased to 90%, 
indicating that the level of financial autonomy of the utility has increased substantially. 
Much of this improvement is related to a substantial tariff increase in 2002.  
The utility does not face acute shortages of water resources. Although the water 
level of the main aquifer is dropping, the utility only used 50% of its capacity and the 
water that is abstracted is of relatively good quality. Attracting qualified staff appears to 
be more of a problem for the utility. 
The level of both external and internal accountability appears to be very much in 
line with what was witnessed in the cases of Moroleón and Dolores Hidalgo. As 
mentioned, accountability to the municipal president remained very strong. Internal 
accountability for results does not appear to be very well developed. 
The level of market-orientation is low, with only 3% of the operational budget 
being outcontracted. Although the utility does partake in a benchmarking exercise, the 
results are not applied in a systematic way. Customer-orientation has improved over the 
past years, and also appears to be linked to the tariff increases of 2002, which forced the 
utility to pay more attention to its customers. 
In general, the impression that is obtained from SAPAM is that it is a utility which 
has shown considerable performance improvement over the past years but which 
remains also very much a politicized and relatively unstable organization. With the 
arrival of a new management team in 2000 and the (political) support for tariff 
increases in 2002, the utility was able to turn around the poor performance of the late 
1990s. However, with a change in the municipal president in 2003, political support 
disappeared and the management of the utility fired. With three different management 
teams in four years, management is not very stable, meaning that long-term planning 
may be difficult. 
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9.4 Sistema de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado del Municipio de San 
Francisco del Rincon157 
 
The municipality of San Francisco del Rincon was created by the governor of the State 
of Guanajuato in 1867. The municipality is located in the western part of the State of 
Guanajuato. The per capita GDP in the municipality lays approximately US$4,000 
above the State average, which is largely explained by the prominence of the industrial 
and manufacturing sector in San Francisco del Rincon. The main manufacturing 
activities, for which this municipality is renowned, concern the production of footwear 
and hats. The prominence of the manufacturing and industrial sector is also visible in an 
overview of industrial activities in terms of the employment of the municipality’s 
residents. Whereas a municipality like Valle de Santiago had only 10% of its residents 
working in the industrial and manufacturing sector, more than half the employed 
population works in this sector in San Francisco. Also of interest is the relatively small 
share of agriculture in the employment figures for this municipality. 
 
Table 9.22: General characteristics SAPAF 
Indicator  2000 2001 2002 
Annual water abstraction (million cubic meter) 7.1 7.0 7.4 
Water supply connections 15,540 16,987 17,522 
Sewerage connections 15,930 16,921 n.a 
No. Of Employees 52 56 50 
Service coverage – water supply 93.7% n.a. n.a. 
Service coverage – sewerage 81% n.a. n.a. 
Average domestic tariff (US$/14m3) 1.35 1.66 2.69 
Sources: SAPAF 2003; CEAG 2002 
 
9.4.1 Governance Structure of SAPAF 
 
The Sistema de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado del Municipio de San Francisco del 
Rincon was first registered in August 1983. In November 1993, the first statutes of the 
company were published. These statutes were redrafted in 2000 and since June 2000 the 
governance structure of the SAPAF is laid down in the Reglamento del Sistema de 
Agua Potable y Alcantarillado del Municipio de San Francisco del Rincon. Article 1 of 
this Reglamento states that the provision of potable water, sewerage and sanitation 
services shall be done by an autonomous agency with a separate legal status. Article 5 
appoints the SAPAF as being the autonomous agency in question, and article 6 spells 
out the responsibilities of the SAPAF in more detail. These responsibilities include: 
 
• Study, plan, construct, rehabilitate, expand, operate, maintain infrastructure for 
providing potable water, sewerage and sanitation services 
• Prevent and control contamination of water sources assigned for water services 
• Establish norms and guidelines for the provision of water services 
 
157 Unless otherwise mentioned, the information in this case derives from interviews held with 
management of the SAPAF.  
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• Develop and maintain a database on consumers of water services 
• Develop and maintain a database concerning the wells, goods, resources, 
hydrological reserves and infrastructure in the municipality.  
• Develop and implement programs stimulating the efficient use of water in the 
municipality 
 
The SAPAF is to be overseen by a Council, which is to consist of seven members. 
These members include a chairman, a secretary, a treasurer and 4 ‘external members’. 
The responsibilities of the Council are stipulated in article 20 and are similar to the 
responsibilities attributed to the Councils of other water utilities in Guanajuato. These 
responsibilities include: 
 
• Oversee management of SAPAF according to guidelines established by the 
Reglamento and other regulations; 
• Approve the Master Plan for the provision of water services; 
• Discus and approve the annual budget, which is subsequently submitted for 
approval to the municipal government; 
• Approve the proposal for tariffs of water services as well as of fess and fines that 
may charged by the utility; 
• Appoint and remove the general manager of the utility; 
• Inform the municipality bi-monthly about the functioning of the utility; 
• To monitor the provision of water services in accordance with the corresponding 
laws, regulations and tariffs. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.7: Governance structure SAPAF 
 
The members of the Council are elected for a term of three years. Reelection is possible 
only once. The municipality assigns the chairman, the secretary and the treasurer of the 
Council. The municipality also elects the external members or vocales on the basis of 
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proposals submitted by a variety of organizations. Article 10 of the Reglamento 
specifically states that the Council should include representatives of different 
organizations from civic society. These organizations include: 
 
• Chamber of commerce 
• Chamber of industry 
• Neighborhood associations 
• Banks 
• Labor unions 
• Engineering institutions 
 
Contrary to some of the other water utilities in the State, the procedures as stated in the 
Reglamento are actually followed in San Francisco del Rincon. The governance 
structure of the municipality is presented in figure 9.7. 
 
9.4.2 The Degree of Autonomy and Accountability of SAPAF 
 
9.4.2.1 External Autonomy 
 
SAPAF is subject to the official norms and standards for water supply and wastewater 
discharge as issued by the Ministry of Health and the CNA. 
SAPAF uses only groundwater for the production of potable water and abstracts its 
water resources by way of 10 groundwater wells. It abstracts approximately 7.3 million 
m3 per year, which represents about 63% of its total capacity. The abstraction of water 
is not without problems, however. It is estimated that the total overexploitation of the 
aquifer from which SAPAF abstracts its water is approximately 26 million m3 per year. 
Since 1983, it is not allowed to drill additional groundwater wells meaning that any 
abstraction above the current allocation for SAPAF has to come by way of purchasing 
‘water rights’ from other users (such as farmers). SAPAF estimates that its current 
capacity is enough for 10-15 years, but in order top meet the required demand beyond 
that period additional water rights must be bought. SAPAF is already trying to purchase 
water rights from ‘retiring’ farmers. 
The total income of SAPAF in 2003 was approximately MXP 16 million in 2003. 
SAPAF has a billing/collection ratio of approximately 68%, which is substantially 
higher than the 52% of 2000, but still means that 32% of bills are not collected. 
Overall, the ratio of income generated from the provision of water services to the 
level required to provide those services shows that the income from service provision 
still lags behind the costs of providing those services, although it should also be noticed 
that this ratio has improved considerably since 1997. In January 2001, a tariff increase 
of 48% was approved and at current tariff levels are indexed and automatically 
increased 2% per month.  
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Figure 9.8: Level of income in relation to what is required SAPAF 
 
In 2001 and 2002 the level of external financing for the utility was 5.8% and 19.5% 
respectively. All external funds come from the CNA, CEAG or the municipality. As it 
is never certain, what kind of external assistance to expect, the percentage fluctuates 
considerably, depending on the type of programs CEAG and the CNA implement. With 
the working ratio hovering around 1.0 over the past years, the utility is very much 
dependent on the external financiers for its investment in infrastructure. According to 
the general manager, however, the financial situation of SAPAF is quite good and they 
are able to raise the funds required to match possible grants from the CNA and CEAG. 
Attracting qualified staff is not without problems, despite the relatively low salaries 
offered by the utility. The salary levels vary from approximately MXP 2,910 per month 
for the gardener to a little over MXP 17,000 per month for the general manager. 
Considering the average per capita income of more than US$ 10,000 it is clear that only 
three employees of the utility earn above average wages. The average salary is 
approximately US$ 5,500 per year. The management of the utility proposes salary 
levels to the Council. After the Council has approved the salary levels, the proposal is 
forwarded to the municipality for final approval (along with the budget of SAPAF). In 
addition to low salary levels, another problem is the qualification of the inhabitants of 
San Francisco del Rincon. Most people will have worked in the shoemaking and hat 
making industry, and have little formal education. As such, their qualifications are not 
really suitable for a water supply and sanitation company. The utility is also relatively 
small (48 employees), meaning that there are few possibilities for career development. 
On the other hand, SAPAF does provide considerable job security and with the 
shoemaking and hat making industries in decline, such job security can be appealing. 
Also the working hours of the utility (from 8:00 – 16:00) are favorable. 
The utility in San Francisco del Rincon is characterized by relative stability since 
its creation in 1983. Until 2000, the general manager had been in office for 17 years. In 
2000, however, the incoming municipal president decided to appoint a political 
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supporter as the general manager. The new general manager did not last long however, 
and was replaced by the ‘old’ general manager in 2001. Overall, the Council that 
oversees the functioning of the utility has also been relatively stable and functioning 
according to the regulations as prescribed in the Reglamento. At the same time, it 
remains difficult to obtain support from the municipality for tariff levels, which recover 
costs of service provision as is illustrated by figure 9.8. 
The utility is allowed to service provision to consumers who do not pay for their 
bills. The utility threatens to terminate services to approximately 800 to 1000 
connections per month158. Article 68 of the statutes provides three possibilities. These 
are: 
 
1. Terminate the contract between the user and the utility and as such, the provision 
of services. This requires the utility to inform the consumer of an alternative source 
for water nearby. 
2. Reduce the level of service provided 
3. Initiate legal action against the consumer. 
 
Table 9.23: An overview of external autonomy 
Indicator Value 
Who determines the pay-scales for the various levels within the 
utility? Municipality 
What is the basis for appointing members to the Council? Community representatives 
Is the utility able to take out loans without prior approval from 
the owner? No 
Is the utility allowed to limit service delivery to defaulters? Yes 
Who is responsible for setting tariffs? Municipality and the State 
Congress 
Does the utility follow public sector procurement rules? Yes 
 
9.4.2.2 External Accountability 
 
The official norms as stipulated in the NOMs issued by the Ministry of Health and the 
CNA contain the standards to which the water supply and wastewater discharges must 
adhere. SAPAF does daily testing of water samples both in the water tanks as well as at 
randomly selected houses. Every week the utility submits a report to the local office of 
the Ministry of Health, which is also sent to the CNA and the State Water Commission. 
The Council checks that the standards are met every two months and the results of the 
samples are published in the local newspapers. 
SAPAF can be sanctioned if they do not meet the specified standards. However, to 
date, fines have not been imposed on the utility. Both the Ministry of Health and the 
CNA carry out inspections in the municipality of San Francisco del Rincon. The CNA 
carries out inspections about once per year. The inspections of the Ministry of Health 
are more frequent.  
 
158 In general out of 10 cases, 6 customers will choose to immediately pay their outstanding bills, 
2 customers will try to negotiate with the utility and 2 customers will try to find alternative 
sources for water supply (including possible illegal connections) 
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There are no clear performance targets that the utility must achieve. In fact, it 
appears that the municipality has limited its involvement with the utility to approving 
the annual budget of the utility. Even though the utility is to report to the municipality 
every three months, in reality they only report to the municipal president once per year. 
This report contains financial statements and projections of income and expenditure for 
the following year. Any expenditure that is done by the utility has to be within the 
budget approved by the municipality. Any adjustments in the budget would require 
approval from the municipality. A representative of the municipality attends the 
monthly meetings of the Council and as such is informed about functioning of the 
utility. 
The financing institutions do impose criteria to which the utility must adhere. Both 
CEAG and the CNA tend to offer funds only when their contribution is matched by that 
of SAPAF. Moreover, most of these funds have specific allocations (the CNA funds 
coming from groundwater charges for example, must be use for the development of 
wastewater treatment facilities). In the case of CEAG, the funds and their spending are 
largely managed by CEAG themselves. This means that many of the contractors and 
consultants required to undertake an activity will actually be contracted by CEAG. 
CEAG then also supervises and monitors these contracts. When the SAPAF uses its 
own funds for investment they manage the spending of these funds themselves.  
There is no formal customer organization, which is mainly focused on water 
services. During the municipal administration, which was in office from 2000-2003, 
there was a meeting every Thursday, however, called the Jueves Ciudadanos (Thursday 
for Citizens), which resembles a townhall-type meeting in which a representative of 
every municipal government entity is present. During these meetings, the consumers 
were able to express their complaints and suggestions to a representative of the water 
utility. In the administration in the period of 1997-2000, representatives of the various 
municipal entities would visit a different section of the municipality to receive 
complaints and suggestions of the citizens of that particular part of the city159.  
The consumers also have a contract with the water utility in which rights and 
obligations of both parties are stated. These rights and obligations do not contain any 
performance targets, however, and also do not contain penalties in case one of the 
parties would not fulfill their obligations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
159 Events such as Jueves Ciudadanos and visiting different sections of the municipality every 
Thursday are dependent on the ideas of a new incoming municipal president. In other words, 
when the municipal administration changes, these events are also likely to change, depending on 
the views of the incoming municipal president. 
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Table 9.24: An overview of external accountability 
Indicator Value 
Does the utility have a customer charter, which specifies 
performance targets and are there any financial penalties for non-
performance? 
No 
Does the utility have to meet specified performance targets set by 
or agreed upon with the owners? No 
Is an annual report produced, which is audited by an external 
accountant? 
There is an annual external 
audit, but no annual report 
Are external groups represented in advisory or management 
oversight bodies of the utility? Yes, in the Council 
Has the utility secured loans in the commercial market on its own 
credentials/ability? No 
Does the utility participate in some form of credit rating scheme? No 
Does the lender impose financial covenants on the utility? Yes 
 
9.4.3 Hierarchy and Levels, the Market and Customers 
 
9.4.3.1 Decentralization of Authority  
 
For the procurement of goods and services proposals are developed in the relevant 
Departments and forwarded to the Finance Department. Depending on the type of good 
or service procured, a certain procurement policy has to be followed. Generally, three 
quotations are requested from three different suppliers. Ultimate decisions regarding 
which supplier to choose are taken in consultation with the general manager. Within the 
utility three people are allowed to sign for procurement cheques. These are the 
chairman of the Council, the treasurer of the council and the general manager. Each 
cheque needs to be signed by at least two people, meaning that either one council 
member and the general manager sign or two Council members sign. 
The general manager and the Head of a Department can hire someone provided 
that the position for that person is mentioned in the budget that was previously 
approved by the Council. In case of terminating the contract of an employee prior 
approval of the Council is required. The general manager is appointed by the Council in 
consultation with the municipality. The municipality appoints and dismisses the 
Council members. 
The general manager and the Heads of Departments can propose the promotion of 
staff members. However, the Council must approve these proposals. The municipality 
has the final say in the salary levels that the utility adheres to. 
A general procedure exists within the Customer Services Department with regard 
to the termination of or limitation of service provision. Service is terminated or limited 
for any domestic consumer who is more than 3 months behind in paying their bills. 
Prior to stopping service provision the consumer will receive a letter from the utility 
informing them about the procedure that will be followed if they do not pay their bills. 
Customer complaints are either addressed by the person receiving the complaint, if 
that person is able to do so. Or if that person is not able to do so, the complaint is 
forwarded to the relevant department. 
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Table 9.25: An overview of decentralization of authority 
Indicator SAPAF 
What is the purchasing ceiling for procurement of operational 
departments as a percentage of operational budgets? 
Not based on amount but on type 
of expenses 
Does the hiring of staff members in departments require prior 
approval from the general manager? Yes 
How many layers of management separate the Chief Executive 
and the entry-level workers? 
Three levels 
At what level are internal work processes and standards 
defined? 
Management and department 
level 
In what areas does field-staff have decision-making powers? Customer-service, maintenance, 
billing and collection, suspension 
of service, storage of materials 
 
9.4.3.2 Internal accountability for results 
 
The general manager meets with the Council once per month to discuss the functioning 
of the utility. These meetings do not incorporate standard reporting requirements apart 
from the financial statements. The general manager will bring whatever information he 
finds necessary to report. 
The utility has a Master Plan, which was adopted in 2002, which contains 
information and projections for the next 20 years. Although this plan does contain 
targets and guidelines for the management of the utility, it does not really impose clear 
and measurable targets that the general manager must meet and for which he can and 
will be held accountable. The general manager also develops annual plans, which are 
developed in consultation with the relevant Heads of Departments. However, these too 
are not really used as basis for which to hold the management accountable for the 
results they have produced. 
The Council does have the ability to remove the general manager and any 
management employees they consider are not functioning as expected. Over the past 
years the Council has also resorted to these measures. 
The Council can award the management of the service provider for good 
performance, but this would have to be incorporated in the budget that is to be approved 
by the municipality. In practice, this reward has not been provided to the management. 
The only system in place for rewarding the ‘performance’ of employees relates to a 
bonus for punctuality and attendance. In essence everyone that arrives at work before 
8:00 a.m. can receive a bonus of 10% on top of their salary. In practice, however, every 
employee gets this bonus. There is no system in place to evaluate the performance of 
employees of the utility. 
 
Table 9.26: An overview of internal accountability 
Indicator Value 
How often does the Chief Executive meet with the Council? Once per month 
Are penalties and rewards applied to the Chief Executive and Directors for 
achieving specified performance targets? No 
Are penalties and rewards applied to the staff by the management for 
achieving specified performance targets? No 
Is staff subject to annual evaluations on their functioning in the utility? No 
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9.4.3.3 Market-orientation 
 
SAPAF outcontracts approximately 30% of its operational budget, which appears to be 
a quite high percentage. The nature of tasks and service that are outcontracted include 
engineering projects, network rehabilitation, developing an operations manual, 
undertaking feasibility studies, ICT, undertaking the tariff study, legal services, etc. 
There does not appear to be a specific outcontracting policy to which the utility 
adheres. 
The utility sends a bi-monthly report to the State Water Commission concerning 
various (performance) indicators. On the basis of these reports, which are submitted by 
all utilities in the State of Guanajuato, the State Water Commission then publishes an 
annual overview of the performance of the utilities160, which allows the various utilities 
to compare their own performance with that of their neighbors. However, although this 
benchmarking information is available every year, it is not used in a systematic way. 
The utility does not engage in market-testing exercises. 
 
Table 9.27: An overview of market-orientation 
Indicator Value 
What is value of contracts outsourced as a percentage of 
the operational budget? 30.36% 
What is the nature if the functions that are outsourced? Engineering projects, legal services, 
ICT, tariff study, operations manual, 
developing a master plan, etc. 
How often does the utility engage in benchmarking 
exercises? Once per year 
In what areas are benchmarking activities undertaken? Technical, commercial, financial and 
administrative activities 
Does the utility engage in market testing and does it 
develop internal markets? No 
 
9.4.3.4 Customer-orientation 
 
The working ratio of the utility fluctuates around 1 indicating that operation and 
maintenance expenditure can be covered by the revenue generated from the consumers. 
The customers can pay their bills in SAPAF’s Office, in banks and in Caja Populares.  
The only way in which the utility more or less obtains the opinions of its customers is 
during the Jueves Ciudadanos. The utility does not undertake surveys or try to obtain 
the opinions of the consumers about the provision of water services in any other way. 
The utility also does not track the complaints that are submitted by consumers. As 
such, neither the opinions of the consumers or the information from complaints are used 
in determining the focus of the utility161. It is estimated that the utility receives about 
 
160 Diagnostico Sectorial 
161 At the time of the interviews the utility was working on establishing a system called 
‘Mapinfo’ which would link the Customer Services Department with the Operations Department, 
This system would allow the utility to geographically determine the origin of complaints 
concerning leaks and based on that establish priorities for maintenance and rehabilitation of the 
network. If the system is implemented at current, however, is not clear. 
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300 complaints per month and the majority of complaints concern high bills, leakages, 
service interruptions and termination of service. It is not clear if the number of 
complaints has increased or decreased over the past years. 
Customers can submit their complaints to SAPAF in person at the SAPAF Office, 
by telephone or in writing. In addition, the customers can approach the Controlaría 
Municipal or the Federal Consumer Agency162. 
The utility does have infrequent training programs for employees in which they 
learn how to deal with customers and how they can better express themselves.   
 
Table 9.28: An overview of customer-orientation 
Indicator  Value 
In what ways can the bills be paid? SAPAF’s office, Banks, 
Cajas Populares 
In what ways does SAPAF pro-actively seek the opinions/views of its 
customers? 
Town hall meetings  
What is the menu of options for service delivery that the SAPAF 
provides? 
In-house connection, 
block connection, tank 
trucks 
In what ways does the SAPAF actively inform its customers about 
changes related to service provision? 
Flyers added to the 
receipt, radio, on rare 
occasions newspapers 
What is the percentage of complaints that is addressed? 95% for leaks, for other 
complaints it is not 
known 
What are the average response times to complaints? N/A 
 
9.4.4 Conclusion 
 
The overall impression that SAPAF leaves is that it is relatively stable utility, which has 
been able to avoid the impact of political intervention, which characterizes a few of the 
other utilities. At the same time, the functioning of the utility is also hampered by 
relatively little political support for tariff increases, difficulties of attracting qualified 
staff and concern regarding the availability of water resources. As such the utility seems 
to have a large degree of managerial autonomy, but at the same time the utility appears 
to be lacking capacity and resources to translate that managerial autonomy into 
substantial performance improvements. Moreover, the developments in 2001 in which 
the general manager was temporarily replaced illustrate that continued managerial 
autonomy is not a given.   
Whereas market-orientation of SAPAF appears to be stronger than the previously 
discussed utilities because of the relatively high percentage of outcontracted activities, 
the level of customer-orientation appears lower. 
The utility remains strongly centralized, with most decision-making powers being 
attributed to the general manager or Council members. Internal accountability for 
results appears to be quite limited with a 10% bonus for attendance and punctuality to 
be the main instrument of internal accountability. 
 
 
162 Procuradoria Federal del Consumidor  
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9.5 El Sistema Municipal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de 
Guanajuato163 
 
SIMAPAG serves a population of approximately 142,000 inhabitants in the 
municipality of Guanajuato. The per capita consumption is around 97 liters per capita 
per day, which is relatively low. Guanajuato lies in a relatively mountainous area, 
which leads to difficulties of ensuring the correct pressure in the distribution network.  
 
Table 9.29: General indicators SIMAPAG 
Indicator  2000 2001 2002 
Annual water abstraction (million cubic meter) 7.4 8.2 8.2 
Water supply connections 22,395 22,997 24,345 
Annual income from water sales 22,974 23,953 n.a. 
Unaccounted-for-water 23% 27% 18% 
No. Of Employees 163 182 185 
Service coverage – water supply 94.4% n.a. n.a. 
Service coverage – sewerage 83.4% n.a. n.a. 
Average domestic tariff (MXP/m3) 4.73 5.31 5.47 
Sources: SIMAPAG 2003; CEAG 2002 
 
9.5.1 Governance Structure of SIMAPAG 
 
The SIMAPAG was established as an autonomous agency with a separate legal status 
in 1992. Its responsibility is to provide water services in the municipality of 
Guanajuato. The current governance structure of the utility is stipulated in the 
Reglamento del Sistema Municipal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de Guanajuato, 
which was last adapted in May of 2001. Article 2 of the Reglamento stipulates that the 
SIMAPAG is responsible for the detection, abstraction, treatment and distribution of 
water as well as for drainage, sewerage, treatment and discharge of wastewater. Article 
10 states that the utility shall be monitored and administrated by a Council, which shall 
consist of one chairman, one treasurer and seven ‘external members’164. The members 
of the Council are appointed for a period of three years and start their term soon after a 
newly elected municipal president has taken office. The Council members cannot be 
reappointed the following term. Article 11 finds that Council members are to represent 
organizations from civil society, including: 
 
• Representatives of rural communities; 
• Neighborhood associations; 
• Chambers of commerce; 
• Established businesses; 
• Labor unions; 
• NGOs; 
 
163 Unless otherwise mentioned, the information contained in this document derives from 
interviews held with management of the SIMAPAG.  
164 Vocales 
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• Institutions for higher education. 
 
Article 15 provides a number of criteria that potential Council members must meet in 
order to be eligible to become Council members, such as have the Mexican nationality, 
not have debts with the utility, not hold a management position in a political party and 
not have participated in elections prior to the election to the Council. Article 16 states 
that the Commission of Public Works will consider the profiles of the proposed Council 
members and present the results of their analysis to the municipal president. He will 
then select the Council members. During the first Council meeting the Council 
members will decide who will be the chairman and who will be the treasurer. The 
Council members are paid for their services, although the monthly salary varies 
considerably. The chairman receives more than MXP 23,000 per month whilst the 
vocales receive a little less than MXP 4,000. 
Article 26 of the Reglamento stipulates the responsibilities of the Council. These 
responsibilities include165: 
 
• To manage SIMAPAG in accordance with the general guidelines established by the 
Relgamento and other applicable regulations; 
• To draft the annual budget and submit the budget for approval to the municipality; 
• Monitor the correct application of tariffs; 
• Receive and address complaints by the consumers of water services; 
• Inform the Municipality every three months with respect to the functioning of the 
utility; 
• Anything else that is required by rules and regulations. 
 
Interestingly, the description of responsibilities in Article 26 also specifically mentions 
that the Council under no circumstance must allow for exceptions or subsidies in 
relation to bills that should be paid.  
 
 
 
Figure 9.9: Governance structure SIMAPAG 
 
165 Article 26 mentions 29 different points for which the Council is responsible. 
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Article 46 states that general manager of the utility is to be appointed by the Council at 
the proposal of the chairman of the Council. Article 49 stipulates the responsibilities of 
the general manager. These include166: 
 
• Direct, support, coordinate and supervise the activities of the Departments; 
• Present to the Council the projected budget; 
• Develop the Master Plan for the utility in coordination with the Administrative 
Department and the Technical Department; 
• Attend the Council meetings; 
• Present monthly updates to the Council regarding the financial status of the utility; 
• Develop a manual for procedures and functions; 
• To appoint and dismiss personnel that do not occupy management positions; 
• Monitor that income and expenditure is in accordance with the approved budget; 
• Any other things required by the Council.  
 
The Reglamento also describes the selection of a so-called Commissioner167 who is a 
representative from the municipality and who attends the meetings of the Council. The 
This Commissioner does not have a vote during the meetings. 
 
9.5.2 The Degree of Autonomy and Accountability of SIMAPAG 
 
9.5.2.1 External Autonomy 
 
The SIMAPAG is subject to the official norms and standards as issued by the Ministry 
of Health and the CNA. 
Annually the utility abstracts about 8.2 million m3 of water per year (SIMAPAG 
2003). The utility has a capacity to abstract more than 22 million m3 and as such, the 
SIMAPAG utilizes less than 40% of its capacity. The water resources used for the 
production of potable water are surface water (40%) and groundwater (60%). Prior to 
1983, the utility used only surface water for the production of potable water. However, 
the quality of these water resources has deteriorated and now the utility also uses 
groundwater sources. These groundwater sources are also under pressure as is 
illustrated by the abstraction depth. In 1983 water was abstracted at 30 meters. 
Currently water is abstracted from depths of approximately 180 meters, which 
illustrates that the aquifer is being depleted. It is likely that in the near future the 
availability of water resources will become a serious problem for the utility. 
 
 
166 Article 49 mentions 26 different points of responsibility for the managing director. 
167 Article 52. The term used for Commissioner is Comisario 
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Figure 9.10: Actual versus required income SIMAPAG 
 
The working ratio of SIMAPAG has been declining steadily from 1.02 in 1995 to 0.77 
in 2002. This implies that SIMAPAG has no problem covering operations and 
maintenance costs and also can contribute to investment costs. However, it does remain 
dependent on external financing for meeting part of the investment costs. In comparison 
with the other utilities presented above the revenues generated by the SIMAPAG are 
much higher. The annual income of the utility is close to MXP 56 million of which 
close to MXP 42 million derives from annual water sales. The relatively high-income 
level is largely due to the tariff level, which lies between 1.6 to 3 times higher than the 
other utilities mentioned above (CEAG 2002). Not surprisingly the ratio of actual 
income versus required income lies considerably better for the SIMAPAG than for the 
other utilities described above. Part of the reason why the SIMAPAG has been able to 
maintain this tariff level is that prior to the summer of 2003, the tariff was indexed and 
automatically increased 1.1% per month. Prior to the municipal election of 2003, 
however, the municipality decided to lower the index rate to 0.01%, which lies well 
below the rate of inflation. Article 40 of the Reglamento dictates that any income 
generated by the utility is to be destined for the provision or expansion of water 
services in the municipality of Guanajuato and cannot be used for other purposes. 
Like the other utilities, the SIMAPAG uses the matching fund schemes that the 
CNA and the CEAG offer. Generally, the utility has no difficulty matching the funds 
they receive from these organizations. In 2001 and 2002, SIMAPAG only received 
external financing from the State Government (through the CEAG). This amounted to 
approximately 5% of the total budget (SIMAPAG 2003).  In case the SIMAPAG would 
want to secure loans they would require prior approval from the municipality as the 
municipality. 
Article 45 of the Reglamento prescribes the way in which the utility can address 
non-payment of bills. In case the consumer concerns an industrial connection, service is 
terminated. In the case of domestic consumers, the utility is only allowed to reduce 
 223 
service provision to a minimum. Although this would seem to imply that service 
provision cannot be cut off, in practice the utility terminates service provision to anyone 
who has not paid their bills and informs these consumers about alternative sources for 
water. 
The utility does not have any difficulty in attracting qualified staff. Salaries for 
management of the utility are similar to what is offered elsewhere in the municipality in 
Guanajuato (for similar work) and the working schedule offered is very appealing (from 
8:00-16:00). For employees in lower levels of the organization, the salary levels are 
quite low. However, the job at the SIMPAG offers considerable security. As the utility 
counts well over 200 staff, there are some areas (especially operations) in which 
employees can develop their careers. For other areas such as legal services or finance 
such possibilities are more limited. Another reason why the utility does not have a lot of 
difficulty attracting qualified staff relate more to the characteristics of the city of 
Guanajuato. As mentioned, it houses a renowned University with more than 15,000 
students, thus providing a large pool of qualified people. Moreover, the city itself, with 
a lot of cultural events168, is considered a very pleasant place to live.    
The pay scales for the utility are proposed by the management of the utility to the 
Council. The Council can adapt/approve the proposal and subsequently forward it to the 
municipality for final approval169. 
Prior to the change of municipal president in 2003 political support for the utility 
appears to have been considerable. The utility had a tariff that was indexed and 
increased 1.1% every month. In addition, the utility was allowed to terminate service to 
defaulters, despite the fact that the Reglamento only allows for services to be limited. 
Moreover, the governance structure, with a separate Council and management of the 
service provider more or less functions the way it is described in the Reglamento. 
Although the general manager did change quite a few times as is illustrated by the fact 
that in the 1995-2003 period four general managers were appointed at SIMAPAG, the 
management of the utility itself has been quite stable, with relatively few changes. 
Recent changes, however, do raise some questions about the current level of political 
support. These changes relate to the lowering of the monthly indexation to 0.01%, 
which is well below the rate of inflation and secondly to the recent changes in the 
management and Council170. In 2003, the Council of the SIMAPAG forced the general 
manager to resign. The chairman of the Council subsequently took over the position of 
general manager. This shifting of positions, in which a Council member first presses the 
general manager to resign and then fills the vacant position does seem to present some 
conflict of interests.   
 
 
168 The most famous of these cultural events is the so-called International Cervantino Festival, 
which takes place every October. During a period of about 18 days, cultural events involving 
music, dance, theater, movies, etc. take place throughout the city. 
169 In years prior to 2003, the municipality implemented a policy of increasing the salaries in the 
SIMAPAG to the same extent as salaries of other government institutions, thus avoiding any 
friction between employees of different government entities. 
170 Between 1995-2000 the utility was managed by only 1 general manager. In the period 2000 – 
2003 three managing directors have been appointed, indicating that in recent years management 
of the utility has become less stable. 
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Table 9.30: An overview of external autonomy 
Indicator Value 
Who determines the pay-scales for the various levels within the utility? Municipality 
What is the basis for appointing members to the Council? Community 
representatives 
Is the utility able to take out loans without prior approval from the owner? No 
Is the utility allowed to limit service delivery to defaulters? Yes 
Who is responsible for setting tariffs? Municipality and 
the State Congress 
Does the utility follow public sector procurement rules? Yes 
 
9.5.2.2 External Accountability 
 
The NOMs issued by the Health Ministry and the National Water Commission contain 
the standards to which the SIMAPAG must adhere. SIMAPAG takes water samples 
daily. These samples are collected at the water source, in the treatment plant and 
reservoir tanks and randomly at different houses. In addition the utility monitors the 
wastewater it discharges. SIMAPAG adheres to this sampling procedure in order to 
obtain a Water Quality Certificate from the Ministry of Health, which requires 
relatively stringent monitoring requirements. The reports for samples are mainly for 
internal use, but five times a week a report is submitted to the local office of the 
Ministry of Health. The utility also sends quarterly reports to the CNA regarding the 
quality of untreated and treated wastewater. Both the Ministry of Health and the CNA 
perform inspections to ensure that the standards as stipulated in the NOMs are met. 
Although a possibility exists to issue a fine in case standards are not met, such a fine 
has not been imposed on SIMAPAG yet. 
Apart from reports pertaining to the quality of potable water and the quality of 
wastewater, the SIMAPAG also reports to the CNA about the amount of water it has 
abstracted every three months. 
The Council sends reports to the municipality every three months. These reports 
include financial statements, a summary of decisions made by the Council, volume of 
water produced, progress with infrastructure projects, personnel, customer services and 
other information the Council considers relevant. In addition each Council meeting is 
attended by the Comisario, which attends the meeting on behalf of the municipality. 
The Comisario also drafts a bi-monthly report for the municipality. The  
At the beginning of each year the Council submits a year-plan to the municipality 
containing an outline of all the anticipated activities that the utility will undertake and 
the way in which these are to be financed, etc. The municipality forwards this year-plan 
to the Controlaría Municipal. This organization has the tasks of monitoring the 
fulfillment of the year-plan. For this purpose the SIMAPAG sends bi-monthly reports 
the Controlaría.  
Apart from the year plan, which is submitted to the municipality, the municipality 
does not set clear and measurable performance targets that the utility must meet. The 
utility is also not obliged to meet any service standards.  
The matching fund grants offered by the CNA and the CEAG do come with 
conditions that have to be met by SIMAPAG. Apart from the requirement of matching 
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the funds, these funds have specific allocations for which they have to be used. In the 
case of CEAG, the funds and their spending are largely managed by CEAG themselves. 
The utility is not accountable to a separate customer organization, which 
specifically focuses on the provision of water services in the municipality of 
Guanajuato. Consumers can approach the Controlaría Municipal or the Procuradoria 
Federal del Consumidor who can approach SIMAPAG on behalf of a consumer. In 
case a consumer contacts the Controlaría an employee of this organization approaches 
the SIMAPAG to address the complaint of the user. The utility does not have a 
customer charter, but the contract that is signed between the consumer and the utility 
does contain some rights and obligations of the different parties. These rights and 
obligations do not specify any performance targets or penalties in case of non-
compliance. 
The utility is not accountable to any non-governmental organizations. The utility is 
audited by an external auditor. 
 
Table 9.31: An overview of external accountability 
Indicator Value 
Does the utility have a customer charter, which specifies performance targets 
and are there any financial penalties for non-performance? No 
Does the utility have to meet specified performance targets set by or agreed 
upon with the owners? No 
Is an annual report produced, which is audited by an external accountant? Yes171
Are external groups represented in advisory or management oversight bodies 
of the utility? Yes, in the Council 
Has the utility secured loans in the commercial market on its own 
credentials/ability? No 
Does the utility participate in some form of credit rating scheme? No 
Does the lender impose financial covenants on the utility? Yes 
 
9.5.3 Hierarchy and Levels, the Market and Customers 
 
9.5.3.1 Decentralization of Authority 
 
Tariff levels are set based on the same procedure as the other utilities mentioned before. 
On the basis of a tariff study of an external consultant, the utility proposes tariff levels 
to the Council. If the Council approves this proposal, the proposal is forwarded to the 
municipality. The municipality then decides if they accept this proposal or not. If the 
municipality supports the proposal it is forwarded to the State Congress, which 
provides the final approval172. 
All procurement in the utility carried out by the ‘procurement coordinator’, who 
resides in the Department of Business and Accounting. All departments submit their 
request for procurement to that person. He then obtains three quotations from various 
suppliers and these quotations are then passed on to either the general manager or the 
 
171 Every year SIMAPAG is subject to an external audit, however not every year an annual report 
is published. 
172 In general, the approval of new tariff levels and structures by the State Congress is a formality. 
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Council, depending on the type of good or service that is procured173. Some decisions, 
for example those relating to the procurement of assets, can only be taken by the 
Council. Other decisions require only approval of the general manager. However, the 
cheques issues by the utility always require two signatures and with only the general 
manager and two of the Council members authorized to sign174, de facto at least one of 
the Council members must approve the procurement of all goods and services. 
Internal work processes and standards are proposed by each Department and 
discussed with the general manager. Once the department and the general manager 
agree, the proposal is forwarded to the Council for final approval. The monitoring and 
replacement of meters is defined by a standard policy, which stipulates when the meters 
should be changed175 and is the responsibility of the customer services department. 
The hiring and firing176 of individual staff members is a decision taken by the 
general manager and the Council. The Council is officially responsible for hiring and 
firing the general manager although the municipal president can also wield his 
influence in this decision. The general manager and the Personnel department are 
responsible for the hiring and firing of lower level employees (including other 
management employees)177. 
Decisions relating to the termination of services to defaulters are done 
automatically by the customer services department following a set procedure. 
 
Table 9.32: An overview of decentralization of authority 
Indicator Value 
What is the purchasing ceiling for procurement of operational 
departments as a percentage of operational budgets? 
Not based on amount but on type of 
expenses 
Does the hiring of staff members in departments require prior 
approval from the general manager? Yes 
How many layers of management separate the Chief Executive 
and the entry-level workers? 
Four levels 
At what level are internal work processes and standards 
defined? 
Management and department levels 
but requires approval of the Council 
In what areas does field-staff have decision-making powers? Customer-service, maintenance, 
billing and collection, suspension of 
service, storage of materials 
 
 
 
 
173 The question of who is authorized to make a decision is mainly based on the type of good or 
service that is procured and not so much on the amount involved in the procurement. Also of 
importance is if the procurement of a particular good or service fits within the specified budget to 
which the utility adheres. 
174 The chairman and the treasurer of the Council are authorized to sign. 
175 This policy is stipulated in the Procediemento de Aclaraciones 2002 
176 It should be noted that straightforward firing is relatively unusual. More common is that a staff 
member (in the management of the utility) is forced to resign. 
177 Although this is the way things are arranged according to the Reglamento there have been 
decisions recently in which the Council ‘fired’ a management employee. In 2003 the Head of the 
Legal Department and the Commerce Department were ‘fired’ by the Council. 
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9.5.3.2 Internal Accountability for Results 
 
The Council meets twice per month, as is stipulated by article 19 of the Reglamento. 
The meetings is attended by the general manager and, if needed, by the other employees 
of the utility. During the first meeting, the monthly report is presented. The second 
meeting every month is more for taking any outstanding decisions that are left.  
The Council does not provide clear and measurable targets that must be achieved 
by SIMAPAG. The SIMAPAG does set goals and targets for themselves and presents 
these to the Council. The Council can comment on these and suggest modifications. 
Within the utility a balanced scorecard is used for setting targets and measuring the 
performance of the utility. The balanced scorecard incorporates a series of indicators, 
which provide 4 different ‘perspectives’ on the utility, which together are considered to 
provide a good picture of the overall functioning of the utility. These perspectives 
include a ‘client’s perspective’ (considered to be the most important), a ‘financial 
perspective’, a ‘process perspective’ (which includes a number of efficiency indicators) 
and a ‘learning perspective’ (which covers indicators such as absenteeism, rotation of 
personnel, etc.). The indicators measuring the four perspectives of the scorecard are 
compiled on a monthly basis by the Department of Institutional Development and 
reported to the Council. 
The performance of employees is evaluated every month and the employee can 
earn a bonus on the basis of this evaluation. In essence the employee is evaluated on the 
basis of two criteria: attendance and punctuality (30% of the bonus) and performance 
(70% of the bonus). The category of performance is subdivided into five sub-categories, 
which each represent 14% of the overall bonus. These five sub-categories are: 
 
• Knowledge of work done 
• Quality of work done 
• Quantity of work done 
• Initiative 
• Attitude and cooperation 
 
Each employee is evaluated by his or her immediate boss. As no clear guidelines exist 
on how to implement the evaluation, the evaluation may be rather subjective. 
Moreover, for employees in management positions it is very rare that the bonus is not 
awarded in full. As long as an employee is not absent the full bonus is awarded. 
 
Table 9.33: An overview of accountability for results 
Indicator Value 
How often does the Chief Executive meet with the Council? Twice per month. 
Are penalties and rewards applied to the Chief Executive and Directors for 
achieving specified performance targets? No 
Are penalties and rewards applied to the staff by the management for achieving 
specified performance targets? Yes
178
Is staff subject to annual evaluations on their functioning in the utility? No 
 
178 It should be noted that in general the full bonus is awarded as long as the employee is not 
absent. 
 228 
9.5.3.3 Market-orientation 
 
SIMAPAG outsources about 20% of its operational budget, mostly for engineering 
works. Other activities for which they outcontract include developing an operations 
manual, undertaking feasibility studies, external auditing, ICT, tariff studies, etc. In 
principle the utility can follow one of three outcontracting procedures as defined by the 
State and Federal Law. These three procedures are: 
 
• Direct awarding of the contract – Direct awarding can be done up to an amount of 
approximately MXP 112,000 for goods and services and up to MXP 1.485 million 
for infrastructure works under State Law. The utility is required to obtain three 
quotations prior to awarding the contract; 
• Restricted tender – Up to MXP 438 thousand for goods and services and MXP 7.4 
million for infrastructure works, the utility can follow a restricted tender in which 
three potential suppliers present their economic and technical bids to the Council.  
• Public tender – the water utility invites any company or organization that wants to 
present a bid to do so. 
 
Like the other water supply and sanitation utilities does partake in a benchmarking 
exercise carried out every year by the CEAG but SIMAPAG uses the data resulting 
from this benchmarking exercise mostly for ad-hoc comparisons with other utilities. 
The results are not used systematically for determining policy priorities or setting 
performance targets.  
There are no market testing exercises carried out by the utility. 
 
Table 9.34: An overview of market-orientation 
Indicator SIMAPAG 
What is value of contracts outsourced as a percentage of the 
operational budget? 20.37% 
What is the nature if the functions that are outsourced? Construction works, 
engineering projects, 
feasibility studies, external 
audit, ICT, collection of 
uncollected bills, tariff 
studies, etc. 
How often does the utility engage in benchmarking exercises? Once per year 
In what areas are benchmarking activities undertaken? Technical, commercial, 
financial and administrative 
activities 
Does the utility engage in market testing and does it develop internal 
markets? No 
 
9.5.3.4 Customer-orientation 
 
The income SIMAPAG generates from its customers cover operation and maintenance 
expenses and part of the investment costs. The customers can pay their bills SIMAPAG 
offices, banks, Cajas Populares, and local businesses such as video shops or 
supermarkets.    
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In order to obtain the views and opinions of the customers, SIMAPAG undertakes 
daily surveys. These surveys cover about 210 to 220 users per month. This survey 
measures the following dimensions: 
 
• If the user is satisfied with service provided by SIMAPAG. This includes 
indicating how they were attended to by personnel of SIMAPAG (plumbers, meter 
readers, reception, customer service, etc.) 
• What their opinion is of the service provided. This includes giving their views on 
the provision of potable water, quality of water delivered, attention to leakages, 
sewerage, etc.) 
• An assessment of how important the services that SIMAPAG provides are.   
 
On the basis of the survey the ‘image’ that SIUMAPAG has with its users is calculated 
on a scale from 1 to 5. This ‘image’ is the most important indicator of the Balance 
Scorecard that SIMAPAG uses to measure its performance. At the beginning of 2003, 
the utility had a score of 3.4 and the target was to reach a score of 4.5 by the year 2005. 
SIMAPAG also has a suggestion box in it main office but this is hardly ever used. 
Customers can submit complaints in person at the SIMAPAG offices, by telephone, in 
writing or through the municipal authorities. In addition the customer can approach the 
Procuradoria Federal del Consumidor, but this rarely happens. The average number of 
complaints received by the utility is 1,460 and this represents about 6% of the total 
number of connections. The main complaints concern service interruptions, leakages 
and high bills. In comparison with the other case studies from the State of Guanajuato, 
the level of complaints is relatively high. Possibly, the number of complaints is linked 
to the relatively high tariffs charged to the consumers. Between 1996 and 2001 the 
revenues generated from consumers increased by 280% (Aguiñaga 2003). Although the 
users were willing to pay increased tariffs they also appear to have become more 
demanding and insist on having services of better quality (Nieto 2003).  
A few years ago, employees working with customers underwent a training program 
relating to customer management sponsored by the State Water Commission. 
Employees who underwent that training periodically have to attend refresher courses. In 
addition the utility organizes training sessions on ‘effective stress management’ as it 
was observed that many of the problems experienced with customers were based on the 
way the customers were treated by the personnel. Also training sessions focusing on the 
personal image that an employee projects and how they talk and deal with customers 
are organized179. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
179 It should be noted that SIMAPAG pays considerable attention to training/capacity building 
within the organization. In 2002 a total of 33 training sessions were organized which resulted in 
an average training time of about 25 hours per employee (SIMAPAG 2003b). 
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Table 9.35: An overview of customer-orientation 
Indicator Value 
In what ways can the bills be paid? SIMAPAG Office, Banks Cajas 
Populares180, selected small 
businesses 
In what ways does SIMAPAG pro-actively seek the 
opinions/views of its customers? 
Customer surveys (about 200 per 
months); suggestion box 
What is the menu of options for service delivery that the 
SIMAPAG provides? 
In-house connection, block 
connection, tank trucks 
In what ways does the SIMAPAG actively inform its 
customers about changes related to service provision? 
Flyers added to the receipt, 
newspaper, radio, perifoneo181
What is the percentage of complaints that is addressed? 100% 
What are the average response times to complaints? For a leak 5 hours, for a 
reconnection 1 day 
 
9.5.4 Conclusion 
 
The water supply and sanitation utility in Guanajuato provides an interesting case of 
utility which has been able to improve performance consistently over the past decade. 
The water crisis in the 1980s provided a context in which water supply and sanitation 
received considerable political and social support. Consumers, who still had the water 
crisis fresh in their memory, were willing to pay relatively high tariffs, but only if this 
would be accompanied by substantial improvements to the level of service they 
received. What followed appears to resemble a ‘vicious circle of performance 
improvement’ in which necessary tariff increases were accepted as long as the utility 
improved services. The relatively high tariff levels and the presence of critical 
consumers meant that the utility both had considerable (financial) autonomy as well as 
a need to develop a strong customer-orientation, which it did. 
Despite some changes in the management over this same period, the utility retained 
a degree of stability, by having existing members of the management team replace a 
general manager. The utility’s capacity (in terms of financial resources and human 
resources) also appears to place it in a more favorable position then the four utilities 
discussed previously. At the same time, recent developments, such as the lowering of 
the monthly tariff indexation to 0.01% and the somewhat unconventional changes in the 
management of the utility do raise some questions about the sustainability of the 
performance gains of the past decade.  
SIMAPAG also appears to be a bit further with the development of internal 
accountability mechanisms linked to performance targets. The development of the 
balanced score card as a guiding instrument for the management of the utility as well as 
the initiation of a system for assessing the performance of employees are indications of 
this development. 
On the other the hand elements such as external accountability, the level of 
decentralization within the organization and market-orientation seem to be much more 
in line with the other four utilities. 
 
180 Small local banks 
181 A perifoneo is a car with speakers that drives around the city providing information through 
its speakers. 
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10 Annex 2: Cluster 2 Cases 
10.1 National Water and Sewerage Corporation, Uganda  
 
In Uganda, water management is a task of the Ministry of Water, Lands and 
Environment (MWLE), whose mandate is “to promote and ensure the rational and 
sustainable utilization and development and safeguard of Land and Water Resources 
and Environment, for social and economic welfare and development as well as for 
regional and international peace”182. The MWLE consists of one Minister and three so-
called Ministers of State. These Ministers of State include one State Minister for Water, 
one State Minister Lands and one State Minister for the Environment. At the 
operational level the ministry’s structure consists of two Directorates, The Directorate 
of Water Development183 and the Directorate of Land and Environment. The Heads of 
these Directorate report to the Permanent Secretary, who is the Chief Executive and 
Accounting Officer (Philips 2003). The MWLE supervises three statutory bodies. One 
of these statutory bodies is the National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC).  
The NWSC was established in 1972184 with the responsibility of delivering water 
supply and sewerage services in 15 large urban centers185.  The 15 centers in which the 
NWSC provides services count a population of 2.1 million people, which represents 
about 75% of the population in urban centers (Mwoga 2004). 
 
 
 
Figure 10.1: Governance structure National Water and Sewerage Corporation 
 
182 www.mwle.go.ug 
183 Water services in rural areas and urban areas not entrusted to the NWSC are managed by the 
Directorate of Water Development (Philips 2003). 
184 The NWSC was founded by Decree no. 34 of 1972. This Decree was repealed by Statute No. 
8 of 1995. This Statute, also known as the NWSC Statute governs all operations of the NWSC 
(Mwoga 2004) 
185 The 15 towns served by the NWSC: Kampala, Jinja, Njeru, Entebbe, Mbale, Mabarara, 
Masaka, Tororo, Gulu, Lira, Kasese, Fort Portal, Kabale, Bushenyi, Soroti and Arua 
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The functioning of the NWSC is overseen by a Board of Directors, which is also the 
policy making body of the NWSC. The Board of Directors consists of 8 people 
including the Managing Director of the NWSC186. Of the seven other members, one 
must be the Director of the Directorate of Water. The other six members are appointed 
by the MLWE. These 6 Board members serve terms of 3 years and may be re-appointed 
for a second term. Selection of the Board members takes place on the basis of expertise 
in the fields of water utility management, public finance, engineering or public health. 
Although appointment of the Directors is on the basis of expertise, it is noteworthy that 
most of the members have a political background or are in some way involved with the 
Government of Uganda (Philips 2003). The Managing Director is appointed on the 
basis of competitive selection. In principle the Managing Director serves a contract 
term of five-years, but the contract can be renewed after the contract term has expired.  
 
Table 10.1: General characteristics NWSC 2000-2003 
Indicator 2000/01 2001/02 22002/03 
Population served   1,315,000 
Connections   87,172 
No of employees   950 
Unaccounted for Water 43% 40% 39% 
Working ratio 0.85 0.79 0.79 
Staff per 1000 connections 17 12 11 
Staff per 1000 population served   0.72 
Accounts receivable as a share of annual revenue, 
expressed in months sales 
4.9 5.6 4.7 
Service coverage – water supply n.a n.a. 63% 
Average domestic tariff (US$/m3) 0.38 0.38 0.40 
Source: Mwoga 2004 
 
10.1.1 Background: Reforms in the NWSC 
 
During the 1970s and early 1980s Uganda was subject to considerable political and 
economic turmoil and the performance of NWSC, like that many other institutions, 
declined significantly. Between 1986 and 1997, NWSC embarked on major 
rehabilitation and expansion of its water supply and sewage systems with the support of 
international donor agencies. Although water supply and sanitation infrastructure was 
rehabilitated and expanded, performance of the utility was still lacking. This resulted in 
poor service provision despite improved infrastructure.  
In 1998, a new Board of Directors was appointed. The Board, in turn, appointed a 
new Managing Director, after the position fell vacant upon the expiry of the contract of 
the previous Managing Director. With a new Board and management a rare opportunity 
existed to review past performance and implement new strategies for improving 
 
186 Philips (2003) states that the Board consists of 11 members. The other members are a 
Corporation Secretary and a member of the Utility Reform Unit within the Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Development and the chairman. 
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performance of the utility. At the same time, external pressure was applied to improve 
performance. This external pressure came from: 
• Donor agencies who wanted NWSC to improve performance levels in order for it 
to be able to meet its debt obligations and be more credit worthy;  
• The Government who wanted the NWSC to service the customers better; and 
• The possibility of increased private sector participation, meaning that the NWSC 
had to show it could perform as well as a private operator.  
 
10.1.2 The Degree of Autonomy and Accountability of NWSC  
 
10.1.2.1 External Autonomy 
 
Standards for the quality of drinking water are set by the Uganda National Bureau of 
Standards (UNBS). Standards for wastewater treatment are set by the National 
Environment Management Authority (NEMA). The Ministry of Water Lands and 
Environment (MWLE) together with the Utility Reform Unit (URU) that falls under the 
Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MOFPED) jointly set 
service standards.  
The Directorate of Water Development (DWD) issues abstraction permits for raw 
water and discharge permits for treated wastewater. The NWSC uses surface water for 
all its operations with the three largest towns (Kampala, Jinja and Entebbe) using water 
from Lake Victoria as a water source. The NWSC has experienced no difficulties in 
accessing sufficient levels of raw water, but the quality of raw water varies 
considerably from season to season. 
The NWSC enjoys considerable support from both the Ministries and the local 
governments. This support has been most evident in support received for obtaining 
investment funds for expanding services.  
The utility is allowed to terminate services to defaulters, although the utility uses 
these powers selectively. Preferably, the NWSC will try to collect arrears in other ways 
before resorting to terminating service provision. 
The NWSC has three main sources for its finances. The first source of finances is 
the revenue generated from tariffs charged to customers. The second source of funds is 
the Government, which at times provides subsidy funds for investments in line with the 
Governments social policy. The third category of funds concerns the international 
donor and lending agencies, such as the World Bank, the German Government (through 
KfW and GTZ and the European Union. The availability of these three sources of funds 
means that access to financial resources is not a major problem for the NWSC. 
NWSC management initiates tariff-setting procedures and proposes changes in the 
tariff to the Board. After Board review and approval, the tariff changes are forwarded to 
the MWLE for approval and eventual gazetting. With effect from April 2002, the tariff 
is indexed annually, to take into account inflation, and the depreciation of the Uganda 
Shilling against foreign currency. 
NWSC has some difficulties attracting qualified staff. The main difficulties relate 
to the salary structure, which is not as competitive as those from some other 
corporations in the country.  The Board in consultation with the unions sets the salary 
structure of NWSC. The salary structure is based on the projected income and the 
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obligations that NWSC has to meet (such as debt servicing, depreciation, asset renewal 
and counterpart funding of investments). Recruitment takes place only on the basis of 
the organogram as approved by the Board. This means that the only possibilities for 
recruitment occur when either an existing position falls vacant or the organizational 
structure is adapted. 
NWSC is subject to and follows public procurement regulations. 
 
Table 10.2: An overview of external autonomy 
Indicator Value 
Who determines the pay scales for the various levels within the 
utility? 
The Board of Directors  
What is the basis for appointing members to the Board of Directors? Expertise and experience  
Is the utility able to take out loans without prior approval from the 
owner? 
Yes, in principle  
Is the utility allowed to terminate service delivery to defaulters? Yes  
Who is responsible for setting tariffs? The Ministry of Water, 
Lands and Environment  
Does the utility follow public sector procurement rules? Yes 
Source: Mwoga 2004 
  
10.1.2.2 External Accountability 
 
A set of clear performance targets exist for the quality to which the drinking water 
produced by the NWSC must adhere. These targets are set by the UNBS and are 
considered realistic by the NWSC. Although the DWD is officially responsible for 
monitoring NWSC’s performance on meeting these water quality targets, this 
monitoring effectively does not happen. NWSC also has to meet wastewater quality 
targets, but feels the targets set by the NEMA are unrealistic. If the NWSC would have 
to meet these standards, they would have to invest substantially in wastewater treatment 
facilities. This in turn would impact the tariffs charged to consumers, and the resulting 
tariff would be unaffordable for many of the NWSC’s customers. Not surprisingly then, 
the standards are not being enforced. 
The MWLE sets clear and measurable targets for service that that the NWSC has to 
achieve. Previously this was done through the Minister’s review and acceptance, or 
revision of the Corporate Plan. This approach is reported to have been strengthened 
since 2000 by the introduction of a Performance Contract187 between the MWLE and 
the NWSC. The NWSC reports on these reports on the performance in relation to these 
targets in the annual report, which is submitted to the Minister. The recourse that the 
Minister has in case the NWSC fails to meet the specified standards is that the MWLE 
can remove the Board or pressure the Board into removing the Managing Director. 
However, the actual implementation of the Performance Contract raises some questions 
about the effectiveness of this contract. Formally, a review committee should exist to 
 
187 The Performance Contract brought considerable benefits to the NWSC as, at the suggestion of 
the World Bank, the NWSC was allowed to postpone repayments of loans to the Government of 
Uganda during the running time of the Performance Contract. The idea was that the NWSC 
would only be able to obtain the required level of performance if the debts of the NWSC could be 
frozen (Philips 2003). 
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monitor and review the contract. However, this Review Committee was never 
established and as such, performance of the NWSC was never really monitored (Philips 
2003). 
There are scheduled meetings between the Ministry and the NWSC Board. These 
meetings are held when needed and deal with performance targets, performance of 
NWSC against the set targets, NWSC’s contribution to the Ministry Policy Statement, 
and the presentation of the annual report and audited accounts to Parliament. 
Generally, the agencies, which lend money to the NWSC, impose financial 
covenants on NWSC.  These covenants can include requirements such as including a 
minimum target of 20% of funds from internal sources to be used for either capital 
investment or counterpart funding, reducing employee related costs by 18%, and timely 
submission of audited accounts to the lender. Different loans and grants will have 
different requirements. 
There is a formal customer organization (Uganda Consumer Protection Unit -
UCPU), which represents the interests of consumers and works hand in hand with the 
National Bureau of Standards. The UCPU, however, covers all services and not only 
water services. In theory the UCPU can alert the responsible authorities to take action 
in case certain products or services are not satisfactory. However, the UCPU has not 
been very active in the field of water supply services. 
 
Table 10.3: An overview of external accountability for results 
Indicator Value 
Does the utility have a customer charter, which specifies performance 
targets and are there any financial penalties for non-performance? 
Yes but financial 
penalties are not 
specified. 
Does the utility have to meet specified performance targets set by or agreed 
upon with the owners? 
Yes 
Is an annual report produced, which is audited by an external accountant? Yes 
Are external groups represented in advisory or management oversight 
bodies of NWSC? 
Yes 
Has the utility secured loans in the commercial market on its own 
credentials/ability? 
No 
Does the utility participate in some form of credit rating scheme? No 
Does the lender impose financial covenants on NWSC? Yes 
 
10.1.3 Hierarchy and Levels, the Market and Customers  
 
10.1.3.1 Decentralization of Authority within the Utility 
 
As mentioned, the NWSC currently operates in 15 towns. Each town has a separate 
Area Service Provider (ASP). The relatively bigger ASPs have connections above 
3,500 while the smaller ASPs have less than 2500 service connections.  
Considerable authority has been decentralized to the ASP. Billing and collection 
for is done at area level. These ASPs all have billing centers and produce their own 
bills. They can also outsource activities and functions, below a certain amount, without 
the interference of the Head Office, including hiring of guards and collectors, 
maintenance of premises, office equipment or vehicles. The ASPs also carry out 
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expansion and minor rehabilitation of the network and existing facilities in their area. 
The ASPs also formulate and implement strategies for reducing unaccounted for water. 
And finally, the ASPs have the power to disconnect non-paying customers and they can 
determine the way in which customer complaints are dealt with, provided they achieve 
the response time targets. 
The decisions regarding the procurement of goods and services are made at 
different levels depending on the monetary value. The ASPs procure goods and services 
up to values of US$2,500. The NWSC Head Office Management procures goods up to 
values of US$9,000 and the Board of Directors procures goods and services up to 
values of US$25,000. Beyond this latter threshold, the Solicitor General must clear the 
NWSC Management procurement decisions before the NWSC Board can endorse them. 
Currently the managers of the ASPs can hire and fire contract staff as well as staff 
below a specified salary position. The staff on higher salaries are hired and posted to 
the ASPs by the Head Office in consultation with the managers of the ASPs. The salary 
structure of all staff members is determined and approved by the Board of Directors.  
 
Table 10.4: An overview of decentralization of authority within the utility 
Indicator Value 
What is the purchasing ceiling for procurement of 
operational departments as a percentage of operational 
budgets? 
Between 4%-7.5% of the monthly 
operational budget  
Does the hiring of staff members in departments 
require prior approval from the Managing Director? 
Yes, for some positions 
How many layers of management separate the 
Managing Director and the entry-level workers? 
Four layers of management  
At what level are internal work processes and 
standards defined? 
Internal work processes are defined at 
Area level; standards are defined at Head 
Office Management Level. 
In what areas does field-staff have decision-making 
powers? 
In maintenance and partially in customer 
service. 
 
10.1.3.2 Internal Accountability for Results 
 
The Government of Uganda sets performance targets for NWSC through the 
performance contract, although as mentioned this contract is not really monitored. The 
NWSC Head Office ensures that targets in the performance contract are consistent with 
the corporate plan. Based on the performance targets set in the performance contract, 
the Head Office sets and negotiates performance standards with the Areas. The 
principle used by the NWSC Head Office is to set higher targets for the Area Service 
Providers than stipulated in the performance contract between the NWSCV and the 
Government of Uganda. Therefore, when the ASPs achieve or exceed their individual 
targets, NWSC will automatically achieve the targets as stipulated in the performance 
contract. Upon setting targets for the ASPs, workshops are held to determine the 
logistical requirements needed by the ASPs to meet the targets. Having determined 
these requirements, a harmonization session with the Head Office is conducted during 
which commitment of the Head Office to provide the required logistics is secured.  
 237 
The Board can reward the management for achieving performance targets. These 
rewards are usually in the form of annual salary increments or bonus payments. 
The performance of employees is evaluated annually using standardized 
performance appraisal systems. The recently introduced “One Minute Management 
Concept” has strengthened this process: Every employee has an individual “pseudo 
contract” outlining specific key verifiable tasks and deliverables. 
Achievement of the performance targets is accompanied by incentive payments 
that can be as high as 50% of the basic salary. On the other hand, under-achievement of 
the performance standards below a certain level may lead to members of the ASPs 
forfeiting 25% of their basic pay. These rewards or penalties are implemented as 
frequently as good or poor performance occurs.  
Promotions and salary adjustments are usually made on the basis of the following 
factors: performance review, years of service, collective bargaining and certification. 
There is an annual staff performance appraisal. Sometimes, the recommendations for 
promotion made by the Department Heads are implemented. The years of service are 
recognized alongside good performance. 
 
Table 10.4: An overview of internal accountability for results 
Indicator Value 
How often does the Managing Director meet with the Board? Once a month. 
Are penalties and rewards applied to the Managing Director and 
Management for achieving specified performance targets? 
Yes, in principle. No penalties 
applied so far 
Are penalties and rewards applied to the staff by the management 
for achieving specified performance targets? 
Yes 
Is staff subject to annual evaluations on their functioning? Yes 
Source: Mwoga 2004 
 
10.1.3.3 Market-orientation 
 
The degree of outsourcing ranges from 30% to 40% of the total operating expenses. 
Most of the outsourcing arrangements are set up as one-year service contracts. The 
largest contract, representing 14% of total operating expenses, is the management 
contract for the distribution of water, billing and revenue collection in the Kampala 
Water Supply Service Area188.  
Procurement is carried out according to the Procurement Act. The available 
procedures according to this Act range from open competitive bidding with or without 
pre-qualification, restricted or selective bidding, shopping, to sole sourcing. 
NWSC partakes in benchmarking exercises within the African region through the 
African Water Utility Partnership (WUP). NWSC also indirectly partakes in 
benchmarking exercises through the World Bank. Additionally, NWSC carries out 
internal benchmarking amongst its areas of operation. NWSC has also undertaken 
benchmarking exercises with energy utilities and other industries in the country. 
 
188 The management contract for Kampala expired in 2004. Although the NWSC was interested 
in renewing the contract, no agreement could be reached for extension of the contract. After 
deliberation, the NWSC decided to award another management contract for the city of Kampala 
to a local company. 
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NWSC has partaken in market testing activities on an ad-hoc basis. 
 
Table 10.5: An overview of market orientation 
Indicator Value 
What is value of contracts outsourced as a percentage of 
the operational budget? 
Between 30% and 40%. 
What is the nature if the functions that are outsourced? Premises maintenance, collections, 
billing, fleet maintenance, works 
and engineering design.  
How often does NWSC engage in benchmarking 
exercises? 
Annually and on an ad-hoc basis if 
needed 
In what areas are benchmarking activities undertaken? Internal reforms, change management, 
reducing water losses, optimizing 
energy/pumping costs, revenue 
collections, etc. 
Does NWSC engage in market testing and does it develop 
internal markets? 
NWSC has partially engaged in 
market testing especially for non-core 
functions.  
 
10.1.3.4 Customer-orientation 
 
Although the NWSC receives contributions from international donor and lending 
agencies and the Government for purposes of capital investment, the utility is fully 
dependent on its customers for covering its operational expenses.  
NWSC has a training program that delivers training to employees, which deal with 
customers in customer care and service. Initially, the training was carried out for front 
desk officers only but it was later expanded to include other staff, such as cashiers, field 
staff and meter readers. 
NWSC has a Customer Charter, which specifies the nature of the services that 
NWSC commits to provide to the customers. However, the Charter does not incorporate 
compensation payments in case NWSC fails to meet its responsibilities. 
Annual customer surveys aim to establish the customers’ views regarding areas 
where NWSC still has to improve. Customers can currently get access to NWSC in 
person, by phone and through the internet. The first two methods are more common 
than using the internet. Customers are involved in the decision-making in NWSC 
mainly through what is known in NWSC as “strategic alliance meetings”. The Area 
Service Providers conduct regular and scheduled strategic alliance meetings with the 
different customer segments. From the strategic meetings customers make statements of 
what they require from the NWSC. These requirements are taken as action items for the 
NWSC Area Service Providers.  
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Table 10.6: An overview of customer-orientation 
Indicator Value 
In what ways can the bills be paid? NWSC Cash Offices, Banks and at ATMs  
In what ways does NWSC pro-actively seek the 
opinions/views of its customers? 
Annual customer surveys, suggestion 
boxes, and strategic alliance meetings. 
What is the menu of options for service delivery 
that NWSC provides? 
In-house connections, yard taps, public 
stand posts, water kiosks, bulk 
connections for institutions and water 
vending. 
In what ways does NWSC actively inform its 
customers about changes related to service 
provision? 
Flyers, newspaper advertisement, radios 
and strategic alliance meetings. 
What is the percentage of complaints that is 
addressed? 
Between 95% to 100%. 
 
NWSC invests substantially in staff training. It is the Corporation’s policy to train staff 
for skills acquisition rather than academic achievements. The Human Resource 
Manager collects training needs compiled by the Department Heads after the annual 
staff appraisal and prepares a training program and corresponding budget. 
Absenteeism is not tolerated in NWSC. The employees have to register their 
attendance in the daily attendance register and the register is audited. The staff turn 
over is very low and is usually limited to the cashiers.  
 
Table 10.7: An overview of corporate culture 
Indicator Value 
What factors influence promotion and/or salary 
adjustment decisions? 
Staff performance appraisal, years of 
service, collective bargaining and academic 
advancements. 
Annual staff turnover? Below 10%. Predominantly in the lower 
levels. 
What are the training costs per year as a percentage 
of operational budgets? 
Between 1.5% and 3%. 
Is the staff informed about meetings of 
management? 
Partially (need-to-know basis) 
What is the ratio of support/technical staff to 
management? 
Between 3:1 to 5:1 
Is the mission statement internally visible in NWSC? Yes 
 
10.1.4 Conclusions 
 
The NWSC appears to enjoy considerable managerial autonomy. The strong 
improvement in performance since 1998 coincides with arrival of a new Board and a 
new managing director, who under the threat of privatization, had to show that the 
NWSVC was able to improve its performance. What is also noteworthy is the role 
played by external financiers. The NWSC enjoys considerable support from donor and 
lending agencies. Although their assistance is crucial for turning around the utility, the 
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question is if the NWSC can continue to depend on these organizations if political 
realities in Uganda change. 
The NWSC is the only utility with a detailed performance contract with the owner. 
Some doubts exist about this contract, however, as the monitoring entity, responsible 
for monitoring the contract, was not established. 
Being a national utility, the NWSC has for obvious reasons had to decentralize 
considerable decision-making authority to lower levels in the organization. It appears 
that the Head Office in Kampala is developing the role of a monitoring agency, which 
monitors the performance of the 15 ‘areas’ that operate under the Head Office. 
Interesting in this respect is that the NWSC as developed internal performance contracts 
with the various areas, which ‘translates’ the performance contract it has with the 
MWLE to the 15 areas. 
Market orientation appears to be considerable in the case of the NWSC. The main 
reason for this was the fact that service provision in Kampala was subject of a 
management contract with SUEZ. Customer-orientation was also well-developed.  
10.2 Sociedade de Abastecimento de Água e Saneamento S.A., Campinas, 
Brazil189 
 
The city of Campinas is located in the Brazilian State of Sao Paulo. The water services 
in this city of about 1 million inhabitants are provided by the Sociedade de 
Abastecimento de Água e Saneamento S.A (SANASA). SANASA, which was formed in 
1974, is a so-called “empresa-mixta”190. Although the empresa-mixta usually involves 
substantial private ownership, in the case of SANASA, the overwhelming majority of 
shares are owned by the Municipality of Campinas, which owns 99.99% of the 
shares191. The remaining 0.01% of the shares are owned by other persons and 
organizations, varying from the Mayor of Campinas in 1973 to the Municipal Company 
for Development of Campinas. As mixed-ownership company, SANASA has both an 
Administration Council as well as an Inspection Council. The Administration Council 
sets the general direction that SANASA follows, approves the annual plan and 
supervises the Executive Team. The Inspection Council is a consultative body that 
analyses proposals and decisions on a range of issues. The Inspection Council reports to 
the Administration Council and once a year to the Shareholders Meeting. The 
Administration Council has a minimum of 3 and no more than 5 members who are 
elected or dismissed by the shareholders. The members of the Administration Council 
represent the executive team of SANASA (2 members appointed by the Municipality), 
the employees of SANASA (1 member) and 2 members are external members who are 
appointed on the basis of professional experience. The majority shareholder, in this case 
 
189 The case of SANASA is based on Aguiñaga 2003 and Ramos, 2004 
190 The “empresa mixta”, or “mixed ownership company”, originated in Spain. It has 
subsequently spread to other countries in Latin America (Ringskog 2002:3). 
191 Although SANASA is on paper an 'empresa mixta', the fact that shares are so heavily 
concentrated with the Municipality of Campinas, means that it functions more like a government-
owned company than a joint-stock company. Potential benefits that are often cited by promoters 
of the ‘empresa mixta’ (such as access to private sector capital and private sector expertise) are 
unlikely to be achieved with the current ownership structure. 
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the Municipality of Campinas, appoints the president of the Administration Council 
who is also the president of SANASA. 
 
 
 
Figure 10.2: Governance structure SANASA 
 
Management of the utility is the responsibility of a four-member Executive Team, 
which is appointed by the Administration Council every year. The Inspection Council is 
a consultation body without decision-making powers. They report their views to the 
Administration Council and at least once per year to the shareholders meeting.  
 
Table 10.8: General characteristics of SANASA 
Indicator  2000 2001 2002 
Population served   982,977 
Water supply connections   209,091 
Sewerage connections   186,652 
No Of Employees   1,609 
Unaccounted for Water 26.66% 26.62% 26% 
Working Ratio 0.65 0.81 0.79 
Staff per 1000 connections 4.16 4.11 4.13 
Staff per 1000 population served 1.65 1.73 1.68 
Accounts receivable as a share of annual revenue, expressed 
in months sales 
2.5 3.5 3.2 
Service coverage – water supply 98.54% 98.60% 98.89% 
Service coverage – sewerage 87.06% 87.47% 88.09% 
Average domestic tariff (US$/10m3) 1.75 2.39 2.62 
Source: Aguiñaga 2004 
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10.2.1 The Degree of Autonomy and Accountability of SANASA 
 
10.2.1.1 External Autonomy 
 
As a joint-stock company, SANASA has a strong (nominal) legal autonomy. However 
the fact that SANASA has one major shareholder, the municipality of Campinas, makes 
the utility vulnerable to intrusions on that autonomy. The mayor of Campinas appoints 
the President and least two members of the Executive Team. These appointments are 
based on a combination of professional suitability and political affiliation. Changes in 
the municipal government usually lead to changes in the executive team. The 
vulnerability to political intervention means that much depends on how the 
municipality uses its powers as a major shareholder. Illustrative of the influence of the 
municipality are the developments following the municipal election of 2004. Following 
the election, which resulted in a change of municipal government, all but one of the 
management team were replaced by new people. 
SANASA is to a large extent financially autonomous. The tariffs that SANASA 
collects form its main source of income and cover operation and maintenance costs. To 
cover capital expenses SANASA has taken out loans with both government institutions 
as well as private banks. The following table provides an overview of the external 
sources of funds that SANASA has access to. 
 
Table 10.9: Overview of external funds of SANASA (in US$) 
External Funds  2000 2001 2002 2003 
BRADESCO (Private bank)  143,103.45   
FEHIDRO192 190,551.01 212,973.54 186,150.36  
CEF-PROSSNEAME193 2,428,217.79 6,144.52   
ABN AMRO - Banco Real 
(Private bank)   1,009,877.06  
FINAME    634,482.76 
BNDES194    16,064,137.93 
TOTAL 2,618,768.80 2,926,563.88 4,618,374.25 20,118,965.52 
Yearly Budget 62,088,075.60 54,408,591.27 69,314,360.01 68,773,824.35 
% of External Funds 4.22% 0.67% 1.73% 24.28% 
Source: Aguiñaga 2004:17 
 
 
192 The State Fund for Water Resources (FEHIDRO) has as its main objective to provide support 
to the State’s water resources policy by financing water projects.  
193 The Federal Economic Bank (CEF) is part of the Ministry of Finance and has as an objective 
to improve the quality of life for the citizens of Brazil by stimulating the development of urban 
infrastructure 
194 The National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) is a federal institution 
linked to the Ministry of Development, Industry and International Trade. Its objective is to 
finance initiatives that contribute to the development of the country. 
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For SANASA to apply for external funds, approval is required Administration and the 
Inspection Council. Moreover, the municipality also needs to approve the request for 
external funds. At the end of 2002, SANASA had a Baa2.br rating from Moddy’s 
America Latina. 
Recruitment is not a significant problem for SANASA as Campinas is an industrial 
city with a well-established university. Apart from having a large pool of professionals 
to choose from, SANASA also offers relatively good terms of employment, making it 
easy to attract qualified personnel. Not only is the salary level offered by SANASA 
above market-levels, also the secondary benefits, such a health-plan, end-of-the-year 
bonus, training programs, etc., are considered very good. Moreover, SANASA offers 
considerable job security, as it is very unusual for people to be laid off. Not 
surprisingly, many employees have been with the utility for 10, 15, 20 or even more 
years.   
All vacancies in SANASA must be open for internal applications first and are 
opened for external application only after no suitable candidate can be found internally.  
The pay scales (for non-executive team members) are determined by a committee 
within SANASA, created exclusively for the issue of setting salaries and positions. This 
committee negotiates with the labor union to come to a general agreement. This is 
subsequently reviewed by the Executive Team, which needs to approve the agreement. 
The Administration Council determines the salaries of the Executive Team. 
SANASA uses mostly surface water for its water resources195. Under normal 
circumstances, water resources are sufficient, however, during dry periods, problems 
can arise especially because the City of Sao Paulo draws its water from the same 
sources as SANASA. SANASA currently uses about 83% of quantity of water allocated 
to it by the State Department of Water and Energy. The utility expects the allocated 
water resources to be sufficient until at least 2010. 
 
Table 10.10: An overview of external autonomy 
Indicator Value 
Who determines the pay scales for the various levels within the utility? Administration Council 
What is the basis for appointing members to the Board of Directors? Political representatives / 
professionals 
Is the utility able to take out loans without prior approval from the 
owner? 
No 
Is the utility allowed to terminate service delivery to defaulters? Yes 
Who is responsible for setting tariffs? Utility 
Does the utility follow public sector procurement rules? Yes 
 
Source: Aguiñaga 2004 
 
10.2.1.2 External Accountability 
 
The Ministry of Health has set standards for potable water that all water utilities must 
adhere to. By way of Decree No. 1469 from 2000, the Ministry of Health has also 
 
195 On the perimeter of the city SANASA has 3 wells. The abstraction of these wells represents 
about 0.03% of the water resources used by SANASA (Aguiñaga 2003b:16) 
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established the procedures by way of which I regulates that these standards are indeed 
met. Decree 1469 establishes how and where samples are to be taken and the reporting 
requirements. SANASA reports monthly to the municipal representative of the Ministry 
of Health.  
The Ministry of Environment at the state level establishes and enforces wastewater 
standards. State Law 997 from 1976 sets the standards that must be met. Decree No. 
8468specifies what needs to be measured and how these results are to be reported to the 
State Ministry of Environment. Reports are submitted to the State Environment 
Ministry every 6 months. Although the Ministry of Environment can implement 
sanctions and fines in case standards are not met, SANASA has, until now, not been 
fined. 
SANASA is not subject to performance targets imposed by the owner. However, 
annually, a report is submitted to the owners of SANASA detailing the performance of 
the organization. The report includes the balance sheet, all relevant financial 
information and an activity report, as well as an annual plan and budget for the 
following year. The Municipal ‘tribunal de contas’ (accounts tribunal) evaluates the 
information that SANASA presents. SANASA must publish their balance accounts 
annually in a newspaper and must submit them to a federal regulator of joint-stock 
companies. 
Loan agreements between SANASA and the Federal Economic Bank (CEF) have 
stipulated performance indicators and targets relating to service standards. SANASA 
reports every six months on these performance indicators. The reports are not 
published, but are available on request. In case SANASA does not achieve the specified 
targets, they become ineligible for further financing from CEF. 
There is not a special consumer organization to which SANASA is accountable. 
Dissatisfied consumers can, however, approach the Consumer Agency (PROCON) 
whose role it is to protect the interest of consumers. 
 
Table 10.11: An overview of external accountability for results 
Indicators Value 
Does the utility have a customer charter, which specifies performance targets and are 
there any financial penalties for non-performance? 
No 
Does the utility have to meet specified performance targets set by or agreed upon with 
the owners? 
No 
Is an annual report produced, which is audited by an external accountant? Yes 
Are external groups represented in advisory or management oversight bodies of 
SANASA? 
No 
Has the utility secured loans in the commercial market on its own credentials/ability? Yes 
Does the utility participate in some form of credit rating scheme? Yes 
Does the lender impose financial covenants on SANASA? Yes 
Source: Aguiñaga 2004 
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10.2.2 Hierarchy and Levels, the Market and Customers 
 
10.2.2.1 Decentralization of Authority within SANASA 
 
In general, decisions within SANASA are prepared by working groups. These working 
groups then submit proposals for decisions to the Executive Team and/or 
Administrative Council for approval and endorsement. Ideally, these working groups or 
working committees will incorporate the most qualified personnel for that particular 
issue. It is quite rare that management rejects proposals of working groups.  
Internal work processes and standards are developed within the various 
departments and are approved by the Executive Team. 
The tariff structure that SANASA uses is determined by an in-house commission, 
which has been established for the sole purpose of developing a proposal for the tariff 
structure. The Administrative Council makes the final decision about the tariff 
structure. At present the proposed tariff structure is passed through the municipality for 
endorsement, even though there is no legal obligation to do so.  
Groups from various departments handle procurement. These groups develop a 
proposal on the basis of a financial, administrative and/or technical analysis that is 
presented to the Executive Team and the Administrative Council for information, but 
does not require approval.  
Recruitment is carried out through open applications. First the vacancy is 
announced internally and then externally. The decision about hiring new staff is made 
by the manager involved and the respective director, who inform the Executive Team of 
their decision. The termination of service is the responsibility of the Commercial 
Department and is done according to internal policy.  
The termination of service to customers who have failed to pay their bills is the 
responsibility of the Customer Services Department. Customer complaints are dealt 
with by the 12 Customer Service Offices or the call center. If the Offices can handle the 
complaints themselves (for example, clarification of bills, etc.) they can do so. 
Otherwise the complaint is forwarded to a relevant Department that can address the 
complaint.  
 
Table 10.12: An overview of decentralization of authority within the utility 
Indicator Value 
What is the purchasing ceiling for procurement of operational 
departments as a percentage of operational budgets? 
n.a. 
Does the hiring of staff members in departments require prior 
approval from the Managing Director? 
No  
How many layers of management separate the Chief Executive 
and the entry-level workers? 
4 levels 
At what level are internal work processes and standards defined? Management and Department 
level 
In what areas do field staff have decision-making powers? All 
Source: Aguiñaga 2004 
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10.2.2.2 Internal Accountability for Results 
 
The Executive Team meets with the Administration Council and the Inspection Council 
every month. Prior to these meetings, the Executive Team submits all financial 
information about the utility to the two Councils. The Councils can request any 
information they desire at any time. The Administrative Council and the Inspection 
Council jointly approve the budget and tariffs. 
There is no set mechanism for evaluating the performance of the employees. 
Although some managers undertake evaluations at their own initiative, these 
evaluations are not structured or standardized. All employees have a contract detailing 
their duties and tasks, but not the performance that is expected of them. 
 
Table 10.13: An overview of internal accountability for results 
Indicator Value 
How often does the Chief Executive meet with the Board? Monthly 
Are penalties and rewards applied to the Chief Executive and 
Directors for achieving specified performance targets? 
only rewards are applied 
Are penalties and rewards applied to the staff by the 
management for achieving specified performance targets? 
only rewards are applied 
Is staff subject to annual evaluations on their functioning 
SANASA? 
No 
 
10.2.2.3 Market-orientation 
 
SANASA outsources 21% of its operational budget. Outsourced services include non-
core functions, consulting services, billing/collections, works, and certain operation 
functions. SANASA outsources any activity that would require staff working overtime 
(peak-demands). When outcontracting, SANASA follows public procurement rules.  
SANASA partakes in the ‘analysis of water and sewage services’, a national 
benchmarking exercise undertaken annually by the National Information System of 
Sanitation Companies (SNIS). SANASA uses its benchmark results to prioritize its 
future plans.  
SANASA has not undertaken any market-testing exercises. 
 
Table 10.14: An overview of market orientation 
Indicator Value 
What is value of contracts outsourced as a percentage of 
the operational budget? 
20.77%  
What is the nature if the functions that are outsourced? non-core functions, consulting services, 
billing/collections, certain operation 
functions 
How often does SANASA engage in benchmarking 
exercises? 
Once per year 
In what areas are benchmarking activities undertaken? water quality, service, environment, 
finance and efficiency, other 
Does SANASA engage in market testing and does it 
develop internal markets? 
No 
Source: Aguiñaga 2004 
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10.2.2.4 Customer-orientation 
 
SANASA is highly dependent on its customers for financing its operations.  In 2001 
SANASA contracted an external institution to carry out a survey to know the 
satisfaction of the users. The results were quite favorable for SANASA though there 
identified two weak points: quality of water and customer service. After that survey, 
specific strategies were developed to improve those two points. Since then, no other 
survey or research has been carried out but now in the Strategic Plan for 2010 ‘client 
satisfaction’ is considered as one of the indicators. Another survey was held in 2004.  
The customers also have the possibility of impacting decisions regarding water 
supply and sanitation by contributing to the initiative of the “Participatory Budget”. In 
this initiative the population can indicate where they want the money of the 
Municipality to be spent on. The results of the consultation are submitted to SANASA 
and they are expected to take actions around the needs expressed by the people in 
relation to water and sewage services. 
In past years, SANASA has strengthened its focus on Customer Service and there 
are several courses and training programs for staff that are likely to have to deal with 
customers.  
Users can get access to SANASA through their main office or any of the 12 service 
points available all across the city. There is a mobile unit which travels to different 
places every day and there is a 24-hour call center that receives complains or requests 
for services from SANASA. It is also possible for the customer to contact the utility by 
way of internet, but this communication channel is not used often. SANASA receives 
between 18,000 and 21,000 complaints through its head office and the 12 service 
points. Between 38,000 and 55,000 complaints are received monthly through the call 
centers. All complaints are, in principle, addressed. The worst-case scenario is that it 
takes longer than expected to address a certain complaint. Throughout the years, the 
number of complaints has reduced as SANASA has taken specific actions to address 
the different problems presented in the complaints.  
 
Table 10.15: An overview of customer-orientation 
Indicator Value 
In what ways can the bills be paid? In banks and in lottery selling points 
In what ways does SANASA pro-actively seek the 
opinions/views of its customers? 
Customer surveys 
 
What is the menu of options for service delivery 
that SANASA provides? 
In-house connection, block connection and 
some public stand post for the peri-urban 
communities 
In what ways does SANASA actively inform its 
customers about changes related to service 
provision? 
Newspapers, Internet, radio and “carro de 
som” (speaker car) 
What is the percentage of complaints that is 
addressed? 
100% 
What are the average response times to 
complaints? 
New connection - 11 days, Leaks - 17 
hours.  
Source: Aguiñaga 2004 
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10.2.3 Conclusions 
 
SANASA is a well performing utility, which embarked on its performance 
improvement in 1996 with the arrival of a new managing director. SANASA strengths 
consist of: 
 
• SANASA has considerable autonomy. Its management model of an empresa mixta 
gives it substantial nominal legal autonomy. However, in reality the Municipality 
of Campinas, as SANASA’s major shareholder, has a decisive influence on the 
utility. SANASA is partially financially autonomous. Its lenders hold the utility 
accountable for its performance. 
• SANASA has a strong internal management system. It attracts and maintains 
qualified, experienced and motivated personnel. Its working-group based decision-
making process makes use of its most qualified personnel and provides a 
substantial degree of autonomy to its staff.  
• SANASA captures the benefits of competition between suppliers outside the utility 
through considerable outsourcing. It benchmarks itself vis-à-vis other utilities. 
 
The largest threat for SANASA’s future performance is its limited institutional defense 
against political interference of municipal politicians. Currently SANASA has a very 
good relationship with the Municipality of Campinas, which supports the direction of 
SANASA’s work. The challenge to SANASA is to continue to be successful after the 
municipal government will change in 2004. SANASA’s management is trying to 
consolidate its performance improvements through its Strategic Plan 2010 and its quest 
for ISO 9000 certification.  However, only time will tell whether it will be able to 
institutionalize its good performance by shielding itself from excessive political 
interference in the long run. 
10.3 Hai Phong Water Supply Company, Hai Phong, Vietnam196 
 
Located on the northeastern coast of Vietnam, Hai Phong is the third largest city in 
Vietnam and it is one of four cities with a provincial status197. The Hai Phong Water 
Supply Company (HPWSC) has the responsibility of providing water services to the 1.7 
million inhabitants of the city of Hai Phong. The HPWSC is a statutory body owned by 
the Hai Phong Provincial People’s Committee (HPPC).  
 
 
196 The case description of the Hai Phong Water Supply Company (HPWSC) is based on the 
Master of Science thesis of mr. Do Nhat Hoang, which was undertaken in the period September 
2003-April 2004. In addition, the HPWSC was visited in November 2003, during which 
interviews were held with managers and the former managing director. 
197 The provincial status means that the Hai Phong People’s Committee reports directly to the 
national government 
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Figure 10.3: Governance structure Hai Phong Water Supply Company 
 
As a state-owned enterprise, the HPWSC has to observe the Law on State Enterprises 
of April 20th, 1996. According to this law, state-owned enterprises are granted larger 
autonomy in decision making, to procure inputs, to introduce new technologies, to 
borrow, to acquire or less assets, to hire and fire employees, and to allocate after-tax 
profits. On the other hand, it has the obligation of using capital and other resources 
provided by the government for production and delivery of services with tariffs 
regulated by the government. 
The Transport, Urban and Public Works Department (TUPWS), which operates 
under the HPPC, oversees the management of the service provider. The vice-director of 
TUPWS, who is responsible for overseeing the management of HPWSC, is appointed 
by the HPPC. HPWSC employs 762 employees divided over 5 main departments 
(production, construction, support, project management and consumption). The largest 
of these departments is the consumption department, which is responsible for water 
distribution and customer relations.  
 
Table 10.16: General characteristics HPWSC 2000-2002 
Indicator 2000 2001 2002 
Population served 460900 480000 538,600 
Water supply connections 94724 112,427 131,136 
No of Employees 713 730 762 
Unaccounted for water 44 41 32% 
Working Ratio   = (Annual Operating Costs – Depreciation – 
Funding Charges)/ Annual Gross Revenues) 
0.82 0.67 0.62 
Staff per 1000 connections 7.20 6.49 5.66 
Staff per 1000 population served 1.55 1.382 1.27 
Accounts receivable as a share of annual revenue, expressed 
in months sales 
1 1 0.1 
Service coverage – water supply 75% 
(estimated)
80% 85% 
Average domestic tariff (US$/m3) 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Source: Hoang 2004 
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The facilities operated by HPWSC are designed for treating a total of 176,000 m3 per 
day. The actual daily production is approximately 125,000 m3 per day, which is 
distributed to 87% of the population of Hai Phong by way of a main network measuring 
200 kilometers in length.  
 
10.3.1 Background: Reforms in the Hai Phong Water Supply Company 
 
In the summer of 1993, the city of Hai Phong was faced with an acute water shortage 
resulting in rioting directed against the utility (which even resulted in the death of a 
company employee). As a result, the owner (HPPC) changed the utility management 
team and gave a clear mandate to the new director to produce results. Pressure from 
both the owner and the customers were the initial driver for change in management of 
the utility, with the new managing director as a major instigator of change. The first 
institutional reform was made in 1993. 
The first step in reforming the utility really consisted of a number of steps. The 
managing director received support from the HPPC (as is illustrated by allowing three 
tariff increases in the 1993-1997 period) and received the leeway to implement a new 
model for managing the utility: the ‘phuong’ model (Ahn Thu and Luy 1998:1-3). The 
‘phuong’ is the smallest administrative unit in the Vietnamese administration system 
and encompasses between 10,000 and 15,000 inhabitants. In the ‘phuong’ model, on a 
phuong by phuong basis, the network in the phuong is upgraded and rehabilitated and 
the household connections in that phuong are provided with meters. Each phuong is 
connected to the main network by no more than 3 connections. The limited number of 
connections between the phuong and the main network allow the utility to accurately 
establish the amount of water going into a phuong and the meters at the household 
connections allow the utility to determine the actual consumption by the users. As a 
result the utility is able to accurately monitor the unaccounted-for-water levels per 
‘phuong’. At the same time, customer agencies are established at the ‘phuong’ level. 
These customer agencies both collect the bills that users have to pay as well as receive 
complaints from users. 
In addition to introducing the ‘phuong model’, the new management worked hard 
on changing the corporate culture of the utility (basically convincing everyone of the 
need for change). Training of utility staff, by using international donor support, formed 
an important component of this change process.  
As a result of the reforms in Hai Phong, performance of the HPWSC showed 
impressive improvements over the 1993-2002 period as is illustrated by table 10.17. 
 
Table 10.17: Performance improvements for HPWSC 1993-2002 
Indicator 1992 2002 
Unaccounted for water 73% 32%* 
Service coverage 68% 85% 
Metering  0% 91% 
Staff per 1000 connections n.a. 5.3 
* - figure for 2003; Source: Hoang 2004:20 
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10.3.2 The Degree of Autonomy and Accountability 
 
10.3.2.1 External Autonomy 
 
A number of national and local agencies impact the services provided by the HPWSC. 
At the national level, HPWSC is regulated by the Ministry of Construction (for 
construction standards), by the Ministry of Planning and Investment (for investment), 
and by the Ministry of Finance (for financial operations). The Ministry of Labor and 
Social Affairs set labor policies, to which the utility must adhere. As such, this Ministry 
determines the official salary levels for employees in the HPWSC. In reality, however, 
the HPWSC has considerable flexibility in determining its own pay scales as the 
management of the utility sets the ‘soft’ part of the salary received by the employees198. 
The Ministry of Public Health sets standards for drinking water. Despite this multitude 
of organizations, which regulate the functioning of the HPWSC, only a few agencies at 
the local level influence the functioning of the utility in practice. At the national level, 
the Ministries predominantly play an indirect role through sector policies and 
regulations.  
The HPPC has considerable influence over the water supply company and is 
responsible for decisions relating to investments and tariffs. In the past decade the 
HPPC has provided important support199 to the HPWSC during the introduction and 
implementation of the ‘phuong’ model. This support consisted of providing assistance 
in accessing financial resources (including international loans from FINIDA and the 
World Bank), and by allowing HPWSC to increase its water tariffs five times in the 
past the ten years. Moreover, the HPPC has not interfered much in the day-to-day 
functioning of the utility as no problems with regard to the provision of water services 
have arisen. One area where the influence of the owner is noticeable, however, is in the 
staffing levels of the utility (which continue to increase due to ‘external pressures’ 
despite already having sufficient staff). 
The process of tariff setting is initiated by the HPWSC, which prepares a tariff 
proposal and submits it to TUPWS and the Financial Department. These two 
organizations check the validity of the proposal and then submit it to the HPPC for final 
approval. With water pricing being politically sensitive, increasing tariffs is a long and 
complicated process.  
Service standards in Hai Phong are set by the HPWSC itself. HPWSC uses 
pressure in the network, continuity of supply and response time to complaints as 
indicators for the service standards.  
 
198 In state-owned enterprises in Vietnam, the income of an employee consists of two parts: an 
official or ‘hard’ part and an unofficial or ‘soft’ part of the salary. Nationally, the ‘hard’ salary is 
set by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. This pay scale is applicable for all employees of 
state-owned enterprises. ‘Soft’ salary levels vary from company to company depending on the 
specific policy of each company. Soft salary comes from internal cash of the company. 
According to a recent study by the Ministry of Finance, the ‘soft’ salary is on average two to 
three times higher than the hard salary (Hoang 2004:23). 
199 Also important in this respect is that the managing director of the HPWSC during this period 
of reform was a member of the People Council. This membership provided a useful platform to 
generate support from the government for reforms and tariff increases. 
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The HPWSC uses only surface water for the production of potable water. During 
the 1993 crisis, the utility had difficulties gaining access to sufficient raw water 
resources. Since the unaccounted-for-water level dropped from 72% to close to 30%, 
however, access to raw water sources has not been a problem. 
 
Table 10.18: An overview of external autonomy 
Indicator Value 
Who determines the pay scales for the various levels within the 
utility? 
Government for the hard 
part; utility for the soft part  
What is the basis for appointing members to the Board of Directors? Political representatives 
Is the utility able to take out loans without prior approval from the 
owner? 
No 
Is the utility allowed to terminate service delivery to defaulters? Yes 
Who is responsible for setting tariffs? Owner 
Does the utility follow public sector procurement rules? Yes 
 
10.3.2.2 External Accountability 
 
The HPPC sets annual performance targets that the HPWSC has to meet. These targets 
include total revenue, water production, water consumption, new connections and 
contribution to the owner’s budget. The actual targets that are set appear to be quite low 
in comparison with actual achievements200. It appears that the HPPC does not view the 
performance targets as a way of pressuring the utility to achieve greater efficiency. 
Rather, as long as the HPWSC accomplishes its task of providing reliable water 
services, the HPPC will not intervene.  
The HPWSC submits annual reports to its owner, which include measurable 
performance targets. These performance targets are set relatively low. In case the utility 
performs significantly worse than is expected, the HPPC can dismiss the managing 
director (this last occurred in 1993). Financial reports, including information such as 
balance sheets, financial statements, cash flow, contribution to the city budget, are 
submitted on a monthly and quarterly basis to TUPWS, the local Tax Department and 
the Local Finance Department. End-of-the-year accounts are audited by the HPPC. 
The Hai Phong Preventive Medical Center is the regulator for water quality. This 
agency takes water samples in various locations and tests these in their laboratory. If 
these samples fail to meet national standards, the agency has no authority to apply any 
penalties on the utility. They can only inform the utility and TUPWS. No external 
agency exists for monitoring service standards.  
The utility has to prepare annual reports to international lending agencies (World 
Bank) concerning: revenue, profit, loss and contribution to the city budget. This report 
is audited by firms acceptable to the international lending agencies. 
 
200 Setting targets, which are easy to achieve is not uncommon in government-owned 
organizations. In discussing why contracts often fail to improve performance in the public sector, 
the World Bank (1995:123) mentions evidence that performance targets are often ‘soft’ and set at 
levels that are easy to achieve.  
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No formal customer organizations exist to which HPWSC is accountable. The 
utility does have a standard water supply contract in which rights and obligations of the 
customers are explicitly mentioned. 
 
Table 10.19: An overview of external accountability for results 
Indicator Value 
Does the utility have a customer charter, which specifies 
performance targets and are there any financial penalties for non-
performance? 
No.  
Does the utility have to meet specified performance targets set by or 
agreed upon with the owners? 
Yes (but financial 
performance targets are low) 
Is an annual report produced, which is audited by an external 
accountant? 
Yes 
 
Are external groups represented in advisory or management 
oversight bodies of HPWSC? 
No 
 
Has the utility secured loans in the commercial market on its own 
credentials/ability? 
No 
Does the utility participate in some form of credit rating scheme? No 
Does the lender impose financial covenants on the HPWSC? Yes 
 
10.3.3 Hierarchy and Levels, the Market and Customers 
 
10.3.3.1 Decentralization of Authority within HPWSC 
 
Decision-making in HPWSC is generally highly centralized, with the Managing 
Director making most of the operational decisions. Procurement of goods and services 
is undertaken by the Department of Materials, but any decisions relating to the 
outcontracting of activities, monitoring and replacement of meters, maintenance of 
assets and expansion of the network, is the responsibility of the Managing Director.  
Similarly any decisions concerning the hiring and firing of staff and the possible 
promotion or demotion of staff are to be taken by the Managing Director.  
 
Table 10.20: An overview of decentralization of authority within HPWSC 
Indicator Value 
What is the purchasing ceiling for procurement 
of operational departments as a percentage of 
operational budgets? 
No level exists. All procurement requires 
approval from the Managing Director 
Does the hiring of staff members in departments 
require prior approval from the Managing 
Director? 
Yes 
 
How many layers of management separate the 
Chief Executive and the entry-level workers? 
3 layers 
At what level are internal work processes and 
standards defined? 
Management and departmental level 
In what areas does field-staff have decision-
making powers? 
None 
Source: Hoang 2004 
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10.3.3.2 Internal Accountability for Results 
 
HPWSC has created attractive pay scales in comparison to other public utilities 
operating in Hai Phong and it has connected the ‘soft’ part of the salary to individual 
performances. In the production sector, for example, individual performance is 
measured based on an agreed set of indicators such as chemical and energy 
consumption, and monthly water production. Achievement of set targets will decide the 
magnitude of the ‘soft’ salary. The income of bill collectors is connected to the amount 
of money collected by these collectors. In HPWSC, the average monthly income of a 
bill collector is about VND 1.2 million. The average income level of employees of 
state-owned enterprises in Hai Phong is VND 800,000. 
The performance of the employees is evaluated at the departmental level on 
quarterly basis. The outcomes of these evaluations are sent to the management. The 
management will consider these evaluations based on the nature of work of each 
individual. 
 
Table 10.21: An overview of internal accountability for results 
Indicator Value 
How often does the Chief Executive meet with the Board? Once every month 
Are penalties and rewards applied to the Chief Executive 
and Directors for achieving specified performance targets? 
Penalties and rewards are applied 
(but not financially) 
Are penalties and rewards applied to the staff by the 
management for achieving specified performance targets? 
Rewards and penalties are applied  
(both non- financially and 
financially) 
Is staff subject to annual evaluations on their functioning? Yes 
 
10.3.3.3 Market-orientation 
 
The level of outsourcing in HPWSC is rather limited with less than 6% of its 
operational budget being outcontracted. Part of the explanation may lie in the relatively 
high staffing levels, which minimizes the potential benefits that outcontracting may 
have. 
Benchmarking is in its infant stages in Vietnam. HPWSC does participate in the 
national benchmarking exercise, which covers technical, financial and commercial 
performance. However, the management of HPWSC questions the reliability of the data 
collected from its peers in the sector Therefore, HPWSC does not use the outcomes of 
the benchmarking exercise in its strategic or operational policy. HPWSC does make use 
of benchmarking with foreign water supply companies on an ad hoc basis.  
HPWSC has not engaged in market testing exercises. 
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Table 10.22: An overview of market orientation 
Indicator Value 
What is value of contracts outsourced as a percentage of the 
operational budget? 
5.8% 
What is the nature of the functions that are outsourced? Some non-core functions 
How often does HPWSC engage in benchmarking exercises? Once a year  
In what areas are benchmarking activities undertaken? Water quality; service standards; 
finance and efficiency 
Does HPWSC engage in market testing and does it develop 
internal markets? 
No 
Source: Hoang 2004 
 
10.3.3.4 Customer-orientation 
 
Opinions of customers concerning performance of HPWSC are reflected through public 
media such as TV, radio and newspapers. In addition, there are customer officers in 
‘’phuong’’ offices and suggestion boxes located in the utility main office. These receive 
comments from customers on various aspects of water services such as water quality, 
leakage or accuracy of water meter readings. Customer surveys are normally used to 
obtain opinions from the customers for new projects e.g. expansion of the network to 
new areas.  
In Hai Phong, public media is quite powerful as HPPC is quite sensitive to the 
public opinion. TV, radio and newspapers all established hot lines to receive comments 
from Hai Phong citizens. Those comments related to HPWSC are then transferred to 
HPWSC for clarification.  
The relation between HPWSC and its customers are legalized by standardized 
water supply contracts. The contract specifies rights and obligations of the customers, 
and stipulates the compensation to be made by the utility in case of interruption of 
water supply (although this measure has never been used).  
HPWSC has developed a set of Customer Service Indicators, which incorporates 
measurable indicators for water supply, customer relations and customer development. 
The utility intends to publish this set of indicators to inform all customers about service 
standards. 
 
Table 10.23: An overview of customer-orientation 
Indicator Value 
In what ways can the bills be paid? Bill collector; bank transfer;  ‘’ward’’ 
offices 
In what ways does HPWSC pro-actively seek the 
opinions/views of its customers? 
Suggestion boxes 
What is the menu of options for service delivery that the 
HPWSC provides? 
In-house connections; block 
connections 
In what ways does the HPWSC actively inform its 
customers about changes related to service provision? 
Newspaper advertisements, radio, 
letters 
What is the percentage of complaints that is addressed? 95 % 
Source: Hoang 2004 
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10.3.4 Conclusions 
 
In terms of external autonomy, the HPWSC appears to have considerable autonomy in 
their day-to-day functioning. The utility does not have much difficulty accessing 
financial resources, human resources and has enjoyed considerable support from the 
HPPC for tariff increases over the past decade. The main point of interference appears 
to be in relation to the hiring of additional staff despite already being overstaffed.   
On paper, the HPWSC is strongly accountable to a number of external 
organizations. In practice, however, this accountability appears to be limited. Although 
the utility does have to meet specified performance targets, these seem to have been set 
relatively low, making it relatively easy for the HPWSC to achieve them. In relation to 
water quality the Hai Phong Preventive Medical Center regulates the HPWSC. 
However, this agency has no authority to apply any penalties on the utility if the tested 
samples fail to meet the specified standards. Also no formal customer organizations 
exist to which HPWSC is accountable.  
The level of market-orientation also appears to be low. Less than 6% of the 
operational budget is outcontracted201 and the utility does not engage in market testing. 
Although the utility does partake in annual benchmarking exercises, the management of 
the utility distrusted the figures submitted by the other utilities, severely limiting the 
usefulness and impact of the benchmarking exercise. 
The level of customer-orientation for the utility is high. With the ‘phuong model’ 
each phuong has its own customer services office, where the customers can pay their 
bills and file complaints. As such, the consumers have easy access to the utility. 
The utility remains highly centralized in the sense that many of the decision-
making powers remain with the managing director and these decisions are also 
generally made by the managing director. Only in the field of customer management 
has authority been decentralized to lower levels in the organization. 
The utility has developed a strong level of internal accountability for results by 
letting the level of the ‘soft’ salary depend on results achieved by the employees. This 
‘soft’ salary, which can make up two-thirds of the salary for an employee provides a 
strong incentive to achieve the set results. 
10.4 Servicios de Agua y Drenaje de Monterrey, Mexico202 
 
The state of Nuevo Leon is located in the North of Mexico, on the border with the 
United States. Although the State counts 51 municipalities, political and economic life 
in the State is dominated by the city of Monterrey, which state houses 85% of the 
State’s inhabitants. The Servicios de Agua y Drenaje de Monterrey (SADM) initially 
was responsible for providing service only to the Monterrey Metropolitan Area. 
However, in 1995, its mandate was extended to cover the entire state of Nuevo Leon. In 
addition to providing water services to the population of Nuevo Leon, the utility was 
 
201 The current staffing levels also provide little incentive for the utility to try to achieve 
efficiency gains by way of outcontracting. 
202 The case description of SADM is largely based on Rangel (2005). 
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attributed storm water management functions in 2000. SADM provides these services 
to approximately 3.3-3.5 million people.  
 
 
 
Figure 10.4: Governance structure SADM 
 
SADM is a statutory body, owned by the State of Nuevo Leon. As a statutory body, the 
utility is monitored by a Board of Directors consisting of 7 members. In addition to 
being on the Board of Directors himself, the State Governor appoints one other 
representative of the State Government and one representative of the water users203. 
The other four Directors are appointed by different Stakeholders. One Director 
represents the municipalities and is appointed by the municipality of Monterrey in 
which 85% of the population resides. One representative is appointed by the Nuevo 
Leon Real Estate Owners Chamber, one representative is appointed by the Nuevo Leon 
Industry Chamber and the final representative is appointed by the regional office of the 
National Commerce, Services and Tourism Chamber. The terms of the members of the 
Board vary depending on their appointment. For the members appointed by the State 
Governor their terms coincide with the 6-year term of the Governor himself, the Board 
member for the municipalities has a three-year term (coinciding with the terms of the 
mayors) and the Chambers are able to replace their representatives at any time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
203 There is no standard procedure by way of which the governor appoints the other two Board 
members. They typically tend to be “people of the Governor’s confidence” (Rangel 2005) 
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Table 10.24: General characteristics SADM 
Indicator 2003 2002 2001 
Population served (in millions): 
Water supply 
Wastewater  
 
3.428  
3.373  
 
3.363 
3.373 
 
3.327 
3.263 
Water supply connections 853,752   
No of Employees 3,220 3,187 3,082 
Unaccounted for water 24.9% 23.5% 27.5% 
Working Ratio   0.73 0.73 0.68 
Staff per 1000 connections (water supply) 3.77 3.83 3.85 
Staff per 1000 population served (water supply) 0.94 0.95 0.93 
Service coverage – water supply204 99.18%   
Average customer bill water and wastewater US$10.40   
Source: Rangel 2005 
 
In 2003, the Mexican Commission of Environmental Infrastructure and the National 
Water Commission undertook a performance assessment of 72 utilities, which served 
more than 100,000 people. The criteria used for this assessment included, amongst 
others, indicators on service coverage, wastewater treatment coverage and efficiency of 
service provision. In the final ranking the SADM was ranked first. 
 
10.4.1 The Degree of Autonomy and Accountability of SADM 
 
10.4.1.1 External Autonomy 
 
The Health Secretariat (SSA) is responsible for setting drinking water quality standards 
and has done so by way of NOM-127-SSA1-1994. The Environment and Natural 
Resources Secretariat (SEMARNAT) is responsible for setting standards related to 
discharge of wastewater. SADM must comply with NOM-001-SERMANAT-1996), 
which establishes the limits for pollutants in wastewater that is discharged to national 
water bodies. Although SEMARNAT sets the standards for discharge to national water 
bodies, the National Water Commission (CNA), which operates under the 
SEMARNAT umbrella, is responsible for ‘managing’ of these water bodies, meaning 
that CNA both grants licenses for abstracting water resources as well as authorizes 
discharges of wastewater effluents to national water bodies. CNA is also responsible for 
collecting the payments related to abstraction of resources and discharge of effluents. 
Apart from these federal institutional, the Nuevo Leon Water Commission 
(NLWC) also administers the water sector in the State of Nuevo Leon. The functions of 
the NLWC include: 
 
• To monitor the provision of water supply and sanitation services in the State; 
• To provide advice regarding water projects, policies and tariffs if required; 
• To provide advice regarding water concessions (water rights); 
 
204 Although SADM has the authority to provide water services to the whole state, there are areas 
where SADM has no infrastructure. In these areas, SADM provides (metered) bulk water to the 
municipality, which further distributes the water to the local inhabitants (Rangel 2005:86). 
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• To propose to the state and municipal governments policies, strategies, programs, 
objectives and standards to optimize the exploitation and use of water in the State. 
 
According to the management of SADM, the utility has not been the subject of large-
scale political intervention, as electoral candidates have not used the utility to promote 
their own image. The management believes that this ‘insulation’ from political 
influence is a result of an awareness campaign started in the 1980s, which aims to 
inform the population about providing water services (and the need for them to pay 
their water bills). The SADM tries to fill vacancies internally prior to offering these 
vacancies external candidates. This system of giving preference to internal candidates 
also acts as a buffer against political interference as politicians have limited means to 
offer ‘supporters’ jobs at the SADM. 
The appointment of the General Manager does appear to be influenced by political 
changes as “the General Manager usually changes when the State Governor does” 
(Rangel 2005:91). The General Manager can be removed by the State Governor at any 
time the State Governor desires to do so. The General Manager can appoint the other 
managers in the company without approval from the Board. However, although the 
General Manager tends to alternate with changes in the State Government, other 
managers in the organization do not change that frequently, not even when the political 
party in power changes. This provides a measure of stability to the management team of 
the utility. According to the management of the utility this is one of the success factors 
of the utility (Rangel 2005:122).  
SADM is not authorized to disconnect domestic consumers who default on their 
bills. The utility is allowed, however, to reduce the level of service provision by 
installing valves, which restrict the flow of water. Installation of these valves generally 
occurs after the consumer in question fails to pay three water bills. The utility can 
disconnect non-domestic users and does so when the owner of that connection fails to 
pay his bills. 
The human resources manager of SADM indicates that the labor market in Nuevo 
Leon is mixed. On the one hand, some positions, such as accounts, are relatively easily 
fulfilled. However, more specialized personnel are difficult to find. In these cases the 
utility hires staff with the closet possible profile and fills the remaining gaps with 
training. As the utility is financially autonomous, it has no restrictions on hiring 
additional personnel apart from budgetary restrictions. 
The utility has a good relationship with the labor union. In general the union 
appears to be open to negotiate modifications in the utility when required. This 
openness is conditional, however, to the assurances that modifications do not involve 
retrenchment.  
The utility has adequate access to financial resources. It is stated explicitly in the 
regulations that the utility must be financially self-sufficient by applying cost-
recovering tariffs. This also recognized by the management of SADM and the utility 
depends on tariffs for all its expenses, including financing infrastructure works. In the 
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past the utility has obtained access to financing from International Lending Agencies205 
and the utility was recently evaluated by Fitch ratings and obtained an AA- rating. 
The tariff charged by SADM is automatically adjusted every month using a 
formula stipulated in the State Water Law of Nuevo Leon. The formula incorporates the 
inflation of operating costs for the utility (especially electricity and salary costs) and the 
national inflation index (as reported by the Mexican Central Bank). Adjustments in the 
tariff based on this formula do not require the approval of any authority. However, the 
Board has intervened a few times when they considered further increases inappropriate. 
In 1995, when national inflation levels increased drastically, the Board refused to let 
that increase translate into large tariff increases. A second example of intervention took 
place in 2004, when it was proposed that SADM would not apply the monthly tariff 
increases as long as its surplus finances were healthy enough to absorb the lower real 
tariff rates. SADM started applying the automatic increases again in December 2004.   
SADM uses both groundwater and surface water resources for the production of 
potable water. Currently, the water availability is enough to provide water services 24 
hours per day. However, in the past the utility has faced dry periods, which forced it to 
reduce the number of hours per day that services were provided. The most recent severe 
dry period was in 1997. 
 
Table 10.25: An overview of external autonomy 
Indicator Value 
Who determines the pay scales for the various levels within the 
utility? 
Human Resources 
Director/General Director 
What is the basis for appointing members to the Board of Directors? State Governor appoints 3 
Board members, 4 others 
are appointed by other 
stakeholders 
Is the utility able to take out loans without prior approval from the 
owner? 
Yes 
Is the utility allowed to terminate service delivery to defaulters? No 
Who is responsible for setting tariffs? The Board of Directors, but 
approval from the State 
Governor is required 
Source: Rangel 2005 
 
10.4.1.2 External Accountability 
 
The procedure through which the SSA supervises compliance with NOM-127-SSA1-
1994 is established in NOM-174-SSA1-1998. The SSA does not closely regulate the 
water utility. SADM is responsible for collecting and analyzing its own water samples, 
on which it is then required to report to the SSA. The management of the utility 
mentions that they analyze water samples according to the stipulated procedure. No 
penalties are applicable if the utility fails to meet the specified norms206.  
 
205 In the early 1990s, it managed to obtain a loan from the Inter-American Development Bank for US$180 
million 
206 Although the failure to meet the set standards is not subject to penalties, penalties can be 
imposed for other reasons such as ‘damaging the health of the population’. 
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SADM has obtained licenses for discharging its treated wastewater on national water 
bodies and reports to the CNA every three months regarding the quality of its 
wastewater effluents and the abstraction of water resources. 
Although the Nuevo Leon State Water Law assigns the NLWC the responsibility of 
proposing standards applicable to water supply and sanitation services, it has, to date, 
not issued any standards. 
The State Government has not set any performance targets that the SADM has to 
meet. The State Government can supervise the functioning of the utility through its 
involvement in the Board of Directors. The State Government has also not established 
any penalties or rewards for meeting any levels of performance. 
The SADM is repaying the loan acquired from the IDB in the early 1990s, and 
during the first years of that loan, SADM had to present its income statement, external 
auditor reports, and operation and maintenance reports. If, at that time, SADM would 
have failed to present the required reports, the loan could have been cancelled. 
However, SADM has not failed to meet the requirements and at current SADM does no 
longer have detailed reporting requirements to the IDB.  
Although SADM does not have any reporting requirements to the agencies with 
which it has outstanding loans, the utility, being a State Enterprise, is required to report 
to the State Comptroller. The State Comptroller audits the utility finances and verifies 
that the utility has used the financial resources in accordance with the applicable fiscal 
and financial regulations. 
There is not a formal organization in Nuevo Leon representing the consumers of 
the services of SADM. Although an organization for monitoring the provision of public 
services exists, this organization focuses more on transportation issues.  
 
Table 10.26: An overview of external accountability for results 
Indicator Value 
Does the utility have a customer charter, which specifies performance targets and 
are there any financial penalties for non-performance? 
No 
Does the utility have to meet specified performance targets set by or agreed upon 
with the owners? 
No 
Is an annual report produced, which is audited by an external accountant? Yes 
Are external groups represented in advisory or management oversight bodies of 
SADM? 
Yes 
Has the utility secured loans in the commercial market on its own 
credentials/ability? 
Yes 
Does the utility participate in some form of credit rating scheme? Yes 
Does the lender impose financial covenants on the SADM? No 
Source: Rangel 2005 
 
10.4.2 Hierarchy and Levels, the Market and Customers 
 
10.4.2.1 Decentralization of authority within SADM 
 
In the field of financial management, most of the decisions are made by the 
management of the company but requires approval of the Board of Directors (and as 
such also with the owner). Changes in tariff structures are proposed by the Finance 
 262 
Department in consultation with the general manager and are then submitted to the 
Board of Directors for approval. In case a loan is required, the general manager presents 
a proposal, based on information provided by the Finance Department, for the loan to 
the Board. The Board has to approve the proposal before the utility can apply for the 
loan. 
Decisions in the Operations Department are generally taken by managers in the 
Department and then communicated to the Head of the Operations Department for 
approval. If the decision has a major impact on the provision of services, however, such 
as service interruptions in large areas or for long periods of time, the decisions are made 
by the Head of the Operations Department in consultation with the General Manager. 
The procedures to be followed by the managers and employees within the Operations 
Department are also determined by the Head of that Department. Superintendents, who 
are one level below the managers in the Operations Department, take day-to-day 
decisions. 
In case new staff needs to be hired, prior approval of the General Director is 
required. The General Manager, the Human resources Manager and the Financial 
Department review all new employees. In case an employee is fired, approval from the 
Head of the Department in which that person is working is required. 
Decisions regarding the reduction of water services to customers who have 
defaulted on their bills are taken automatically by the computer system used for billing 
and collection. This computer generates a message, which is sent to the Head Office of 
SADM. From there a message is passed on to the Regional Office for the region in 
which the premises of the defaulting customer is located. Staff of the Regional Office 
then installs the valves for reducing the water flow. This process will take between 24 
hours to 3 days. 
Communication and education campaigns are prepared in the relevant Department 
within the utility. However, prior to being implemented these campaigns require 
approval of the Head of the Administrative Department, the General Manager and in 
some cases the Communications Department of the State Government.  
 
Table 10.27: Key indicators on decentralization of authority within the utility 
Indicator Value 
What is the purchasing ceiling for procurement of operational 
departments as a percentage of operational budgets? 
Depends on the amount. Direct 
procurement can be done up to an 
amount of US$ 1,782 
Does the hiring of staff members in departments require prior 
approval from the Managing Director? 
Yes 
How many layers of management separate the Chief Executive 
and the entry-level workers? 
n.a. 
At what level are internal work processes and standards 
defined? 
Management and Department level 
In what areas does field-staff have decision-making powers? Maintenance, customer service 
Source: Rangel 2005 
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10.4.2.2 Internal Accountability for Results 
 
 There are no real accountability mechanisms between the owners, the State 
Government, and the Board of Directors. Such a mechanism would also seem to be a 
bit superfluous as the State Government has a very strong representation on the Board 
with three out of seven representatives being appointed by the State Government.  As 
such, the State Government has not imposed performance targets on the Board of 
Directors.  
There are monthly meetings involving the Board of Directors and the General 
Manager of the utility. During these meetings the General Manager presents the 
financial and operational status of the utility and these discussed during the meeting. 
The Board of Directive has, however, not set a series of clear and measurable targets 
that must be achieved by the utility. The Board also has no means to reward the General 
Manager should the utility show outstanding performance. 
The evaluation of employees is not subject to a standard one-size-fits-all system. 
Moreover, the utility does not have a strict results-based evaluation system or a process-
based evaluation system. Rather, the nature of evaluation depends on the position of the 
employee. Employees working in operational positions are required to strictly follow 
the work procedures and instructions that they are given. Employees working in 
operational positions can be rewarded by providing them the opportunity to work extra 
shifts, and in doing so increase their income. 
Employees in managerial positions have more room for making decisions and are 
also evaluated differently. Employees in managerial positions are evaluated more on the 
results that their sections or Departments produce. Although no performance contracts 
exist within the utility, each Department and section do have performance indicators 
(such as electricity use, chemicals use, trained employees per year, etc.), which are 
monitored to evaluate the performance of the utility’s managers. The managers are 
furthermore evaluated by their superior every year. The performance evaluation by the 
superior determines the bonus (of up to one month’s salary) that the employee may 
receive. The evaluation of managerial staff is based on performance, responsibility, 
productivity and willingness to work overtime (which is not paid). 
 
Table 10.28: An overview of internal accountability for results 
Indicator Value 
How often does the Chief Executive meet with the Board? Monthly 
Are penalties and rewards applied to the General Manager for achieving specified 
performance targets? 
No 
Are penalties and rewards applied to the staff by the management for achieving 
specified performance targets? 
Yes 
Is staff subject to annual evaluations on their functioning? Yes 
Source: Rangel 2005 
 
10.4.2.3 Market-orientation 
 
In percentages of the operational budget, the SADM outcontracts relatively little. The 
utility tends to use outcontracting mostly for specialized activities although it does try 
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to keep sufficient capacity in-house in cases of an emergency. The way in which the 
utility outcontracts depends on the value of the contract. 
SADM performs some benchmarking activities in order to compare itself with 
other national and international utilities. The benchmarking exercises are generally 
metric benchmarking exercises. In the past it has been difficult to undertake these 
exercises with other Mexican utilities, due to the fact that the utilities were either not 
comparable or essential data for the benchmarking study was missing. SADM usually 
starts a benchmark study when it receives complaints regarding an aspect of service 
delivery. As such, it uses benchmarking to address complaints concerning the tariff 
levels in Nuevo Leon in comparison with other states in Mexico.  
The utility has not developed any internal competition between departments 
 
Table 10.29: An overview of market orientation 
Indicator Value 
What is value of contracts outsourced as a percentage of the 
operational budget? 
<10% 
What is the nature of the functions that are outsourced? Specialized activities only 
(welding, excavation, construction) 
How often does SADM engage in benchmarking exercises? Not periodically 
In what areas are benchmarking activities undertaken? Equipment/technology, overall 
performance 
Does SADM develop internal markets? No 
Source: Rangel 2005 
 
10.4.2.4 Customer-orientation 
 
SADM is fully dependent on its customers for its finances. In order to ensure that its 
customers would continue to provide sufficient revenue SADM has developed a very 
strong customer orientation. Every year, the utility undertakes a survey to measure the 
level of satisfaction of its customers and to receive feedback about the services they 
provide. In addition SADM has suggestion boxes in all offices where customers may be 
in order to receive comments and suggestions from its consumers.  
Any employee of the utility that comes in contact with customers is trained in 
customer management. Training courses include client management techniques that 
allow the employee to treat the customer “with kindness and courtesy” (Rangel 
2005:111). 
The utility also proactively informs the customers about developments concerning 
the provision of water services. Apart from several for a provided by various types of 
media (such as a weekly one-hour radio program in which customer complaints and 
suggestions are addressed207), SADM has an up to date website, which information 
about the company, an overview of performance of the company and a possibility to 
contact the company to send comments and complaints. In addition to these activities, 
the utility also organizes educational and public relations campaigns including an 
annual summer program to reinforce water awareness during the dry period of the year. 
 
207 In this weekly radio program inhabitants of Nuevo Leon can phone the radio program and 
express their complaints and suggestions on the air. 
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Also SADM has entered into agreements with supermarkets, pizza stores, and other 
store chains to include messages related to water saving measures and SADM in 
general on their packaging material. 
The customers also officially have a representative on the Board of Directors. 
However, the State Governor appoints this representative and it is uncertain how 
independent this representative is. 
Complaints and survey results are organized by specific topics. SADM then 
designates working groups to determine if a specific topic about which complaints have 
arrived requires SADM to develop and implement a project in order to address the 
complaints or if the topic can be addressed in another way. As such, SADM uses the 
complaints as a means for identifying potential projects and actions that allow the 
utility to serve its customers better. For example, following received comments and 
complaints the Human Resources and Commercial Department started scheduling 
holiday periods for the employees in a stepped way in order to avoid having the 
customer counters understaffed (and thus reduce waiting times which is the main 
complaints the company receives). Another way for addressing this complaint was by 
making arrangements for the customer to pay in a variety of locations such as 
convenience stores, supermarkets, banks and even through the internet by way of a 
credit card. 
 
Table 10.30: An overview of customer-orientation 
Indicator Value 
In what ways can the bills be paid? At SADM offices, convenience stores, 
supermarkets, through internet, banks 
In what ways does SADM pro-actively seek the 
opinions/views of its customers? 
Through suggestions boxes, a radio-
program, annual survey, internet. 
What is the menu of options for service delivery 
that the SADM provides? 
In-house connections, bulk water delivery 
to some municipalities 
In what ways does the SADM actively inform its 
customers about changes related to service 
provision? 
Newspaper advertisements, radio, and 
leaflets 
What is the percentage of complaints that is 
addressed? 
All complaints are addressed within 3 days 
Source: Rangel 2005 
 
10.4.3 Conclusion 
 
The SADM appears to enjoy considerable autonomy. The management believes the 
utility is ‘insulated’ from political influences by both institutional measures (4 of 7 
Directors of the Board are appointed by other parties than the State Government, a 
preference for filling vacancies internally) as well as cultural characteristics strong 
consumer awareness, history of limited political intervention). In some ways this 
insulation also is apparent. Despite the General Manager changing with changes in the 
State Government, the rest of the managerial staff is relatively stable. With automatic 
tariff increases based on two inflation indices, the utility also does not have annual 
struggles for support with the State Government. However, one question that remains is 
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if this insulation will remain in existence in the future if the State Governor were really 
to push for increasing his influence over the utility. 
Although some difficulties exist with respect to access to suitable human resources 
and water resource, these are not difficulties that threaten the good performance of 
SADM in the short run. SADM’s impressive track record, and an AA- credit rating, 
means that access to financial resources is not a real problem for SADM.  
On paper, the SADM appears to have considerable accountability to a number of 
external organizations. These organizations include the State Government Comptroller, 
the National Water Commission and the Ministry of Health. Accountability between the 
utility and the owner seems to have been arranged through the Board of Directors in 
which the Owner is strongly represented. 
The level of market-orientation appears to be quite low. Outcontracting levels are 
well below 10% and the utility appears to specifically focus on outcontracting certain 
specialized activities. This means the utility does not primarily use outcontracting as 
tool to increase efficiency by creating competition between suppliers. Although the 
utility does undertake sporadic benchmarking exercises, the use of these exercises 
appears to be more ad-hoc in nature. Also, the main reasons for initiating these 
exercises does not appear to be a comparison with other utilities with the aim of 
increasing efficiency and performance, but rather to address customer complaints.  
SADM’s focus on customer-orientation is very high. The utility is fully dependent 
on the tariffs it charges to its customers for financing its operations and its investments. 
In addition, the utility goes to great lengths to seek its customer’s opinions and to 
address any complaints and suggestions they receive. The utility also invests in training 
staff that deals with customers during their work.  
The utility remains quite centralized in the sense that many of the decision-making 
powers remain with the general manager and the Heads of the various Departments in 
the organization. Illustrative are the hiring procedures, which require the General 
Manager to review any new recruits. 
The utility has developed a level of internal accountability for results by 
introducing incentives for both employees with operational positions as performance-
based bonuses for staff in managerial positions. At the same time, although monthly 
meetings occur between the Board of Directors and the General Manager of SADM, the 
management is not subject to any performance targets. 
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11 Annex 3: Guidelines for Data Collection 
11.1 Establishing the Degree of Autonomy and Accountability of the 
Utilities 
 
11.1.1 Policy Formulation 
 
• Which organization is responsible for setting quality standards for water supply 
and waste water treatment? 
• What are the standards for water supply and wastewater treatment with which the 
utility must comply? 
• Which organization is responsible for setting service standards to which the utility 
must adhere? 
• What service standards are specified? 
• Which organization is responsible for the permits concerning the use of water 
resources? 
• Which organization is responsible for determining the institutional set-up of the 
water supply and sanitation sector?  
 
11.1.2 Regulation 
 
Regulation, as it is used here, in essence relates to enforcing regulations that have been 
formulated by the organizations responsible for policy formulation 
• What organization is responsible for ensuring that the utility meets the standards 
for water supply and wastewater treatment that have been set?  
• Does the organization do its job? 
• What organization is responsible for ensuring that the service standards for 
provision of services have been met?  
• Does the organization do its job? 
• Which organization is responsible for economic regulation (tariffs) of the utility?  
• Does the organization do its job? 
• How often do the regulator and the utility meet? 
 
11.1.3 The Legal Authority of the Utility 
 
• Description of the legal status of the utility (what type of organization is the 
utility?)  
• Which type is the utility in terms of taxonomy? 
• Which organization owns the utility? 
• What is the general governance structure of the utility as specified by laws and 
statutes? 
− What is the mandate of the Board? 
− How are decisions taken within the Board? 
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− What is the basis for selection of the Board Members? 
• What are the responsibilities of the utility and to what criteria must the utility 
adhere (for example financial self-sustainability) as defined by law and statutes? 
 
11.1.4 Political Commitment and Support 
 
• What is the nature of political support and commitment to the utility? 
- Description of the working relationship between the political environment 
and the utility; 
- Is the Managing Director appointed based on political affiliation? 
- Is the utility allowed to terminate service provision to defaulters? 
- How strong is the influence of the Union? 
- Has the utility received political support for the increase of tariffs over the 
past years? 
 
11.1.5 Resources 
 
• What is the condition of the labor market?  
is it possible to attract qualified staff to the utility? − 
− 
− 
− 
− 
− 
Can the utility determine its own pay scales? 
does the utility face any constraints or obligations on the recruitment of staff? 
• What is the availability and quality of natural resources required for providing 
water and sanitation services? 
• From what sources does the utility have access to financial resources? 
Is the availability of financial resources sufficient? 
What is the bond rating/credit rating of the utility? 
What is the proportion of funds coming from: loans, ‘grants’, ‘subsidies’, and 
internal cash?  
 
Key Performance Measures: External Autonomy 
1. Who determines the pay-scales for the various levels within the utility? 
(General managers, Managing Director, Board of Directors, Owner, 
Government)What is the basis for appointing members to the Board of 
Directors? (political representatives, representatives of the community, (sector) 
professionals, other) 
2. Is the utility able to take out loans without prior approval from the owner? 
(yes, until a certain amount, no) 
3. Is the utility allowed to terminate service delivery to defaulters? (yes, no) 
4. Who is responsible for setting tariffs? (Managing Director, Board of Directors, 
Owner, Regulator/Government) 
5. Does the utility follow public sector procurement rules (yes, no) 
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11.1.6 Accountability for Results 
 
11.1.6.1 Performance Targets 
 
The questions below, relate to performance targets in relation to the effectiveness as 
well as the efficiency of service provision. 
• Do a set of clear and measurable performance targets exist for the quality of 
drinking water?  
• If so, is there a transparent, adequate and agreed upon system for measuring 
achievement of these targets?  
• Is the system used? 
• Do a set of clear and measurable performance targets exist for the treatment of 
wastewater?  
• If so, is there a transparent, adequate and agreed upon system for measuring 
achievement of these targets? 
• Do a set of clear and measurable performance targets exist for the services 
provided?  
• If so, is there a transparent, adequate and agreed upon system for measuring 
achievement of these targets? 
• Do a set of clear and measurable financial performance targets exist for the 
functioning of the utility?  
• If so, is there a transparent, adequate and agreed upon system for measuring 
achievement of these targets? 
• Are the set performance targets realistic and achievable? 
 
11.1.6.2 Accountability to Owner 
 
What are the reporting requirements that the utility must adhere to? 
• How often do the owners meet with the management oversight agency? 
• Do the owners provide clear and measurable targets that must be achieved by the 
utility? 
• What are the measures that the owners can take if performance is not in line with 
the expected and agreed upon performance targets? 
• Have these measures ever been used? 
 
11.1.6.3 Accountability to Regulator 
 
11.1.6.3.1 Quality  
• What is the procedure (reporting requirements, etc.) that is used to regulate the 
utility’s achievement of the specified standards for water supply and wastewater 
treatment? 
• What are the measures (penalties and rewards) that this organization has to ensure 
that the utility complies with these standards? 
• To what extent has the regulator applied these measures to the utility? 
• Are the reports publicly accessible? 
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11.1.6.3.2 Service Standards 
• What is the procedure (reporting requirements, etc.) that is used to regulate the 
utility’s achievement of the specified service standards? 
• What are the measures (penalties and rewards) that this organization has to ensure 
that the utility complies with these standards? 
• To what extent has the regulator applied these measures to the utility? 
• Are the reports publicly accessible? 
 
11.1.6.3.3 Tariffs 
• What is the procedure used for establishing tariffs of the utility (i.e. tariff setting 
procedures)?  
 
11.1.6.4 Investment requirements  
 
• Is the utility subject to minimum investment requirements? 
• If so, what are these requirements and what is the procedure in which these 
requirements are determined? 
• What are the measures that can be taken to ensure that the utility complies with 
these standards? 
• To what extent have these measures been applied? 
 
11.1.6.5 Accountability to Financial Institutions 
 
• What are the reporting requirements that the utility must adhere to in order to 
satisfy the institutions that have provided loans or grants to the utility?  
• What are the measures that the financial institutions can take when the utility has 
not met these requirements? 
• To what extent has the application of such measures occurred? 
• Does the lender impose financial covenants on the utility?  
• If so, which? 
 
11.1.6.6 Accountability to Customer Organizations 
 
• Is there a formal customer organization, which represents the interests of the 
consumers? 
• If so, what are the powers of this organization? 
• To what extent are these powers used? 
• Are customers in any other (formal) way involved in the functioning of the utility? 
• Does the utility publicly report on its performance? 
• Are customer organizations represented on the Board? 
• Is there a customer charter in which the rights and obligations of the customers are 
explicitly mentioned? 
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11.1.6.7 Accountability to Non-governmental Special Interest Groups  
 
• Are there any non-governmental special interest groups, which have involved 
themselves with the functioning of the utility? 
• What has been the nature of their involvement? 
• Has the utility been subject of many media reports? 
• If so, what has been the nature of these media reports? 
 
Key Performance Measures: External Accountability 
1. Does the utility have a customer charter which specifies performance targets 
and are there any financial penalties for non-performance? (yes, yes but 
without specified targets/financial penalties, no) 
2. Does the utility have to meet specified performance targets set by or agreed 
upon with the owners? (yes, no) 
3. Is an annual report produced which is audited by an external accountant? (yes, 
yes but not audited, no) 
4. Are external groups represented in advisory or management oversight bodies 
of the utility? (NGO’s, customer groups, government, financing institutions, 
owners) 
5. Has the utility secured loans in the commercial market on its own 
credentials/ability? (yes, no) 
6. Does the utility participate in some credit rating scheme? (yes, no) 
7. Does the lender impose financial covenants on the utility? (yes, no) 
 
11.2 Hierarchy and Levels, the Market and Customers 
 
11.2.1 Corporate Culture  
 
Aspects of this dimension that should be described in each of the case studies include:  
 
• History of the utility; 
• Organizational chart; 
• Description of the functional differentiation within the organization and the 
deployment of staff over the different functions;  
• Broad responsibilities of the departments in the utility; 
• What are the mission and vision of the utility? Is this mission and vision well 
known by the employees? 
• Are there any mechanisms for information sharing between departments?  
• Does the utility invest in the training of its staff? 
• What are the factors influencing promotion and/or salary adjustment? 
• What are the mechanisms by way of which information is shared between 
management and the departments? 
• What is rate of absenteeism? 
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• What is the annual staff turnover per year? What are the main reasons for staff 
turnover? 
 
Key Performance Measures: Corporate Culture 
1. Factors influencing promotion and/or salary adjustment decisions? (longevity, 
performance review, certification, meeting performance targets, collective 
bargaining, other) 
2. Annual staff turnover (as a percentage of total staff)?  
3. What are the training costs per year as a percentage of operational budget? (%) 
4. Is the staff informed about meetings of management? (yes, partially, no) 
5. What is the ratio of support/technical staff to management? (x:y) 
6. Is the mission statement internally visible in the utility (yes, no) 
 
11.2.2 Market orientation 
 
• The use of outcontracting of tasks and responsibilities in service provision  
o What is the degree of outcontracting (number of contracts and % of 
operational budget)? 
o What is the nature of the services and tasks that are outcontracted and 
what is the nature of these outcontracting arrangements? 
o What are the processes by which services are outcontracted (are there 
multiple procedures or one standard one, etc.)? 
o What is the company philosophy towards outcontracting? 
• The use of bench-marking in the utility 
o Does the utility partake in bench-marking exercises? 
o What areas do these bench-marking exercises cover? 
o What is the nature of these exercises? 
o What is the frequency of these bench-marking exercises? 
o Are the outcomes of these bench-marking exercises translated into 
strategic and operational policy? 
o What is the company philosophy towards benchmarking? 
 
       Key Performance Measures: Market-orientation 
1. What is value of contracts outsourced as a percentage of the operational 
budget? 
2. What is the nature of the functions that are outsourced? (non-core functions, 
billing/collections, treatment operations, works, engineering design, other) 
3. How often does the utility engage in bench-marking exercises? (never, once a 
year, once every two years, once every three years, other) 
4. In what areas are bench-marking activities undertaken? (water quality, service, 
environment, finance and efficiency, other) 
5. Does the utility engage in market testing and does it develop internal markets? 
(yes to both, only market testing, only internal markets, neither) 
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11.2.3 Customer-orientation 
 
To assess to what extent a utility has adopted a customer-orientation the following 
aspects are to be investigated: 
 
• To what extent is the utility dependent on its customers for financing? 
• Are any instruments/practices employed to establish what the opinions of the 
customers are concerning the functioning of the utility? (for example, customer 
surveys, customer councils, focus groups, customer interviews, etc.) 
• How are these results incorporated in the operation of the utility? 
• Are any instruments in place which arrange for ‘rights’ of the customers? (for 
example, customer charters, customer contracts, etc.) 
• Do these arrangements also incorporate compensation payments in case the utility 
fails to meet its responsibilities? 
• Are any instruments/practices in place to train employees of the utility in dealing 
with customers? (customer service training)  
• What are the ways in which customers can get access to the utility? (phone, in 
person, internet, etc.) 
• To what extent are customers involved in decision making in the utility? 
(suggestion boxes, customer councils, etc.) 
• What has been the number and nature of complaints over the past years? 
• What percentage of these complaints has been successfully addressed? 
• Has the number increased or decreased? 
• Has the nature of the complaints changed? 
• How does the utility use the information generated by the complaints? 
• Does the utility organize town hall type meetings for their customers? How often, 
on which subjects? 
• Does the utility perform customer surveys? 
• How does the utility reports its performance to its customers. 
 
 Key Performance Measures: Customer-orientation 
1. In what ways can the bills be paid? (bank, bill collector, shops, bank transfer, 
other) 
2. In what ways does the utility pro-actively seek the opinions/views of the 
customers? (customer survey, customer councils, focus groups, suggestion boxes, 
other) 
3. What is the menu of options for service delivery that the utility provides? (in-
house connection, block connection, public standpost, other) 
4. In what ways does the utility actively inform the customer about changes related to 
service provision? (flyer, internet, newspaper advertisements, radio, letter, other) 
5. What is the percentage of complaints that is addressed?  
6. What is the average response time to complaints? 
7. Does the utility perform customer surveys? 
 274 
11.2.4 Decentralization of responsibilities within the utility 
 
To assess to what degree the decision-making responsibilities have been decentralized 
within the utility four broad categories have been selected: financial management, 
operations management, human resources management and customer management. The 
idea is to establish at what level in the utility the decisions in each category are made. 
 
11.2.4.1 Financial Management 
 
The case study should document (if applicable) at what level within the utility decisions 
are made about: 
 
• The billing and collection for services 
• The determination of the tariff structure 
• The setting of water tariffs and connection fees 
• The entering of loan agreements (decisions about capital sourcing) 
• The appointment of an external auditor 
 
11.2.4.2 Operations Management 
 
Operations and Maintenance of the facilities for service provision are key activities for 
every service provider. The case study should provide information about the level at 
which decisions are made with respect to: 
 
• The procurement of goods and services 
• The procurement of assets 
• The definition of internal work processes and standards 
• The outcontracting of activities 
• Rehabilitation of the existing network and facilities 
• Expansion of the network 
• Maintenance of assets 
• The monitoring and replacement of meters 
• The strategy for reducing unaccounted for water 
• Increasing energy efficiency 
 
11.2.4.3 Human Resources Management 
 
In the category of human resources management, information regarding the level at 
which the following decisions are made should be included:  
 
• The hiring and firing of individual staff members 
• The promotion and demotion of individual staff members 
• The determining of the salary and incentive structure of employees 
• The hiring and firing of the Managing Director 
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11.2.4.4 Customer Management 
 
The case study should indicate at what level decisions are made relating to: 
 
• The termination of service provision to defaulters 
• The way in which customer complaints are dealt with 
• Educational and PR campaigns 
• Establishing the alternative ways in which bills can be paid 
 
Key Performance Measures: Decentralization of authority 
1. What is the purchase ceiling for procurement of operational department(s) as a 
percentage of operational budget? 
2. Does the hiring of staff members in departments require prior approval from 
the managing director? (yes, for some positions, no) 
3. How many layers of management separate the utility director and the entry 
level worker? 
4. At what level are internal work processes and standards defined? (management 
level, management and department level, department level) 
5. In what areas does field-staff have decision-making powers? (none, 
billing/collection, disconnection, maintenance, customer services, other) 
 
11.2.5 Accountability for Results 
 
Assessing the internal accountability for results will be done by investigating two 
‘accountability relationships’. These are the relationship between the service provider 
and the management oversight agency and accountability within the service provider. 
 
11.2.5.1 Between the Management Oversight Agency and the Service Provider 
 
• What are the reporting requirements that the service provider must adhere to? 
• Does the managing director of the service provider sit on the management 
oversight board (as an observer or a member)? 
• How often do the Management oversight agency and the management of the 
service provider meet? 
• How often does the management oversight board meet? 
• Does the management oversight agency provide clear and measurable targets that 
must be achieved by the service provider? 
• What are possible measures that the Management oversight agency can take when 
the service provider does not achieve the agreed upon performance targets? 
• Have these measures ever been used? 
• Can the Management Oversight Agency reward the Management of the Service 
providers for achieving performance targets?  
• If so, how and how frequently are these rewards used? 
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11.2.5.2 Within the Service Provider  
 
• How is the performance in the utility measured? 
• How is the performance of the employees evaluated? 
• To what extent are the accountability mechanisms based on procedural 
accountability and to what extent on the achievement of performance targets? 
• Does the utility use (internal) performance contracts? (either personnel contracts or 
contracts between departments) 
• If performance is evaluated against set performance targets, what measures are 
available to punish or reward the employee with failing to achieve or succeeding to 
achieve the performance targets? 
• How does that system of penalties and rewards work? 
• How often are penalties imposed? 
• How often are rewards imposed? 
 
Key Performance Measures: Internal Accountability for Results 
1. How often does the managing director meet with the Board? (once every two 
weeks, once every month, once every two months, once every 6 months, other) 
2. Are penalties and rewards applied to the Managing Director/Executive Directors 
by the Board of Directors for achieving specified performance targets? (no 
performance targets exist, performance targets exist but no rewards and penalties 
are applied, only rewards are applied, rewards and penalties are applied) 
3. Are penalties and rewards applied to the staff by the management for achieving 
specified performance targets? (no performance targets exist, performance targets 
exist but no rewards and penalties are applied, only rewards are applied, rewards 
and penalties are applied) 
4. Staff is subject to annual evaluations on their functioning in the utility? (yes, no) 
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12 Annex 4: Overview of Interviews in the 
State of Guanajuato  
 
General 
Name Organization Position 
Ricardo Sandoval CEAG Director 
Raul Silva CEAG Water Supply and 
Sanitation 
Victor Lara Independent Consultant Consultant 
 
CMAPADH 
Name Area 
Javier Carrizo Managing director 
Dario Romero Treasurer 
Graciela Gonzalez Human Resources 
Margarita Rangel Computing 
Alma Angelica Mtz. Accountant 
Francisco Alvarado Technical Department 
Carmen Rodriguez Contracts 
 
SIMAPAG 
Name Area 
Ruben Rodriguez President Board of Directors 
Marco Antonio Ortiz Managing Director 
Alejandro Torres Commercial Department 
Hugo Mendez Wastewater 
Arturo Magaña Public Relations 
Andres Balderas Water Supply 
Jose Luis Administration 
Silvia Gutierrez Lara Institutional Development 
 
SMAPAM 
Name Position 
Abel Ortega President Board of Directors 
Jesus Esquipulas Managing Director and Technical 
Department 
Sandra Ramirez Accounting 
Maribel Oseguera Billing 
Martin Ibarra Pumping 
Margarita Calderon Customer Management 
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SAPAF 
Name Area 
Nemecio Armenta Managing Director 
Jose Luis Chagoya Accounting 
Isaias Martinez Municipality 
Sergio Mendez President Board of Directors 
Jose Luz Chavez Commercial Department 
 
SAPAM 
Name Area 
Luis Manuel Flores Incoming Director 
Juan Ramirez Former Director 
Sergio Rivera Administrative Coordinator 
Efrain Orozco Social communication 
Marcelina Arredonde Commercial Department 
Juvenal Barron Technical Coordinator 
Martin Donovan Contreras Customer council 
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Summary 
Despite strong encouragement of many international financing and development 
agencies to stimulate private sector involvement in the water supply and sanitation 
sector, the overwhelming majority of water supply and sanitation services are still 
provided by public sector organizations in most middle- and low-income countries. In 
many low and middle-income countries, however, public water utilities are not 
providing adequate water supply and sanitation services to its consumers. The 
consequences of poor service provision in terms of health and financial costs to 
especially the low-income households are enormous. At the same time, the 
disappointing experiences with private sector involvement in the water supply and 
sanitation sector have lead to the acknowledgement that the overwhelming majority of 
people will continue to be serviced by public water utilities for many years to come.  
In response to the poor performance of many public water utilities, the 
implementation of New Public Management (NPM) reforms has been promoted heavily 
by international agencies and sector professionals. The New Public Management, which 
has its roots in Managerialism and Public Choice theory, originated in New Zealand 
and the United Kingdom in the early 1980s. Since then, it has become something of a 
generic term to describe a market-oriented and output-based management model with 
an increased emphasis on user-orientation, most-commonly by ‘business’ style 
measures. Although the actual effectiveness of NPM reforms for developing countries 
has been questioned and empirical evidence for the impact of the New Public 
Management in the water supply and sanitation sector remains rather thin, a 
considerable number of authors contend that it is proving to have a significant impact 
on improving service provision of public water utilities. The present study examines the 
potential of reforms associated with the New Public Management and contrasts these 
reforms with reforms associated with the bureaucratic model of public administration, 
the so-called Weberian reforms. The main research questions that underlie this thesis 
are: 
 
• Do urban public water utilities in low- and middle-income countries perform better 
because they adhere to the New Public Management?  
• Do poorly performing urban public water utilities adhere to the traditional 
‘bureaucratic’ model of public management?   
 
Introductory Chapters: Two introductory chapters (chapter two and chapter three) orient 
the reader to the main theme of this study. The first of these chapters serves to 
introduce issues in the management of water services which are important to highlight 
in order to understand the research. Issues examined in this chapter include the 
organization of water services, the factors underlying the organization of water 
services, the prevalence of public water utilities and the way in which performance of a 
water utility can be measured. The second introductory chapter contains an introduction 
to two models of public management (the bureaucratic model and the New Public 
Management) which feature prominently in this study. The bureaucratic model is 
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largely based on Weber’s ideal-type bureaucracy. The New Public Management is 
defined by comparing the definitions provided by a number of authoritative authors. 
For both models, existing criticism of the model is also elaborated upon. On the basis of 
the discussions in the introductory chapters the two main hypotheses were translated 
into 12 propositions, which were subsequently tested in the case studies selected for this 
study. Six proposition linked good performance to the New Public Management model. 
Six other propositions linked poor performance to the ‘traditional’ bureaucratic model 
of management. 
 
Research Methodology: The research methodology underlying this study is based on 
case study research of two clusters of case studies. The first cluster concerns five 
municipal water utilities in the State of Guanajuato, Mexico. As the main hypotheses 
both revolve around the issue of performance and management models, the five case 
studies that were selected in the State of Guanajuato had to show varying performance. 
The idea being that this variation in performance could then be explained by a different 
pattern of adherence to one of the public management models, as the propositions 
would suggest. The second cluster of case studies concerns two cases from Latin 
America, one from Africa and one from Asia. What makes these cases interesting is 
that all these cases are viewed and promoted as examples of well performing public 
water utilities. The main purpose of researching these cases is to check if the findings 
from the five cases in Guanajuato are corroborated by evidence from these four cases.  
 
Findings from the Case Studies in Guanajuato:    
Proposition 1, which reads that well performing public utilities have a large degree of 
external autonomy has not been not falsified by the research findings in Guanajuato. Of 
specific importance in explaining performance of a utility appears to be the degree of 
financial autonomy that a utility enjoys.  
Proposition 2 stipulates that a well performing utility is strongly accountable for 
results to external organizations. In the understanding that individual customers do not 
represent external organizations and in light of the fact that the utilities were not subject 
to meeting specified results, this proposition is falsified.  
The level of market-orientation was low for all organizations, be they poorly 
performing or well performing. As such, the proposition (number 3) that a well 
performing utility has a strong market-orientation is not supported by the findings from 
the cases. 
The best performing utility was, by far, the most customer-oriented of the utilities. 
As the chairman of the Consejo of that utility explained in 2003, the reason why the 
strong customer orientation was developed is because the customers have become more 
demanding as a result of the relatively high tariffs the utility charges. These 
observations lead to the conclusion that proposition number 4, which states that well 
performing utilities have a high level of customer orientation has not been falsified. 
In all researched cases the employees working in the public utilities operated 
within and according to the limits set by the established procedures. Making decisions 
was largely limited to applying the exiting procedure for a specific decision. If the issue 
to be decided upon concerned something not covered by existing procedures and 
policies, the matter would need to be referred to the superiors of the employee. As such, 
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proposition 5, which suggests that a well performing utility has a strong 
decentralization, is falsified.  
Although the best performing utility was more advanced in developing and 
implementing (internal) accountability mechanisms, these mechanisms did as of yet not 
hold the employees, be they management employees or not, accountable for results. 
Both the evaluation of management employees as well as non-management employees 
was relatively subjective. In the understanding that the existing accountability systems 
did not hold the employees accountable for results, no evidence was found in the cases 
to support proposition 6, which finds that well performing public utilities have a strong 
accountability for results within the organization. 
Proposition 7, which states that poorly performing utilities are ‘apolitical’ has been 
falsified. In the case of Guanajuato, all poorly performing utilities proved to be highly 
politicized.  
Proposition 8 puts forward that poorly performing utilities are characterized by 
hierarchal levels and organized on a rule-governed basis. When analyzing the poorly 
performing cases, all cases were indeed characterized by hierarchical levels in which 
lower offices were subordinate to higher offices. As such, the proposition as stated is 
not falsified.  
Little evidence was found to support proposition 9, which proposes that poorly 
performing utilities are characterized by permanence and stability. Three out of the four 
poorly performing utilities in Guanajuato were relatively unstable organizations with 
frequent changes in the management of the utility. The well performing utility, on the 
other hand was relatively stable in the 1995-2003 period. 
Proposition 10 turned out to be one of the more problematic propositions as it 
stated that poorly performing utilities operate following internal regulations. On the one 
hand, this proposition has been falsified as findings indicate that the regulations on 
paper are not necessarily enacted in practice (as, for example, the appointment of the 
Consejo shows). On the other hand, at lower levels within the organization, the 
regulations are more strictly adhered to. These regulations basically form the guideline 
for the employees and these generally follow these regulations. As such, if the 
proposition had been limited to lower levels within the organization, the proposition 
would not have been not falsified. Within the context of this research, however, the 
proposition, which is assumed to cover the entire organization, is considered falsified. 
In terms of the remuneration of employees the research found that poorly 
functioning utilities indeed mainly remunerated the employees according to a fixed 
salary. Although a few schemes for bonuses were established, remuneration 
overwhelmingly follows fixed salaries or the bonus schemes were such that they were 
de facto part of the fixed salaries. This means that proposition 11 has not been falsified. 
In terms of vocation, it was found that the main reasons why the poorly performing 
public utilities were attractive employers was their favorable working hours and the 
promise of job security, which was especially valued in the more industrialized towns, 
which were experiencing the stress of global competition in their industries. As such, 
little support could be found for proposition 12. 
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Findings from the Four Well-performing Utilities:    
The findings from previous cluster of cases are largely supported by the findings from 
the four well performing utilities. However, some qualifications regarding this broad 
conclusion should be made. Although the proposition regarding external autonomy has 
not been falsified, this conclusion is subject to some comments. The concept of 
(external) autonomy as used in this research is composed of a few dimensions and some 
dimensions appear to be more important than others. Most important appear to be 
financial autonomy of the utility and stability in the management of the utility (which 
can be interpreted as a reflection of political support for the management of the utility). 
Also, all ‘well performing’ utilities were able to attract qualified staff to work for the 
utility. This indicates that both in terms of financial resources and human resources 
these utilities had considerable capacity for providing water services. Dimensions of 
autonomy that seemed less important relate to the availability of water resources and 
the role played by regulatory agencies.   
Well performing public utilities do appear to have a strong accountability to the 
government-owners who remain firmly in control of the utility. However, this control 
does not incorporate the use of performance targets to hold the management of the 
utility accountable for results produced. Moreover, accountability to regulatory 
agencies (who have never imposed sanctions), to customer agencies and to NGOs 
appears to be very limited. The only real accountability for results found was 
accountability to financial institutions that have lent or granted money to the utility. In 
the well performing cases these institutions often did impose performance targets.  
The reasoning behind the conclusion that well performing utilities have not 
decentralized authority for decision-making is that in many areas, such as procurement, 
hiring and firing of staff, all of the utilities are highly centralized. In summary, 
decisions, which have financial implications, remain centralized. Moreover, in the areas 
where decision-making has been decentralized, i.e. customer management, employees 
can do little else than apply existing guidelines.    
Similar to the conclusions regarding the cases in Guanajuato, interpreting the 
findings for internal accountability for results presents something of a challenge. This is 
because the findings do not lead to a clear-cut conclusion regarding this proposition. 
For the ‘well performing’ cases the picture is mixed, with some utilities having strong 
levels of accountability related to performance, whilst the remaining utilities have fewer 
mechanisms for accountability.  
 
Conclusions: 
The researched case studies did not provide a coherent picture of well performing 
utilities implementing the NPM model. Rather, the well performing utilities appear to 
adhere to only a few of the elements of the NPM (in particular external autonomy and 
customer-orientation). An important qualification that has to be raised in relation to this 
finding is the question if these elements can only be traced back to the NPM. The main 
point here is that a dimension such as ‘autonomy’ may be an important element of the 
NPM model, but the NPM does not have a monopoly on the concept of ‘autonomy’. 
The conclusion is then that the hypothesis that well performing utilities adhere to the 
NPM model is falsified.  
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In addition to finding that well performing utilities have only implemented a few of 
the elements of the NPM model, the study found that the only elements of the 
bureaucratic model that poorly performing utilities adhere to is that they are 
characterized by hierarchy and levels and operate according to internal regulations. 
However, this also applies very much to well performing utilities and as such, this 
characteristic does not differentiate between well performing and poorly performing 
utilities. As such, the hypothesis that poorly performing utilities adhere to the 
bureaucratic model of public management is also falsified.  
 
Financial Autonomy and Customer Orientation 
The dimensions of external autonomy (specifically financial autonomy) and customer 
orientation were strongly visible in the well performing utilities and noticeably absent 
in the poorer performing utilities. The finding concerning the importance of financial 
autonomy supports earlier research.  
Having emphasized the importance of financial autonomy and its relationship with 
customer orientation, these findings should not be overstretched to conclude that well 
performing utilities operate on the basis of full cost recovery. All of the cases of well 
performing utilities studied in this research at one time or another depended on external 
financing to fund investments. In fact, apart from one utility, all of the well performing 
cases still have and need regular access to external financing. As such, although 
increased financial autonomy is important, this does not mean that national and 
international financial institutions have no role to play in assisting public water utilities.  
 
The Suitability of NPM Reforms: Principal-Agent Perspective 
Though it is not possible to refute or support the possible contribution of the New 
Public Management in improving service provision in general, this research suggests 
that the impact of the NPM is likely to be limited, in cases where the principal-agent 
relationship is such that the power of the bureaucracy (the agent) is small in comparison 
with that of the agent. Moreover, in many countries, an approach combining Weberian 
reform measures with NPM reforms may hold greater promise for improving service 
provision than simply focusing on the New Public Management reforms.  
If the argument that the NPM reforms are aimed at weakening the power of the 
agent is accepted, it would seem that strong bureaucratic power and relatively weak 
elected officials who have difficulty in steering and controlling the bureaucracy are an 
important presupposition for implementing NPM reforms. After all, these reforms are 
aimed at mitigating this situation. In this research, however, it was found that this 
presupposition does not necessarily hold for the provision of water services in low- and 
middle-income countries. The example of the State of Guanajuato in Mexico illustrated 
that the political institutions in these municipalities are such, that a primacy of the 
principal (elected official) over the agent (management of the utility) exists. Similar 
conclusions can be drawn for the cases of Hai Phong in Vietnam, Campinas in Brazil 
and SADM in Mexico. The question is then how beneficial New Public Management 
reforms, which result in weakening the position of the agent further, will be in these 
countries? Do the water supply and sanitation sectors operating in the context of such 
political institutions ‘lend themselves to NPM reforms’? This research suggests that 
they may not. 
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The Bureaucratic Model – New Public Management Dichotomy 
Linked to the principle-agent discussion is the issue of viewing the NPM as a “mirror 
image” of the bureaucratic model. Such sentiments are shared by a considerable 
number of proponents of the New Public Management, some of whom have even 
argued that the bureaucratic model is obsolete and has effectively been replaced by the 
New Public Management.  
The findings of this research provide something of a different perspective as they 
suggest that viewing the NPM and the bureaucratic model as competing models is not 
very useful when addressing the reform of public water utilities in low- and middle-
income countries. In this sense the research supports Kaufman’s findings (2003:284) 
who suggests that the ‘competition’ between the New Public Management and 
Weberian reforms is more relevant for ‘developed countries’ and less so for the 
countries of Latin America.  
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Samenvatting 
Ondanks druk van (internationale) ontwikkelingsorganizaties om de rol van de private 
sector in de levering van water en sanitatie te vergroten, worden verreweg de meeste 
mensen in ontwikkelingslanden voorzien van water door publieke drinkwater bedrijven. 
In vele gevallen zijn de geleverde diensten echter van een zeer slecht niveau. De 
gevolgen van de slechte dienstverlening zijn enorm, met name voor de allerarmsten in 
de samenleving. Tegelijkertijd hebben de tegenvallende ervaringen met dienstverlening 
door private drinkwaterbedrijven duidelijk gemaakt dat ook in de toekomst de levering 
van drinkwater en sanitatie grotendeels in publieke handen zal blijven in de meeste 
ontwikkleingslanden.   
De slechte dienstverlening door veel publieke bedrijven heeft ertoe geleid dat 
zowel internationale organizaties als sector experts de implementatie van ‘New Public 
Management’ hervormingen hebben aanbevolen. New Public Management (NPM), dat 
voortkomt uit de ‘Public Choice’ theorie en ‘Managerialism’, vindt zijn oorsprong 
begin jaren tachtig in Nieuw Zeeland en Engeland. Sindsdien wordt NPM veelvuldig 
gebruikt om een meer prestatie en klant-gericht management model aan te duiden voor 
de publieke sector. Hierbij ligt de nadruk op het toepassen van management praktijken 
en technieken die veelvuldig met de private sector worden geassocieerd.  
Hoewel NPM in ontwikkelingslanden niet onomstreden is en er weinig empirische 
onderbouwing bestaat voor de effectiviteit van hervormingen die tot de NPM gerekend 
worden, wordt door sommigen beargumenteerd dat NPM een bijgedrage heeft geleverd 
aan de verbetering van dienstverlening door publieke drinkwater bedrijven. Dit 
proefschrift beoogt de toepassing van NPM hervorming in de water sector te 
bestuderen. Dit wordt gedaan door NPM te contrasteren met een ‘traditioneel’ 
bureaucratisch management model. De centrale onderzoeksvragen die deze studie 
adreseert zijn alsvolgt: 
• Worden goed-functionerende publieke drinkwaterbedrijven in ontwikkelingslanden 
gekenmerkt door toepassing van NPM? 
• Worden slecht-functionerende publieke drinkwaterbedrijven in 
ontwikkelingslanden gekenmerkt door een bureaucratische management model? 
 
Inleidende hoofdstukken: Twee inleidende hoofdstukken (hoofdstuk twee en hoofdstuk 
3) orienteren de lezer tot de centrale themas van deze studie. Het doel van het eerste 
hoofdtsuk is om belangrijke aspekten van dienstverlening in de water sector uit te 
leggen en te verduidelijken. Onder meer wordt aandacht besteed aan de wijze waarop 
de water sector is georganiseerd, de factoren die deze organizatie bepalen en hoe het 
functioneren van bedrijven in de drinkwater sector gemeten kan worden. Het tweede 
hoofdstuk gaat dieper in op de twee management modellen (NPM en het bureaucratisch 
model) die in deze studie centraal staan.  
De discussie in de twee inleidende hoofdstukken leidt tot de formulering van een 
twaalftal proposities die in deze studie worden getoetst. Zes proposities betreffen de 
relatie tussen het goed functioneren van drinkwaterbedrijven en de NPM. Zes andere 
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proposities behandelen de relatie tussen slecht-functionerende drinkwater bedrijven en 
het bureaucratisch model. 
 
Onderzoeksmethodologie: Het onderzoek in deze studie is gebaseerd op ‘case study’ 
onderzoek bestaande uit twee clusters van case studies. De eerste cluster betreft een 
vijftal gemeentelijke drinkwater bdrijven in de staat Guanajuato in Mexico. Aangezien 
de centrale hypothesen de prestaties van drinkwater bedrijven koppelen aan een bepaald 
management model, zijn de gemeentelijke drinkwater bedrijven uit de staat Guanajuato 
geselecteerd op basis van hun verschillende prestaties. Het idee is dan dat de verschillen 
in prestaties uitgelegd kunnen worden door verschillende management modellen die 
deze bedrijven kenmerken.  
De tweede cluster betreft twee drinkwaterbedrijven uit Latijns Amerika, één uit 
Afrika en één uit Azie. Deze bedrijven zijn geselecteerd omdat ze allen beschouwd 
worden als voorbeelden van ‘goed-functionerende’ drinkwater bedrijven. Het 
onderzoeken van deze cases maakt het mogelijk om de bevindingen uit de 
gemeentelijke drinkwaterbedrijven in Guanajuato te controleren.  
 
Bevindingen van de gemeentelijke drinkwaterbedrijven in Guanajuato: 
Propositie 1, die stelt dat goed-functionerende publieke drinkwaterbedrijven een grote 
hoeveelheid autonomie hebben is niet gefalsifieerd door het onderzoek in Guanajuato. 
In het bijzonder lijkt de financiele autonomie van het drinkwaterbedrijf een belangrijke 
verklarende factor voor de prestaties van dat bedrijf. 
Propositie 2, die luidt dat goed-functionerende bedrijven in grotre mate 
veranwoording zijn verschuldigd voor hun functioneren is gefalsifieerd. Hoewel, de 
berdijven wellicht wel verantwoording verschuldigd zijn aan individuele klanten is 
relatief weinig verantwoording verschuldigd aan externe organizaties. 
Alle drinkwaterbedrijven, inclusief de goed-functionerende bedrijven, waren 
relatief weining markt-gericht. Alszodanig is ook propositie 3, die zegt dat goed-
functionerende bedrijven een sterke mate van markt-gerichtheid ten toon spreiden 
gefalsifieerd. 
Daartegenover is propositie 4, die de relatie tussen klant-greichtheid en prestaties 
betreft niet gefalsifieerd. De beter-functionerende bedrijven lieten allen een sterkere 
klantgerichtheid zien dan de slecht-functionerende bedrijven. De sterkere klant-
gerichtheid lijkt voort te komen uit de hogere tarieven die deze bedrijven aan hun 
klanten berekenen. Hoewel de klanten deze hogere tarieven wel willen betalen, eisen ze 
wel betere dienstverlening van de bedrijven. 
In alle gevallen werkten de werknemers van de bedrijven volgens bestaande en 
expliciete procedures. Het nemen van beslissingen ging veelal volgens deze procedures. 
Wanneer beslissingen dienden te worden genomen die niet beschreven stonden was 
goedkeuring van hogergeplaatste managers nodig. Hierdoor is propositie 5, die stelt dat 
goed-functionerende bedrijven beslissingsbevoegdheid in sterke mate hebben 
gedecentraliseerd gefalisfieerd. 
Hoewel de goed-functionerende bedrijven verder waren in het ontwikkelen van 
interne systemen om werknemers verantwoordelijk te houden voor hun functioneren, 
werden werknemers van deze bedrijven niet afgerekend op hun functioneren in relatie 
tot gespecificieerde doelstellingen. Alszodanig waren de beoordelingen nogal subjectief 
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van aard. Hierdoor is er weinig steun gevonden voor propositie 6, die luidt dat goed-
functionerende bedrijven hun werknemers afrekenen op hun functioneren. 
Propositie 7 luidt dat slecht functionerende berdijven a-politiek zijn. In Guanajuato 
bleken alle slecht-functionerende bedrijven zeer gepoliticiseerd te zijn en alszodanig is 
deze propositie gefalsificieerd. 
All slecht-functionerende bedrijven bleken te zijn gekenmerkt door een 
hierarchische opbouw en het hanteren van duidelijke regels voor het interne 
functioneren van werknemers. Dit betekent dat propositie 8, die stelt dat slecht-
functionerende bedrijven worden gekenmerkt door hierarchie en management middels 
regels, niet is gefalsificieerd. 
Er is weinig bewijs gevonden om propositie 9, die stelt dat slecht-functionerende 
drinkwaterbedrijven stabiele organizaties zijn. In tegendeel, alle slecht-functionerende 
bedrijven die in Guanajuato werden onderzocht bleken te worden gekenmerkt door vele 
veranderingen in de management van het bedrijf.  
Propositie 10, die luidt dat slecht-functionerende bedrijven gekenmerkt worden 
door strikte interne regels bleek een van de moeilijkste proposties om te toetsen. 
Enerzijds bleek dat met name op bestuurlijk niveau dat bestaande regels veelvuldig 
werden genegeerd. Anderzijds bleek dat op lagere niveaus in de organizaties, 
werknemers wel gebonden waren aan interne regels en procedures.  
De meeste werknemers bleken een vast salaris te ontvangen dat niet gelieerd was 
aan geleverde prestaties. Hoewel een aantal bedrijven wel een bonus systeem kende 
voor werknemers bleek vaak dat dit systeem niet leidde tot salaris op basis van 
geleverde prestaties. Vaak was de toekenning van de bonussen een automatisme, 
ongeacht het functioneren van de werknemer. Alszodanig is stelling 11 gefalsificieerd. 
De meeste werknemers bleken te kiezen voor een baan bij het drinkwater bedrijf 
omdat dit bedrijf hen zekerheid bood en tevens gunstige werktijden leverde. Er kon dus 
weinig steun gevonden worden voor de propositie dat werknemers kozen voor het 
werken voor het publieke berdijf uit morele overtuiging.  
 
Bevindingen van de vier goed-functionerende bedrijven:    
De bevindingen van de vier goed-functionerende bedrijven komen grotendeels overeen 
met de bevindingen van de vijf gemeentelijke drinkwater bedrijven in Guanajuato. Er 
zijn echter wel enkele kanttekeningen te plaatsen bij deze brede conclusie. In dit 
onderzoek is het concept autonomie opgebouwd uit een aantal verschillende dimensies. 
Het onderzoek heeft aangegeven dat enkele dimensies meer invloed hadden op het 
functioneren van het waterbedrijf dan andere. Het meest belangrijk lijken finaciele 
autonomie en stabilitiet van het bedrijf (hetgeen gezien kian worden als politieke steun 
voor de management van het bedrijf) te zijn. Tevens waren alle goed-functionerende 
bedrijven in staat om voldoende kundige werknemers aan te trekken. Dit betekent dat 
deze bedrijven over een ruime capaciteit in termen van financiele middelen en 
arbeidskracht kunnen beschikken.  Dimensies van autonomie die miner belangrijk 
waren betreffen onder meer de beschikbaarheid van water voor de productie van 
drinkwater en de rol die gespeeld wordt door regulerende instanties. 
Goed-functionerende bedrijven zijn allen verantwoording schuldig aan de 
eigenaren die over het algemeen aanzienlijke invloed houden in het functioneren van 
het bedrijf. Echter de verschuldigde verantwoording is niet gebaseerd op objectieve 
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prestatie indicatoren. Verantwoording aan regulerende instanties lijkt zeer beperkt (zo 
zijn nimmer sancties jegens de bedrijven geimplementeerd). Tevens zijn de goed-
functionerende bedrijven weinig verantwoording schuldig aan klantenorganizaties en 
andere belangengroepen. Daarentegen is wel weer verantwoording schuldig aan 
finaciele instellingen die leningen hebben verschaft aan deze bedrijven. Vaak zijn 
tevens prestatie indicatoren gekoppeld aan die leningen.  
In alle organizaties is besluitvorming relatief gecentraliseerd. Alle beslissingen die 
financiele consequenties hebben (zoals vacatures, uitbesteden van taken, contracten 
aangaan) blijken de goedkeuring te moeten hebben van de directeur. Bij taken waar wel 
enige beslissingsbevoegdheid is gedecentaliseerd (met name klantenbeheer) zijn de 
werknemers verplicht strikt de bestaande regels te volgens. 
Evenals in het geval van de vijf gemeentelijke drinkwaterbedrijven in Guanajauto 
is het moeilijk om duidelijke conclusies te trekken omtrent de verantwoording die 
werknemers moeten afleggen voor hun functioneren. Bij de goed-functionerende 
bedrijven levert dit een zeer gevarieerd beeld op. In sommige bedrijven is 
verantwoording minimaal, in andere juist zeer sterk.  
 
Conclusies: 
De onderzochte cases hebben geen coherent beeld opgeleverd omtrent de toepassing 
van NPM. Het blijkt echter wel dat goed-functionerende bedrijven wel elementen van 
de NPM toepassen (met name autonomie en klangerichtheid). Hierbij moet echter de 
kanttekening worden geplaatst dat autonomie en klantgerichtheid niet exclusief tot het 
domein van de NPM behoren. 
Afgezien van deze conclusie, blijkt ook dat slecht-functionerende bedrijven over 
het algemeen weinig ‘bureaucratisch’ functioneren. In tegendeel, het bleek dat de goed-
functionerende bedrijven meer volgens het bureaucratische model opereerden dan de 
slecht-functionerende bedrijven.  
 
Finaciele autonomie en klantgerichtheid 
In alle goed-functionerende bedrijven bleek het bedrijf over een ruime mate van 
autonomie te beschikken en zeer klantgericht te zijn. Tevens bleken deze elementen 
afwezig in de slecht-functionerende bedrijven. De bevinding omtrent het belang van 
financiele autonomie steunt de bevindingen uit eerder onderzoek dat tot soortgelijke 
conclusies kwam. 
Hoewel uit dit onderzoek het belang van financiele autonomie duidelijk naar voren 
komt, moet uit deze bevinding niet worden geconcludeerd dat goed-functionerende 
drinkwaterbedrijven op basis van volledige ‘cost-recovery’ (waarbij zowel operationale 
als investeringskosten gedekt zijn) moeten opereren. Alle goed-functionerende cases 
hebben op een gegeven moment een beroep moeten doen op externe financiering om 
investeringen te financieren. Het blijkt zelfs dat afgezien van één bedrijf alle goed-
functionerende bedrijven nog regelmatig een beroep moeten doen op externe 
financiering.  
 
New Public Management: Een ‘principal-agent’ perspectief  
Hoewel het moeilijk is om algemene cocnlusies te trekken inzake de impact van NPM 
of op het functioneren van waterbedrijven blijkt uit dit onderzoek dat de mogelijke 
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impact waarschijnlijk beperkt zal zijn in omstandigheden waar de macht van het bedrijf 
klein is in vergelijking met de macht van de eigenaar. Deze constatering kan worden 
teruggeleid naar het feit dat de NPM voortkomt uit de ‘Public Choice’ theorie. Deze 
theorie heeft als leidraad dat ‘de bureaucratie’ teveel macht heeft verworven en dat het 
noodzakelijk is om de macht van politici ten aanzien van de bureaucratie te vergoten. 
Om deze reden worden de hervormingen die tot de NPM gerekend worden ook 
gekenmerkt door het feit dat ze de macht van de bureaucratie verzwakken ten opzichte 
van de eigenaren (vaak de politici). NPM zou dan met name impact kunnen hebben 
wanneer een situatie zich voordoet waarbij een drinkwaterbedrijf een sterke positie 
heeft vis-à-vis de eigenaar. Uit dit onderzoek bleek echter dat in de onderzochte cases 
deze situatie niet aanwezig was. De vraag is dan in hoerverre de NPM kan bijgdragen 
aan het verbeteren van het functioneren van het drinkwaterbedrijf? Dit onderzoek  
suggereert dat die bijdrage beperkt zou zijn. 
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